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appropriate. Without her sympathy for my research endeavour, this study would have never 
been completed. 
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1 
Introduction 
"All over the world people struggle with problems and seek solutions. Often those who 
struggle are unaware that others face similar problems, and in some instances, are solving 
them. It is destructive and wasteful that people should be frustrated and often defeated by 
difficulties for which somebody else has found a remedy" 
- Glaser and Marks (1966:6). 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, a growing interest exists in the concept of knowledge related to the 
competitive and corporate advantages that it may provide (Baden-Fuller and Pitt, 1996; 
Prahalad and Conner, 1996). In line with and stimulated by the growing influence of resource-
based theorists in the strategic management field who stress the role that organizational 
capabilities, resources, and other firm-specific assets may play in a firm's strive for a 
competitive and corporate edge (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991), knowledge is increasingly 
considered to be one of the strategic assets a firm can control (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; 
Itami, 1987; Winter, 1987; Drucker, 1993)) This growing interest is based on the particular 
traits of knowledge (e.g., not inherently scarce, not easily appropriated, and increasing returns 
to use) enabling firms to jump into opportunities and ward off the threats in the business 
environment. Distinctive learning skills based on a firm's knowledge creation and utilization 
capabilities are conceived as underlying the firm's ability to act in a differentiated way and to 
sustain and further extent above-average performance levels (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 
1996a)j| 
The "knowledge stock" of an organization, following the metaphor of Dierickx and Cool 
(1989), is a dynamic reservoir of skills, know-how, and experience that is replenished through 
a diverse set of knowledge processes. Flows of knowledge enter and leave the organization to 
update, rejuvenate, advance, and commercialize the firm's stock of intellectual property. The 
individual employee is often the main "point of entrance" for knowledge flows into an 
organization and these flows appear in many alternative ways (Grandstrand and Sjolander, 
1990; Huber, 1991; Pisano, 1994).j(As depicted in Table 1.1, four knowledge procurement 
processes can be discerned from the position of an individual in a multi-affiliate corporation. 
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Such a distinction can be presented along two dimensions, being the method and the scope of 
the knowledge procurement process. 
With respect to the first dimension, the method of procurement, a distinction is made 
between knowledge creation and knowledge acquisition processes. Creation is the intentional 
or unintentional learning which takes place through direct experience. It is what Huber (1991) 
calls experiential learning and comprises such activities as organizational experiments, 
organizational self-appraisal, and "on-the-job" learning. Apart from generating the know-how 
through direct experience, a manager's demand for a particular knowledge item can also be 
fulfilled by pulling in expertise from outside the corporation. This collection process of 
"second-hand" knowledge is denoted by the term acquisition here and is comparable with 
Cohen and Levinthal's (1990) concept of knowledge absorption and Huber's (1991) vicarious 
learning. The term "second-hand" points to the fact that the knowledge item acquired was 
already known by at least one other party, namely the knowledge donor. Knowledge 
acquisition processes can consist of activities like innovation diffusion, corporate and 
competitive intelligence, technology licensing, and best practice transfer. 
The second dimension, the scope of the processes, makes a distinction between intra and 
intercorporate knowledge procurement processes within a multi-business firm. Intracorporate 
knowledge procurement processes take place within the boundaries of one corporation. The 
term corporation in this respect is defined as a collection of businesses or activities under 
common ownership. Multi-business corporations like most multinational enterprises and 
diversified conglomerates govern numerous companies that each have their own knowledge 
procurement strategy and reservoirs of valuable skills, ideas, and information. Knowledge 
activities shared by these subsidiaries, affiliates, business units or companies are classified as 
intracorporate. Intercorporate knowledge procurement processes are knowledge-related 
activities which go beyond the boundaries of one corporation and can be effectuated via quasi-
organizational settings such as joint ventures and alliances or via contractual arrangements in 
the market. 
So, along these basic dimensions, four generic ways can be discerned to satisfy the demands 
for knowledge by organizational members throughout the hierarchy (see Table 1.1), namely 
intracorporate experiential learning, intercorporate experiential learning, intracorporate 
knowledge sharing, and intercorporate knowledge sharing. Although all four knowledge 
^""•""•••^iScope of Procurement 
MethodoJ^^^.Process 
Procurement ~-~^_ 
CREATION 
ACQUISITION 
INTRACORPORATE 
INTRACORPORATE 
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 
INTRACORPORATE 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
INTERCORPORATE 
INTERCORPORATE 
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 
INTERCORPORATE 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING I 
Table 1.1: Four Knowledge Procurement Processes for a Multi-Business Firm. 
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procurement processes deserve serious scientific attention, intracorporate knowledge sharing 
has been selected as the principal research topic in this research project. Intracorporate 
knowledge sharing as an object of study is valuable because it is often still a neglected 
"parenting advantage" in many multi-business enterprises.!Leveraging the firm's "stock of 
intellectual property" can add to the viability of the corporate whole by reinforcing the 
competitive strategies of its various subsidiaries (e.g., Peters, 1994; Goold, Campbell, and 
Alexander, 1995; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1995). Intracorporate knowledge sharing can generate 
savings in knowledge development expenses, contribute to the achievement of "best practice" 
levels, and accelerate the innovation processes of the affiliates involved.)) 
In contrast with these practical benefits, recent academic work in the management and 
organizational fields tends to focus on experiential learning (e.g., Argyris, 1977; Levitt and 
March, 1988; Levinthal and March, 1993). Moreover, many accounts of learning 
organizations, as stated by Wishart, Elam, and Robey (1996: 16), "seem to emphasize 
exploration over exploitation" while we should aim for a more balanced body of knowledge 
into this issue. Although we need to acknowledge the importance of devoting energy to the 
exploration of new knowledge to ensure the firm's future competitiveness, it needs to be 
stressed that firms compete today. Earning returns on existing knowledge resources strongly 
adds to the firm's current viability and its competitive success in today's product markets. 
Management must learn to balance between the exploratory gathering of new knowledge and 
the exploitation of what is already known (March, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992). From a 
corporate management point of view, intracorporate knowledge sharing contributes to the 
exploitation objectives of the firm at large by reinforcing the knowledge exploration strategy 
of its affiliates. 
I Intracorporate knowledge sharing is defined as the initiation and effectuation of a 
knowledge1 flow between two or more subsidiaries of one single enterprise. The knowledge 
flow, following Gupta and Govindarajan (1991: 773), could comprise expertise (e.g., skills, 
capabilities), market knowledge or a combination of these two. Expertise is related to input 
processes (e.g., purchasing skills), throughput processes (e.g., product design, process designs, 
packaging designs), or output processes (e.g., marketing know-how, distribution expertise). 
Market knowledge includes information on country or region-specific circumstances such as 
competitive developments and supplier proliferation which could, if leveraged appropriately to 
other subsidiaries, reinforce their competitive strategy|JExcluded in this study are the transfers 
of either internal administrative information (e.g., financial data or management accounting 
information) and general management information. The transfer of these information items are 
primarily effectuated with the aim to influence the front-line managers of the affiliates on 
' The words information and knowledge will be used interchangeably in this study. I have, however, tried to use 
information, in line with Huber (1991), when referring to data that give meaning by reducing ambiguity, 
equivocality, or uncertainty, or when referring to data which indicate that conditions are not as presupposed. I 
have tried to use knowledge when referring to more complex products of learning, such as interpretations of 
information, beliefs about cause-effect relationships, or, more generally, "know-how." 
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issues of strategic direction, resource allocation, financial planning and control, and not to 
increase the exploitation of the firm's knowledge exploration activities. 
The decision was made to focus the research activities on the managerial role of the firm's 
top management. Numerous articles have been written on the managerial complexities of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process and on alternative "managerial responses" (e.g., 
Peters, 1994; Goold, Campbell, and Alexander, 1994; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1995a). Only 
rarely, however, the tasks and responsibilities of corporate management have been 
systematically investigated and documented with the aim of encompassing many of the 
variables involved. As a consequence, a research project which is aimed to capture and 
structure the managerial complexity in managing intracorporate knowledge sharing seemed 
interesting from both a practical and scientific point of view. 
I A key assumption underlying this study is that the complexity of many multinational 
enterprises inhibits an active role for corporate management in the initiation and effectuation 
of knowledge flows at lower levels of the hierarchy. More and more, corporations, assisted by 
the developments of information technology and telecommunications, are able to disperse their 
activities and organizational tasks over the various subsidiaries. In this way, a knowledge 
network of strongly interrelated companies is established that facilitates learning and the 
building of an organizational capability to share knowledge on a lateral level between the 
different units. Which linkages will be useful at some particular point in time for a specific 
task between two or more subunits is unpredictable, and probably needs to be self-adjusting 
(Doz and Prahalad, 1991). Consequently, the main task of corporate management in the 
process of intracorporate knowledge sharing is an indirect one: it comprises the stimulation 
and facilitation of this process by taking away, reducing, and helping employees throughout 
the organization to overcome various obstructing or complicating barriers. II 
Management Tools 
Reducing and Eliminating the Barriers to Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing 
Knowledge Flow 
TRANSFER 
FAILURE 
Barriers 
Obstructing 
and 
Complicating 
the 
Intracorporate 
Knowledge 
Sharing 
Process 
' ' ' ' ' 7 7 7 
TRANSFER 
SUCCESS 
Figure 1.1: Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing. 
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Corporate management can effectuate its task by creating a structural context (Bower, 1970; 
Burgelman, 1983; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994) as a subtle control mechanism within which 
opportunities for linkages between subunits will arise at various levels in the organization at 
various points in time. (Although a context is strongly shaped in the day-to-day interactions 
between the organization's managers based on the corporation's administrative heritage2, top 
management of most companies has available a broad repertoire of management tools which 
can be effectively used in shaping the behavior of managers many levels lower in the 
organizational hierarchy (Prahalad and Doz, 1987).|JThis set of corporate management tools 
merits academic attention and was therefore of particular interest in the development of this 
research project. 
1.2 RESEARCH PROJECT RATIONALES 
The research project "Managing Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing - Building Unity on 
Diversity in a Changing European Context" was initiated by the Faculty of Business 
Administration of the Erasmus University Rotterdam in September 1993 and has been 
effectuated within the context of the Department Strategic Management and Business 
Environment. Like most other research projects, this study started out with a problem of 
definition. A specification of this problem of definition will be given in this section by making 
a distinction between the research aim, the research questions, and the research method 
respectively. 
1.2.1 Research Aim 
The project "Managing Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing" focuses on the role of corporate 
management regarding the intracorporate knowledge sharing process in multinational 
enterprises. Notwithstanding the thought-provoking empirical evidence and hypotheses present 
in the scattered literature on knowledge-related issues (Hedlund, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Grant, 1996), a generic framework or an integrated set of constructs on the tasks of 
corporate management in stimulating and facilitating the transfer and exchange of knowledge 
is still lacking. In an attempt to contribute to this almost uncharted territory and to accomplish 
some progress in this area, this study tries to capture much of the complexity involved in the 
actual process of managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. It encompasses many of the 
relevant variables and integrates them into a generic framework, while at the same time some 
2 A corporation's administrative heritage is often strongly related to a firm's geographical and cultural 
background. The distinctiveness in background has created and institutionalized distinct structural 
organizational configurations, administrative processes and management mentalities which are hard to change 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989: 49). 
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preliminary propositions on the management systems that stimulate and facilitate 
intracorporate knowledge sharing are included.|As argued by Porter (1990: 98), "Frameworks 
identify the relevant variables and the questions which the user must answer in order to 
develop conclusions tailored to a particular industry and companyfJ[...] As long as the building 
of frameworks is based on in-depth empirical research, it has the potential to not only inform 
practice but to push the development of more rigorous theory." 
The presented framework proposes a set of constructs3 which are related to each other by 
preliminary propositions, bounded by the author's assumptions.JThe set of constructs and 
propositions depicted in the integrated framework enables both scientists and managers to 
structure their observations, invigorate their research findings, challenge their thinking, and 
communicate their experiences with regard to managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
Moreover, the integrated framework provides the means to effectuate a normative assessment 
regarding the stimulating and facilitating properties of a firm's corporate context. The manager 
concerned with managing the transfer of internally available knowledge items can achieve a 
more proper understanding of the issues involved in intracorporate knowledge sharing in a 
multinational enterprise." 
Intracorporate knowledge sharing is difficult both to research and to manage, particularly 
because the circumstances surrounding the interaction between the donor, the entity who 
possesses the knowledge, and the recipient, the entity who receives the knowledge, differ from 
situation to situation, even within the boundaries of a single organization. Although it is 
acknowledged that the search for a universalistic theory may be inappropriate given the 
fundamental differences that exist across knowledge items (Downs and Mohr, 1976; Kimberly, 
1981) and environments, the general notion upon which the research project has been built is 
that the circumstances surrounding a knowledge sharing effort are not totally idiosyncratic. 
[The common issues related to intracorporate knowledge sharing among the geographically 
scattered companies of a multinational enterprise are deduced from previous research and are 
utilized as the groundwork on which some generic conclusions and an integrative framework 
are constructed. 
Integrated in the research aim is the objective to study the implications of recent 
developments in the field of information technology and telecommunications (IT&T) on the 
process of intracorporate knowledge sharing. It has become apparent from the efforts of many 
organization and management researchers (Huber, 1990) that the nature and effectiveness of 
many organizational processes change when advanced information technologies are employed. 
Consequently, the assumption can be made that the process of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing will strongly be affected by new technologies such as electronic mail, video 
conferencing, desk-top computing, and electronic bulletin boards. Therefore, the implications 
of these advances in the information technology and telecommunications area fit within the 
domain of this research project. 
' Constructs, as stated by Bacharach (1989: 500), "may be defined as terms which, though not observational 
either directly or indirectly, may be applied or even defined on the basis of the observables." 
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The process of intracorporate knowledge sharing is studied in multinational enterprises 
operating in Europe4. A multinational enterprise owns, controls, and manages income-
generating assets in more than one country and the inherent complexity of such a structure 
offers a "rich" context for empirical research on this issue. The differences between the 
countries constitute the main characteristic of international - as distinct from domestic -
operations (Johanson and Vahle, 1977). The added dimension of different cultural, 
institutional, and competitive situations extends the difficulties of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. The complexity of managing intracorporate knowledge sharing in the multinational 
enterprise, if accepted, calls for the implementation of additional management tools to enable 
the firm as a whole to leverage its knowledge resources over the international network of 
operating companies. 
The rationale for limiting the research to the European operations of multinational 
enterprises is twofold. First, firms in Europe have a long history in managing international 
operations. The relative small size of many countries in Europe and the European integration 
process have resulted in the need for many companies to transcend fragmented, national 
markets to achieve a critical mass5. Firms have been trying to acquire and develop managerial 
capabilities to deal with the diversity and to exploit the knowledge resources scattered over 
geographically dispersed and culturally differentiated subsidiaries. The empirical observations 
with respect to these capabilities not only are highly relevant in a European context, but can 
also be applied in the analysis of firms operating in other regions in which the integration 
process of economic markets has just started (e.g., NAFTA, MERCOSUR, GATT). Second, 
the European surroundings are chosen as research context because much research on the 
multinational enterprise has an Anglo-Saxon background. The availability of European cases 
and other research material is still rather limited. By focusing on the European operations of 
firms, we serve the need for more European research material. 
1.2.2 Research Questions 
The research project "Managing Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing" has been strongly 
i induced by a principal research question which, in line with the aim of this study, is: How to 
manage intracorporate knowledge sharing between the internationally dispersed companies of 
a multinational enterprise? For the purpose of systematic study, this question has been 
In this research project, multinational enterprises in Europe embrace firms with operations in the member 
states of the European Union for more than 10 years. Included in this definition are corporations meeting the 
preceding specifications while having their home-base in a non-European country. 
Particularly firms from smaller countries like the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden lack the critical mass in 
their home country and hence have been forced to internationalize their business to be able to exploit scale 
economies and to built competitive cost structures. 
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decomposed into six subquestions. These subquestions are enlisted below, grouped under three 
separate headings. 
I The Need for Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing in Corporate Strategy 
(a) Which knowledge items are interesting from an intracorporate knowledge sharing point 
of view and where do these knowledge items reside? 
(b) How and to what extent can intracorporate knowledge sharing contribute to a firm's 
competitive and corporate performance? 
II The "Negative" Effects on the Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing Process 
(a) Which barriers obstruct and inhibit the initiation of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
efforts within an organization ? 
(b) Which barriers complicate and hinder the effectuation of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing initiatives within an organization? 
III The "Positive" Effects on the Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing Process 
(a) What kind of management systems could stimulate the initiation of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing efforts within an organization? 
(b) What kind of management systems could facilitate the effectuation of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing within an organization? 
I 
Regarding the subquestions, two remarks need to made. First, a clear distinction has been 
made between negative and positive factors (the "barriers" versus the "management systems") 
influencing the intracorporate knowledge sharing process. Both the negative and positive 
effects on intracorporate knowledge sharing have been widely investigated before and 
numerous lists of determinants can be found in the available literature. Hence the conceptual 
and practical challenge is not to detect any new factors affecting or fostering the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process, but to make managerial sense of the number and range of possible 
determinants. This calls for an organizing framework that incorporates a synthesis of what we 
already know and a definition of what else we need to explore to come up with a managerial 
contribution. Instead of discussing all the factors involved in an uncohcsive manner, the 
theoretical reasoning towards the key propositions on managing intracorporate knowledge 
sharing starts off with a structured review and categorization of the deterrents involved. 
Detecting where and how the various barriers affect the leverage of internal knowledge items 
enables the formulation of conclusions regarding the critical managerial responsibilities and 
the required management systems for stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge 
sharing between a firm's dispersed subsidiaries. 
INTRODUCTION m 9 
DECIDING 
To Share Knowledge 
DOING 
Knowledge Sharing 
Figure 1.2: The Two Activities of a Practical Task. 
Second, within the research questions listed under the latter two headings a clear and 
important distinction has been made between the decision to initiate and the effort to effectuate 
an intracorporate knowledge sharing project (see Figure 1.2). Any practical activity involves 
both "deciding" and "doing" or, in other words, both formulation and implementation. As a 
consequence, a theory of management should be concerned with the process of decision as 
well as with the process of action. As Simon (1976: 1) argues: "the task of'deciding' pervades 
the entire administrative organization quite as much as does the task of 'doing' - indeed, it is 
integrally tied up with the latter. A general theory of administration must include principles of 
organization that will ensure correct decision-making, just as it must include principles that 
will insure effective action." 
1.2.3 Research Method 
Although having the ambition to contribute to the development of a universally applicable all 
encompassing theory of managing intracorporate knowledge sharing, this aspiration was 
baffled by the complexity of the phenomenon and the lack of a clear research history. The 
availability of the observations, findings, and conclusions offered by hundreds of thoughtful 
workers in related fields such as technology transfer, innovation diffusion, and information 
processing, however, provides the research project with a very useful groundwork on which an 
integrated framework on managing intracorporate knowledge sharing has been built. "Products 
of the theorizing process seldom emerge as full-blown theories," Weick (1995: 385) argues. 
"[...M]ost of what passes for theory in organizational studies consists of approximations." In 
building these approximations, however, methodological rigor has to be secured; in this 
respect, the construction and perfection of the managerial framework has been driven by a 
classical research approach including a substantial amount of both conceptual and empirical 
research. 
The empirical research was preceded by a conceptual phase in which an attempt was made 
to formulate some preliminary propositions. Notwithstanding the lack of a generic framework 
or an integrated set of constructs on the tasks of corporate management in stimulating and 
facilitating the transfer and exchange of knowledge, earlier research in such research fields as 
technology transfer, innovation diffusion, intellectual property, strategic management, 
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multinational management, and organizational learning provided this study with the requisite 
groundwork for identifying key constructs and variables in managing intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. So, instead of a research approach aimed at the generation of grounded 
theory, the integrated framework and the related propositions have been deducted from an 
extensive review of the literature complemented by some early checks and pilot studies in 
practical settings. Subsequently, the key constructs and the proposed interrelationships 
between these constructs are illustrated and refined by in-depth empirical research. 
Considering the empirical research part of this project, the comparative case study strategy 
has been applied. A case study is a history of a past or current phenomenon, drawn from 
multiple sources of evidence (Leonard-Barton, 1990: 249) and focuses on understanding the 
dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989). The case study strategy has been 
used because the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin, 
1989). If the process of how multinational enterprises manage intracorporate knowledge 
sharing among their internationally dispersed companies is to be understood fully, one could 
not rely on a survey or an examination of archival records because the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident yet. The existing knowledge base on 
managing intracorporate knowledge sharing enables us to identify key constructs and variables 
but still faces a lack of structure. As a consequence, conducting what in the final analysis 
would be a history or a case study seems to be more appropriate. The methodology applied in 
this research project draws strongly on the work of other researchers in the management field 
who have demonstrated the comparative case study approach by their own field research 
(Bower, 1970; Pettigrew, 1979; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). 
In specifying the population and hence the number of case study objects, the decision was 
made to effectuate one in-depth study of a large enterprise and a more limited inquiry within 
two other firms for replication purposes. The three case study corporations (i.e., Unilever, 
Canon Europe N.V., ITT World Directories, Inc.) have been chosen based on contextual 
differences. The diversity among the corporations involved brought into focus differentiated 
perspectives on the issue of managing intracorporate knowledge sharing and, as expected, 
variety in the implemented management tools6. 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This research project is an effort to acquaint the interested reader with the managerial issues 
surrounding intracorporate knowledge sharing within the setting of a multinational enterprise. 
/ It aims to present an integrative framework encompassing the factors negatively and positively 
influencing the intracorporate knowledge sharing process and allowing the observation, 
analysis, understanding, and normative assessment of the managerial tasks and responsibilities 
" In chapter 6 a more detailed explanation is given of the rationales underlying the number and selection of the 
case study objects, the sources of evidence, and the order of the research activities. 
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regarding such an organizational process. Embedded in the strategic management and 
international business field, the managerial framework integrates our key contributions: 
• a conceptualization of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process; 
• a managerial classification of the barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing; and 
• an integrated set of propositions on the management systems stimulating and 
facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing. ., 
A serious concern of the author was how to arrange the content in a way that would prove 
most useful to both practitioners and academics. Apart from this introductory chapter, nine 
chapters will follow in which the theoretical and empirical research on the role of corporate 
management in the process of intracorporate knowledge sharing is presented. For the 
theoretical part of this dissertation a caution is in order because the separation of topics in 
some of these chapters belie the fact that the matter of intracorporate knowledge sharing is not 
a neatly arranged, step-by-step process, but, rather, a mix of various factors at various stages, 
tailored to the situation at hand. 
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In chapter 2, after defining one of the key concepts of this research project (i.e., 
knowledge), the importance of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process for the survival 
and competitiveness of the multinational enterprise is reviewed. In search of new sources of 
competitive and corporate advantage, knowledge has increasingly been considered as one of 
the most important strategic assets a firm controls (Hedlund, 1994; Nonaka, 1994; Grant, 
1996). In chapter 2 we argue how, when, and to what extent intracorporate knowledge sharing 
can create the groundwork on which a firm's subsidiaries can build their competitive advantage 
in each of their product markets. Moreover, the existing literature is reviewed on how people 
act and are to be managed to enlarge the actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing in a 
multinational enterprise. The main conclusions of this chapter are summarized and depicted in 
a strategic "fit" model linking the required and actual level of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. 
Chapter 3 presents a conception of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process which is 
grounded in a communication approach. The process analysis contributes to our objective to 
bring some kind of managerial order in the theoretical and empirical research on this issue. 
Subsequently, chapter 4 and 5 elaborate on the numerous barriers affecting the initiation and 
effectuation of knowledge transfer efforts and the management systems which could and 
should be implemented by corporate management in their responsibility to create a "fit" 
between the required and actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing. In chapter 4 we 
focus on the decision to initiate an intracorporate knowledge sharing project. Based on an 
enumeration, categorization, and evaluation of the barriers obstructing the initiation, two 
propositions are explicated regarding the management systems stimulating employees 
throughout the multinational enterprise to participate in the transfer and exchange of 
knowledge. In chapter 5, the factors affecting the effectuation of a knowledge transfer are 
exhibited and discussed and the prerequisite management systems to reduce or eliminate them 
are proposed. 
From chapter 6 to chapter 9 the approach and the findings of the empirical research are 
described. (An important element of scientific research is the use of a careful chosen 
methodology to arrive at scientific accountable answers to the research questions of the 
research project (Yin, 1989). This means that the sources of evidence and the techniques which 
are used to collect the evidence need to be explicated as is done in chapter 6.11 In chapter 7, 8 
and 9 respectively, three case studies on managing intracorporate knowledge sharing are 
documented: Unilever, Canon Europe N.V., and ITT World Directories, Inc. Each case differs 
from the other cases in several aspects of its organization (e.g., the parent's regional home-
base, size, industry) and in the prevailing perspective and management tools with respect to 
managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. The most in-depth investigation was executed 
within the Unilever Corporation: here, a detailed analysis has been conducted of five 
implemented management tools and comparisons were drawn between divisions (Foods versus 
Personal Products), product categories (e.g. ice cream, frozen products, margarine), and 
functions (IT, Marketing and Sales). The case on the Canon Europe organization shows the 
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challenges for a company when confronted with a transition from a focus on leveraging 
technological excellence to an emphasis on the cross-fertilization between its firm-specific 
expertise and market-specific information. The ITT World Directories, Inc. case describes the 
problems of being confronted with a changing business environment and the subsequent 
complexities of the necessary transformation process to upgrade the firm's abilities in 
managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
In the final chapter, the main conclusions are enlisted based on a confrontation between the 
desk research and the empirical research as presented in Figure 1.3. Some critical notes to put 
the research project in its appropriate context and suggestions for further research are 
presented in this document's final pages. 

2 
The Need for Intracorporate 
Knowledge Sharing in 
Corporate Strategy 
Toward a Strategic "Fit" Model 
"Leveraging an organization's institutional knowledge in today's business environment is 
not simply a business advantage; it is a business imperative. Those companies that develop 
best practices for managing knowledge capital will be the ones that ride this competitive 
wave." 
-R.J. Hiebeler(1996:22). 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Multinational enterprises, the objects of study in this research project, are very visible and 
important features of the world economy as they generate a significant part of global 
production and employ a large fraction of the world's workforce. Their economic logic has 
been studied, both empirically and theoretically, by many academics and in the previous three 
decades we have seen great advances in this respect. In the field of International Business (e.g., 
Hymer, 1960, 1967; Kindleberger, 1970, Dunning, 1980), for example, reasonable accounts 
were introduced extending and complementing the traditional macro-economic arguments for 
the activities of multinational enterprises. In general, the research activities focused on such 
questions as: Why do multinational enterprises decide to internalize certain activities which 
could also be left over to the market? What is the reason that firms conduct some but not all 
operations abroad? and What is the enabling factor to compete in local markets with both 
indigenous and other multinational firms? 
Particularly the last question is of interest in exploring the practical relevance of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process to the survival and competitiveness of the 
multinational enterprise because this question is not directly concerned with the managerial 
choices regarding diversification and internationalization, but with the ability of the firm to 
survive in a foreign market environment once these managerial choices have been made. 
Corporations can be very strongly motivated to seek an internationalization strategy and 
15 
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perceive many locational advantages of investing in foreign markets. If the subsidiaries of a 
multinational enterprise, however, lack distinctive advantages relative to their local 
competitors or do not control sufficient ways to sustain their competitive edge, this strategy 
will not succeed and will lead, at least in the longer term, to an unprofitable operation 
(Dunning, 1988). An internationalization strategy cannot succeed unless the corporate 
"umbrella" adds value to the multinational enterprise's subsidiaries by providing benefits that 
can offset the inherent costs of not-being an independent local firm and score off the potential 
corporate advantages provided by other corporations. Intracorporate knowledge sharing, as 
argued in this chapter, can lead to a multitude of such business benefits, including faster 
product and process innovation, reduced duplication of development efforts, and pro-active 
competitive moves (Hiebeler, 1996). 
Hymer (1960, 1967) calls the multinational's distinctive benefits owned over and above 
those possessed by indigenous competitors monopolistic advantages and presents the 
corporation's property rights, skills, and expertise as important examples. Hymer and 
numerous subsequent authors argue (e.g., Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1980; 
Rugman, 1981) that knowledge advantages such as access to product and process innovations, 
production skills, and marketing experience have enabled many affiliates of multinationals to 
compete in markets abroad. Internalizing markets for the transfer of these knowledge 
advantages reinforce the competitive strategy of the corporation's business units.] Moreover, 
those companies that are able to develop best practice for spreading and leveraging available 
knowledge over their network of affiliates can outperform other corporations in managing 
"knowledge capital." These firms will be the ones that have more chance to dictate their 
collection of competitive markets and create not only distinctive, but also sustainable 
competitive advantages in their product-markets throughout the world (Galbraith and Kay, 
1986; Kogut and Zander, 1992)jf 
Although there is still little theoretical and empirical convergence on the antecedents of 
corporate success to date, existing perspectives in the fields of international business and 
strategic management are reviewed in this chapter to deduce some ideas on the importance of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing for the survival and competitiveness of the multinational 
enterprise. We will argue why, how, when, and to what extent intracorporate knowledge 
sharing can be an important foundation on which a firm's subsidiaries can build their 
competitive advantage in each of their product markets. Moreover, anchored to the 
achievement and sustainability of competitive and corporate advantage, a strategic "fit" model 
is developed linking the required and actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing. The 
strategic "fit" model embeds the managerial framework, as presented in the following chapters, 
in the strategic management and international business literature. 
Before we elaborate on the competitive and corporate relevance of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process, however, the central concept of this research project, knowledge, 
requires some further clarification. Without knowing the particular traits and "faces" of 
knowledge in an organization, a clear discussion on intracorporate knowledge sharing will not 
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be possiblef/Therefore, section 2.2 will address a managerial inquiry of the meaning of 
knowledge to the organizational field. Subsequently, section 2.3 presents the contingencies 
determining the intracorporate knowledge sharing requirements, while section 2.4 focuses on 
how people act and are to be managed to enlarge the actual level of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. 
2.2 A MANAGERIAL INQUIRY INTO THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE 
J Many have argued that the most prosperous economies in the world are gradually turning into 
information or knowledge societies (Naisbitt and Aburdene, 1986; Toffler, 1990). A society is 
emerging in which, as argued by Drucker (1993: 94), "the real and controlling resource and 
absolutely decisive factor of production is neither capital nor land nor labor. It is knowledge." 
The knowledge concept itself, however, is often defined in loose terms and still surrounded 
with a lot of ambiguity. Knowledge, as argued by Wikstrom and Normann (1994: 9), is "not 
the homogeneous or clearly defined concept which the current debate on its role in the post-
industrial information society might seem to imply." Hence it seems reasonable to commence 
this study on managing intracorporate knowledge sharing with a brief elaboration on the 
concept of knowledge and its various "faces" in an organizational context. This enables us to 
discern distinct knowledge items that are relevant to the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process. I) 
2.2.1 The Origins and Definitions of Knowledge 
People concerned with the development of a theory of knowledge are called cpistemologists 
and the branch of philosophy that is concerned with knowledge-related issues is epistemology 
(In Greek the word "episteme" means knowledge, while "logos" stands for theory). For the 
beginning of the epistemological discussion we need to go back to the 5th century B.C. to a 
leading Greek sophist of that time called Gorgias. Gorgias argued that nothing really exists, 
that if anything did exist it could not be known, and that if knowledge was possible, it could 
not be communicated. With these penetrating thoughts, epistemology as a separate field of 
study emerged and during many years famous philosophers like Plato, Aristoteles, Descartes, 
Spinoza, Locke, Kant, and Wittgenstein have contributed to its development. The main issues 
discussed within the confines of this discipline include the definition of knowledge, the 
sources and criteria of knowledge, the kinds of knowledge possible and the degree to which 
each of these types is certain, and the exact relation between the one who knows and the object 
known. 
I What is knowledge? Contemporary analysis of the knowledge concept shows a common 
understanding of knowledge as a "justified true belief," a concept that was first introduced by 
18 • CHAPTER TWO 
Plato in his Meno, Phaedo, and Theaetetus (Nonaka, 1995). Knowledge is a special type of 
belief - a belief we have reason to have, and that we can be sure about. It serves to define 
expected relationships, behaviors, and actions (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992) and hence is also the 
belief in a solution for a particular problem. Knowledge is stored in memory in that it can be 
brought to bear on present or future decisions and problem-solving activities. In this respect, 
knowledge can be considered as "decisional stimuli and responses that are preserved in 
particular storage bins and that have behavioural consequences when retrieved" (Walsh and 
Ungson, 1991:61).// 
Although the definition above may imply that a clear epistemological tradition exists, in 
reality the epistemological field is still in its developmental stages. In Western philosophy 
there are two great epistemological traditions, namely the rationalists and the empiricists. The 
rationalists stress deductive reasoning based on self-evident principles as the main source and 
final test of knowledge, while the empiricists argue that all knowledge is derived from 
experience, either experience of the external world or from internal experience, in which the 
mind reflects on its own activities. In Asian philosophy the mutually complementary of mind 
and body is emphasized instead of focusing on the dominance of one of them (Nonaka, 1995). 
An interactive relationship exists between human beings and the world by means of human 
action, experiment, and experience, a perspective which can also be found in pragmatism, an 
American philosophical tradition. 
| The world's greatest thinkers have been intrigued by the philosophical discussion but have 
not been able to achieve a kind of consensus on what is knowledge (Grant, 1996)|]What 
constitutes a good picture of reality in philosophical terms, however, is from a managerial 
point of view probably even not so important. The philosophical discussion can be sidestepped 
by explicating when a knowledge item becomes interesting from an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing point of view and value creation seems to be the "casting vote" in this respect (Grant, 
1996: 110). As Penrose (1959: 76) argues: "More services become available, previously 
unused services become employed and employed services become unused as knowledge 
increases about the physical characteristics of resources, about ways of using them, or about 
products it would be profitable to use them for." Value is created if beliefs or behavioral 
patterns increase the gap between the value of a firm's inputs and outputs. Beliefs and 
behavioral patterns that have proved on a consistent basis to add value to a practical setting are 
of interest to the intracorporate knowledge sharing process in a multinational enterprise. 
Whether the knowledge can also be conceived as knowledge in philosophical terms is then, 
from a managerial point of view, not relevant any longer. 
2.2.2 A Typology of Knowledge 
In the economic and strategic management field, few have systematically and seriously 
addressed the nature of knowledge till recently. Information processing was used by theorists 
as Thompson (1967), Galbraith (1973, 1977), and Egelhof (1982) as a framework for 
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describing and better understanding critical fits between the business environment and the 
organization. Information, in this respect, served as inputs to decision-making and problem 
solving (e.g., Daft and Macintosh, 1981; Galbraith, 1977; March and Simon, 1958). 
Information in the information processing model was seen as a valuable resource, but a 
resource which was not considered as significantly different from the other production factors. 
The information-processing paradigm emphasizes the quantity of information instead of its 
quality (Nonaka, 1988a). Information was formalized as abstract, task-specific and oriented 
towards problem solving and hence the less explicit knowledge like the "behavioral 
knowledge" discussed by Barnard (1938), the "tacit knowledge" emphasized by Polanyi 
(1966), the "subjective knowledge" described by Popper (1972), and the "embedded 
knowledge" distinguished by Badaracco (1991) were totally disregarded. 
Knowledge can have many more faces than the abstract, task-specific knowledge as 
assumed by the information processing theorists (Blackler, 1995; Spender, 1996).[ Although 
many distinctions can be made, a useful typology of knowledge items can be made along two 
dimensions, being knowledge nature and knowledge level (see Table 2.1). The knowledge 
nature dimension ranges from fully ar t iculable or explicit knowledge to highly tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). Explicit knowledge is the structured knowledge which is specified 
either verbally or in writing, computer programs, patents, drawings or the like. Explicit 
knowledge is easily transmittable and can be stored in registers, libraries, and documentation 
(e.g., customer and product files). With respect to explicit knowledge, the concepts of data and 
information are often used to illustrate its nature. Data is the raw material that comes directly 
from sensors (Martin and Powell, 1992; Bohn, 1994). Data on its own can serve little useful 
purpose, but by processing it one gets information. Information is structured data which gives 
relationships between data elements by data processing (e.g., sorting, comparing, condensing). 
Information can be a major input in managerial decision-making. Tacit knowledge, in contrast, 
is hard to verbalize as it is strongly interrelated with the "carrier" of the knowledge. It is 
difficult or impossible to be conveyed linguistically or in writing. Tacit knowledge is often 
hard to gel at because it resides in people's heads and it is less well registered. Tacit 
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knowledge, however, comprises critical "impulses" for organizational behavior and hence has 
a major impact on the firm's performance. Polyani (1958) uses the concepts of skill and 
connoisseurship to illustrate the nature of tacit knowledge. 
The second dimension, the knowledge level, indicates the organizational level at which 
knowledge resides. Based on Kogut and Zander (1992: 388) and Hedlund and Nonaka (1993: 
119), a distinction has been made between four different levels of carriers, or donors, of 
knowledge: the individual, the group (e.g., department, team), the organization, and the 
interorganizational domain. In a strict sense, knowledge resides only at the individual level or, 
as Simon (1991: 124) states, "all learning takes place within individual human heads." Without 
the individuals, no organizational knowledge can ever exist. However, each individual is part 
of one or more social structures. A social structure comprises a network of roles and 
relationships in which interpretations of problems and solutions are shared. The thread of 
coherence that characterizes group, business unit or corporate interpretations is made possible 
by the sharing of interpretations. Through this process of sharing, the interpretation system in 
part transcends the individual level (Walsh and Ungson, 1991: 61). In that respect, the notions 
of routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), invisible assets (Itami, 1987), capabilities (Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen, 1994), and competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) are often mentioned 
as typical forms of knowledge which are created if behaviors between two or more parties are 
repeated over time to the point where those behaviors are taken for granted or expected. 
Knowledge transcends in these situations the level of the individual and resides at the group, 
organization, or interorganizational level .|f 
If intracorporate knowledge sharing could be brought back to the distribution of data written 
down in some company reports, then the management task of corporate management in this 
respect could be limited and reduced to the composition of some key management distribution 
lists. Knowledge, however, as we have tried to show in this section, is much more than the 
abstract, task-specific knowledge as assumed by many academics in the past.) Knowledge 
resides unstructured throughout the corporation on various levels of the organization and is 
stored in many forms and various degrees of tacitness. Consequently, utilizing this reservoir of 
knowledge requires much more than technology-oriented solutions like the roll-out of a highly 
advanced system of networked computers. Managing intracorporate knowledge sharing in an 
efficient and effective way requires an acknowledgement of the diversity inherent in the firm's 
knowledge and an understanding of how this diversity will affect the leverage potential of a 
firm's reservoir of prevalent knowledge items. \\ 
2.3 CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE QUEST TO LEVERAGE KNOWLEDGE 
Knowledge, as assumed by many academics today, is a key resource in a firm's strive for 
competitive and corporate advantage. Strategic management theorists working in the field of 
research concerned with the competitive and corporate advantages that knowledge may 
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provide for organizations, argue increasingly that a development of a better understanding of 
the organization as a knowledge system is needed (Von Krogh et al, 1995; Grant, 1996b). "The 
central competitive dimension of what firms know how to do is," as argued by Kogut and 
Zander (1992: 384), "to create and transfer knowledge efficiently within an organizational 
context.'^Building on the elaboration regarding the general characteristics of the knowledge 
concept in the previous section, this section places particular emphasis on the role of 
knowledge in an organization's value added activities and the contribution knowledge can 
make to a firm's performance. 
Strategic management is a relatively "young" field of academic research which is still 
strongly in transition (Van den Bosch, 1993).[Strategy, the key concept in this field, has been 
defined in the past as the formulation of long-term goals and the major policies and plans for 
achieving these goals (Chandler, 1962; Learned, Christensen, Andrews and Guth, 1969; 
Andrews, 1971) or as the match an organization achieves with its environment (Hofer and 
Schendel, 1978; Henderson, 1979). More recently, the pursuit by a firm and its management of 
competitive advantage (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1994) has been added to these definitions 
that each describe a particular element within the strategy concept. As stated by Hax (1990), 
providing a simple definition of strategy is not easy because some elements of strategy have 
universal validity and thus can be applied in any situation, while other elements are heavily 
dependent on the nature of the firm, its constituencies, its structure, and its culture. 
From a managerial perspective, a well-defined strategy takes into respect both the 
organization and its business environment, both the formulation and effectuation of goals, and 
both the achievement and sustainability of competitive advantage. Strategy can be formulated 
within various settings (e.g., functions, teams, units, multinational enterprises) and at various 
levels in the organizationJ|Within a multi-business corporation a distinction is often made 
between competitive strategy and corporate strategy. Competitive strategy is concerned with 
the creation or exploitation of those advantages that are most telling, enduring, and most 
idifficult to duplicate in one specific business (Rumelt, 1980). Corporate strategy, instead, is concerned with what makes the corporate whole add up to more than the sum of its business unit parts (Porter, 1987; Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994) and focuses on the scope and 
management of the portfolio of business units (Johnson and Scholes, 1988; Goold and Luchs, 
1993). In other words, corporate strategy concerns two questions: what businesses the 
corporation should be in or out and how the corporate office should manage the array of 
business units. 
Intracorporate knowledge sharing can be an important "parenting advantage" for a multi-
business corporation (Goold et al., 1994). Leveraging the "stock of intellectual property" can 
\ add to the justification of the corporate whole by reinforcing the competitive strategies of its 
subsidiaries. Owing to the fact that many '"traditional" sources of corporate advantage like 
operational and financial synergy have become less attractive or evaporated, many diversified 
corporations have fundamentally rethought their corporate strategies since the late 1980s. The 
leverage of resources in general and of knowledge in particular have increasingly been 
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discerned as an important parenting advantage by many academics (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989; Prahalad and Hamel). David Whitman, CEO of Whirlpool, states in this respect 
(Maruca, 1994): "The only way to gain lasting competitive advantage is to leverage your 
capabilities around the world so that the company as a whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts. [...] To me, competitive advantage means having the best technologies and processes for 
designing, manufacturing, selling, and servicing your products at the lowest possible costs. 
r~Our vision of Whirlpool is to integrate our geographical businesses wherever possible [...] take 
the best capabilities we have and leverage them in all of our operations worldwide." 
In search of alternative sources for adding value to the corporate whole, however, each and 
every corporate strategy needs to adhere to certain premises which, as Porter (1987: 46) 
argues, "cannot be altered, and when ignored, [...] explain in part why so many corporate 
strategies fail." Porter (1987) postulates three prerequisite demands put upon a corporate 
strategy. The first one is that competition occurs in the markets in which only the firm's 
subsidiaries are active. Competition and the decision on the "life and death" of the corporation 
occurs at the business unit level. Not the diversified corporations, but their affiliates compete 
in product markets. Consequently, corporate strategy must place primary attention on 
nurturing the success of each unit. The corporate center must get a clear notion how value can 
be created for their business units, directly or by providing advantages which could reinforce 
the competitive strategy of their business units. Corporate strategy can only be successful as 
primary attention is placed on the competitiveness of its business units. Successful corporate 
strategy adds to the creation and sustainability of the competitive advantage of its business 
units. Successful corporate strategy must, as argued by Porter (1987: 46), "grow out of and 
reinforce competitive strategy." 
The second premise which corporate planners need to respect is that diversification 
inevitably adds costs and constrains to a firm's business units. Besides the headquarters' 
overhead costs (e.g., manpower, travel expenses), the subsidiaries create costs in their attempt 
to conform to the procedures for operational and strategic planning, capital appropriations, 
annual budgeting, and monthly reporting. Moreover, opportunity costs and motivational 
problems exist due to the reduced autonomy caused by the formal procedures to which every 
manager within the corporate whole needs to adhere. Although these costs and constraints can 
never be totally eliminated, corporate management must acknowledge their existence. Without 
regaining these "corporate costs" in any kind of way, a firm's top management has to admit 
that the corporate "umbrella" loses its justification. 
Finally, Porter argues that corporate managers must recognize that shareholders can better 
diversify themselves by building a portfolio of investments which best match their own 
preferences and risk profiles. Although executives based on general portfolio theory 
(Markowitz, 1952, 1959; Sharpe, 1963, 1970) frequently still justify a diversification move by 
claiming that it reduces a firm's exposure to cyclical and secular uncertainties or risk (Fox and 
Hamilton, 1994; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994), a more efficient and effective capital market 
has led to the ability of shareholders to diversify themselves more cheaply and effectively. 
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Apart from the avoidance of hefty acquisition premiums, individual shareholders don't impose 
the corporate costs and constraints on their investments. Moreover, as Coffee (1988: 90) 
argues, "... given the continuing search for stocks to fill specific niches in a portfolio, investors 
would rationally tend to disinvest in broadly diversified conglomerates." 
I Based on these three premises it is reasonable to conclude that corporate strategy can only 
! succeed if it really adds value to its subsidiaries and hence if it generates value for a firm's 
shareholders. Investors can form the same portfolio of investments as a firm but the firm's 
distinct way of managing this portfolio must make the fundamental difference and justify the 
existence of the corporate whole. Corporate value needs to be created, directly or indirectly, to 
offset the inherent costs of lost independence and intracorporate knowledge sharing could play 
an important role in this respect. However, corporate strategy should never be formulated and 
implemented without serious regard for the competitive strategies of the subsidiaries it tries to 
govern or otherwise corporate value will be very difficult to generate. Consequently, an 
elaboration on the importance of managing intracorporate knowledge sharing in corporate 
strategy needs to commence with a review of those theories elucidating on the sources of 
competitive advantage and the role knowledge can "play" in this respect. 
2.3.1 Competitive Advantage within a Knowledge-Based View of the Firm 
Historically, economists have not been strongly interested in and convinced of the role and 
influence of the firm and its managers on the outcome of the market processes. For example, 
neo-classical perfect competition theorists, those whose line of intellectual descent can be 
traced from Smith through Walras, were primarily concerned with constructing equilibrium 
theories of price based upon the interaction of supply and demand and upon the assumption of 
rational behavior by the firm's actors. Firms, from the perspective of perfect competition 
theorists, are identical because perfect information together with a specifiable production 
function assure that each firm has equal access to product technology; perfect information plus 
resource mobility and divisibility assures that each firm is able to obtain exactly the right 
inputs (Conner, 1991). Thus, the individual firm's ambition to maximize profits yields a market 
equilibrium of zero economic returns to each firm, because they are equally able to team the 
inputs of labor and capital. 
During the past decades various academics have challenged the structural pillars of the 
perfect competition model and identified different roles for managers in their strive for 
competitive advantage. Industrial and evolutionary economists have questioned the 
assumptions that, on the long term, firms yield zero economic returns. The way these theorists 
have analyzed and compared companies and industries in their pursuit of competitive 
advantage, however, varies strongly. Roughly speaking, two extremes, the "outside-in" and 
"inside-out" approach, can be distinguished which differ in their emphasis placed on the role of 
the firm and its environment in creating a competitive advantage. 
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I \ Strongly based on the work of industrial economists like Mason (1939) and Bain (1968), 
| the outside-in approach primarily attends to the environmental conditions and their 
I implications for the success of competitive strategy. Porter (1980, 1985), the most well-known 
contributor to the development of this perspective, made the outside-in approach dominating 
the strategic management field until the beginning of the 1990s. The essence of strategic 
management in the structuralist framework is to shield the firm, to the maximum extent legally 
possible, from competitive forces (e.g., rivalry among existing firms, threat of new entrants, 
threat of substitute products, bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of buyers). As 
Porter (1980: 4) formulates it, "The goal of competitive strategy for a business unit in an 
industry is to find a position in the industry where the company can best defend itself against 
these competitive forces or can influence them in its favor. (Based on collected information, 
firms seek monopoly power in order to control the economic rents, often called monopoly 
rents of their activities. Although the resource endowments of companies are homogeneous 
and companies are not able to direct the market processes, the company as an output-restrainer 
(Conner, 1991) controls, although to a very limited extent, its own success by being well 
informed. 
At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, however, more and more strategic 
management theorists began to question the deterministic nature of the business environment 
as assumed by Porter and his colleagues and the limited attention they directed to the firm's 
management in the achievement of competitive advantage. Under the banner of the resource-
based view of the firm, more and more authors started to argue that, at least in the long run, a 
firm's bundle of resources is more important than the deployment of these resources through 
particular product-market combinations|/(Rumelt, 1984, 1987; Barney, 1986; Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989; Conner, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992). Although the influence of the 
business environment on the firm is not denied, these theorists argue that firms are 
heterogeneous in nature which was not assumed by the industrial economists (Rumelt, 1991; 
Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1994). Based on some early very influential works (Selznick, 
1957; Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982), this inside-out approach was reinvented as an 
important paradigm in studying the distinctiveness and sustainability of the firm's 
competitiveness. 
In explaining performance differences among firms within this resource-based approach 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), distinctiveness in product offerings or low costs are tied directly to the 
distinctiveness in input resources. In contrast to perfect competition and Industrial 
Organization economists, resource-based theorists discern resources which are not completely 
mobile and divisible and hence flow unimpeded to the highest-valuing use (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989). Peteraf (1993: 182) concludes: "What distinguishes monopoly profits from Ricardian 
rents is that monopoly profits result from a deliberate restriction of output rather than an 
inherent scarcity of resource supply.] In resource-based theories, the firm is a seeker of unique, 
or otherwise costly-to-copy, inputs. In resource-based strategies, opportunities to undertake 
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rent-generating projects or activities ultimately rely upon the control of scarce resources 
(Barney, 1986a; Rumelt, 1987)j) 
Related to this particular resource-based view of the firm and stemming from the same 
dissatisfaction with the leading explanations of the firm's competitive success in the strategic 
management field, a more dynamic variant of the inside-out approach was gradually developed 
in the early 1990s, strongly based on the work of Marshall and Schumpeter (1934, 1942). The 
contributions to this dynamic perspective on the firm's competitive success reflects the 
dissatisfaction with the static, equilibrium framework of considering the firm as an 
independent actor of market forces (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1994, 1997). Competition is not static, these theorists argue, but is continuously changing. The 
economy is never in equilibrium because of the continuous process of innovation (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). The firm is not a dependent actor of the market processes, but consciously tries 
to direct these processes by innovation to disrupt market equilibria. Entrepreneurial rents, these 
theorists argue, can be achieved by challenging the established competitive rules based on the 
entrepreneurial capabilities possessed by firms to address and proactively direct these changing 
circumstances. 
Identifying that a uniform model of competition in strategic management, as depicted in 
Table 2.2, is still far away (Reve, 1990; Hamel and Heene, 1994), one can conclude that, as we 
know today,] firms can decide the competitive "battle" in three ways (Spender, 1996): on their 
market positioning and shielding from competitive forces, on the distinctive and difficult to 
replicate resources which they posses, and on their capability to learn and innovate more 
effectively than their competitors|jNoticing this fragmented but complementary state of the 
field, some authors pose that more coherence in strategic management theory could be 
achieved by recognizing knowledge as a central element for competitive success (Itami, 1987; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996; Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Without selecting the most 
preferable source of competitive advantage which is, as assumed by the author, contingent on a 
complex set of variables, [a knowledge-based view seems attractive because everything that 
describes a firm's competitive strategy is an aspect of its available knowledge. A knowledge-
based view has the potential to provide the strategic management field with a consistent basis 
for explaining performance differences between competing firms. Within a knowledge-based 
view, management's performance regarding the creation, procurement, analysis, combination, 
Monopoly Rents Ricardian Rents Entrepreneurial Rents 
Strategic Objective Restricting competitive 
forces 
Market Perspective Static 
Resource Perpective Homogeneous 
Exploit firm-specific 
resources 
Static 
Heterogeneous 
Innovation, seek market 
disequilibrium 
Dynamic, influence 
of the firm on the 
market process 
Heterogeneous 
Table 2.2: Differences in Perspectives in the Strategic Management Field. 
26 • CHAPTER TWO 
and application of knowledge is seen as one of the key competitive dimensions in a firm's 
strategy. II 
An organization, in Kogut and Zander's terms, serves as a mechanism by which new 
knowledge is created and current knowledge replicated (see Figure 2.1). Both exploration and 
exploitation in an organization, however, are strongly interlinked and cannot be characterized 
as independent of each other. To explore this dynamic aspect, Kogut and Zander (1991: 384) 
introduce the concept of combinative capability to synthesize and apply current and new 
knowledge and to direct investments in those assets that correspond to a combination of 
current capabilities and expectations regarding future opportunities. By transforming 
knowledge into the marketplace as products and services, available knowledge is 
commercialized (Kozmetsky, 1990). The organizing principles underlying the creation, 
replication, and application of the firm's stock of knowledge "open a window on understanding 
these combinative capabilities as a set of 'inert' resources that are difficult to imitate and 
redeploy" (Kogut and Zander, 1991: 385) and as the basic source of a firm's competitive 
advantage. 
\ Knowledge items can be categorized in numerous ways. The knowledge environment grid, 
as depicted in Figure 2.2, complements the distinction in Table 2.1 in that it brings into the 
discussion an additional differentiation between two kinds of knowledge which play a 
significant role in a firm's competitive strategy, being expertise and market knowledge (Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 1991). Expertise , on the one hand, is the firm's craftsmanship often referred 
to as skills, capabilities, and competences. Expertise could be related, as described before, to 
input processes, throughput processes, or output processes. It is the knowledge underlying the 
firm's ability to produce and market the products of today and to generate the product and 
process innovations to create the product offerings for tomorrow. Market knowledge, on the 
other hand, is the firm's information on and understanding of the circumstances and 
developments in a particular marketplace (e.g., customer demands, strategy of competitors, 
Market Organizational Domain Market 
Products 
Services Firm's 
Combinative 
Capabilities 
Market 
Information 
Adapted/wm Kogui <£ Zander (1992: 3S5). 
Figure 2.1: The Organization as a Knowledge System. 
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Figure 2.2: The Knowledge Environment Grid. 
supplier proliferation). Market knowledge is the knowledge underlying the firm's ability to 
customize and adapt the products and operations to the market needs and demands. Only by 
understanding where to apply the expertise that will make a difference in the minds of both 
customers, intermediaries, and other stakeholders, one can hope to be able to commercialize 
the firm's knowledge reservoir.)! 
Commercialization requires the active integration of expertise and market knowledge and 
hence the firm's combinative capabilities must achieve a cross-fertilization between them. The 
importance of both expertise and market knowledge, however, can differ strongly between 
firms. Based on such determinants as the industry in which the firm competes, the selected 
source of competitive advantage, and particular product characteristics, firms vary in the 
weight given to both types of knowledge and hence occupy different positions on the 
knowledge environment grid. Industries, for example, in which firms strongly compete on 
their ability to create, collect, and apply expertise are the computer, chemicals, consumer 
electronics, copier, and car sector which are characterized by relatively high levels of R&D 
expenditures and the control over a large number of patents. Firms putting major emphasis on 
their ability to collect and aggregate market information are often located in such industries as 
the foods, cosmetics, leisure, and recreation sector. Firms in these industries are more 
dependent on their adaptation to specific market needs and are often characterized by relatively 
high marketing budgets and strongly decentralized business operations. 
Notwithstanding the differences in knowledge environment, the knowledge management 
abilities of many firms are challenged by knowledge life cycles, as depicted in Figure 2.4, 
which are dramatically speeded up since the early 1990s (Berry and Taggart, 1994). A 
knowledge life cycle starts with an invention and ends with the knowledge item becoming 
obsolete (Schon, 1971). Caused by such phenomena as innovation, imitation and shifting 
customer preferences nowadays, knowledge depreciates very rapidly (Argote, Beckman, and 
Epple, 1990). New knowledge life cycles arise quickly (see Figure 2.3b), affecting the market 
value of existing knowledge and forcing companies to invest in the pursuit of new knowledge 
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Time 
b) Succesive Knowledge Life-cycles 
Figure 2.3: The Knowledge Life-Cycle. 
(Perrino and Tipping, 1989). The competitive success of firms becomes increasingly 
dependent on their ability to upgrade their internal "stock of intellectual capital" and hence to 
learn faster than their competitors (De Geus, 1988). 
Concluding, we can state that it is reasonable to assume that knowledge plays an ever-
increasing important part in a firm's strive for competitive success. Although firm's differ 
regarding their position on the knowledge environment grid and hence put a different value on 
expertise and market knowledge, the reinforcement of knowledge procurement processes 
becomes an almost universal business objective. Intracorporate knowledge sharing, if managed 
appropriately, is an effective and cost efficient way for a subsidiary to procure the requisite 
knowledge items. Moreover, as will be discussed in the next section, it is one of the few ways 
in which the corporate "umbrella" can add value to its business units and hence justify the 
existence of the corporate whole. 
2.3.2 Corporate Strategy from a Knowledge-based Perspective 
Academic research indicates that corporate strategies have not been so successful in recent 
years and that many multi-business corporations are nothing more or less than the sum of their 
affiliates (Goold, Campbell, and Alexander, 1994). Still too often the drive for growth simply 
reflects the desire of boards to insulate themselves from the risk inherent in any individual 
business or the quest for power over more and more people and assets as an end in itself 
(Schenk, 1990). Building upon the conclusions of the previous section and the discussion on 
how, whether and when the subsidiary is better off as part of a larger corporation rather than 
being an independent entity, we argue in this section that the process of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing can provide a multitude of benefits (e.g., faster product and process 
innovation, reduced development costs, proactive product strategies) justifying the existence of 
the corporate whole. 
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Conceptually there are three ways that a corporation can add value to its businesses, namely 
through increased operating discipline, portfolio strategy, and horizontal strategy. In the past, 
businesses have gained from membership of the corporate whole owing to the effectuation of 
! one of these three strategies. Although it was common for managers in subsidiaries to 
complain about the paperwork and fight the overhead allocation, all three strategies could 
make subsidiaries perform better as part of the corporate portfolio. Recently, however, the 
capacity for value creation of these strategies is changing very rapidly and many "traditional" 
sources of corporate advantage seem to evaporate. One of the traditional ways in which 
corporate management tried to create added value, for example, was through the increase of 
the operating discipline put upon the firm's affiliates. Front-line managers were put under 
severe pressure by their superiors to increase performance. Top management communicated in 
sharp and unambiguous terms via advanced management accounting systems the goals for 
company-wide profits and growth in their attempt to "squeeze" the most out of their 
investments. Strategic plans, operating plans, review meetings, budget meetings, and incentive 
systems (e.g., remuneration, job improvements) were used to increase the pressure on 
subsidiary management and coerce them to significantly improve the top and bottom-line 
performance. Since the early 1990s, however, increased market competition and a growing 
dynamism in local business environments force many front-line companies to downsize and 
restructure. Without the interference of corporate management, front-line managers have to 
establish "lean and mean" operations to remain competitive and to survive. Moreover, 
corporate management experiences more and more problems in defining long-term strategies, 
business objectives, and hence feasible performance levels on a significant "distance" from 
increasingly dynamic product markets. Consequently, one can safely conclude that the value 
creating "power" of this strategy has been gradually reduced over the past few years. 
Apart from the operating discipline as a declining source for corporate advantage, the 
portfolio strategy has also become a less rational mechanism to validate the size and scope of 
many enterprises. The portfolio strategy, as mentioned earlier, is based on the premise that a 
single company's contribution to the risk of a portfolio is not the same as the risk of operating 
the single company alone. The portfolio strategy, however, can only be of economic value 
under imperfect capital markets. The portfolio strategy loses its potential for corporate value 
creation as the capital market becomes able and more suitable for effectuating this task. 
Today's institutional investors and other "smart" investors can obtain the same risk-return 
properties by buying stocks rather than acquiring companies under joint ownership and 
management. Moreover, hefty acquisition premiums are avoided and investments via the 
capital market impose no corporate costs and constraints on the investments. 
As the first two corporate strategies lose their ability to justify the corporate umbrella, the 
implementation of an effective horizontal strategy becomes more important (Buzzell and Gale, 
1987). By linking the subsidiaries horizontally, the available synergy can be exploited. 
Synergy occurs in situations where two or more activities or processes complement each other 
to the extent that their combined effect is greater than the "sum of the parts." Although costs 
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are associated with managing interdependencies (e.g., costs of coordination, loss of flexibility, 
reduced innovation, costs of compromise), the benefits of a horizontal strategy can be 
significant (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). Besides such horizontal strategies as the exploitation of 
scale by reallocation of production responsibilities and economies of scope in sourcing and 
logistics activities, intracorporate knowledge sharing can add to the justification of the 
corporate whole by reinforcing the competitive strategies of its affiliates.(intracorporate 
• knowledge sharing creates corporate value by exploiting what is already known. Exploiting 
( what is already known throughout the corporation can generate savings in development 
expenses, contribute to the achievement of "best practice" levels, and accelerate the innovation 
process of the affiliates involved.)/ 
In search of new sources of corporate advantage, the sharing of knowledge seems to be of 
growing interest for many corporations in an attempt to justify their size and scope (Hamel and 
Prahalad, 1993; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1995). Intracorporate knowledge sharing seeks to get the 
most out of the knowledge the corporation owns and in this way is a more creative response to 
productivity improvement pressures than downsizing and delayering operations) Corporations 
can reduce redundant investments in knowledge exploration activities and exploit new ideas to 
boost the innovativeness of the affiliates by increasing the transfer of knowledge between their 
subsidiaries. As a consequence, intracorporate knowledge sharing is increasingly perceived as 
an interesting way to reinforce the firm's collection of competitive strategies and add corporate 
value//"The challenge for an organization with geographically distributed units," as Goodman 
and Darr (1996: 8) argue, "is to transfer best practices across settings. The more that best 
practices are diffused, with decreased costs of duplication and increased innovation, quality 
and frequency, the more the benefits of organizational learning are realized." 
Besides emphasizing the importance of the leverage of internal knowledge resources, 
corporate management determines the required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing by 
their decision on the scale and scope of the portfolio of business investments. On the one hand, 
relatedness in terms of knowledge requirements is positively related to the possibilities to 
share knowledge with colleagues throughout the corporation. As previous research indicates 
(Pitts, 1977; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1986; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991), resource 
sharing tends to be greater within related diversified firms than within unrelated firms. 
Companies drawing strongly on some common knowledge areas are more liable to share 
knowledge than companies with unrelated knowledge requirements. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to assume that a positive correlation exists between the required level of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing and the size of the corporation. The larger the scale of a 
corporation the larger the number of opportunities to transfer and adopt knowledge resources 
to and from colleagues internally. 
Knowledge transactions are in many situations most efficiently governed by a firm's internal 
organization, as one of the firm's alternative coordination mechanism (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975). Compared to the market option, the organizational framework can provide 
higher order organizing principles such as shared coding schemes, shared values, and a shared 
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language (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Foss, 1996) prerequisite for successfully managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. Furthermore, the firm is a more efficient organizing mode 
than the market due to numerous knowledge-based transaction costs over and above the 
opportunistic considerations explored by Williamson (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Although 
the transfer of knowledge could also be effectuated by selling it to foreign producers or a 
quasi-organizational arrangement with external parties (e.g., joint ventures, alliances), external 
transactions in knowledge are susceptible to several market imperfections including 
recognition problems, disclosure problems, and negative externalities (Buckley and Casson, 
1976; Teece, 1980; Rugman, 1981). Moreover, as stressed by Bidault and Fischer (1994: 382), 
the threat of opportunistic behavior could become quite severe, especially in those situations in 
which the knowledge item is a key source of a firm's competitive advantage. As a consequence 
of the preceding constraints, many firms prefer to exercise an equity interest in the use of their 
intangible property and proprietary knowledge in order to exploit the organizational domain of 
unleveraged or low-powered incentives (Teece et al, 1994) and hence protect the firm's 
competitive edge. Also in launching operations in other parts of the world, companies often 
prefer green or brownfield investment instead of license agreements to be able to adequately 
control the firm's knowledge resources through a fully-owned subsidiary (Buckley and Casson, 
1976). 
Research by Teece (1987) and Pavitt (1990) shows that large firms have both the resources 
and the time to explore the implications of technological discontinuities for their business and 
to link them to the firm's core competencies through internal development without exposing 
certain valuable firm-specific assets to the threat of misappropriation by competitors. The 
corporation can be conceptualized as a network of companies, created to avoid purely 
contractual forms of knowledge transfer arrangements, in which each and every company is as 
a source of ideas, skills, capabilities, and knowledge that can be harnessed for the benefit of 
the total corporation. Conceptualized in this way, the overlapping activities and multi-country 
positions of multinational enterprises provide them with an important strategic opportunity. 
They have the chance to capitalize on the increasingly complex nature of their markets in a 
way that a smaller competitor with a more narrow range of activities will have a hard time to 
match. The multinational enterprise in this way becomes an interdependent network of 
companies with possibilities of strong cross-fertilization and mutual reinforcement of 
operations. 
2.3.3 The Required Level of Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing 
In the previous two sections, we reviewed the significance of knowledge within a firm's value 
added activities and its contribution to a firm's competitive and corporate performance. Based 
on research in the strategic management and international business fields, the need for 
knowledge exploration processes has been denoted and intracorporate knowledge sharing is 
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therefore presented as an effective and cost efficient way to procure the requisite knowledge 
items for a front-line manager in a multi-business firm. Intracorporate knowledge sharing 
provides a multitude of benefits for the affiliates of a multi-business firm and in doing so 
justifies the existence of the corporate whole. The required level of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing, however, differs between enterprises and is, to a major extent, determined by two 
determinants, namely the firm's knowledge environment and the firm's corporate strategy (see 
Figure 2.4). 
Firms occupy different positions on the knowledge environment grid, as has been argued in 
section 2.3.1, because firms vary in the weight given to expertise and market knowledge. The 
importance of expertise and market knowledge in a firm's strive for competitive advantage is 
based on such factors as the industry in which the firm competes, the selected source of 
competitive advantage, and the particular product characteristics.fln general, we assume that 
the need to share knowledge increases along each dimension of the knowledge environment 
grid, but in particular if a multinational enterprise is confronted with a growing need to achieve 
a cross-fertilization between their expertise and market knowledge.il 
In line with research findings of Hirschey and Caves (1981), we expect that the proportion 
of global knowledge exploration activities is positively correlated with the importance of basic 
research (high importance expertise) and negatively related with the need to adapt products to 
local market conditions (high importance of market knowledge). This means that if either 
expertise or market knowledge determines a firm's competitive success, concentration or 
dispersion of the firm's knowledge procurement activities can strongly limit the required level 
of intracorporate knowledge sharing. If expertise is the only critical resource in a firm's 
competitive strategy (i.e., left corner below in Figure 2.5), a firm will be able to achieve 
economies of scale by concentrating its research, development, and production activities 
without much concern for the circumstances in local marketplaces. An export strategy can take 
care of the exploitation of the product-embodied expertise. If the available market knowledge 
is the critical competitive success factor (i.e., right upper corner in Figure 2.5), a firm could 
Knowledge Environment 
Corporate Strategy 
REQUIRED 
Level of 
Intracorporate 
Knowledge 
Sharing 
Figure 2.4: Antecedents of the Required level of Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing. 
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Figure 2.5: The Knowledge Environment Determinant. 
decide to decentralize its business operations to facilitate the development of a distinct market 
feeling. By operating as close as possible to the marketplace, front-line managers can procure 
the required market knowledge and create a well-grounded understanding of local market 
circumstances. 
If, however, cross-fertilization between expertise and market knowledge becomes essential 
(i.e., right corner below in Figure 2.5), effectiveness and efficiency rationales enforce one of 
the knowledge types to flow. The firm can disperse its activities and enable inter-unit 
relationships for the exchange and transfer of expertise; or the firm can concentrate its business 
activities and puts an incentive on the transfer of market information to the research, 
development, and production sites. As Johanson and Vahlne (1977) state, however, market 
knowledge is experimental of nature, the product of confrontation with all kinds of market 
signals, and hence difficult to codify and communicate. Consequently, the growing need to 
customize and adapt to local circumstances compel many multinational enterprises to shift 
towards a network form with multiple resource centers comparable with the transnational 
organization model as introduced by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987), the heterarchy as described 
by Hedlund (1986), and the multi-center firm as studied by Forsgren (1990). Assisted by 
flexible manufacturing methods reducing economies of scale and advanced communication 
technology freeing much work from geographical constraints, more and more firms decide to 
decentralize key business functions and activities and create an interdependent network of 
business units obliged to share expertise for the efficiency of the organizational form. 
Over and above the influence of the knowledge environment, the required level of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing is determined by a firm's corporate strategy comprising the 
selected and embraced value-added strategy, the firm's scope, and the firm's scale.j|The more 
the firm's top management and corporate strategy emphasizes the exploitation of the dispersed 
stock of intellectual property as one of the main sources of corporate value creation, the higher 
' 
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the need to share knowledge. If other parenting advantages exist to justify the corporate whole 
and are effectively employed, less pressure will be put on leveraging the firm's scattered 
"knowledge reservoir. "|The relatedness of the corporation's portfolio of business activities and 
the size of the corporation in terms of the number of governed companies are both positively 
related with the possibilities and hence the need to share knowledge within the multinational 
enterprise. The required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing is small as a firm governs a 
multitude of unrelated business units or only a very small number of physically separated 
business operations. 
2.4 MANAGING INTRACORPORATE KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
I Although it is essential to recognize that intracorporate knowledge sharing is one of the key 
challenges corporate managers face in a multinational enterprise, it is of equal importance to 
know how to manage this process to make it really happen. The execution of a particular 
strategy does not take place simply because it is considered to be desirable; it takes place if it 
is made to work (Pettigrew, 1987; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991))|For this reason, the major 
theme throughout this section is how people act and can be managed to enlarge the degree of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing between the dispersed subsidiaries of a multinational 
enterprise."While the former section presented the antecedents of the required level of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing, this section tries to discern the determinants of its actual 
level of intracorporate knowledge sharing by giving an elaboration on the most recent 
perspectives on managing the multinational enterprise. By matching the actual with the 
required situation, a fit is created which is anchored in this research project to the achievement 
of competitive and corporate advantage.* 
Management science is a field of study devoted to determine how best to attain goals in 
organizations. Fayol (1916, 1949) defines the concept of management as comprising of five 
activity elements: forecasting and planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, and 
controlling. In general, however, the research history of the management field shows a 
continuous strive to classify a group of people into formal structures. Although the 
management theory has moved from "the one best way" approach (Chandler, 1962; Stopford 
and Wells, 1972; Franko, 1976), toward an "it all depends" approach, formally known as 
contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Pfeffer, 1978, 1981, Miller, 1987), a new 
school of research on the multinational enterprise argues that this approach needs to be further 
adapted. For many years, top management in many corporations turned to structural solutions 
to their problems, but more and more companies need a more flexible organization which is 
better able to adapt to the changes in the internal and external environment. Formal 
arrangements create no space for steady and continuous adaptations and tend to oscillate from 
one form to another. By focusing on the processes instead of the structure underlying each 
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company, researchers and managers will be better able to find the key indicators determining 
success or failure of a company. 
The essential difference between multinationals and more simple organizations, Doz and 
Prahalad (1991: 146) argue, stems from the combined consequences of multidimensionality 
and heterogeneity. "Multi-dimensionality results from the very nature of diversified 
multinational companies: they cover multiple geographical markets, with multiple product 
lines, in typically multi-functional activities, such as sales, manufacturing, service, R&D, etc... 
Heterogeneity results from the differences between the optimal trade-offs for different 
businesses, countries, functions and tasks as a function of a whole range of economic and 
political characteristics which differ between countries and affect individual businesses and 
tasks in quite varied ways." More and more, multinational enterprises are becoming global 
organizations with their companies linked through an interdependent internal network and 
differentiated because of differences in local circumstances. Managers are constantly trying to 
find the right balance, as Doz and Prahalad (1987: 5) argue, between two imperatives. First, 
the economic imperative represents the impact of global competition that pressures the 
multinational enterprise to transcend the boundaries of national markets, to develop a global 
strategy and to rationalize global operations through central control and coordination. Second, 
the political imperative can be denoted by the adjustments made necessary by host government 
demands, resulting in greater autonomy at the subsidiary level but arising from diversity 
among national markets that call for increased local responsiveness. 
Emphasizing such a global integration/local responsiveness framework, the contributors to 
this so called "process" school of research on multinational enterprises (e.g., Prahalad and Doz, 
1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hedlund and Rolander, 1990) conclude that no one best 
structure provides the solution to this dilemma. The required internal differentiation due to the 
need to deal with both the multidimensionality and heterogeneity makes a structural theory of 
multinational enterprises probably impossible to develop. No single stable one-dimensional 
structure is likely to be practical. A management theory of the multinational enterprise must 
take into account that management processes need to differentiate between various countries, 
products, and functions. The existing management theory is too "architectural" to be applicable 
to the complexity and internal diversity of the multinational enterprise. Thus, strong objections 
can be made regarding efforts to set boundaries of multinational enterprises against other 
forms of organization of international investment and trade (Hymer, 1960; Dunning, 1981) and 
to investigate contingencies of organizational structures of multinational enterprises (Fouraker 
and Stopford, 1968; Stopford and Wells, 1972). Instead, theorists of the process school build 
upon the idea that the multinational enterprise has become too complex to be centrally 
managed and propose to go beyond the organizational structure to focus on the analysis of 
management processes in multinational enterprises. 
Their argument is strongly based on Joseph Bower's (1970) work on the resource allocation 
process in large diversified organizations. Assuming an intentional rational manager who is 
pursuing both corporate and personal goals, Bower proposes that the key role for top 
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management is not in taking decisions or formulating management objectives, but in shaping 
the structural context as the principal way to influence the behavior of managers further down 
the hierarchy. In contrast to the situational context which is made up of personal and historical 
factors, the structural context - comprising the formal organization, the system of information 
and control, and the systems used to measure and reward performance of managers - is 
"particularly important because all its elements are subject to control by top management. [...] 
The role of the structural context is that it shapes the purposive manager's definition of 
business problems by directing, delimiting, and coloring his focus and perception; it 
determines the priorities which the various demands on him are given" (1970: 73). Thus, by 
shaping the structural context, and in this way clarifying what the corporation regards as 
desirable behavior, top management can control the levers that influence behavior of managers 
at the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy.|| 
In line with Bower and various subsequent writings of academics (e.g., Burgelman, 1983), 
this so called process school of research on the multinational enterprise stresses the need to 
focus on the issues that managers face in their day-to-day operations, and to direct the central 
task of general management as shaping the organizational context. Instead of changing the 
"blueprint" of the organization, the preferred alternative for corporate management is to create 
a structural context as a more subtle strategic control mechanism within which opportunities 
for linkages between subunits will arise at various points, levels in organization, and times. As 
stated by Doz and Prahalad (1991: 147): "The size and complexity of the typical multinational 
enterprise often with hundreds of business units active in scores of countries, means that 
linkages and interdependencies cannot be planned, or centrally managed. Which linkages are 
going to be useful at a particular point in time for a specific task between two or more subunits 
is unpredictable, and probably needs to be self-adjusting." For managing the key processes in 
the global businesses, top management of most companies, Prahalad and Doz (1987: 187) 
argue, has available a broad repertoire of management tools. Planning systems, accounting 
systems, management development systems, measurement systems, committees for 
coordination, and business reviews provide a rich infrastructure for top management to shape 
the behavior of managers lower down the organizational hierarchy. These management tools 
express the organizational rules of the game that shape executive perception, expectations, and 
behavior. 
Apart from the implementation of management tools,fa corporate context is strongly 
influenced by its administrative heritage (see Figure 2.6). A corporation's administrative 
heritage is the consequence of the way the organization has acted and was managed in the past. 
The administrative heritage is often strongly related to a firm's geographical and cultural 
background.IThe distinctiveness in background has created and institutionalized distinct 
structural organizational configurations, administrative processes and management mentalities 
which are hard to changeJJln an empirical research project, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) have 
found three clearly distinguishable organizational models among nine multinational enterprises 
which could be linked to their geographical home-base in the USA, Japan, and Europe. 
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According to Bartlett and Ghoshal, all three multinational enterprise models have problems in 
today's complex global environments, because they cannot meet the demand to simultaneously 
achieve national responsiveness, global efficient integration, and the ability to develop, 
transfer, and combine knowledge worldwide. Bartlett and Ghoshal have constructed the 
transnational organization as a solution to this demand which, however, is not derived from 
empirical evidence as are the other three models. Important tools in this new kind of 
organization are informal mechanisms of coordination, including normative values, and modes 
and patterns of internal communication. 
The new kind of organization which these various researchers of the process school 
describe should trade-off the costs and benefits regarding national responsiveness and 
multinational integration in a flexible manner. The key organizational competence of the 
global firm is the capability to "shift the locus and logic of decision from a national concern to 
a global view, and vice versa, from decision to decision" (Doz, 1986: 214). This type of 
organization is not easy to manage. The threat of internal fragmentation and dissipation is 
obvious, because of the strong degree of dispersion. Furthermore, the interdependence 
deliberately created between companies may counteract the need for flexibility, since 
complexity can obstruct the necessary learning capability. However, according to Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1987), these problems can be resolved by top management if they succeed in 
legitimizing diverse perspectives, develop multiple coordination and innovation processes, and 
build shared vision and individual commitment. The only way corporate management can 
accomplish this is through the creation and adaptation of the structural context of their 
corporation. This corporate context needs to clarify the direction the various businesses should 
be going and to stimulate and facilitate the desired actions of managers within the 
multinational network. 
Administrative Heritage 
Implemented Management Tools 
Corporate Context 
ACTUAL 
Level of 
Intracorporate 
Knowledge 
Sharing 
Figure 2.6: Antecedents of the Actual Level of Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing. 
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To summarize, we believe that it is the responsibility of corporate management to create a 
structural context as a subtle strategic control mechanism within which opportunities for 
linkages between subunits will arise. Like Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994: 92), we assume that 
"an organization can similarly create and embed in its context a work ethic that would induce 
rational yet value-oriented actions on the part of its members in furthering the interests of the 
organization as an end in itself, not just a means to an end." Top management can use a broad 
"arsenal" of management tools in shaping this structural context. In this study, the aim is to 
present those management tools shaping the corporate context and affecting the deterrents and 
behavior of managers regarding intracorporate knowledge sharing.l Although acknowledging 
the importance of the administrative heritage on the day-to-day interactions between a firm's 
employees, we focus this study on the role of a firm's top management in managing this value-
creating process. Limited in its ability to pursue a more active role, corporate management can 
primarily stimulate and facilitate the intracorporate knowledge sharing process by 
implementing management tools directed at neutralizing or at least minimizing the barriers to 
the transfer of knowledge./( 
2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this second chapter, the concepts of knowledge and intracorporate knowledge sharing were 
reviewed and related to the discussions on competitive and corporate strategy. After a brief 
elaboration on knowledge and its various faces in the organizational context, it has been 
argued that the competitive advantage of an individual firm to a major extent is based on the 
firm's relative position in the industry, its stock of relevant, valuable and unique resources, and 
its ability to innovate. More coherence in the strategic management field can be created, as 
various scientists propose, by putting knowledge into the center of the competitive process. 
Everything that describes a firm's competitive strategy is an aspect of its available knowledge 
and hence knowledge could be positioned as the common determinant in explaining 
performance differences between competing firms. In a knowledge-based view, knowledge is 
conceptualized as one of the key resources owned by a firm and the creation, procurement, 
analysis, combination, and application of this knowledge is one of the critical competences 
underlying successful competitive strategy. 
As a consequence, multinational enterprises should start to acknowledge trie potential value 
of leveraging internal knowledge resources as an important way to reinforce the competitive 
strategies of their subsidiaries. In search of new sources of corporate advantage to justify the 
existence of the "corporate umbrella", we believe that intracorporate knowledge sharing 
generates considerable added value to offset unavoidable corporate costs and validates the 
portfolio of companies as more than the sum of its parts. In this respect, Peters (1995: 162) 
quotes Sune Karlsson, head of ABB's Power Transformers division, who confirmed this 
argument by stating: "We are a collection of local businesses with intense global coordination. 
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[...] Our most important strength is that we have 25 factories around the world, each with its 
own president, design manager, marketing manager, and production manager. These people 
are working on the same problems and opportunities day after day, year after year, and 
learning a tremendous amount. We want to create a process of continuous expertise transfer. If 
we do, that's a source of advantage none of our rivals can match." If managed appropriately, 
intracorporate knowledge sharing offers a corporation's subsidiaries a multitude of benefits 
like faster product and process innovation, reduced development costs, and proactive product 
strategies. Because injecting high-powered, market-like incentives on knowledge transactions 
may jeopardize this process, the internal organization with its unleveraged and low-powered 
incentives is discerned as the preferred setting to coordinate knowledge sharing (Teece, Pisano 
andShuen, 1994: 14). 
In this connection, leveraging valuable and internally available knowledge resources should 
increasingly be notified as one of the major managerial challenges of the 1990s. To put it 
simply, intracorporate knowledge sharing is the application of existing knowledge for a new 
use or user. It is a process by which knowledge developed for one purpose is employed either 
for a different application and/or by a new user. The activity involves principally an increased 
utilization of the existing knowledge base, comprising both expertise and market knowledge, 
in new areas of application as opposed to its expansion by means of further knowledge 
exploration. The time span for the transfer can be quite short - a matter of days in cases where 
the knowledge transferred may be directly applied in its existing form to the new environment 
- or the process can extend to a considerable number of years in cases where extensive 
modification, redesign, or adaptive engineering is required to make the knowledge fit its new 
role (Gee, 1981). 
We can now embed our managerial framework, as presented in the following chapters, in 
the strategic management and international business field. The issue of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing has been put into a broader perspective and the main observations are 
summarized in the conceptual model as presented in Figure 2.7. The conceptual model depicts 
the need to create a strategic "fit" between the required and actual level of intracorporate 
Firm's 
Knowledge Environment 
Firm's 
Corporate Strategy 
Effectiveness is a function of matching 
the actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
with 
the required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
Fit< 
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Intracorporate 
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^ V Sharing 
Administrative Heritage 
Implemented 
Management Tools 
Figure 2.7: Strategic Perspective on Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing. 
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knowledge sharing. The concept of "fit" is an important building block for theory construction 
on strategic management (Venkatraman, 1989) and is anchored in this research on managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing to the achievement of competitive and corporate advantage 
(see Figure 2.7).|The knowledge environment in which the firm's subsidiaries operate and the 
firm's corporate strategy in terms of the value added strategy applied and the scale and scope 
of its portfolio are the two main determinants of the required level of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. The antecedent of the actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing and 
hence the factors giving form and content to the corporate context are the corporation's 
administrative heritage and the implemented management tools. || 
As argued in the introductory chapter, the principal research aim of this research project is 
the development of a managerial and integrative framework depicting the management 
systems stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing between the dispersed 
companies of a multinational enterprise. Although the other three determinants in the strategic 
"fit" model have been integrated in the empirical research and acted as selection criteria for the 
three case study companies, the implemented management tools are of particular interest 
because of our particular concern for the role of corporate management in the leverage of the 
firm's knowledge reservoir. As argued in this chapter, the complexity of multinational 
enterprises enforces corporate management to delegate the responsibility to initiate and 
effectuate intracorporate knowledge sharing to front-line managers and limit oneself to the 
creation of a corporate context stimulating and facilitating the desired behaviour lower down 
the organizational hierarchy. Assuming that the administrative heritage has to be treated as a 
given, a broad repertoire of management tools is available to fulfil this task. 
"Our vision of Whirlpool," David Whitman, CEO of Whirlpool, argues, "is to integrate our 
geographical businesses wherever possible. [...] take the best capabilities we have and leverage 
them in all of our operations worldwide. [To achieve these goals] you must create an 
organization whose people are adept at exchanging ideas, processes, and systems across 
borders', people who are absolutely free of the "not-invented-here" syndrome; people to 
identify the best global opportunities and the biggest global problems facing the organization" 
(Maruca, 1994). Which management tools can and should be implemented by corporate 
management in its responsibility to shape this kind of organization and to create a "fit" 
between the required and actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing is at center stage in 
chapter 4 and chapter 5. Before focusing on the theoretically required and empirically 
implemented management tools, however, chapter 3 introduces a conception of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process to structure the theoretical and empirical research in 
this respect. 
Conceptualizing the 
Intracorporate Knowledge 
Sharing Process 
A Process Analysis 
"The need for differentiation makes a structural theory of multinational enterprises relative 
difficult to develop. In fact, [...] a structural theory of multinational enterprises would have 
little to offer. One needs a theory that transcends the structural dimensions to focus on 
underlying processes." 
- Doz and Prahalad (1991: 146). 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research project is an effort to develop a managerial framework including some 
preliminary propositions on the management systems for stimulating and facilitating 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. Former studies have contributed to the general 
understanding of the need for intracorporate knowledge sharing in corporate strategy (e.g., 
Hamel & Prahalad, 1993; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1995) and have elaborated extensively upon the 
factors positively and negatively influencing the intracorporate knowledge sharing process 
(e.g., Glaser, Abelson, and Garrison, 1983; Rogers, 1995). Former studies, however, failed to 
come up with an integrative perspective on the intracorporate knowledge sharing process 
allowing the observation, analysis, understanding, and normative assessment of the managerial 
tasks and responsibilities with respect to this particular knowledge activity. The earlier-
mentioned "process" school of research on the multinational enterprise, for example, refers 
regularly to the issue of intracorporate knowledge sharing but with the expressed ambition of 
putting managerial relevance before theoretical elegance. Notwithstanding its thought-
provoking research evidence and statements, the conceptual contributions are expressed in 
rather general terms obstructing empirical verification (Hagstrom, 1991) and provide limited 
!
;uidance for practical managers inspired by their appealing conclusions (Melin, 1992). 
I Top management, as argued in the preceding chapter, has the responsibility to create a 
corporate context as the principal way to influence the behavior of managers further down the 
hierarchy. In shaping a context that stimulates and facilitates the transfer and adoption of 
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internally available knowledge items, top management can use a broad repertoire of 
management tools. In our search for and attempt to structure "stimulators" and "facilitators"1, 
the deductive reasoning has been built upon an understanding of the barriers obstructing, 
hindering, and complicating the successful initiation and effectuation of knowledge transfer 
efforts. The communication involved in knowledge transfer often takes place between 
individuals using different vocabularies, styles, channels, schedules, and reward systems. 
Formal and informal communication barriers exist between different cultures, different 
sciences, and different levels of abstraction in what is being transferred (e.g., an abstract 
theoretical technology as against, say, a concrete product design)JBoundary spanning seems to 
be an important concept for this issue (Williams and Gibson, 1990) and hence should be 
acknowledged as such in our study. 
The process analysis presented in this chapter provides an organizing framework for further 
exploitation of what is known and delineation of what else we need to know to paint a more 
complete picture on managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. The conceptualization of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process enables the clustering of the voluminous set of 
barriers enlisted in the literature around particular stages and hence provides a means to 
integrate and leverage the observations and findings offered by former studies. The conceptual 
and practical challenge is not to detect new barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing, but to 
make managerial sense of the number and range of possible deterrents. By detecting where and 
how these various variables affect the transfer and exploitation of internally available and 
valuable knowledge items, conclusions can be formulated on the critical managerial 
responsibilities and the prerequisite management systems for managing intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. 
In the following section, a general description of the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process is given and a distinction between two phases is made, being the decision phase and 
the execution phase. Subsequently, the decision and execution phase are discussed and 
reviewed on their particulars in section 3.3 and section 3.4 respectively. 
3.2 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF INTRACORPORATE KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
Intracorporate knowledge sharing can be viewed, conceptualized, and investigated as a special 
kind of communication (Van Gecnhuizen, 1994; Szulanski, 1995a). Communication is 
commonly defined as a process of social interaction through messages (Fiske, 1990) and could 
be seen, in oversimplified terms, as a source sending a message via certain channels to a 
receiving individual (Berlo, 1960). A communication effort can be classified as an act of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing if the core message, transmitted within the boundaries of a 
1
 "Stimulators" and "facilitators" are implemented management tools stimulating and facilitating intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. "Stimulators" have a positive effect on the initiation and "facilitators" are positively 
correlated with the effectuation of intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts. 
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Figure 3.1: A Communication-based Model of Knowledge Transfer. 
! firm, comprises a knowledge item (e.g., expertise, market information of strategic value) 
.which will be applied and integrated in the organization of the receiving unit. Apart from the 
donor and the recipient, Van Geenhuizen (1993: 5) introduces an intermediary as a third party 
in the knowledge sharing process2. Whereas the source and the receiver are crucial actors, the 
intermediary can be considered as optional. Intracorporate knowledge sharing may equally run 
by means of intermediation and without intermediation, directly from source to receiver (see 
Figure 3.1). 
Instead of the communication-based model, various alternative models can be applied to 
conceptualize the technology transfer process3 like the appropriability model (Devine, James, 
and Adams, 1987), the dissemination model (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981), and the knowledge 
utilization model (Glaser, Abelson, and Garrison, 1983). These alternative models, however, 
do not capture the process as well as the communication-based model. The communication-
based perspective on knowledge transfer integrates into the research approach several 
important characteristics of interpersonal communication (Williams and Gibson, 1990; 
Spence, 1994).[Intracorporate knowledge transfer is an interactive communication process 
where the actors involved exchange their thoughts simultaneously. Knowledge transfer is often 
a chaotic, disorderly process involving people who may hold different views about the value 
and potential use of the knowledge in question. Feedback helps participants reach convergence 
about the important implications and characteristics of knowledge items. Moreover, both 
problems looking for solutions (knowledge pull) and solutions looking for problems 
(knowledge push) are encountered by the communication-based model on intracorporate 
knowledge sharing (Gibson and Smilor, 1991: 292). jl 
Following the research tradition of many communication theorists, a study on managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing should focus, as depicted in Figure 3.2, on the barriers 
In an organizational setting, the intermediary role refers to a formally institutionalized responsibility for the 
firm's top management, liaisons, or boundary spanners. Intermediation can also be offered on a more informal 
basis by employees throughout the organization. 
See Williams & Gibson (1990: 15) for a brief review of these prior attempts to model the technology transfer 
process. 
<& 
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obstructing, hindering, and complicating the successful initiation and effectuation of this 
process (Souder and Padmanabhan, 1989; Keller and Chinta, 1990). Communication 
researchers often see communication as a process by which one person affects the behavior or 
state of mind of another. If the effect of the communication is different from or smaller than 
was intended, many communication researchers tend to talk in terms of communication failure 
caused by certain barriers to the effective transmission of the message from donor to recipient. 
With respect to intracorporate knowledge sharing, the number and range of possible deterrents 
enlisted in the literature are overwhelming (e.g., Arrow, 1971; Allen, 1977; Ounjian and 
Came, 1987; Smilor and Gibson, 1991). Consequently, the conceptual and practical challenge 
is not the generation of new deterrents, but bringing some order and making sense of this 
voluminous set of variables (Glaser, Abelson and Garrison, 1983). This collection serves as a 
building block from which the managerial framework on intracorporate knowledge sharing is 
constructed. 
I In this research, a process conceptualization of intracorporate knowledge sharing is used 
comprising four distinctive stages, namely awareness, interest, preparation, and transfer (see 
Figure 3.3). Although no subdivision can actually be as self-contained as a discrete stage in a 
process which is characterized by a high level of reciprocity, thinking in terms of stages is 
more convenient since it brings order into a rather complicated processjfBy detecting where 
and how the various deterrents affect intracorporate knowledge sharing, clusters of barriers can 
be deduced. Such a grouping of barriers can operate as a groundwork for deductive reasoning 
towards propositions on the theoretically prerequisite management systems for managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. Consequently, the distinction of four stages is justified on 
the basis of its contribution to researchability and its help in clustering the numerous barriers 
to intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
In contrast to the classical diffusion model (e.g., Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971), the four-
stage conception of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process places more emphasis on the 
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Figure 3.2: The Knowledge Transfer Problem. 
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Figure 3.3: The Four Stages of the Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing Process. 
activities concerned with the effectuation of the knowledge transfer. The classical model 
identifies five sequential stages (i.e., awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, application) and is 
primarily concerned with personal decision-making leading, eventually, to the acceptance or 
rejection of an innovation (Spence, 1994). As argued in the introductory chapter, however, any 
practical theory of management should be concerned with the process of decision as well as 
with the process of action (Simon, 1976). A theory of management, as Simon (1976:1) argues, 
"should include principles of organization that will ensure correct decision-making, just as it 
must include principles that will insure effective action." So, instead of focusing on 
dichotomous yes/no adoption decisions (Tornatzky and Klein, 1982: 29), one should look to 
both the formulation (initiation) and the implementation (effectuation) as the dependent 
variables of successful intracorporate knowledge transfer. 
Following the two-phase conceptualization suggested by Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek 
(1973), Rogers (1983), and Damanpour (1991), an additional sub-division was made between 
those stages in which the actors decide to initiate a knowledge transfer effort and those stages 
in which the transfer of knowledge is effectuated J The decision phase determines the number 
of times (n) that a knowledge transfer effort is initiated (Quantity Determinant). The execution 
phase determines the success of the attempt to transfer knowledge and hence the value added 
by the knowledge sharing initiative (the Value DerermwanOjICombining the quantity and 
value determinant, one is able to approximate the actual total value created by intracorporate 
knowledge sharing (ATVIKS)4 by accumulating (N) the value added by each intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project (Vi). In mathematical terms, this means: 
ATVIKS= £ V. (3.1) 
i = I 
The concepts actual total value created by intracorporate knowledge sharing and actual level of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing (see chapter 2) are used interchangeably in this study. No difference in meaning exist 
between the two concepts. 
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The formula on the actual total value created by intracorporate knowledge sharing 
(ATVIKS) has acted as an important indicator during the research project. Although 
impossible to quantify exactly, this formula clearly depicts the managerially most relevant 
determinants, namely the number of initiated intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts and the 
value added of each individual attempt. Each determinant is negatively correlated with 
deterrents related to the decision {Barriers n) and execution phase (Barriers v). "High" barriers 
in the decision phase are most often related with a low number of initiated intracorporate 
knowledge sharing efforts. "Low" barriers in the execution phase mean that a larger chance 
'exists that the value added by an intracorporate knowledge sharing effort is optimized. Top 
management, in its task to stimulate and facilitate the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process, has to reduce the obstructing and complicating influence of the various barriers. 
Treating the administrative heritage as given, the "height" of the barriers is negatively related 
to the degree of development of the prerequisite management systems (the "stimulators" and 
"facilitators"). In mathematical terms, this means: 
A TVIKS = /(Barriers , Barriers- ) (3.2) 
Barriers = f(mgt. systems, adm. heritage) (3.3) 
Before the barriers and theoretically prerequisite corporate management systems are 
described and reviewed in chapter 4 and chapter 5, the two distinctive phases of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process require some further attention. The decision and 
execution phase, each comprising two distinctive stages and each influencing one of the two 
determinants of the actual total value of intracorporate knowledge sharing, are discussed in the 
next two sections of this chapter. 
3.3 DECIDING TO PARTICIPATE IN SHARING OF KNOWLEDGE 
Individuals in organizations need to make various decisions each day whether, how, arid when 
they or their subordinates are going to take action. The fact that organizations make decisions 
which determine their actions is widely and firmly accepted in the field of organization theory 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1990). Organizational members are confronted with various decision 
situations which enforce them to make choices from among two or more alternative possible 
actions, any one of which a given individual may undertake. Consequently, "the task of 
deciding," as Simon (1976: 1) argues, "pervades the entire administrative organization quite as 
much as does the task of doing - indeed, it is integrally tied up with the latter." Instead of 
discussing administration as the art of getting things done, "a general theory of administration 
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must include principles of organization that will insure correct decision-making, just as it must 
include principles that will insure effective action." While section 3.4 places emphasis upon 
the activities insuring incisive action, this section focuses upon the preceding decision-making 
process regarding intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
| Knowledge transfer and knowledge adoption are special kinds of decision-making 
processes involving both the knowledge donor and the potential recipients of a valuable 
knowledge item. Besides the donor being willing to share his or her knowledge, potential 
/ recipients have to make up their mind with respect to their eagerness to adopt, apply, and 
integrate a particular knowledge item originating from one of the firm's other subsidiaries, in 
their own operations. The decision phase is a critical phase because if one of the parties 
decides to withdraw and hence block the initiation of an intracorporate knowledge transfer 
effort, knowledge sharing and hence corporate value creation will not onset. Consequently, to 
leverage the internal knowledge reservoir successfully, a firm's top management is obliged to 
manage the decision phase of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process in an attempt to 
upgrade the number of intracorporate knowledge sharing initiativesl|(i.e., the quantity 
determinant of the actual total value of intracorporate knowledge sharing). 
Although agreeing with Pettigrew (1990: 8) that decision-making should be understood 
.conceptually as a continuous process in context, we assume for analytical reasons that the 
decision phase commences when individuals become aware of an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing opportunity and concludes when the decision is made by both the donor and recipient 
to agree upon or reject the initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing effort. Although 
some writers still assume that when something new and worthwhile becomes available it 
creates a demand by itself, it is increasingly acknowledged that the adoption process is far 
more complicated and needs to be conceptualized as any other decision-making process. The 
optimizing model of decision-making (Rados, 1972) can provide a fairly accurate description 
of the decision-making process if the parties are faced with a simple decision situation (e.g., 
when there are few alternative courses of action and cost of searching for and evaluating 
..alternatives are low). We need to acknowledge, however, that many decisions to initiate an 
intracorporate knowledge sharing effort do not involve simple and well-structured problems. 
Rather, decision situations regarding knowledge transfer initiatives are often characterized by 
'complexity, relatively high uncertainty, and goals and preferences that arc neither clear nor 
I consistent. 
The decision phase, as discerned in the preceding section, comprises two arbitrarily defined 
stages, being an awareness and an interest stage (see Figure 3.4). Once again, we want to stress 
that it is acknowledged that no subdivision of the process can actually be as self-contained as a 
discrete stage (Spence, 1994: 56). It is recognized that there is no boundary point of separation 
between any of them and that the decision-making process could be better conceived if 
decision-making is understood as a continuous process in a context and not as a discrete 
decision event abstracted from the series of decisions and other actions of which it is part 
(Pettigrew, 1990: 8). The subdivision into a selected number of stages, however, is used in this 
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Figure 3.4: The Two Stages of the Decision Phase. 
research project because it helps to break up a rather complicated process and enables us to 
focus on smaller units which may be more easily understood. The orderly presentation of 
stages of intracorporate knowledge sharing provides source material for detecting and 
structuring the numerous barriers involved. 
I \ The awareness stage is the only genuine stage. One can only become aware of something 
I new once and without successfully passing this stage an intracorporate knowledge sharing 
I option will not be considered. Awareness can be the result of the donor looking for application 
opportunities, the recipient searching for appropriate knowledge internally to solve its 
problems or exploit the identified opportunities, and an intermediary detecting an opportunity 
_ t^o leverage internally available knowledge||Previous research (Feldman and Kanter, 1965; 
Glueck, 1976; O'Reilly, 1982; Culnan, 1983) suggests that some sort of threshold must be 
exceeded before organizational members or units are actively going to search for new 
information or knowledge. Often the donor starts to search for intracorporate knowledge 
sharing opportunities only in response to actual or suspected problems or opportunities. Next 
to the "buyer's model," Ross (1974) presents the "seller's model" as an alternative way in 
which innovations could be diffused. The seller's model entails the process of initiating contact 
with potential users and sustaining that contact to achieve the transmission and use of the 
innovation by others. The role of the "seller" can be taken by the knowledge donor or by an 
intermediary (e.g., process leader, liaison member). 
After the knowledge item attracted the attention of a possible user, he or she will try to find 
out whatever additional details and information is obtainable about the item. The user's actions 
to acquire factual data on the performance and effects of the knowledge will be aimed towards 
providing an adequate basis for the making of an evaluative judgement. The recipients 
primarily will be trying very hard to apply the new knowledge mentally to their present 
situation in order to judge its potential benefit for the future or will decide to start a trial on a 
reduced scale. The costs of acquiring the knowledge and putting it into practice will be 
confronted with its benefits. Besides these direct costs, other disadvantages to be considered 
could include uncertainty of operation, eventual obsolescence, and problems in making 
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adjustments to the solution to adapt to local circumstances. Moreover, the particular 
knowledge item will be traded off against other ways to solve the existing problem and the 
most adequate level of adoption will be determined to circumvent a situation in which the 
acquired knowledge is utilized far beyond its intended limits and becomes dysfunctional. 
I The interest stage is technically finished as the parties involved have decided upon their 
willingness to put their effort in the transfer of the knowledge item. The decision phase ends 
when one of two situations occur: (1) the recipient decides to integrate the knowledge item at 
stake in its own operations and finds the donor willing to participate in the effectuation, or (2) 
the parties involved are not convinced of the added value of the knowledge transfer initiative 
and consequently decide to rejec(| In practice, however, evaluation is a continuous process and 
hence often continues in the execution phase of an intracorporate knowledge sharing effort. 
The time elapsed between the conception of a knowledge item and its adoption can vary 
strongly (Gee, 1974, 1978; Ettlie and Rubenstein, 1979). Gee (1974) shows that the average 
time span for adoption or adaptation of promising innovations varies for different countries -
for example, 7.4 years in the United States, 7.7 years in the United Kingdom, 3.4 years in 
Japan, and 5.2 years in Germany. The time period also varies for different industries, 
technologies, product types, environmental conditions, and means of financing (Glaser, 
Abelson, and Garrison, 1983). 
I The role of a firm's top management in managing the decision phase is limited to a 
stimulating task. The task to stimulate means the responsibility to enlarge the number of 
knowledge sharing initiatives by influencing, in Bower's (1970) terminology, the decision-
making process of the front-line managers lower down the hierarchy. In this section it has 
been argued that before knowledge can become subject of an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing project it is necessary that its existence is known and that the problem owners are 
made aware of their decision situation. Consequently, a firm's top management needs to ensure 
that those knowledge items interesting from a knowledge sharing point of view are known 
throughout the organization. Moreover, they need to make sure that the decision criteria 
applied by the front-line managers lower down the hierarchy are in line with the objectives of 
the firm at large5.|\ 
3.4 ACTIVITIES TO EFFECTUATE KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
Like every other decision, intracorporate knowledge sharing does not take place simply 
because it is considered to be desirable; it takes place if it can be made to work. Every 
decision-making process is of little value to an organization unless the decision is capable of 
being effectuated. Consequently, since implementation can make a sound decision ineffective 
-' These preliminary conclusions evolve into well-founded propositions in the fourth chapter where the barriers 
in the decision phase of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process are detailed and the prerequisite 
management systems to remove or reduce them proposed. 
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Figure 3.5: The Two Stages of the Execution Phase. 
or a debatable choice successful, it is important to study the process of implementation while 
evaluating the appropriate decision. After making the decision to initiate an intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project, however, the second phase of effectuating the transfer of 
knowledge commences. This execution phase concerns those activities that put the knowledge 
item into use and ensures its integration in the knowledge reservoir of the recipient 
(Damanpour, 199 l)j| Instead of the strictly mental exercise of the decision phase, the execution 
phase involves overt behavior change as the new idea is actually put into practice (Rogers, 
1995) and hence requires a totally different orientation than the one needed in the preceding 
phase.: 
The execution phase usually follows the decision phase rather directly (unless its is held up 
J H 
by some logistical or resource problem) and ends eventually as the point is reached at which 
the new idea becomes an institutionalized and regularized part of the adopter's ongoing 
operations, or as the parties involved agree that the adoption decision was a mistakcJJAlthough 
we have to admit once again that the boundaries and sequence of the stages are far less than 
clear and that even the possibility exists that the actors return to the decision phase during the 
knowledge transfer endeavour| two generic stages arc discerned in the execution phase of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process, namely the preparation and the transfer stage (see 
Figure 3.5). To complete the knowledge transfer successfully, a shared responsibility of both 
the donor and the recipient exists in these two stages of the execution phase. Although the 
leading role shifts from the donor to the recipient during the execution phase, both actors have 
to put their effort in the optimal application and integration of the knowledge item at stake. 1 I 
Without this mentality of the involved parties, the value added of the knowledge sharing 
initiative (the Value Determinant) will suffer and could even lead to a loss-making process. 
The preparation stage creates - if managed appropriately - the requisite groundwork for the 
transfer process (Reilly, 1988) during which the donor and recipient study the particular 
characteristics of the project, formulate their judgement on the complexity of the project, and 
decide upon the required transfer medium (e.g., distract from databases, special reports, liaison 
member, bilateral or group meetings, personnel transfer). Communication media, as Daft and 
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Lcngel (1984;_[986) argue, vary in their capacity to process rich information. The reason for 
nchTTKsthfferences include the medium's capacity for immediate feedback, the number of 
cues and channels utilized, personalization, and language variety (Daft and Wiginton, 1979). 
Media of low richness are effective for processing well-understood messages and standard 
data, while media of high richness are necessary to accomplish the transfer of very complex 
messages. Consequently, it is very important that the complexity of the transfer situation is 
brought into line with the richness of the transfer medium (Galbraith, 1973; Lengel and Daft, 
1984; Adler, 1990; De Meyer, 1991). 
During the preparation stage of an intracorporate knowledge sharing project one needs to 
study the complexity of the particular situation and decide upon the most suitable transfer 
mechanism to be used for the effectuation of the knowledge transfer (see Figure 3.6). On the 
one hand, the particular knowledge transfer medium must be capable of dealing with the 
complexity of the situation to lead to a successful movement and application of the particular 
knowledge item. The knowledge transfer is complicated, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, by 
such factors as the nature of knowledge, the motivation of the actors, the heterogeneity of prior 
knowledge, and the level of trust between the actors. On the other hand, efficiency rationales 
demand that complex transfer mechanisms are not used for relatively simple knowledge 
transfer situations. For example, the know-how and experience regarding the automatization of 
an production plant is very difficult to convey effectively via a telephone conversation or 
written documentation, but the use of an expatriate for the effectuation of a rather simple 
knowledge transaction such as the explication of a particular sales technique could be far too 
high 
Richness 
of the Medium 
Utilized in the 
Intracorporate Knowledge 
Sharing 
Project 
low 
Complexity 
of the Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing Project 
Figure 3.6: Knowledge Sharing Effectuation. 
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costly if it does not significantly improve the effectiveness of the knowledge application and 
integration. 
The preparation stage is a crucial one in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of an 
intracorporate knowledge sharing effort. A misfit between the richness of the transfer medium 
and the complexity of the intracorporate knowledge sharing project will affect the 
effectiveness or efficiency of the endeavour. One has to acknowledge, however, that large 
differences exist between the various "sharing" endeavours. As a consequence, some 
intracorporate knowledge sharing projects will require no preparation at all while in other 
situations preparations will be needed that will require a lot of time and management attention. 
The donor takes often the lead throughout the preparation stage because he or she is often 
better able to make an estimation of the complexity and requirements of the project than the 
recipient. . 
Although strongly intertwined with the preparation stage and arbitrarily defined, the 
transfer stage commences when the main decisions on how to effectuate the knowledge 
transfer have been made and the donor starts to explicate the knowledge item to the recipient. 
The transfer process may last a few minutes or several years, but is often an interactive process 
between acceptor and transferor. Consequently, it may be essential that the parties involved 
develop a team spirit and a strong commitment to the project. Both parties must understand 
that the intracorporate knowledge sharing project will be successful only if they work together 
as a team and are committed to team success. Moreover, because we are dealing with an 
evolutionary process with many different decision points, it is important that management on 
both sides stays abreast of the action. Management needs to monitor progress, ensure that 
I objectives remain clear, negotiate when necessary, and make decisions in a timely manner. 
The transfer stage ends as the recipient takes ownership of the knowledge and the new idea 
has become an institutionalized and regularized part of the adopter's ongoing operations 
(Damanpour, 1991; Rogers, 1995). Recipients are normally obliged to devote substantial 
resources in order to adapt and probably improve upon the original knowledge item (Baranson 
and Roak, 1985). Without the acceptor taking ownership of the knowledge item at stake the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing effort will have strong problems in generating the expected 
added value. The lead in the intracorporate knowledge sharing project must be taken over by 
the acceptor to ensure that the knowledge item becomes an integral part of the receiving 
organization. The transferor can only take a support role in this stage of the project and should 
stimulate the acceptor to promote and effectuate the implementation of the knowledge item. If 
this does not occur, it is important for management to determine the causes and to intervene 
immediately because schedule, costs, and benefits will suffer. 
The role of a firm's top management in managing the execution phase is limited to a 
facilitating task. The task to facilitate means the responsibility to influence the degree of 
success regarding intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts between front-line managers 
throughout the hierarchy by creating the appropriate conditions for effectuating the transfer 
and deployment of knowledge in a productive way. Corporate management has two options in 
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facilitating the effectuation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing project6. On the one hand, 
corporate management could take action with respect to the antecedents of the complexity of 
the intracorporate knowledge sharing projects (e.g., nature of knowledge, level of trust 
between the actors) to reduce, at average, the complexity to share knowledge. On the other 
hand, corporate management could extent the resources and the available transfer media to 
enable front-line managers to deal with the particular complexity of their intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project. 
3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The conceptualization of the knowledge sharing process, as presented and discussed in this 
third chapter, has resulted in an organizing framework which categorizes the factors 
influencing the process of intracorporate knowledge sharing to be reviewed in the next two 
chapters. The process analysis assists us in synthesizing of what we know and delineating what 
else we need to create a more complete picture on the issues surrounding managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. For managerial reasons, a line has been drawn between the 
phases of decision and execution within the intracorporate knowledge sharing process. The 
decision phase comprises an awareness and an interest stage. Management of the decision 
phase determines the number of times that an attempt is made to share knowledge (the 
Quantity Determinant). The execution phase consists of a preparation and a transfer stage. 
Management of the execution phase influences the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
knowledge transfer effort and hence the added value of the knowledge sharing initiative (the 
Value Determinant). Combining the quantity and value determinant, one is able to 
approximate the actual total value created by intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
Top and front-line management each have their own contribution to make to intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. While front-line management is accountable for both the initiation and 
effectuation of knowledge transfer efforts, top management has only an indirect role to play. 
Due to the prevailing complexity in most multinational enterprises (Doz and Prahalad, 1991), • 
top management has to limit its managerial role to the stimulation and facilitation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts. As Bartlett and Ghoshal (1995: 140) argue, "...unlike 
capital, knowledge is most valuable when those on the front lines control and use it." The task 
to stimulate consists of the attempt to enlarge the number of knowledge sharing initiatives by 
influencing the decision-making process of those employees lower down the hierarchy to 
participate in the supply, reception, and application of internally available knowledge. The task 
to facilitate represents the effort to influence the successfulness of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing projects between managers throughout the hierarchy by creating the 
° These preliminary conclusions evolve into well-founded propositions in the fifth chapter where barriers in the 
execution phase of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process are described and the prerequisite 
management systems to remove or reduce them proposed. 
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Task to 
EFFECTUATE 
Task to 
FACILITATE 
Table 3.1: Different Roles regarding Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing. 
appropriate conditions for effectuating the transfer and deployment of knowledge in a 
productive way. 
Based on a managerial categorization of the barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing, 
the next two chapters present detailed propositions regarding the management tools which a 
firm's top management can and should implement in its responsibility to stimulate and 
facilitate the leverage of a multinational's internationally scattered knowledge resources. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the barriers and management systems related to the decision phase, while 
Chapter 5 details the barriers and management systems in the execution phase. 
4 
Management Systems that 
Remove and Reduce the 
Barriers to Initiation 
The Decision Phase 
"A general theory of administration must include principles of organization that will 
insure correct decision-making, just as it must include principles that will insure effective 
action." 
-Simon (1976: 1). 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Intracorporate knowledge sharing could be conceptualized as being influenced by both 
obstacles and spurs (see Table 4.1). Obstacles inhibit the initiation and effectuation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts, while spurs stimulate and facilitate themjf Both the 
negative and positive effects on the intracorporate knowledge sharing process have been 
widely investigated before and numerous lists of determinants can be found in the literature. 
Instead of discussing all the factors involved in a commingled way, the aim of deductive 
reasoning necessitates the more focused effort of creating a managerial categorization of the 
barriers involvcd.| Apart from the fact that obstacles and spurs can often be brought back to the 
same underlying phenomenon, the obstacles restrain the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process and hence, from a corporate management point of view, should be eliminated or 
reduced to smooth the initiation and effectuation of knowledge transfer efforts by front-line 
managers lower down the organizational hierarchy.jBy detecting where and how the various 
deterrents affect the leverage of internally available knowledge items, conclusions can be 
drawn on the critical managerial responsibilities and the management systems for stimulating 
and facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing. By eliminating and reducing the barriers to 
initiation and effectuation wherever possible, corporate management tends to increase the total 
value created by intracorporate knowledge sharing and hence the corporate value generation 
by means of the leverage of internal knowledge resources.!} 
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Spurs 
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(Chapter 4) 
Barriers to Initiation 
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Execution Phase 
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(Chapter 5) 
Barriers to Effectuation 
Facilitators to Effectuation 
Table 4.1: Typology of Factors Influencing Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing. 
This fourth chapter focuses on factors influencing the initiation of knowledge sharing 
efforts (see Figure 4.1), while the next chapter emphasizes the issues surrounding the 
effectuation of knowledge transfer initiatives. The decision phase of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process, as conceptualized in the previous chapter, comprises an awareness 
and an interest stage. On the face of these stages, it has been concluded that before knowledge 
can be shared, its existence and redeployment possibilities must be known by the knowledge 
donor or the potential recipients. Moreover, corporate management has to make sure that the 
front-line manager's decision criteria concerning the willingness to participate in such a 
knowledge transfer effort are in line with the objectives of the firm at large. Building upon the 
process analysis and provoked by these preliminary conclusions, the barriers obstructing the 
initiation of intracorporate knowledge sharing projects in multinationals are further detailed 
and reviewed in this chapter. As illustrated in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the barriers to initiation arc 
clustered in two groupings, namely Awareness Barriers and Interest Barriers. An effort to 
Management S y s t e m s to St imulate 
Focused at Reducing the Obstructing Influence of the Barriers to Initiation 
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Figure 4.1: Factors Influencing the Initiation of Knowledge Sharing Efforts. 
THE DECISION PHASE m 57 
Managing Awareness Barriers 
Managing Interest Barriers 
MANAGING 
THE 
DECISION 
PHASE 
Figure 4.2: Managing the Decision Phase. 
transfer and redeploy an internally available knowledge item is only initiated if the front-line 
managers involved can overcome these awareness and interest barriers to intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. 
When all managers throughout the organization would have perfect and complete 
information and would agree on the corporation's objectives or desired outcomes, deciding on 
when, where, and how to share knowledge would be a clear-cut issue. In reality, however, a 
decision situation with respect to intracorporate knowledge sharing is often surrounded with a 
lot of fuzziness and uncertainty, and hence necessitates serious attention of a firm's top 
management. Consequently, the analysis of the barriers, as presented in both section 4.2 and 
4.3, is utilized as a means to investigate the required management systems for managing the 
decision phase or, in other words, the management actions necessary to at least reduce and 
eliminate the awareness and interest barriers regarding the initiation of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing efforts. Based upon an understanding of these barriers, two preliminary 
propositions are offered regarding the prerequisite management systems for stimulating the 
initiation of knowledge transfer efforts throughout the organization. In the concluding section 
of this chapter, we are able to devise the first half of our managerial framework encompassing 
the factors influencing the intracorporate knowledge sharing process and allowing not only the 
observation, but also the analysis, understanding, and normative assessment of the tasks and 
responsibilities within management of the decision phase of the intracorporate knowledge 
sharing process. 
4.2 MANAGING AWARENESS BARRIERS 
) The only genuine stage in the intracorporate knowledge sharing process is becoming aware of 
an opportunity to share a knowledge item with a colleague within the firm at large. Before a 
particular knowledge item can be leveraged, a supplier or recipient must be found. It is far too 
simple to belief that the process of giving and taking knowledge just boils down to finding the 
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' right supplier (Bidault and Fischer, 1994). Indeed, in many occasions knowledge sharing 
opportunities remain unexploited due to the inability to detect the transferors or potential 
acceptors of available business solutions (Allen, 1977; Allen, Tushman and Lee, 1979; Van 
i Geenhuizen, 1993). One reason is that the knowledge donors lack the modes to identify their 
I colleagues receptive to review existing business solutions or information. The other reason is 
that those eager to evaluate available skills and know-how to solve their own business issues 
cannot detect the appropriate knowledge items and their location. 
Unable to inform their front-line managers on all opportunities to share knowledge and 
establish the linkages between them, corporate management must, in its stimulating task, 
remove and reduce the prevailing awareness barriers to ensure that employees throughout the 
firm become aware of increased possibilities to share valuable knowledge items. This section 
deals with how corporate management can cope with these awareness barriers and proposes to 
implement a Knowledge Sharing Awareness System as a stimulator to initiation. Building on a 
comprehensive review of the prevailing awareness barriers as will be presented in the 
following section, section 4.2.2 discusses ways for corporate management to give content and 
form to a knowledge sharing awareness system in its attempt to eliminate and reduce the 
existing awareness barriers. 
4.2.1 Origins of Awareness Barriers 
f Awareness barriers are deterrents obstructing front-line managers to detect opportunities to 
f share knowledge within the boundaries of the enterprise. Awareness barriers cause a passive 
I rejection (Eveland, 1979), meaning that the adoption of a particular knowledge item is never 
j "^accomplished because its use is never really considered. "Organizational units with potentially 
| synergetic information," as argued by Huber (1991: 101), "are often not aware of where such 
1 information could serve, and so do not route it to these destinations. Also, units which might 
Jbe able to use information synergetically often do not know of its existence or whereabouts." 
Consequently, it is surprising that the process of how those who possess nonroutinc 
information and those who need this information find each other is relatively unstudied. If we 
want to learn why so many valuable knowledge items remain unexploited, we need to pay 
serious attention to the numerous awareness barriers blocking the conversion of highly 
interesting knowledge sharing prospects. 
Many reasons can be discerned, as depicted in Figure 4.3, why organizations frequently do 
not know what they know. A first factor effecting the variations in awareness is related to the 
nature of knowledge. With respect to the nature of knowledge, Polanyi (1966: 52) argues that a 
distinction can be made between encoded and tacit knowledge and that "... the indefinable 
knowledge is [...] an essential part of technology". Knowledge is often embedded in the 
activities, habits, and automatic responses of key people throughout the organization. The 
knowledge that can be articulated and thus transmitted in formal, systematic language 
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Figure 4.3: Factors underlying Awareness Barriers. 
constitutes just a small part of our entire body of knowledge and this observation makes 
Polanyi (1966: 4) conclude that "...we can know more than we can tell". The major part of our«. 
knowledge reservoir is tacit knowledge which in many cases remains difficult to abstract and 
hence extremely hard to locate and exploit (Polanyi, 1966; Itami, 1989; Levitt, 1991; Nonaka, 
1994). The factor that makes knowledge, in Von Hippel's (1994) terms, "sticky" and hence 
strategic because it makes knowledge difficult to imitate by competitors, also makes 
knowledge more difficult to leverage intentionally. 
A second reason why a firm's employees may have problems to trace opportunities to • 
leverage internally available knowledge can be related to the lack of a tool or facility (e.g., 
information system, liaison roles, informal network) which, as Boynton (1993: 62) argues, 
"allow managers within the organization to rapidly develop, gather, store, and disseminate 
information across all boundaries about markets, products, or process capabilities." Still too 
often, corporations lack systems and procedures designed to be dynamically responsive for 
managers who have a need to know. While information for planning or reporting purposes is 
often stored in a systematic and well organized manner nowadays with the help of systems that 
routinely index and store "hard" information, the more conceptual and "soft" information is 
only rarely registered and gets lost as a result of specialization, differentiation, and 
departmentalization (Huber, 1991: 106).iKnowing where knowledge resides with the help of a 
"who-knows-what" facility is important for effectively managing and exploiting knowledge 
(•Bonn, 1994JjWithout being aware of the available knowledge and knowledge application 
opportunities within the corporation, the intracorporate knowledge sharing process will never 
onset. Without knowing who to contact for a distinguished knowledge "gap" or being 
informed about an existing knowledge need inside the corporation, both knowledge recipients 
and donors are unable to find their way throughout the corporation and establish cooperative 
relationships with their colleagues to leverage the firm's knowledge base. 
n A third reason why it could be difficult to trace intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects • 
"is related to the donor. The donor can have personal reasons not to explicate and communicate 
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his or her knowledge exploration results to colleagues and superiors inside the corporation, a 
phenomenon called "bootlegging" by Bright (1967). Causal ambiguity related to the 
knowledge item is one of the possible reasons underlying bootlegging behavior in an 
organization. Causal ambiguity occurs, following Rumelt (1984: 562), if all the implications of 
I the knowledge and the precise reasons for success or failure for solving a problem cannot be determined. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the knowledge item, managers can be scared I and hence not willing to diffuse the knowledge because of the threat of public scorn. A second 
! rationale underlying bootlegging is the potentially damaging nature of particular information 
to the party who is supposed to supply it. Confessions of failure are hardly likely, especially 
when some sort of punishment may result. A final reason for the donor to hold back his or her 
i knowledge is the lack of authorization. Business unit management sometimes initiates 
exploration activities deliberately without consultating of the firm's headquarters. Front-line 
managers are often irritated by corporate procedures for certain business and investment 
decisions which strongly restrict the flexibility of their business strategy. By neglecting the 
reporting procedures, time advantages can be won but secrecy of the activities must be kept for 
a while. During this period, however, the knowledge depreciates and is probably reinvented by 
managers of related subsidiaries. 
A final argument underlying the existence of awareness barriers within organizations is that 
the perception and prior knowledge of the parties involved can obstruct the valuation and 
hence the detection of opportunities to leverage available knowledge. "A more realistic view of 
innovation should begin with an appreciation of the physiological limitations of human beings 
to pay attention to nonroutine issues, and their corresponding inertial forces in organizational 
life," Van der Ven (1988:594) argues. People are limited in their search process to new 
solutions based on their current reservoir of knowledge (Aharoni, 1991). A person's own 
vision on a particular field of study influences his or her ability to appraise the importance of a 
new invention or bunch of information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As Pennings and 
Harianto (1992: 30) argue, "... firm's skills cannot be transferred because the current stock of 
skills focuses the efforts of people in organizations in specific directions. New solutions are 
similar to or in the neighbourhood of current solutions. On the voyage to new territories we are 
attracted to what looks familiar to or consistent with what we already know." 
Based on the examination of the factors obstructing awareness, it may be assumed that the 
difficulty to trace and locate intracorporate knowledge sharing opportunities is negatively 
associated with the initiation of intracorporate knowledge sharing projects. Consequently, with 
respect to the responsibility of a firm's top management to stimulate intracorporate knowledge 
sharing, the following proposition was formulated: 
Proposition (PI): 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing project is more likely to occur when there is 
a management system which makes employees aware of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
prospects. 
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The management system which makes employees aware of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing prospects and hence removes and reduces the awareness barriers to initiation is called 
the Knowledge Sharing Awareness System. Based on the scrutiny of the deterrents to 
awareness in this section, the following section enumerates the alternative tools of such a 
knowledge sharing awareness system. 
4.2.2 Toward a Knowledge Sharing Awareness System 
Critical for the conversion of knowledge sharing prospects, as argued in the preceding section, 
is the awareness of the locus of useful expertise and market knowledge throughout the 
organization. Front-line managers must be capable to detect who knows what, who can help 
with what problem, and who can redeploy existing knowledge items (Szulanski, 1995). 
| Corporate management in its responsibility to stimulate can and should assist managers lower 
down the hierarchy to cope with the awareness barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
On average, the awareness stage would come more often into effect throughout the 
organization if a firm's top management is able to remove or reduce the prevailing awareness 
barriers. Knowledge donors and possible recipients need to be able to discern the opportunities 
to leverage internally available knowledge and it is posed that a Knowledge Sharing 
Awareness System could help (see Proposition PI). As Boynton (1991: 63) argues, "Product 
managers responsible for meeting product demand must be able to anticipate and respond to 
product change quickly by identifying what know-how and process capabilities are available 
within the firm." 
A knowledge sharing awareness system focuses on the reduction and elimination of the 
obstructing influence of the awareness barriers (see Figure 4.4). As a conceptual construct, 
Knowledge Sharing Awareness System 
Focused at Reducing the obstructing influence of the Awareness Barriers 
Awareness Interest 
Stage Stage 
Figure 4.4: The Function of a Knowledge Sharing Awareness System. 
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THE KNOWLEDGE SHARING AWARENESS SYSTEM 
A Set of Management Tools 
A Knowledge Sharing Awareness System can be given form and content by using one or 
more of the following management tools. The most suitable set of tools for a particular firm 
and the best way of implementing them are supposed to be situation-specific. 
(1) KNOWLEDGE CODIFICATION, REGISTRATION, AND STORAGE 
Putting an incentive on the codification and/or registration of existing knowledge to facilitate 
the communication and detection of knowledge 
(2) NETWORKING INTRACORPORATE KNOWLEDGE SOURCES & ADOPTERS 
Corporate management can shape or accomodate the development of a network (e.g., an electronic 
information spider web, formal or informal interrelationships) to link all of the firm's employees 
(3) ASSIGNING KNOWLEDGE EXPLORATION RESPONSIBILITIES 
Transparency can be created with respect to the locus of existing knowledge by assigning 
development responsibilities to temporary development projects or permanent expertise centers 
(4) INSTITUTIONALIZING KNOWLEDGE SHARING INTERMEDIARIES 
Intermediating bodies can be institutionalized. "Teachers" for the collection and diffusion of best 
practice. Liaisons for the mediation between knowledge donors and recipients 
(5) IMPLEMENTING INTERNAL BENCHMARKING PROCEDURES 
Implementing a systematic assessment procedure to benchmark the subsidiaries internally in 
search for best practices in particular areas and to collect hard proof on improvement opportunities 
Exhibit 4.1: Management Tools of a Knowledge Sharing Awareness System. 
however, a knowledge sharing awareness system is not directly observable in practical settings 
and hence has to be defined on the basis of observable management tools (see Exhibit 4.1). 
Five tools described and discussed in the remainder of this section are the most representative 
spurs presented in the literature with regard to awareness1. By linking these management tools 
with the factors underlying the awareness barriers (see Table 4.2), we learn that only the 
"bootlegging" phenomenon remains unaffected by the main parts of a knowledge sharing 
awareness system. The discussion on the management tools related to "bootlegging" is 
deliberately postponed to circumvent duplication in the underlying text. A knowledge donor 
who is unwilling to explicate and communicate his or her knowledge exploration results has to 
be persuaded and the next section particularly deals with this issue 
A knowledge sharing awareness system assists front-line managers in drawing from 
organizationally accumulated know-how by providing tools to locate the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing opportunities within the firm at large. The strength of a knowledge sharing 
awareness system to decrease the obstructing influence of the awareness barriers is dependent 
' Although the extent to which a management tool is representative remains somewhat subjective, its 
representative nature has been verified by logical reasoning based on the factors underlying the awareness 
barriers and early checks and pilot studies in practical settings. 
THE DECISION PHASE m 63 
Factor underlying Awareness Barriers Tacitness of Lack of Cognitive Limits 
Knowledge "Who-Knows-What" Bootlegging t 0 Discern 
• 
m 
m 
m 
n 
n 
n 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
m 
Tools of KS Awareness System Facility Knowledge 
Knowledge Codification, Registering, and Storage | X I 
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Institutionalizing Knowledge Sharing Intermediaries I j 
Implementing Internal Benchmark Procedures I | 
Table 4.2: Matching Tools and Factors underlying Awareness Barriers. 
on its degree of development. In boosting the degree of development of such a management 
system, a firm's top management can rely upon a number of mechanisms (see Exhibit 4.1). Top 
management can give content and form to a knowledge sharing awareness system by using one 
or more of the following means: first, incentives can be put on the codification, registering, 
and storage of existing expertise and information on the business environment; second, 
networks can be shaped or its development accommodated to provide the necessary vector for 
information exchange; third, clarity can be created with respect to the locus of existing 
knowledge by assigning development responsibilities to specialized expertise centers; fourth, 
intermediaries can be institutionalized, and finally, top management can institutionalize 
systematic benchmark procedures to register and detect best-practice levels throughout the 
firm. 
TOOL #1: KNOWLEDGE CODIFICATION AND ARTICULATION 
Without any doubt, the major part of the available knowledge in an organization resides 
exclusively in the heads of its employees (Polanyi, 1958). Although it can be transferred to 
some extent via education, training programs, and donor-accompanied trial and error activities, 
human-embodied knowledge is difficult to find and hence very complicated to exploit. 
Consequently, one of the actions corporate management can take in its attempt to reduce the 
awareness barriers is putting an incentive on the codification, registering, and storage of 
existing knowledge within the organization (Davis, 1986; Von Hippel, 1994). Natural memory 
can be supplemented with artificial aids like documents, manuals, and computer memory 
(Arrow, 1971) through the codification and registering of existing skills, capabilities, and 
know-how. Hedlund (1994) calls the process during which tacit knowledge is being made 
explicit knowledge articulation. He argues that "The current, and justified, fascination with the 
tacit component of knowledge in much of the literature must not cloud the fact that 
organizations to a large extent are "articulation machines", built around codified practices and 
deriving some of their competitive advantages from clever, unique articulation. In fact, much 
of industrialization seems to have entailed exactly the progressive articulation of craftsmanlike 
skills, difficult but not impossible to codify" (1994: 76). 
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Therefore, a firm is able to document the codifiable knowledge residing throughout the 
organization. By articulating skills and know-how, it becomes possible to fully convey the 
knowledge by communication alone and this improves the communicability of knowledge 
significantly and hence the detection of knowledge transfer opportunities. As Winter (1988: 
171) states: ""Fully articulatable knowledge can be communicated from its processor to 
another person in symbolic form, and the recipient of the communication becomes as much 'in 
the know' as the originator." Hedlund and Nonaka (1993: 126) argue that "Knowledge 
articulation is a crucial process since it significantly increases the potential for critique, testing 
and for sharing through transfer of knowledge." 
Boisot (1983: 163), however, warns for obstacles which stand in the way of effective 
codification of knowledge. He argues, for example, that "abstracting from experience can be 
done in an almost infinite number of ways... the choice of what to codify and how to codify ... 
remains intensely personal even if it admits of outside influences". "The objects of our 
perception and experience are constructed out of the flux of sensation to which we are 
continuously being subjected by our selecting their most representative states or attributes -
those that is, which we are most familiar with - as a basis for their classification" (pp. 162-
163). Although yielding very useful knowledge, the routines of a ballet dancer, for example, 
would be very difficult to codify. Each and every ballet dancer would stress other facets of 
their experience for emphasis and hence the same experience would be codified in different 
ways by different ballet dancers. 
Being fearful that the codification of knowledge increases competitor imitation is 
understandable, but Zander (1991) shows quite convincingly that this relation does not need to 
exist. Another danger of knowledge abstraction, however, is that it can increase the 
bureaucracy of an organization. By producing whole packages of descriptions of 
organizational procedures, skills, and capabilities, the organization can become reluctant to 
change and lose some of its flexibility. Consequently, if codification of the content of the 
knowledge item seems impossible, too dangerous, or too costly, one can decide to register the 
available skills and capabilities without codifying its nature. By registering the available 
"practices", colleagues can, at least, become aware of the existing know-how and experience 
existing throughout the corporation. As the recipient is willing to participate in a series of trial 
performances of the skill and to attend to the teacher's critique of the errors made in these 
trials, even the not articulatable knowledge can often be transferred (Winter, 1988). The ballet 
dancer, for example, can leach her students ballet dancing gradually by observing and giving 
comments upon their trial and error activities. Being vulnerable for this kind of critique, 
however, the recipient can learn the required skill much faster relative to what would be 
required by the pupil proceeding on trial and error alone. 
TOOL #2: NETWORKING 
Awareness requires more than the codification and registering of available knowledge. Within 
the boundaries of the multinational enterprise, knowledge is scattered over the firm's 
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subsidiaries and valuable knowledge can emerge everywhere. Consequently, more and more 
authors stress that the creation of a network linking knowledgeable employees throughout the 
corporation is one of the prerequisite steps to leverage internally available knowledge (e.g., 
Rogers, 1983; Peters, 1994; Robertson, Swan, and Newell, 1996). Networks provide the 
necessary vector for information exchange and "we must understand the nature of networks if 
we are to comprehend the diffusion of innovations fully" (Rogers, 1983: 293). Bob Buckman, 
head of Buckman Labs, a successful innovative specialty chemical company, adds to this that 
the network should connect everybody to each other within the organization. "If you don't let 
the person on the front line, who is generating the cash flow for the company, have the same 
connectivity as the CEO, you don't have the connectivity necessary to strategically leverage 
knowledge," Buckman told Tom Peters (Peters, 1994: 168). 
"An important characteristic of networks," as stated by Camillus (1993: 316), "is that they TXf" 
recognize and emphasize the different competences of individuals in an organization but 
largely disregard hierarchical structures in terms of who relates to whom. [...] Networks 
emerge to take advantage of the differing capabilities, knowledge, resources, perspectives, and 
locations of their individual participants." Networks are unbounded or bounded clusters of 
organizations that "constitute a basic social form that permits interorganizational interactions 
of exchange, concerted action and joint production" (Alter and Hage, 1993: 46). Networking 
refers, therefore, to the activity of creating or maintaining this kind of organizational exchange. 
Organizations may engage in informational collection and exchange in order to reduce risk or 
uncertainty, or to share expertise. Networks allow information to be communicated across 
organizational boundaries (Robertson, Swan, and Newell, 1996) or, in Rogers' terms, across 
social "cliques." 
Networks can be divided into electronic and interpersonal variants. Nowadays techno : 
experts and organization scientists stress the implications of advanced information 
technologies on knowledge and information processes (Huber, 1991; Scott Morton, 1991; 
Martins, 1994). "Intranets" like Lotus Notes and Novell's Groupwise help people access, track 
and share information like never before. With an advanced and extensive communications 
infrastructure in place, spontaneous lateral communication opens up new avenues for 
knowledge sharing in multinational enterprises. Storage technology has expanded the amount 
and changed the nature of stored knowledge readily accessible to organizations (Yates and 
Benjamin, 1991). Moreover, existing communication technologies give new meaning to 
concepts of distance which is particularly important for multinational enterprises where both 
geographical and hierarchical distances are great (Hagstrom, 1991). 
Linking geographically disparate units with computer-aided systems provide a long-term, 
electronic memory shared by all organization members which can be continuously updated and 
improved. Goodman and Darr (1996: 9), for example, describe a computer aided system at 
Office Equipment where contributors of solutions send their ideas to an electronic library 
where they arc reviewed. Those accepted are stored in library. A potential adopter can gain 
access to the library, review an index cataloging classes of problems and solutions and then 
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review a specific best practice. When an interesting solution is identified, the adopter can 
collect further information by consulting corporate staff or the contributor of the best practice. 
Davenport (1993: 54) enlists three cases in which the goal is to make expert knowledge 
available across an entire firm. As he describes: "Ford [...] has implemented a global database 
of process knowledge for producing electronic components that can be easily accessed by any 
division interested in the experiences of other parts of the organization. American Airlines is 
attempting to build a database of customer service practices and procedures that can be 
accessed by customer service representatives at any airport. Finally, a number of Big Six 
accounting firms [in the USA] have developed networks of information on tax and accounting 
issues." —""""^-v 
Electronic "search engines" maintain reservoirs and conduits of information about all kinds 
of problems and solutions to problems employees have encountered. Although still lacking in 
most corporations, one can expect that such an electronic filing system which registers internal 
capabilities, skills, experience and information will improve the search process for knowledge 
sharing opportunities dramatically. Apart from the dramatic improvement of the search process 
for well-defined knowledge needs, scanning such a system regularly can expose operating 
managers to large amounts of valuable knowledge for which they would not have defined a 
need in advance. 
Despite what the techno-experts might tell, however, knowledge management is not 
primarily a bits-and-bytes issue. For example, as described by Peters (1995: 168), some 17,000 
consultants and accountants at Price Waterhouse are using the Lotus Notes application. 
Although Notes is state-of-the-art software, people at Price Waterhouse are not using it so far 
in a very interesting way. The success of such an information system depends on the capability 
of the "librarian." Strict rules concerning definition and format will determine the use of such a 
system. Moreover, appropriate filters are needed to prevent employees becoming demotivated 
due to the information overload with which they are confronted. For these applications to have 
value, the users have to be motivated to fully exploit their latent power. Electronic networks, 
however, are only one tool supporting the creation and development of an organizational 
network for linking knowledge donors and recipients. 
"While mass media," as Arrow (1991: 33) argues, "play a major role in alerting individuals 
to the possibilities of an innovation, it seems to be personal contact that is most relevant in 
leading to its adoption." Formal and informal organizational interrelations can form the basis 
for personal contact between a firm's employees and hence for their search for opportunities to 
leverage the internally available knowledge. Various studies (Morton, 1971; Allen, 1977; 
Tomlin, 1981) have indicated that if one wants to stimulate communication and interaction 
between employees one has to join them by an organizational bond or create organizational 
linkages. Existing formal coordinative arrangements, however, are not always able to manage 
interdependencies effectively which is due to the potentially damaging nature of particular 
information. Informal channels, instead, by their typical clandestine nature and foundations of 
reciprocity and mutual trust, provide appropriate means for surmounting problems associated 
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with formal channels of communication. Consequently, many authors have pointed out the 
importance of informal flows of information (Zuboff, 1988; Chisholm, 1989; Fleck, 1996; 
Macdonald, 1996). 
The strengths of the informal systems lies in their problem-oriented and pragmatic nature. 
They are self-organizing in the sense that they respond to the effects of experience rather than 
I to the a priori demands of organizational designers (Chisholm, 1989). Informal channels also 
; work more rapidly than their formal analogues because of a reservoir of mutual trust between 
i the individual involved. A principal characteristic of the informal network is that value is 
accorded specific to the individual rather than attached to the position occupied. Unlike the 
formal organization where individuals are valued on the basis of their education, experience, 
and performance, individuals in the informal system are valued on the basis of their knowledge 
and skills. Linkages are initiated on an as-needed basis and have proved surprisingly flexible 
and adaptive as devises for informing colleagues about available knowledge. 
Informal coordination mechanisms can not be used independent from the informal 
counterparts. No organization can rely on a single one of these mechanisms. All organizations 
have to search for the right balance between these two mechanisms, dependent on the 
organization's situation. The type of coordination used in the organization is a function of the 
extent to which the situation is standardized. The more stable and predictable the situation, the 
greater the reliance on coordination by formal arrangements; the more variable and 
unpredictable the situation, the greater the reliance on informal processes within the 
organization. Although less certain, the informal processes are the only means that can be 
relied upon under extremely difficult circumstances (Mintzberg, 1979). 
TOOL #3: ALLOCATING KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
Instead of enforcing employees throughout the corporation to find their way to scattered and 
often ill-defined knowledge sources, corporate management can create more transparency by 
assigning development responsibilities to temporary taskforces or permanent expertise centers. 
( By defining the locus of the development work in a particular area, more insight can be provided in what places various types of knowledge reside. We refer here to situations in 
1
 which a subsidiary, team, or organizational unit gets authority, ability, and autonomy to define 
and serve knowledge development needs beyond the local context (Surlemont, 1994), These 
taskforces or expertise centers can become highly visible experts in the organization and, in 
this way, significantly reduce the confusion with respect to "who-to-contact" problems on 
particular issues. Moreover, competent innovators with complementary knowledge sources can 
be brought together in these expert groups or competence centers which contributes to the 
quality of the development work. 
Temporary development projects are often defined and organized around the objective of 
creating a particular new product, service, or process, but can also be used to develop less 
tangible assets. These assets might include new approaches or methodologies for inventing and 
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designing products or new machines and systems for producing them. On a more subtle level, 
assets might also include the development of new individual skills and organizational 
I capabilities. Achieving an appropriate performance with respect to the output of development 
work and its exploitation throughout the organization requires more than simply naming 
members and designating a project head (Clark and Wheelwright, 1993; Thomas, 1995). Given 
a good development concept, a team, and the necessary resources as a starting point, Bowen, 
Clark, Hollo way, and Wheelwright (1994) present seven key elements for outstanding 
development projects, namely (1) full recognition of interaction with core capabilities and core 
rigidities; (2) guiding visions; (3) the degree to which the performance envelope is pushed; (4) 
project leadership and organization; (5) ownership and commitment; (6) rapid learning and 
early testing through prototyping, and (7) the integration within the development project. 
These seven elements, they argue, when integrated into a holistic approach, become critical 
elements for success. 
A rather new organizational phenomenon in many multinational enterprises is the 
institutionalization of more permanent development groups in areas like marketing, 
information technology, and manufacturing. These groups have various titles like Expertise 
Centers, Lead Centers, Competence Centers, Shared Resource Centers, or Centers of 
Excellence. They are often created with the intention to reduce duplication of knowledge 
exploration activities, to combine the best jnnovators in the organization, to increase the 
returns on investment in development work, and to reduce costs. Top technical expertise for its 
members and soft skills for supervisors are absolutely critical for the success of an expertise 
center. Although complicated by geographical and cultural distance, members of expertise 
centers must learn to operate closely in line with the needs of consumers and the subsidiaries, 
and must avoid situations in which the expertise center drifts away and becomes disconnected 
with the issues and demands concerning the operating level. Moreover, the institutionalization 
of expertise centers often implies that the related subsidiaries have no other choice than to cut 
down their development budgets which can lead to major difficulties in the context of 
organizational politics. 
TOOL #4: INSTITUTIONALIZING KNOWLEDGE SHARING INTERMEDIARIES 
Another way corporate management can deal with the difficulties of making knowledge 
sharing opportunities well known throughout the firm is by institutionalizing special 
knowledge sharing intermediaries. Individuals or teams filling this kind of roles do not 
generate knowledge2, but intermediate between the knowledge owner and acceptor by bringing 
It needs to be noted that while the intermediary process is focused on bringing knowledge donors and 
recipients together, knowledge creation can take place as a side-effect of the intermediary process. As a 
consequence, the intermediary has to acknowledge this knowledge exploration aspect of his or her activities 
and exploit those opportunities that arise. 
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them together. Intermediaries have to be well informed regarding the prevailing knowledge 
items throughout the organization and capable of translating the contrasting coding schemes of -
the firm's affiliates. Intermediaries can appear in two conceivable ways, namely as 'teacher" or 
as "liaison". While the teacher collects the knowledge before transfering it again to the 
"trainees", the liaison only intermediates without retrieving ownership over the knowledge at 
stake. 
The teaching function is, as defined by Lessem (1993: 100), "the imparting of knowledge to 
individuals by lectures, discussion and practice." A department or person having the 
responsibility to teach, is made responsible for the collection of best practice with respect to a 
particular knowledge area (e.g., product, process, business environment) and to convey this 
knowledge throughout the organization. Information Centers, Knowledge Transfer Centers, or 
Training Centers are well known terms for these teaching departments. Teaching, however, is 
a complex task (Heidegger, 1991; French and Bazalgette, 1996) which requires serious 
management attention. A real teacher will always communicate intensively and openly with 
both knowledge sources and its knowledge deployers. Moreover, in diffusing knowledge, 
teachers adapt their learning program to audiences and hence often produce the impression that 
nothing is learned from them. The teacher can pass on information by various means like 
personal advise, workshops, seminars, written manuals, and electronic databases. Electronic 
databases into which the corporation's employees can log via remote connections are becoming 
more advanced and user-oriented these days and hence can be more of interest for training 
purposes. 
If the abstraction or collection of internally available knowledge is too costly (getting ] 
consensus on knowledge abstractions can be a very time-consuming business) or too risky 
(when knowledge becomes more vulnerable to leaking to unintended sources), an alternative 
solution for bringing employees with a knowledge problem to possible sources of information 
is appointing liaison members. Liaison members, and the related roles of gatekeepers (Allen 
and Cohen, 1969; Keller and Holland, 1975; Tushman, 1977; MacdonaldW Williams, 1994), 
are employed to mediate the transfer of knowledge. They may act as key nodes in the 
knowledge network, bridging knowledge sources to other areas in the organization. As 
Robbins (1989: 385) defines, a liaison role refers to "individuals with specialized roles 
designed to facilitate communication between two interdependent work units." In terms of 
managing the awareness barriers in the intracorporate knowledge sharing process this means 
that the liaison establishes the contact between a knowledge donor and a party who is or 
should be interested in the knowledge item possessed by the donor. 
The major drawback of these mediating bodies, however, is that there are limits to their 
ability to handle information (Arrow, 1991), especially when the group is large and 
responsibilities are broadly defined. Differentiating the teachers and liaisons based on 
specialized product, process, or regional areas (e.g.. Product Leaders, Process Leaders) could 
improve their view and their ability to detect knowledge leverage prospects. In this respect it is 
interesting to note that the intermediating role can be one of the main triggers behind setting up 
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a regional headquarters (Lasserre, 1996). A regional headquarters can be a mode to bridge the 
global network to the regional operations and to limit the scope of the intermediary's 
responsibility in geographical terms. Discerning opportunities to transfer from one work-unit 
to another requires an excellent perspective on the concerns and views of the individual 
companies, a "helicopter view" which is often not achievable on a global level. Moreover, a 
regional intermediating body is better able to personalize and adapt its mediating task to the 
specific needs of the knowledge recipient and hence enlarge the likelihood of adoption. 
TOOL #5. IMPLEMENTING INTERNAL BENCHMARKING PROCEDURES 
Finally, corporate management can significantly reduce the awareness barriers by mandating a 
regular and systematic procedure to benchmark the affiliates. As has been argued in the 
discussion on awareness barriers, a realistic view on knowledge adoption processes should 
begin with an appreciation of the physiological limitation of human beings to pay attention to 
nonroutine issues (Van der Ven, 1988). People are limited in their search process for new ways 
of doing things by their current reservoir of knowledge (Aharoni, 1991). A benchmark of a 
firm's subsidiaries is a device to identify best practice levels throughout the firm. By 
benchmarking the firm's subsidiaries, hard proof can be collected on improvement 
opportunities to show front-line managers, often in numerical terms, the value of a particular 
knowledge item and how to circumvent a passive rejection by potential knowledge recipients 
(Eveland, 1979). 
Benchmarking is a systematic process of searching for best practice, innovative ideas, and 
effective operating procedures, ranging from looking at "simply the best" to extremely 
complicated measurement techniques. Benchmarking is based on the idea that no individual, 
team, or operating unit - no matter how creative or prolific - can possibly parent all 
innovations. The goal is to boost the learning process in the individual subsidiaries by adopting 
the best practices of colleagues. It is, as defined by Ettinger (1995: 33), "the practice of being 
humble enough to admit someone else is better at something and being wise enough to try to 
learn how to match and even surpass them at it." Benchmarking is commonly perceived of as 
looking outside the boundaries of the firm for best practice, but could also be effectuated 
within the firm. 
Three distinct types of benchmarking are proliferated by Bogan and English (1994), namely 
process benchmarking, performance benchmarking, and strategic benchmarking. Process 
benchmarking focuses on discrete work processes and operating systems (e.g., customer 
complaint process, the billing process) and seeks to identify the most effective operating 
practices from many companies that perform similar work functions. Performance 
benchmarking enables managers to assess their competitive positions through product and 
service comparisons. Finally, strategic benchmarking examines how companies compete and 
attempts to identify the winning strategies that have enabled high-performing companies to be 
successful in their marketplace. 
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Benchmarking can be applied to virtually every function in the corporation and can 
therefore be very powerful in the detection of intracorporate knowledge sharing opportunities. 
It is very important, however, to remember that when analyzing the information, a crucial 
factor is to compare like with like or, in other words, "apples with apples." Internal 
benchmarking is a politically sensitive activity and hence should be effectuated with a lot of 
care (Camp, 1995; Zairi, 1996; Fisher, 1996). 
4.3 MANAGING INTEREST BARRIERS 
Many managers still think that the process of giving and taking knowledge just boils down to 
distributing information on the existing knowledge sources and their whereabouts. Ideally, the 
knowledge sharing awareness system, as presented in the previous section, provides tools to 
determine the general state of the firm's knowledge reservoir, to detect the particular 
companies studying or controlling the required "package of intellectual property," and to 
facilitate the search for knowledge employment possibilities. After an intracorporate' 
knowledge sharing opportunity has been detected, however, both the donor and acceptor must 
pass numerous stages successfully before the knowledge item is transferred and integrated into ' 
I the operations of the receiver. Knowledge donors and recipients will try, after becoming aware 
of a knowledge sharing opportunity, to find out whatever additional details and information is 
obtainable on this undertaking, and to evaluate whether it is beneficial to be involved in the 
' first place. 
. Many barriers, economic or social, can hinder one or both actors in their willingness to 
• participate in the exploitation of a particular knowledge item. These barriers to initiation are 
called Interest Barriers and should be overcome before the knowledge donor and recipients 
agree upon the initiation of a knowledge transfer effort. In line with the argumentation in the 
previous section, we commence this section with an enumeration and analysis of these barriers 
(Section 4.3.1) and deduce some conclusions on the alternative actions available for a firm's 
top management to remove and reduce them (Section 4.3.2). In managing the interest barriers, 
we propose that corporate management has to implement a Knowledge Sharing Persuasion 
System, as a stimulator to initiation. Such a management system needs to ensure that the front-
line manager's decision criteria concerning the willingness to participate in a knowledge 
transfer effort are in line with the objectives of the firm at large. 
4.3.1 Origins of Interest Barriers 
Various researchers have investigated the decision-making process regarding the adoption of 
knowledge items. Notwithstanding some challenging contributions (e.g., Abrahamson, 1991), 
the perspective that rational adopters make independent and technically efficient choices still 
<e 
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dominates this literature. Explanations guided by what Abrahamson calls the "efficient-choice 
perspective" assume that managerial choices should mostly be influenced by considerations 
related to efficiency and hence trade-offs between costs and benefits related to the decision. 
Apart from efficiency rationales the adoption decision will be influenced by personal 
• rationales of both the transferor and the acceptor of the knowledge item3. Consequently, three 
factors were distinguished as underlying the interest barriers, namely efficiency rationales, 
opposition by the knowledge donor, and opposition by the knowledge recipient (see Figure 
,4.5). 
The efficiency trade-off attempts to put a money value on the tangible and intangible costs 
and benefits related to the initiation and effectuation of a particular intracorporate knowledge 
sharing project. As some researchers have pointed out, the resources required to transfer 
r\ knowledge can be considerable (e.g., Contractor, 1980; Pavitt, 1987). Significant direct costs 
are attached to the transfer and absorption of knowledge, transaction costs which are too often 
assumed to be zero or negligible. Different perceptions exist, however, on the costs associated 
with intrafirm transfers of knowledge (Mansfield, 1975; Teece, 1977). Galbraith (1990) 
suggests two groups of costs associated with transfer of knowledge, namely the costs 
associated with "pre-transfer" planning and engineering (e.g., documentation and codification, 
training) and "post-transfer" management and control (e.g., expatriation of engineers, 
adaptation costs). Teece (1977: 245/246) identifies four categories of transfer costs: costs of 
In this respect and in line with our conclusions on the influence of the administrative heritage, it is interesting 
to note that significant variance in the personal considerations could prevail between firms originating from 
different "triad" regions. For example, while Western managers tend to be individualistic and highly 
motivated by monetary rewards, Japanese are inclined to place a higher value on things like honor, trust, and 
personal worth and orientate themselves more strongly on a group level (Whitehill, 1991). These differences 
have strongly motivated the researcher to select a European, an USA, and a Japanese home-based 
multinational as case-study object for the empirical research. 
Efficiency 
Rationales 1 Opposition \, by Knowledge Donor ] 
! 
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pre:engineering technological exchange, costs associated with transferring the process/product 
design and engineering, costs of personnel during transfer, and pre-start-up training costs and 
"excess manufacturing costs." 
Regarding the determinants of transfer costs, findings by Teece (1981) indicate that transfer 
W k: costs are higher when the underlying technology is labor intensive rather than capital intensive. 
Cusumano and Elenkov (1994: 197) and Von Hippel (1994) emphasize the need to take into 
: account what organizations do prior to the transfer process to determine the recipient's 
absorptive capacity and hence the costs related to the effective deployment of the particular 
knowledge item. Furthermore, many authors argue that the learning curve phenomenon 
significantly decreases the transfer costs. Teece (1977) has found that transfer costs decline as 
a function of the number of transfers already executed for any product. If the knowledge has 
already been commercialized or developed with widely applicable generic characteristics, 
transmission may, in some cases, simply involve transferring existing drawings or 
specifications with a minimum of modification. Customization often necessitates costly 
redesign efforts requiring the utilization of considerable consulting or advisory resources 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990a). 
Besides an appropriate assessment of the costs, a financial justification process of an / 
intracorporate knowledge project also requires an appropriate calculation of the true benefits 
following the successful application and integration of the knowledge item in the adopting 
firm. Like other valuations of intangible assets, however, these gains are very difficult to 
quantify. Too often companies still apply simple payback calculations based on very narrow 
criteria in which the more intangible benefits are often excluded. Important intangibles like 
reduced lead time to market, higher profile with important customers, and flexibility to make 
product changes, however, can strongly contribute to the competitive success of a company 
and hence need to be integrated in the summation of the projected benefits. Moreover, it is 
important to stress that the review of benefits related to an intracorporate knowledge sharing 
project must also integrate the advantages and gains from a corporate point of view. 
Harmonizing systems and creating communality between subsidiaries, for example, could be 
beneficial for a firm's operational integration strategy. Likewise, intracorporate payments to 
the donor could negatively influence the recipient's trade-off with respect to a particular 
intracorporate knowledge sharing project, while such actions can be financially beneficial to 
the corporation as a whole. In that perspective, companies need to use suitable measures to 
perceive the benefits of new knowledge. Usually, though, they are stuck with traditional 
measures that by and large are unable to track all the related gains. 
Although an intracorporate knowledge sharing project could be attractive from an efficiency 
perspective, the knowledge donor and recipient could have their own motives to be unwilling 
to cooperate in the exploitation of the firm's knowledge reservoir. As stated before, 
intracorporate knowledge sharing is and will always be a human activity. The influence of 
personal considerations, as depicted in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, are significant and often even more 
important in shaping the employees' actions than the economically-determined rationales for 
f 
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intracorporate knowledge sharing. Lawler and Rodes (1976: 22) argue in this respect that 
"behaviour generally is predictable if we know how the person perceives the situation and 
what is important to him or her. While people's behaviour may not appear to be rational to an 
outsider, there is reason to believe it usually is intended to be rational and it is seen as rational 
by them." 
The willingness of the donor to participate in an intracorporate knowledge sharing project 
could be restrained for several reasons. Assuming the company's responsibility for both its 
top- and bottom-line, an effort to transfer one's knowledge without returns in terms of a 
payment, reward, or reimbursement for expenses, will from a subsidiary point of view be 
highly irrational and hence not interesting. Most managers are still evaluated and rewarded on 
the basis of certain financial criteria, results, or ratios. An investment in terms of management 
resources can have a severe negative impact on a donor's bottom line and hence harm its own 
interest. Only if the donor puts a value on indirect benefits like network building and being 
appreciated by colleagues and superiors, the donor can appraise its participation in those 
situations as worthwhile. 
| The donor can also decide to withhold its expertise and skills for reasons of inter-subsidiary 
(competition. From a knowledge donor's point of view it can be illogical to advance your 
'colleagues with whom you compete in terms of status, budgets, or survival. From such a 
perspective, it is more profitable to keep your expensive and distinctive systems and processes 
exclusively for your own well-being. Moreover, information is a politically powerful resource, 
as emphasized by some network and resource dependence theorists (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Aldrich, 1979). It is valued for the power it bestows (Pettigrew, 1972; Macdonald, 
1996). Consequently, managers often maintain and secure their dominance by controlling 
access to and distribution of this critical source of power and authority (Fukuyama, 1995: 23). 
Just like the donor, the recipient can have personal rationales to hinder the initiation of an 
intracorporate knowledge sharing project. The Not-Invented-Here syndrome, in which firms 
resist involvement with external inventors as a matter of policy, means that managers neglect 
Returns on the 
Donor's Investment 
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Internal Competitors 
OPPOSITION 
BY 
KNOWLEDGE DONOR 
Figure 4.6: Factors underlying the Personal Barriers of the Knowledge Donor. 
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or are very sceptical about knowledge which is developed by other units (Allen, 1977; 
Macdonald, 1986). The Not-Invented-Here syndrome is defined by Katz and Allen (1977) as 
the tendency of a group of stable composition to believe it possesses a monopoly of 
knowledge of its field, which leads it to reject new ideas from outsiders to the likely detriment 
of its performance. Once again intersubsidiary competition in terms of status, budgets, or 
survival could be the driving force behind the resistance of the recipient. The urge to be seen 
as an advanced and leading company makes it prefer to develop knowledge on their own or 
collect it from an external source. Comparatively more resistance in the adoption of 
innovations created elsewhere, as empirically verified by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1988), could 
be expected in corporations where subsidiaries enjoy considerable strategic and operational 
autonomy. In companies where decision-making authority is highly centralized, "the very 
dependency of the subsidiary on the headquarters facilitates adoption since the subsidiary has 
neither the authority nor the capability to resist" (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988: 371). 
Another reason for obstructing the adoption of new knowledge can lie in resistance to\ 
change (Watson, 1973; Beatty and Gordon, 1988; Johnston and Oman, 1990). A tendency to I 
preserve the status quo in methods of operation based on emotional and political reasons may 
be present at various levels within an organization. Resistance to change is viewed as a devise 
that functions to protect the individual against fears and anxieties aroused by the implications 
of the proposed change. Many authors have argued that learning new methods of work, or 
using new models and concepts, are likely to be resisted if they are perceived as threatening to 
one's established orientation and practice. Watson (1973) makes a distinction between 
resistance in personality and resistance in social structure. Under the former rubric he 
considers such rationales as the defence of strong vested interests, the need for stability, and -
the influence of selective perception and retention. Factors in social systems that contribute to 
the resistance to change are listed as conformity to norms, systematic and cultural coherence, 
and the rejection of "outsiders." In a highly decentralized organization it will be more difficult 
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to convert attitudes towards change into action than in a centralized one, as Dewar and Dutton 
(1986) argue. 
In short, it can be concluded that both efficiency and personal rationales limit the number of 
initiated intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts. While efficiency reasons should be taken 
for granted, personal considerations underlying the opposition of the knowledge donor and the 
knowledge recipient should be tackled to increase the quantity determinant and hence the 
actual total value created by intracorporate knowledge sharing. Founded on the review of the 
various interest barriers in this section, it may be assumed that the willingness to participate by 
the donor and recipient in an intracorporate knowledge sharing project is positively associated 
with the initiation of intracorporate knowledge sharing projects. Thus, with respect to the 
responsibility of a firm's top management to stimulate intracorporate knowledge sharing, the 
following proposition was formulated: 
Proposition (P2): 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing project is more likely to occur when there is a 
management system encouraging employees' interest to participate in the exploitation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects. 
The management system that stimulates employees' interest to participate in intracorporate 
knowledge sharing efforts and hence reduces the interest barriers to initiation is called a 
Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System. Based on the scrutiny of the deterrents to interest in 
this section, the following section enumerates the possible management tools of such a 
knowledge sharing persuasion system. 
4.3.2 Toward a Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System 
No knowledge will be shared effectively without the commitment of its donor and its 
potentially new employer. The disruptive and threatening characteristics of new knowledge 
mean that pro-sharing managerial attitudes at the front-line level are needed to support 
knowledge exploitation. As described in the preceding section, both the donor and the 
recipient can have objective and subjective reasons to oppose to such a process. Apart from the 
existence of opportunities to share knowledge internally and the availability of facilities to 
detect them, another prerequisite condition for the initiation of an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing project is the willingness of the donor and the recipient to participate in the leverage of 
the intellectual property at stake. The motives of the actors involved represent the main input 
in the decision-making process regarding intracorporate knowledge sharing and hence should 
deserve serious attention by corporate management. Consequently, it is posed that the 
initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing effort is more likely to occur when there is 
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Figure 4.8: The Function of a Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System. 
management system, a so-called Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System, encouraging 
employees to reduce their opposition and decide to participate in the exploitation of existing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects. 
A knowledge sharing persuasion system focuses on the reduction and elimination of the 
obstructing influence of the interest barriers (see Figure 4.8). As a conceptual construct, 
however, a knowledge sharing persuasion system is not directly observable in practical settings 
and hence has to be defined on the basis of observable management tools (see Exhibit 4.2). 
Five management tools described and discussed in the remainder of this section are the most 
representative spurs presented in the literature with regard to the willingness of the knowledge 
donor and recipient4. Linking these management tools of a knowledge sharing persuasion 
system and the factors underlying the interest barriers (see Table 4.3), we learn that the interest 
barriers can be managed appropriately by the set of management tools. Particularly the 
personal considerations arc affected by the management tools, meaning that by implementing 
one or a combination of the proposed tools of a knowledge sharing persuasion system, the 
willingness of the donor and recipient to share knowledge and hence the number of initiated 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts are increased. 
The knowledge sharing persuasion system has to convince the donor and the recipient that it 
is worthwhile to deliver, receive, and apply existing knowledge in the corporation. Such a 
persuasion system must lower or take away the interest barriers which obstruct the initiation of 
an intracorporate knowledge sharing project and hence lead to an agreement on objectives and 
desired outcomes. Top management can give content and form to a knowledge sharing 
4
 Although the extent to which a management tool is representative remains somewhat subjective, its 
representative nature has been verified by logical reasoning based on the factors underlying the interest 
barriers and early checks and pilot studies in practical settings. 
78 • CHAPTER FOUR 
T H E KNOWLEDGE SHARING PERSUASION S Y S T E M 
A Set of Management Tools 
A Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System can be given form and content by using one or 
more of the following management tools. The most suitable set of management tools for a 
particular firm and the best way of implementing them are supposed to be situation-specific. 
(1) FINANCIAL MEASURES AND REWARDS FOR KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
Pulling an incentive on participation by providing the donor and/or recipient with an 
objective or subjective reward 
(2) COMMITMENT AND FORMAL STATEMENTS BY TOP MANAGEMENT 
Corporate management is a potent force in the organization which can increase the willingness to 
share knowledge throughout the organization by stressing its importance 
(3) ORGANIZING FOR KNOWLEDGE INTERDEPENDENCES 
By concentrating knowledge exploration responsibilities, interdependencies are created by persuading 
subsidiaries to distract those knowledge items for which they have no development authorization 
(4) INSTITUTIONALIZING KNOWLEDGE CHAMPIONS 
Knowledge champions can be institutionalized with the assignment to enforce front-line managers 
throughout the firm to share and adopt existing knowledge and to overcome resistance 
(5) CORPORATE CULTURE ACTIVATING A SOCIAL PRESSURE TO SHARE 
By creating a corporate culture that "communicates" the shared responsibility for corporate 
welfare, front-line managers are stimulated to participate in knowledge sharing projects 
Exhibit 4.2: Management Tools of a Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System. 
persuasion system by using one or more of the following means (see Exhibit 4.2): first, 
financial measures and rewards can be created to perceive the real benefits of knowledge 
sharing; second, formal statements from top management and its full commitment can 
stimulate the intracorporate knowledge sharing process; third, subsidiaries can be enforced to 
share knowledge if corporate management shapes and facilitates the development of an 
interdependent network of prerequisite expertise and competences; fourth, champions can be 
institutionalized for particular knowledge items or categories to sponsor their exploitation; and 
fifth, corporate management can stimulate the development of a corporate culture activating a 
social pressure to participate in the exploitation of the firm's intellectual property. Each of 
these management tools will be elaborated in greater detail below. 
TOOL #1: FINANCIAL MEASURES AND REWARDS FOR KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
Corporations need new measures to perceive and calculate the true benefits and costs of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing (Beatty and Gordon, 1988). In all cases, for the transfer to 
take place, the benefits must be higher than the transfer costs for the firm at large. Still too 
often, however, front-line managers are stuck with traditional measures that are often unable to 
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Factor underlying Interest Barriers Efficiency Opposition Opposition 
Tools of KS Persuasion System Knowledge Donor Knowledge Recipient 
Financial Measures and Rewards for Knowledge Sharing 
Commitment and Formal Statements by Top Management 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependencies 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure to Share 
Table 4.3: Matching Tools and Factors underlying Interest Barriers. 
track the benefits related to the adoption of new knowledge. Many benefits like improved 
customer service and increased organizational flexibility are intangible and hence are usually 
not integrated in the knowledge cost/benefit analysis. Moreover, front-line managers often 
ignore the benefits for the corporation as a whole with respect to activities that create corporate 
value through the leverage of internal resources and improved operational integration due to 
harmonization of the systems and data schemes. New measures that recognize these intangible 
and indirect advantages increase the attractiveness of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
projects; more advanced and objective measures take away the agitation between the 
knowledge supplier and recipient if they have different estimates of the value of the knowledge 
transferred. 
Apart from using new measures to trade off the true benefits and costs, the interest barriers 
can be reduced by the development of an incentive system (Peters, 1994). In trying to direct 
employees, a system of sound performance measures is one of the most powerful tools 
corporate management can use. Performance measures monitor the company's progress, tell 
employees what really matters, and underpin a realistic reward structure. Performance 
mcasuresjaffect business performance by shaping a company's goals and by influencing the 
actions people take to achieve those goals. Considering the significance of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing, performance measures are essential in steering the behavior of the 
corporation's employees accordingly. Why would a knowledge donor invest scarce 
management resources in the transfer of its own knowledge to other companies if he is not 
compensated for it? Why would a knowledge recipient be more eager to adopt business 
solutions from inside the corporation than from less-threatening outside parties if he has to pay 
the same (internal transfer) price and if he is not rewarded for the corporate value generated by 
exploiting internally available business solutions? Performance measures can strongly help to 
persuade employees to recognize the importance to initiate intracorporate knowledge sharing 
projects. Management information systems must address imperatives relevant to knowledge 
sharing if the corporation's front-line managers are to perform in line with the corporate aim of 
increasing the level of knowledge exploitation. 
A brief look at the past puts contemporary management accounting practices in perspective. 
Perhaps more than anything else, the M-form has legitimated the use of accounting 
information - especially the use of Return-on-lnvestments (ROI) ratios - to control operating 
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units. The performance of Western companies, however, has suffered from the stronghold of 
this philosophy due to the inability to give attention to the "quality" of the short term measures 
(Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Johnson, 1992). Attempts to match revenues with costs during 
arbitrarily short periods cause current period costs to include large allocations of expenditures 
made in prior periods as well as expenditures made in the current period, but whose benefits 
will be realized mainly in future periods. Consequently, for the management accounting 
information system to effectively fulfil its potential contributions to management control, it is 
necessary that complete, accurate, and neutral accounting performance measures are developed 
and implemented which are linked to the critical business processes in the corporation. A 
major limitation of objective formulas, however, as stressed by Gupta and Govindarajan 
(1986: 699), is that they are likely to induce managers to pay less attention to the performance 
along dimensions that are difficult to quantify, yet important. 
\ Intangible assets are very difficult to quantify. Methods to objectively value a company's 
J intangible assets are still rare. Consequently, determining bonus awards regarding one's 
knowledge sharing activities on the basis of a strict formula will remain difficult (Pavitt, 1985; 
Reddy and Zao, 1990). Still, top management can try to install rewards and incentives related 
to intracorporate knowledge sharing through a subjective assessment of a front-line manager's 
activities in this respect. For example, enlisting the number of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing projects in which a person was involved - guided by an approximation of the 
effectiveness of the respective knowledge transfer efforts - can constitute an important 
measure used in business managers' annual appraisal meetings. 
TOOL #2: COMMITMENT AND FORMAL STATEMENTS BY TOP MANAGEMENT 
;With respect to managing intracorporate knowledge sharing, it is important that there exists a 
well-thought knowledge sharing policy and that this policy is backed by the corporation's 
j business leaders (Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; Ameden, 1996). The operationalization of 
best-practice exchange has to be actively supported by senior management. Its commitment 
and statements in public will communicate its objectives and perspectives on past 
achievements. Upper management is a potent force in the organization, especially if decision-
making power is concentrated in its hands (Dewar and Dutton, 1986). Communication fosters 
motivation by clarifying to employees what has to be done, how well they are doing, and what 
can be done to improve performance of it's subpart. Intentions to work towards a goal are a 
major source of work motivation for front-line managers. That is, goals tell an employee what 
needs to be done and how much effort will need to be expended (Early, Wojnaroski, and Prest, 
1987). 
The publicly known commitment of a firm's top management to intracorporate knowledge 
sharing and its confirmation through statements and behavior can significantly stimulate the 
initiation of intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts. As Pucik (1991) argues, many Japanese 
firms have developed a systematic approach to organizational learning that involves more than 
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just an explicit rejection of the parochial "not-invented-here" syndrome. "A strategic planning 
process centered on the value of invisible assets, together with corresponding control systems 
and policies guiding the management of human resources at all levels and functions, 
constituted a vital part of such a learning infrastructure," Pucik (1991: 127) states. The clarity 
surrounding the vital importance of knowledge exploitation establishes effective knowledge-
sharing communities in many Japanese firms, certainly with respect to tacit knowledge 
(Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993). An observation which is investigated further during the 
empirical research (e.g., Canon case). 
Corporate management can boost the actual total value created through intracorporate 
knowledge sharing by consistently emphasizing the importance of leveraging internal 
knowledge resources residing widely throughout their firm. By communicating the necessity 
of leveraging internally available knowledge and giving feedback on current performance, top 
management informs employees on what is expected from them which leads to an increase in 
motivation to effectuate the transfer of knowledge successfully. A suitable means to 
communicate the importance of intracorporate knowledge sharing is represented by statements 
of top management during seminars, workshops, and other kinds of formal meetings. A written 
proclamation often has less impact, but has the potential to reach a broader audience. 
TOOL #3: ORGANIZING FOR KNOWLEDGE INTERDEPENDENCES <£> 
There is a clear trend within multinational enterprises toward greater differentiation oft 
strategic roles assigned to various subsidiaries (Hedlund, 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). • 
As outlined in the previous section, multinational enterprises have to be seen not any longer as 
exploiters of home country knowledge but as vast networks which access technology from 
various locations and share it with other parts of the organization (Almeida, 1996: 156). More J 
transparency is created with respect to the locus of existing knowledge by exclusively 
assigning knowledge development responsibilities over the corporation's network of 
subsidiaries (i.e., reduction of awareness barriers). Moreover, by selectively allocating research 
and development budgets one reduced the capacity of the remaining affiliates to resist 
knowledge adoption. Thus, by delegating the authority for particular knowledge exploration 
activities to, so called, expertise centers, also known as Centers of Competence, Innovation 
Centers, and Lead Companies, top management eliminates or strongly reduces the interest 
barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing. By concentrating or spreading knowledge 
exploration responsibilities, knowledge interdependencies are created which persuade 
subsidiaries to obtain those knowledge items which they do not possess and are not authorized 
to develop5. 
-' In this respect it needs to be stressed that the organization for knowledge interdependencies as a management 
tool of a knowledge sharing persuasion system also contributes to the development of a knowledge sharing 
awareness system. As argued in paragraph 4.2, more transparency with respect to the locus of existing 
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Figure 4.9: Variations in Subsidiary Strategic Contexts. 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) introduce a knowledge flows-based framework to 
categorize the variations in subsidiary strategic contexts. Differences in knowledge flow 
patterns across subsidiaries, they argue, can be captured by focusing on the magnitude of 
knowledge flows in which a subsidiary engages as well as the directionality of these flows. If 
these two factors are combined, then all of the multinational enterprise's subsidiaries can be 
arrayed along a two-dimensional space comprising (a) the extent to which the subsidiary 
engages in knowledge inflows from the rest of the corporation and (b) the extent to which the 
subsidiary engages in knowledge outflows to the rest of the corporation. Thus along these two 
dimensions, as depicted in Figure 4.9, four generic subsidiary roles can be defined: Local 
Innovator, Global Innovator, Integrated Player, and Implementor. 
The Local Innovator role implies that the subsidiary has almost complete local 
responsibility for the creation of relevant know-how in all key functional areas; however, this 
knowledge is seen as too idiosyncratic to be of much competitive use outside the country in 
which the Local Innovator is located. In the Global Innovator role, instead, the subsidiary 
serves as the fountainhead of knowledge for other units, a role which is historically, especially 
in the case of U.S. and Japanese corporations, played only by the domestic units. However, as 
Bartlctt and Ghoshal (1989), Harrigan (1984), and Ronstadt and Kramer (1982) document, this 
is changing and more and more Global Innovator roles are located throughout the world. The 
Integrated Player role is similar to the Global Innovator role because it also implies a 
responsibility for creating knowledge that can be utilized by other subsidiaries. However, 
unlike the Global Innovator, an Integrated Player subsidiary is not self-sufficient in the 
fulfilment of its own knowledge needs. Finally, in the Implementor role, the subsidiary 
knowledge items could be created - and hence the awareness barriers reduced - by allocating knowledge 
development responsibilities. In creating management systems stimulating and facilitating the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process companies should try to exploit these overlapping properties of the attributes. 
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engages in little knowledge creation of its own and relies heavily on knowledge inflows from 
either the parent or peer subsidiaries. 
In terms of the task demands imposed by different strategic roles, Gupta and Govindarajan < < 
(1991: 775) state that "it is obvious that the degree of lateral interdependence will vary across*! . 
roles." The extent of lateral interdependence with peer subsidiaries, they state, will be highest''j 
for Integrated Players, intermediate for Global Innovators and Implementors, and lowest for \V 
Local Innovators. In general, however, the creation of an interdependent network of 
"Innovation Centers" and "Adoption Units" is a very difficult managerial task and hence 
requires a lot of management attention. On the one hand, Global Innovators must be stimulated 
to operate as close as possible in line with the needs of their "customers" and the trends in the 
business environment. Von Hippel (1976) emphasizes the importance of market orientation in 
innovation, and especially in those situations where the forces for differentiation are large, 
obtaining the appropriate market orientation and hence consensus on the appropriate directions 
of the knowledge exploration activities can be very difficult. On the other hand, in enabling the 
expertise centers to balance technical expertise with user needs, one has to ensure that 
absorbing companies communicate their ideas and findings and give effective feedback on the 
developed knowledge items. 
Clear procedures and well-defined decision authorities can often be very helpful in trying to 
achieve fast and effective decision-making on future plans. Keeping the absorbing companies 
actively involved in recent developments, showing them evidence of progress (e.g., through 
presentations, newsletters, workshops), facilitating the friability of an innovation, and ensuring 
a smooth dissemination of outputs will stimulate the creation of an open communication 
culture and will speed up the recipients' adoption process. An alternative for the structural , 
solution to create interdependencies is to use a more temporary organizational form like a C 
taskforce or a project team. Such workgroups are much more flexible and tend to be strongly 
integrated in the organization because of their temporary nature. 
TOOL #4: APPOINT KNOWLEDGE CHAMPIONS 
Interest barriers can also be contested by a firm's top management by appointing, what are 
called, knowledge champions for several knowledge areas (Van den Bosch, 1996). Knowledge 
champions, also known as Process or Product Leaders within many organizations, are persons 
who fight and speak in support of a specified knowledge area and who try to reduce and 
overcome the inevitable forces of resistance6. They have to understand the factors underlying 
interest barriers and must know when and how to put pressure on donors and recipients of 
particular knowledge items to increase the likelihood of knowledge transfer and adoption. The 
knowledge champion is responsible for evaluating the "state of the art" within his or her 
knowledge domain and deliberately triggers discussions among the owners and acceptors of 
° The role of a knowledge champion could be easily combined with the tasks of a knowledge intermediary as 
described in the previous section. 
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best practices in trying to convince them of the actual value to be generated by effectuating the 
transfer of a particular knowledge item. 
Champions without hierarchical power will have a difficult task, but many options exist to 
give meaning to their responsibility. They can finance and facilitate pilot projects to reduce the 
ambiguity surrounding certain inventions. They can also warn knowledge donors and potential 
recipients for the threat of being socially excluded. Furthermore, they can put pressure on the 
actors involved and give concrete material for discussion by effectuating benchmarks of the 
firm's affiliates. As was argued in the preceding section, a benchmark is a device to identify 
best practice levels throughout the firm which provides hard data on improvement 
opportunities to show front-line managers, often in numerical terms, the value of a particular 
knowledge item. Benchmarking can be a powerful method in persuading recipients to adopt 
particular knowledge items from their colleagues by putting a concrete value on its potential 
benefits (Camp, 1989; Bogan and English, 1994). 
TOOL #5: CORPORATE CULTURE ACTIVATING A SOCIAL PRESSURE TO SHARE 
! Finally, the development of a knowledge sharing persuasion system can profit from a strong 
[corporate culture stressing a social need to share knowledge. Many attempts to explain the 
sustained superior performance of firms, as Barney (1986: 656) argues, "have focused on the 
managerial values and beliefs embodied in these firms' organizational cultures." A strong set 
of core managerial values increases the behavioral consistency by conveying to employees 
what kind of behavior they should engage in (Weick, 1987). A dominant corporate culture is 
jattractive because it overcomes the problems of centralization and formalization in terms of 
' 'headquarters overload and inflexibility, and hence facilitates the decentralization of 
knowledge-sharing responsibilities. Moreover, as Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989: 163) argue, 
"Decisions reached by negotiations between knowledgeable groups with common objectives 
should be much better than those made by superior authority or by standard policy". "Elements 
of culture," as Whipp, Rosenfeld and Pettigrew (1989: 582) state, "may supply vital links 
between the rational aspects of policy and the subjective, less tangible features of employees' 
behaviour exactly because of the way values pervade an enterprise." 
A strong culture increases behavioral consistency and, in this way, can be a powerful means 
to communicate the acceptability to resist participation in intracorporate knowledge sharing 
projects7. The pattern of beliefs, symbols, rituals, myths, and practices that have evolved over 
time create a common understanding among members as to what the organization is and how 
its members should behave (Schein, 1985). This common understanding combined with the 
threat to become socially excluded enforces participants to operate in line with the 
A strong corporate culture can both act as a spur and as an obstacle to the initiation of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing efforts. In both cases, however, the corporate culture creates a kind of consistent behavior 
which is hard to change. 
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expectations. If a shared feeling of corporate ownership and interdependence has embedded an 
urge to exploit corporate resources effectively and efficiency, falling short of these 
expectations will harm one's position in the organization. A strong corporate culture motivates 
knowledge donors to transfer their redeployable and valuable knowledge items by making 
them perceive of intracorporate knowledge sharing as a long term investment in one's 
intraorganizational network. 
Although a corporate culture is generally typified as a very rigid and difficult to change 
characteristic of an organization (Whipp, Rosenfeld and Pettigrew, 1989) and. often / 
conceptualized as emerging out of the naturally occurring interactions of people (Barney, \\ 
1986), Wiener (1988) discusses three forces that play the most important part in sustaining\nd 
gradually adjusting a corporate culture, being the organization's selection practices, the actions 
of top management, and the organization's socialization methods. The major disadvantage of 
maintaining a dominant culture is its costs (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Intensive training, 
indoctrination, and socialization require substantial investments, certainly in large 
multinational enterprises. Furthermore, decision-making in firms with dominant cultures is 
usually a slower, more ambiguous, and more complex management process than it is with 
either the centralized or formalized approach. 
4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In managing the intracorporate knowledge sharing process, a firm's top management is 
strongly limited in its capacity to initiate and effectuate knowledge transfer efforts throughout 
the organization. Knowledge resides at the front-line level where it has to be defined, 
integrated, and exploited. Corporate management can only play an indirect part and, in doing 
so, has to create a corporate context which stimulates and facilitates the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process. With respect to the decision phase of this process, we assume that 
the initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing project depends on whether the existence 
of relevant knowledge is known or could be known throughout the organization, depending on 
the height of the Awareness Barriers. Furthermore, such initiation depends upon the degree of 
interest of the knowledge donor and potential recipient to participate in an intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project, depending on objective and subjective rationales that underlie the 
Interest Barriers. 
Based on the assumption that various awareness barriers obstruct the leverage of internally 
available knowledge, it was posed that the initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing 
project is more likely to occur when there is a Knowledge Sharing Awareness System, which 
supports employees in tracing intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects. Five management 
tools incorporated in the Knowledge Sharing Awareness System have been presented: 
knowledge codification and registration, a network linking the knowledge sources and 
adopters, distribution of knowledge development responsibilities, institutionalization of 
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knowledge intermediaries, and benchmark tools. These five management tools are the most 
representative spurs presented in the literature with regard to awareness. 
After the existence and locus of a knowledge sharing opportunity has been detected, both 
actors will determine their willingness to participate in the knowledge transfer project based on 
efficiency and personal rationales. It was posed that the initiation of an intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project is more likely to occur when there is a Knowledge Sharing 
Persuasion System, which motivates employees to participate in knowledge sharing with 
colleagues. Again, five tools form the basis of the Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System: 
financial measures and rewards with respect to knowledge sharing, commitment and 
stimulating statements by top management, creating knowledge interdependencies between the 
subsidiaries, institutionalizing knowledge champions, and creating a corporate culture which 
activates a social pressure to transfer and adopt existing expertise and skills within the firm. 
These five management tools are the most representative spurs presented in the literature with 
regard to the interest of the actors involved. 
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No conclusions have been drawn up regarding the most suitable combination of 
management tools and the best way of implementing them. Although the empirical research 
will present some illustrations, the prevailing contingencies in this respect require further 
study. Interesting to note, however, is the overlap which exists between the management tools 
underlying both management systems. For example, the role of a knowledge intermediary as a 
management tool to give form and content to a Knowledge Sharing Awareness System could 
easily be combined with the tasks of a knowledge champion as part of a Knowledge Sharing 
Persuasion System. Moreover, the establishment of knowledge interdependencies contributes 
to the development of both a Knowledge Sharing Awareness System and a Knowledge 
Sharing Persuasion System in that it creates more transparency with respect to the locus of 
existing knowledge items and puts a pressure on the recipient to adopt internally available 
knowledge items. So, by using some distinct management tools, both management systems can 
be activated at the same time. This not only shows that the two management systems are 
highly interrelated, but also points to the benefits of these tools in terms of "synergies" to be 
gained. 
In conclusion, in managing the decision phase corporate management has to remove and 
reduce the barriers to initiation by adopting two prerequisite "stimulators", being a Knowledge 
Sharing Awareness System and a Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System. Through successful 
implementation of these management systems, corporate management establishes a corporate 
context stimulating the number of initiated intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts 
throughout the organization. 

5 
Management Systems that 
Remove and Reduce the 
Barriers to Effectuation 
The Execution Phase 
"The effective commercialization of new technology is considered less a relay race where 
players hand off a baton to the next player than it is a contact sport like football where the 
person carrying the ball (the technology champion) is met with active resistance (transfer 
barriers) by some players while trying to score a touchdown (introduce the technology into 
the marketplace in a timely fashion)." 
- Gibson and Smilor (1991: 292). 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The execution phase, following the adoption decision at the end of the decision phase, takesi 
care of the actual effectuation of the knowledge transfer. Taking the decision to participate in \ 
the transfer of knowledge is not only the prerequisite starting point but also the beginning of a \ S E 
second phase leading to the knowledge item's actual transfer, application and integration into < 
the recipient's knowledge base. The execution phase of the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process concerns those activities aimed at putting the knowledge item into use and, as the 
conceptualization of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process in chapter 3 delineates, 
consists of two stages, namely a preparation and a transfer stage. Instead of the strictly mental 
exercise of the decision phase, the execution phase, as stated by Rogers (1995), involves overt 
change in behavior as the knowledge item is actually put into practice in the organization and 
operations of the recipient. 
The execution phase affects the actual total value created by intracorporate knowledge 
sharing which is, as mentioned in the third chapter, the summation of the merit of all the 
individual knowledge sharing initiatives. While the management of the decision phase 
determines the number of initiated intracorporate knowledge sharing projects (the Quantity 
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Determinant), managing the execution phase influences the quality of each project and hence 
its particular merit (the Value Determinant). The merit of each individual intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project can be calculated or estimated by subtracting the transfer costs from 
the advantage the new knowledge has over the knowledge it supersedes. The costs related to 
I the transfer of knowledge, as stated in the previous chapter, can be considerable (Contractor, 
1980; Pavitt, 1987) and comprise pre-transfer (planning, engineering, documentation), transfer, 
and post-transfer costs (management time, adaptation). The advantage of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project could be related to benefits for the acceptor such as achieved cost 
reductions (process redesigns, automation), improved customer value (product innovations, 
service improvement), or upgraded competitive position (increased flexibility). Managing the 
execution phase of an intracorporate knowledge transfer project needs to be aimed at 
exploiting the latent merit of each project by mimimizing the knowledge transfer costs and 
maximizing the utilization of the potential advantages. 
A brief study of the execution phase of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process in the 
third chapter of this study made us conclude that the role of a firm's top management in this 
phase is limited to the task to facilitate; in other words, influencing the successfulness of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing projects between managers throughout the hierarchy by 
creating the appropriate conditions for effectuating the transfer and deployment of knowledge 
in a productive way. Once again the role of corporate management is primarily indirect and 
limited to the elimination and reduction of barriers to the effective and efficient transfer of 
knowledge items. It has been argued that the task to facilitate could be fulfilled in two ways. 
On the one hand, corporate management can take action to reduce, on average, the complexity 
to share knowledge. On the other hand, corporate management can invest in the firm's transfer 
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media to enable the front-line managers to cope with the particular complexity of their 
intracorporate knowledge sharing projects. 
In line with the structure of the former chapter, this fifth chapter makes a distinction 
between two sets of barriers, namely Complexity Barriers and Media Barriers. An 
enumeration, classification, and description of these barriers will be used as the foundation for 
deductive reasoning towards two propositions with respect to the management systems 
facilitating the intracorporate knowledge sharing process in its execution phase. It will be | 
posed that without the appropriate attention for and investments in managing complexity and 
media barriers, successful intracorporate knowledge transfer is less likely to occur. 
5.2 MANAGING COMPLEXITY BARRIERS 
Effectuating the successful transfer and deployment of a knowledge item from the knowledge 
donor to a knowledge acceptor is complicated by many situation-specific characteristics of the 
particular knowledge sharing effort. Although the medium richness could be tuned to the 
prevalent knowledge sharing complexity, as will be discussed in the next section, facilitating 
the execution of knowledge sharing by reducing the complicating influence of the existing 
deterrents, at average, can strongly contribute to the eventual application and integration of the 
f" knowledge item in the recipient's organization. A knowledge transfer that is properly 
facilitated in this fashion has a better chance to succeed with a smaller medium investment. 
Unfacilitated knowledge transfer projects simply bound off the barriers to become a transfer 
failure or require a considerable investment in terms of pre-transfer, transfer, and post-transfer 
costs. 
In their task to facilitate, a firm's top management should reduce the hindering influence of 
the complexity barriers. This section deals with how corporate management can cope with 
these complexity barriers and proposes to implement a Knowledge Sharing Complexity 
Reduction System as a facilitator to effectuation. Based on an overview and classification of 
* 
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the barriers complicating the successful transfer, application, and integration of knowledge 
items in the first section, section 5.2.2 presents a number of corporate management tools that 
embody the Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System in its organization. 
5.2.1 Origins of Complexity Barriers 
An examination of the literature reveals a number of factors complicate the effectuation of an 
intracorporate knowledge sharing effort after the knowledge donor and recipient have agreed 
upon its initiation. A wide range of complexity barriers with a negative impact upon the ease 
of transferring internally available knowledge items have been observed, studied, and 
described before (e.g., Keller and Chinta, 1990; Gibson and Smilor, 1991). As depicted in 
Figure 5.3, the attributes of complexity barriers are classified into four distinct categories: 
nature of knowledge, heterogeneity of prior knowledge, personal motivation, and the level of 
trust between the actors involved. This section elaborates upon these categories underlying 
complexity barriers. Each category with its particular relation to the complexity of the 
knowledge sharing situation is briefly reviewed. 
The first - and according to many authors the main element for indicating and describing the 
particular complexity of a knowledge transfer or diffusion situation - is the transfer item itself 
(e.g., Frame, 1983; Aharoni, 1991). In contrast with the view of Downs and Mohr (1976) who 
emphasize the subjective factor of innovation attributes, the heterogeneous nature of 
knowledge is often assumed to affect the complexities involved in intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. Both the knowledge item's form (e.g., capital embodied, human embodied, 
disembodied) and content (e.g., complex, simple) varies across knowledge sharing efforts. In 
this respect Boisot (1983) posed a relationship, based on the work of Polanyi (1958,1966) and 
in line with many subsequent authors (e.g., Winter, 1987; Fleck, 1996), between codification 
and diffusion of knowledge. The more a knowledge item has been codified and made explicit, 
the more easily, speedily, and economically it can be diffused. 
Nature • 1 
Knowledge • 
Heterogeneity 1 
• 
Prior Knowledge • * " 1 Trust 
Complex i ty Barriers 
! 
Figure 5.3: Factors underlying Complexity Barriers. 
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Tacit knowledge, as defined in the previous chapter, constitutes the experience of educated, 
skilled workers which steers the process or act of thinking but which is not easily visible and 
expressible. Tacit knowledge is highly personal, nonverbalized, hard to formalize 
systematically, and hence difficult to communicate to others (Hedlund, 1994). For tacit 
knowledge to be communicated, close human interaction is required and the knowledge item 
"has to be converted into words or numbers that anyone can understand" (Nonaka, 1995: 9). It 
is this conversion from tacit to explicit and back again to tacit which is often unachievable. 
Winter (1987) stresses, however, that a lot of our "tacit knowledge" may be teachable even 
though it may not be articulable. By placing the not articulated position between the teachable 
and not teachable position in one of his taxonomic dimensions of knowledge assets (see Figure 
5.5), Winter indicates that "the failure to articulate what is articulable may be a more severe 
handicap for the transfer of knowledge than tacitness itself" (171). Like the example of the 
ballet dancer in the previous chapter, the swimming instructor teaches his or her pupils the 
skill of swimming not by an abstract conceptualization of his or her know-how, but by 
facilitating and directing a series of trial and error performances. The learning process is 
accelerated by the instructor's advise and critique with respect to the direct experiences of the 
pupils' bodies and minds. 
Apart from the tacitness dimension of knowledge, academics focusing on such issues as 
technology transfer and innovation characteristics have often stressed the complicating 
influence of the knowledge item's equivocality and related to this its level of sophistication, 
Impossible to Transfer Difficult to Transfer Easy to Transfer 
< > 
Tacit - Articulable 
Not teachable Teachable 
Not articulated Articulated 
Adapted Irom Winter (1987). 
Figure 5.5: The Tacitness Dimensions of Knowledge Assets. 
94 • CHAPTER FIVE 
Relatedness 
of 
Functional Knowledge 
HETEROGENEITY 
OF 
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE 
Figure 5.6: The Elements of the Heterogeneity of Prior Knowledge. 
complexity, causal ambiguity, triability, and observability (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971; 
V* Smilor and Gibson, 1991). Equivocality refers to the level of complexity and ambiguity of the 
knowledge item to be transferred (Pinkston, 1989; Weick, 1990). Highly equivocal knowledge 
is harder to understand, more difficult to demonstrate, and more ambiguous in its potential 
applications. If the precise reasons for success or failure are known and hence the features of 
the new context affecting the results of the replication effort controlled, the knowledge transfer 
effort tends to be easier. Moreover, the complexity of knowledge transfer, application, and 
integration is strongly reduced the more a user only has to deal with the knowledge item's 
externals, as in the case of a product or tool-embodied transfer. The less encapsulated the 
package, the more the user has to understand and master details of what is going on within the 
knowledge item and the more difficult knowledge transfer becomes (Smilor and Gibson, 
I 1991). 
A second factor underlying the complexity barriers in the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process is the heterogeneity between the actors' prior knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Szulanski, 1995). Special problems in securing the effective transfer of knowledge can be 
caused by difference between the pairs of individuals in certain attributes such as beliefs, 
values, education, social status, and the like. As argued by Boisot (1983: 163): "It is the fact 
that people possess different types of knowledge and experience that creates opportunities for 
their communication1. Yet, paradoxically, such communication as does take place between 
them can only do so on the basis of similarities in the knowledge and experience they each 
' In line with Boisot (1983), Mahoney (1995) stresses that heterogeneous mental models can contribute to the 
achievement of competitive advantage. He argues that by combining heterogeneous resources with 
heterogeneous mental models "new combinations" can be detected. Instead of affecting the innovativeness of 
the firm by reducing the complicating influence of this Complexity Barrier, a firm can decide to accept this 
barrier to intracorporate knowledge sharing and focus on the firm's ability to match the prevailing complexity 
by reducing the Media Barriers. 
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possess." "[T]he process of codifying a message for transmission," Boisot (1983: 161) stresses, ^ 
"involves a loss of information that can only be recovered in situations where a receiver 
associates the same clusters of meaning with the symbols chosen as does the sender." The 
heterogeneity of prior knowledge can be split, as depicted by Figure 5.6, in two components, 
being the relatedness of functional knowledge and the cultural distance between the donor and 
the recipient. 
Functional knowledge comprises expertise and know-how with respect to a particular 
knowledge problem. Many authors assume that in order to deploy new knowledge in an 
economic or operational sense, recipients need to cultivate an in-house knowledge base to 
improve the firm's "absorptive capacity" (e.g., Agmon and Glinow, 1991; Von Hippel, 1994). 
As stressed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 131), "learning is more difficult in novel domains" 
and hence knowledge sharing between actors specialized in different subject areas could be 
rather complex, particularly in technical areas. Recipients are normally obliged to devote 
substantial resources to assimilate, adapt, and improve upon the original knowledge item. 
Therefore, to the extent that the normal features of knowledge include imperfect 
understanding, incomplete availability, imperfect ability to imitate, tacitness, and so forth its 
successful use tends to be dependent upon the recipient's possession over a related knowledge 
base in functional terms. In that way, Pavitt (1987: 186) points out that "even borrowers of 
technology must have their own skills, and make their own expenditures on development and 
production engineering; they can not treat technology developed elsewhere as a free, or even 
very cheap, good." One should take more into account what organizations appear to be able to 
do prior to the transfer process and integrate this in one's judgement on the attractiveness and 
complexity of the knowledge sharing initiative (Cusumano and Elenkov, 1994). 
Next to the unrelatedness of functional knowledge, heterogeneity in prior knowledge can 
also be caused by a cultural distance between the knowledge donor and the recipient. 
Management is compounded by cultural differences in two dimensions, organizational 
subculture and national culture (Grandstrand and Sjolander, 1990). If organizations grow, 
specialized units are created and each unit generates its own idiosyncratic norms, values, time 
frame, and coding schemes (March and Simon, 1958; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Tushman, 1977). 
Contrasting languages (Tversky and Kahneman, 1985; Dutton and Jackson, 1987) and coding 
schemes (Kennedy, 1983; Ireland, Hitt, Bettis and DePorras, 1987; Walker, 1985) will evolve 
within the same organization because of differences in national environments, historical roots, 
institutionalization processes (education, legislation), and strategic visions. These inherent 
cognitive, conceptual, linguistic, and normative differences act as a communication impedance 
and hence form complicating barriers in the intracorporate knowledge sharing process (Kedia 
and Bhagat, 1988). As stated by Ferraro (1996: 39): "Effective communication among people"^ 
from the same culture is often difficult enough. But when attempting to communicate with S 
people who do not speak English and who have different attitudes, ideas, assumptions, / 
perceptions, and ways of doing things, one's chances for miscommunication increase I 
enormously." 
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The third factor underlying the complexity of the knowledge transfer effort is the personal 
motivation for active participation and support concerning the knowledge transfer (Ounjian 
and Carne, 1987; Szulanski, 1995). Having showed its significance during the initiation of a 
project, the actor's level of motivation, ranging from positive to hostile, is also highly relevant 
for the successful effectuation of the knowledge transfer and its productive integration in the 
t recipient's organization. Without the willingness and motivation of both the transferor and 
acceptor, knowledge transfer is very difficult. The source may be reluctant to share crucial 
knowledge for fear of losing ownership, a position of privilege, superiority or simply as a 
consequence of a lack of proper rewards for sharing hard-won success. The donor may be 
hostile because the successful transfer of knowledge could jeopardize his knowledge 
development budgets and his status as innovator. 
An organizational context which clearly communicates the group's expectations with 
\. respect to intracorporate knowledge sharing influences its members' personal motivation. The 
| direction of the group pressure is shaped by the perceived goals and strategic vision of the 
I corporation and the strive of the corporate whole for survival and competitive success. The 
strength of group pressure is determined by factors as the identification with the group, 
) uniformity of group opinions, and group cohesiveness (March and Simon, 1958). If the firm's 
subsidiaries are strongly interdependent, the threat to be socially excluded can be quite severe 
Which will significantly increase their motivation to cooperate. Apart from pressure of group 
members, as depicted in Figure 5.7 and discussed in the previous chapter, the personal 
motivation of both donor and recipient is influenced by their question "What's in it for me." 
Their expectations with respect to their own gains and expected rewards determine their 
attempt to share knowledge successfully. 
Finally, the complexity to effectuate the transfer of knowledge is influenced by the level of 
trust between the donor and recipient (Lasserre, 1982; Fukuyama, 1995). Although research 
on cooperative behavior and network structures has identified many determinants of 
productive cooperation, virtually all scholars in these fields of research agreed that one 
MOTIVATION 
Figure 5.7: The Elements of Personal Motivation. 
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especially immediate antecedent is trust (Casson and Nicholas, 1989; Smith, Carroll, and 
Ashford, 1995). Trust is an individual's confidence in the good will of the other(s) and belief 
that the other(s) will make efforts consistent with the mutual goals (Ring and Van der Ven, 
1994). As stated by Fukuyama (1995: 26): "Trust is not necessary for cooperation... Groups 
can be formed at any time based on self-interest... But while contract and self-interest are 
important sources of association, the most effective organizations are based on communities of 
shared ethical values. These communities do not require extensive contract and legal 
regulation of their relations because prior moral consensus gives members of the group a basis 
for mutual trust." Without trust, successful knowledge transfer becomes increasingly difficult. 
Consequently, trust constitutes one of main barriers determining the complexity in the 
execution of intracorporate knowledge sharing. A belief by both the knowledge donor and 
knowledge recipient that the other will make efforts consistent with mutual goals is critical for 
their decision to succeed with the transfer and application of knowledge. 
The two main factors determining the level of trust between the source and receiver of 
knowledge, as depicted by Figure 5.8, are the availability of shared norms and values 
(Fukuyama, 1995) and past experiences (Ring and Van der Ven, 1994). Norms and values are 
culturally determined and hence differ across both organizational and national boundaries. The 
lack of a common point of reference complicates communication and harms the feeling of 
confidence in the actions of the other. Besides the lack of shared norms and values, the level of 
trust can be negatively influenced by the existence of a bad record of previous cooperative 
efforts. Ring and Van der Ven (1994: 96) therefore note that cooperative relationships are '"... 
socially contrived mechanisms for collective action, which are continually shaped and 
restructured by actions and symbolic interpretations of the parties involved." Consequently, 
trust can be conceptualized as a dynamic factor which changes over time and during various 
cooperative efforts. The level of trust which exists between the donor and the recipient is 
difficult to influence on the short term. However, if a certain degree of trust exists, it will 
* • 
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smooth the process of intracorporate knowledge sharing and will increase the chances of 
success dramatically. 
Complexity barriers complicate the effectuation of knowledge transfer efforts and a firm's 
top management can remove or reduce them to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of 
knowledge transfer efforts throughout the organization. It is assumed that the complexity of 
knowledge sharing situations is positively correlated with the tacitness and equivocality of the 
knowledge item and the heterogeneity of prior knowledge between donor and recipient, but 
negatively correlated with personal motivation and the level of trust between the actors 
involved. Building on the analysis of complexity barriers complicating the knowledge transfer, 
the responsibility of a firm's top management to facilitate intracorporate knowledge sharing 
can be formally stated in the following proposition: 
Proposition (P3): 
The successful effectuation of an intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is more likely when there 
is a management system reducing the complexity of intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
The management system that reduces the complicating influence of the complexity barriers 
and hence reduces the barriers to effectuation is called a Knowledge Sharing Complexity 
Reduction System (see Figure 5.9). Based on the discussion of the complexity barriers in this 
section, the following section enumerates the possible management tools of such a knowledge 
sharing complexity reduction system. 
5.2.3 Toward a Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System 
Confronted with the voluminous set of complexity barriers, many knowledge transfer efforts 
fail. The difficulties caused by elements as high equivocality of the knowledge item, 
incompatibility of actors' background, and a history of frustrations built up during previous 
transfer efforts complicate the task of a firm's front-line managers to transfer, apply, and 
integrate knowledge items. Top management's task to facilitate intracorporate knowledge 
sharing by lowering the complicating influences on the execution of a knowledge transfer 
effort works only indirectly, but this is no reason to dismiss its significance. Although 
managers on the front lines are the ones who must control, transfer, and integrate knowledge, 
corporate management can create the appropriate conditions to successfully effectuate the 
knowledge sharing efforts throughout the firm. 
Positive organizational actions must be performed by corporate management to encourage 
front-line managers to pursue interrelationships and to ease the inherent difficulties in 
effectuating the knowledge transfer, application, and integration. As a conceptual construct, 
however, a knowledge sharing complexity reduction system is not directly observable in 
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Figure 5.9: The Function of a Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System. 
practical settings and hence has to be defined on the basis of observable management tools. 
The management tools described and discussed in the following of this section (see Exhibit 
5.1) are the most representative spurs enlisted in the literature with regard to the complexity of 
knowledge transfer efforts2 excluding those management tools related to the personal 
motivation of the actors involved. Five management tools have been presented in the 
preceding chapter concerning the reduction and elimination of the obstructing influence of the 
interest barriers: 
(1) Financial Measures and Rewards for Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing; 
(2) Commitment and Formal Statements by Top Management; 
(3) Organizing for Knowledge Interdependencies; 
(4) Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions; and 
(5) Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure to Share. 
These five management tools encourage employees to reduce their opposition and increase 
their motivation with respect to intracorporate knowledge sharing. As a consequence, we refer 
back to the section on the Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System in the preceding chapter to 
circumvent duplication in the underlying text. As stressed before, some management tools can 
activate more management systems at the same time and this not only shows that the 
knowledge sharing management systems are highly interrelated, but also points to the benefits 
of these tools in terms of "synergies" to be gained. 
2 Although the extent to which a management tool is representative remains somewhat subjective, its 
representative nature has been verified by logical reasoning based on the factors underlying the awareness 
barriers and early checks and pilot studies in practical settings. 
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T H E KNOWLEDGE SHARING COMPLEXITY R E D U C T I O N S Y S T E M 
A Set of Management Tools 
A Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System can be given form and content by 
using one or more of the following management tools. The most suitable set of tools for a 
particular firm and the best way of implementing them are supposed to be 
situation-specific. 
(1) KNOWLEDGE ABSTRACTION & CODIFICATION 
Tacil knowledge items can be converted and abstracted into understandable and codified words and 
numbers 
(2) INCREASING USER INVOLVEMENT & TRIABELITY 
Users can be involved early in the knowledge creation process and the triability of the knowledge 
products can be increased 
(3) ESTABLISHING A CORPORATE-WIDE LANGUAGE 
A corporate-wide "language" can be established which will contribute to the communication process 
between donor and recipient by harmonizing definitions and information structures 
(4) ARRANGING REGULAR MANAGEMENT MEETINGS 
The arrangement of regular international management meetings can create the foundation on which 
cooperative interrelationship can grow throughout the organization 
(5) DOMINANT CORPORATE CULTURE 
Corporate management can facilitate the intracorporate knowledge sharing process by establishing 
a dominant corporate culture in which core values are both intensely held and widely shared 
Exhibit 5.1: Management Tools of a Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System. 
Apart from the five management tools concerning the personal motivation, top management 
can give content and form to a Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System by using 
one or more of the following tools: first, tacit knowledge items can be converted and 
abstracted into understandable and codified words and numbers; second, users can be involved 
early in knowledge creation activities and the triability of knowledge items can be increased; 
third, a corporate-wide "language" contributes to the communication process by harmonizing 
definitions and information structures; fourth, the arrangement of regular management 
meetings can create the foundation on which cooperative interrelationships can grow 
throughout the organization; and fifth, corporate management can facilitate the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process by establishing a dominant corporate culture in which some core 
values arc are both intensely held and widely shared. 
TOOL # / : KNOWLEDGE ABSTRACTION AND CODIFICATION 
Corporate management can reduce the complexity of an intracorporate knowledge sharing 
effort by taking action with respect to the tacit nature of a significant part of a firm's 
knowledge base. They can improve the transferability of knowledge items, at average, by 
putting some pressure on the abstraction and codification of knowledge. Firms still too often 
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ignore the value of skills, experience, and capabilities residing in their employees, 
departments, and subsidiaries. In many occasions organizations watch their most 
knowledgeable employees retire or leave without even being slightly concerned about the 
knowledge that is lost and not handed over to their successors. A knowledge abstraction and 
codification policy can unstuck parts of a firm's knowledge reservoir. Knowledge items 
become better moveable as they are converted in words and numbers that anyone can 
understand (Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993). By codifying the existing expertise and experience, 
one significantly increases the ease of transferring knowledge. Consequently, emphasizing the 
need to document one's critical experience and know-how and facilitating its abstraction and 
storage significantly improves, if selectively implemented, the exploitability of and control 
over the firm's knowledge reservoir. 
Knowledge abstraction efforts, however, need to be implemented selectively because the 
major part of the firm's knowledge reservoir remains tacit or, as stated by Levitt (1991: 17), 
"... [t]he most precious knowledge can neither be taught nor passed on." Expensive 
management resources should not be spoiled for the codification of uncodifiable knowledge. 
In many cases, knowledge can only be acquired through direct experience comprising such 
activities as organizational experiments, organizational self-appraisal, and "on-the-job" 
learning. Moreover, as concluded in the previous chapter, one has to circumvent too rigid 
knowledge abstraction strategies because it can significantly harm the corporation's flexibility 
and various obstacles stand in the way of effective knowledge abstraction (e.g., need for 
common coding schemes in the interpretation of knowledge). Therefore, in stimulating the 
abstraction of knowledge, steering a middle course is often most preferable and corporate 
management must seriously control the activities in this respect. Only simple knowledge items 
requiring a limited amount of feedback can be considered as suitable candidates for full 
articulation, meaning that the knowledge item is fully detached from the donor and hence able 
to flow independent from its source. 
TOOL #2: INCREASING USER INVOLVEMENT AND TRIABILITY 
Highly equivocal knowledge items are hard to understand, more difficult to demonstrate, and 
more ambiguous in its potential applications. Although partly intertwined with the tacitness 
U/ 
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dimension of the nature of knowledge, the equivocality dimension stresses the need to reduce 
the fuzziness, uncertainty, and ambiguity surrounding particular knowledge items. Other 
things being equal, a knowledge item is much easier to transfer if it is easy to comprehend and 
if its impact on a new context is totally clear for the parties involved in the knowledge transfer 
effort. Actions of corporate management to lower the equivocality of their knowledge base 
therefore need to focus on making the knowledge more concrete and understandable, less 
uncertain regarding its effects on the recipient's operations, and better observable and testable 
in some practical settings by increasing both the user involvement and the triability (Smilor 
and Gibson, 1991). 
Corporate management can decrease the complicating influence of the equivocality of 
knowledge by making sure that those being responsible for knowledge development involve 
the potential adopters early in the knowledge creation process. The complexity of a knowledge 
transfer efforts can be strongly reduced by stimulating prospective knowledge recipients to 
clarify expectations and explicate the deployment criteria regarding particular knowledge 
development activities. Expertise centers or knowledge development project teams should be 
pushed to establish early linkages and interaction processes with the deployers of the 
knowledge they try to explore and develop. User involvement early in and during the 
knowledge development process can increase the understanding of the user and hence decrease 
the complexity of the knowledge transfer process later on (Ives and Olsen, 1984; Leonard-
Barton, 1990; Leonard-Barton and Sinha, 1993). 
Another way by which corporate management can decrease the complicating influence of 
the equivocality of knowledge on the intracorporate knowledge sharing process is by 
increasing the triability of knowledge items. On-site demonstrations, interactive assessments of 
a new knowledge item, and the opportunity to try new innovation on a pilot basis can extent 
the mutual understanding between donor and recipient and hence strongly facilitate the transfer 
of knowledge. Triability of an innovation, as argued by many authors before (e.g., Bright, 
1967; Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971; Glaser, 1973), increases the comprehension by the 
acceptors and lessens the resistance. 
TOOL #3: ESTABLISHING A CORPORATE-WIDE LANGUAGE 
Communication and conversation management can strongly contribute to the effectuation of 
an intracorporate knowledge sharing effort. The proximity between a firm's employees can be 
decreased if corporate management manages the creation of coherence in the definition of the 
data-elements and information structures throughout the organization. Notwithstanding the 
variety in national languages, companies communicate internally through their own phrases 
and concepts inherited from their past (Von Krogh and Roos, 1995). Assuming no central 
control, each and every organizational unit tends to develop and define its own internal 
language and coding schemes resulting in severe communication problems on an inter-unit 
basis. Employees constantly create new language and new meaning ensuing that concepts and 
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phrases from one company are, in principle, not translatable into the culture of another 
organization (Von Krogh & Roos, 1996). If not managed carefully, each and every subsidiary 
in a corporate whole develops and institutionalizes its own "language" obstructing and 
complicating conversations on a cross-affiliate basis. 
As a consequence, corporate management should acknowledge these language differences 
and take action with respect the development, institutionalization, and control of a corporate-
wide interna] language facilitating the communication and knowledge transfer between front-
line managers throughout the organization. The more time and resources spent by corporate 
management on developing and giving meaning to concepts and phrases, the "richer" the 
corporate context is for sharing internally available knowledge. A well managed corporate 
language could smooth the effectuation of knowledge transfer efforts by taking away major 
difficulties to share knowledge due to the prevailing differences in mother tongue, concepts, 
phrases, process definitions, and data structures and hence facilitate the exploitation of a firm's 
valuable but scattered knowledge resources. 
TOOL #4: ARRANGING REGULAR MANAGEMENT MEETINGS 
Corporate management can take actions to reduce the heterogeneity internally by expanding 
the number and quality of people interacting. Intensifying and improving contacts between a 
firm's employees can increase mutual understanding in terms of values, attitudes, and ways of 
doing things. Formally, one could organize and facilitate management meetings for reasons 
such as the review of current trends, past achievements, and future plans, the deliberation on 
particular issues or assignments, and management training and development. Besides progress 
on these formal aims, however, these encounters can decrease the "personal distance" both in 
functional and cultural terms and these indirect effects are in many cases at least as valuable as 
the direct ones. By being educated or by deliberating on certain topics, perspectives and jargon 
on the issue are made clear, brought together, and in some situations synthesized. Moreover, 
by participating in this kind of meetings employees learn their (foreign) peers, become aware 
of cultural differences, and develop a capability to deal with them. 
An other feature of regular management meetings is that it can increase the level of trust 
between the firm's employees. Accepting cooperation as a dynamic process where participants 
constantly evaluate their own involvement in cooperative projects (Ring and Van der Ven, 
1994), regularly arranged (international) management meetings cannot only reduce the 
heterogeneity between firm's employees but also stimulate a growth of the level of trust. 
Regular management meetings can facilitate an evolution from formal to informal cooperation 
based on the frequency of previous relationships. As Dickson (1996: 133) states: 
"Collaboration creates indebtedness and reciprocity. Whether the collaboration is ultimately 
successful or not, a personal relationship is often established which may prove useful in the 
future." Personal interactions facilitate the transmission of values and enable the formation of 
judgements. The accumulation of these interactions, as Fleck (1996: 106) argues, "helps to 
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create distinct communities which coalesce around particular issues, sometimes sharing 
consensus over views, sometimes gaining a sense of community not from consensus, but from 
a continuity in the patterns of disagreement and conflict.... Such communities, mediated by 
informal information and communication, constitute the primary context within which 
expertise is deployed and play an important part in the formation and expression of that 
expertise." During every period of interpersonal interaction the uncertainty with respect to the 
particular interrelationship is reduced. The level of trust grows and becomes a foundation for 
productive intracorporate knowledge sharing relationships in the future. 
TOOL #5: DOMINANT CORPORATE CULTURE 
The heterogeneity in the firm's workforce can also be reduced by stimulating the development 
of a dominant corporate culture (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; De Meyer, 1991). A strong 
corporate culture institutionalized within a multinational enterprise can establish a corporate 
identity and create some consistency in the norms and values of the geographically spread 
employees. Organizational culture refers to a system of shared meaning held by members that 
distinguishes the organization from other organizations (Becker, 1982) and is typified as 
strong as the organization's core values are both intensely held and widely shared. In many 
corporations norms and values are not explicit and can only be understood by perceiving the 
philosophical rationale that lies behind management behaviour (Campbell and Yeung, 1991). 
A corporate culture that relies on shared norms and values is a robust and flexible means of 
coordination and can reconcile contradictory forces (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). A rich 
corporate culture, however, is difficult to build and difficult to sustain. As stated by Mintzberg 
(1991: 353): "The fact is that there are no five easy steps to a better culture [...] Effective 
ideologies are built slowly and patiently by committed leaders who establish compelling 
missions for their organizations, nurture them carefully, and care deeply about the people who 
make them work." 
Three forces can be distinguished, however, that play a particularly importanl part in 
building and sustaining a corporate culture (Robbins, 1989: 474): selection practices, 
socialization methods, and the actions of top management. The explicit goal of selection 
processes is to assess the candidate's skills and know-how to perform the job. In most cases, 
however, the decision as to who is hired will also be significantly influenced by the decision 
maker's judgement of how well the candidates fit into the organization. As a consequence, a 
corporation can select employees who have common values or at least a good portion of those 
values. In stimulating and facilitating a further adaptation to the organization's norms and 
values after an employee has been recruited, socialization programs are often in place. 
Although very costly, socialization programs are aimed at creating more conformity in the 
workforce (Ashforth and Saks, 1996). The actions of top management also have a major 
impact on the organization's culture (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Through what they say and 
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how they behave, senior executives establish norms and values that filter down through the 
organization. 
5.3 MANAGING MEDIA BARRIERS 
No matter how advanced and effective the prevailing knowledge sharing complexity reduction 
system in a corporation, effectuating the transfer, application, and integration of knowledge 
still is a complex assignment. The complicating influence of the four determinants underlying 
the complexity barriers, as discussed in the former section, can be partially reduced, but the 
left-over effect in most cases is still considerable. Consequently, to succeed in the transfer of 
knowledge, one has to cope with the remaining complexity in a particular intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project. The ability to manage this complexity effectively and efficiently is 
dependent on a firm's capability to tune~4he richness of the transfer medium to the prevalent 
knowledge sharing complexity (see Figure 5.10). Insufficient richness of the transfer medium 
harms the effectiveness of the transfer, application, and integration of the knowledge item; 
superfluous capacity of the transfer channel affects the efficiency of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project. Multiple media barriers, however, obscure this fine-tuning process 
and should therefore be managed by a firm's top management. 
In its task to facilitate, corporate management should reduce and remove media barriers 
hindering the effective and efficient effectuation of knowledge transfer efforts. To reduce these 
high 
Richness 
of the Medium 
Utilized in the 
Intracorporate Knowledge 
Sharing 
Project 
low 
Complexity 
of the Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing Project 
Figure 5.10: Knowledge Sharing Effectuation. 
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barriers and assist front-line managers in their responsibility to effectuate the transfer of 
knowledge, a firm's top management has to implement a Knowledge Sharing Media System. In 
line with the argumentation in preceding sections, section 5.3.1 reviews the factors underlying 
media barriers, while section 5.3.2 builds upon this analysis and infers conclusions regarding 
the management tools that comprise a knowledge sharing media system. 
5.3.1 Origins of Media Barriers 
Media richness is defined by Daft and Huber (1987: 14) as "the medium's capacity to change 
mental representations within a specific time interval," and has two underlying dimensions 
(Huber, 1991: 103) being the variety of cues that the medium can convey and the rapidity of 
• feedback that the medium can provide. Media richness increases the extent to which 
;
 information is given common meaning by the sender and the receiver of a message (Daft, 
: Lengel and Trevino, 1987) and hence the richness of a medium can facilitate an effective 
effectuation of a knowledge transfer. Efficiency rationales, however, enforce an adaptation of 
the medium richness to the particular complexity of an intracorporate knowledge sharing 
project and hence the use of relatively "poor" media for relatively simple transfer situations. 
Finding the optimal fit between the complexity of the particular knowledge sharing project and 
the richness of the transfer medium is obscured by two sets of media barriers, namely skill-
related and resource-related deterrents (see Figure 5.11). 
!
Skills are needed to transfer and adopt knowledge. Apart from social and intercultural skills, 
the donor and recipient need to master some particular knowledge transfer skills. A lack of 
these skills can significantly hinder the intracorporate knowledge sharing process. A donor 
must be able to structure and communicate its knowledge. A sharing effort is more likely to 
r 
^0 succeed if the donor is able to organize, package, and convey its expertise and skills in a user-friendly way. An innovation becomes only of any value if it is accepted and understood by its 
receiver. Consequently, being able to think about a users manual or to think about features that 
may make a knowledge item easier to use, could be as important as the invention itself (Wolff, 
1989). Highly intelligent and creative academics, for example, could be lousy knowledge 
transferors. If they lack the ability to order their knowledge base and are not able to present it 
in an understandable way, their students will have severe problems in understanding what the 
teacher tries to explain. 
Regarding the skills of knowledge recipients, the ability to absorb is a critical necessity. 
Besides prior related knowledge with respect to the issue at stake, a knowledge recipient who 
wants to be able to successfully adopt a knowledge item and to integrate it in its own 
operations has to possess the skills to register, analyse, and interpret the information which it 
gets from the knowledge donor in an intracorporate knowledge sharing effort. The knowledge 
recipient must be able to convert the codified knowledge into a human and process-embodied 
form of knowledge back again and integrate the procured knowledge in the "thinking" and 
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Media Barriers 1 
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Figure 5.11: Factors underlying Media Barriers. 
behavior of the receiving organization. In this respect it is interesting to refer to the experience 
of many educators in their attempt to transfer knowledge. With a group of students unwilling 
or unable to absorb, a teacher's skillfully and recipient-friendly organized and presented lecture 
will not contribute to the students' learning of new knowledge and hence remains an 
unproductive endeavour. 
Apart from skill-related deterrents, a firm's inability to tune the media richness to the 
complexity involved in a knowledge transfer effort is caused by resource-related impediments. 
Resources in this respect comprise management time and transfer channels. A medium 
involving personal face-to-face contact is sometimes a necessity for complex knowledge 
transfer efforts like turnkey operations or the transfer of process innovations. In these cases the 
arrangement of team meetings or the expatriation of a front-line manager could be very 
helpful. The major advantage of these transfer mechanisms is that they facilitate rapid 
feedback and interpretation of the knowledge item transferred. In situations, however, where a 
huge amount of simple data must be exchanged, less rich but broadband channels need to be 
available. Recent advancements in the area of information technology and telecommunications 
have led to the creation of useful management tools in this respect (e.g., EDI, E-mail, video-
conferencing). 
Various transfer channels, both passive and active, are optional for the effectuation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts (Smilor and Gibson, 1991). Passive transfer channels 
are disembodied, considered best for rapidly communicating a simple message to a broad 
audience, and include research reports, computer hardware, and video tapes. Active transfer 
channels arc direct person-to-pcrson interactions, ranging from an electronic mail conversation 
to expatriation of human-embodied knowledge. They are more likely to result in effective 
knowledge transfer, but are also more costly in terms of time commitments, travel expenses, 
and the like. Daft and Lengel (1986) present a scale of media richness that increases from rules 
to formal information systems, via special reports, planning, direct contact, integrator roles, to 
group meetings. Although we have adapted the list of transfer channels and extended it with -w 
: 
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Adapted from Daft & Lengel (1986) 
Figure 5.12: Transfer Channels for Knowledge Transfer. 
new ones derived from advancements in the information and communication technologies area 
(e.g., electronic mail, desk-top computing, videoconferencing, EDI), the basic idea behind the 
continuum of Daft and Lengel (1986) also accounts for intracorporate knowledge sharing (see 
Figure 5.12). Making use of the entire set of knowledge transfer channels in an effective and 
efficient way is to a great extent dependent on the available resources in the organization. The 
lack of these resources significantly affects the effectuation of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing efforts throughout the organization. 
In line with the argumentation in preceding sections, the review of the media barriers leads 
logically to the formulation of a proposition on the prerequisite management system for 
managing these barriers to effectuation. We assume that the availability of knowledge sharing 
skills and resources is positively associated with the successful effectuation of an 
intracorporate knowledge sharing effort. Consequently, with respect to the responsibility of a 
firm's top management in facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing, the following 
proposition has been formulated: 
Proposition fP4): 
The successful effectuation of an intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is more likely to occur 
when there is a management system extending the possibilities to tune the richness of the transfer 
medium to the complexity of the intracorporate knowledge sharing situation. 
The management system which reduces the hindering influence of the media barriers and 
hence reduces the barriers to effectuation in the intracorporate knowledge sharing process is 
called a Knowledge Sharing Media System. Based on the discussion of media barriers in the 
former section, the next section enumerates the possible management tools of such a 
knowledge sharing media system. 
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Figure 5.9: The Function of a Knowledge Sharing Media System. 
5.3.2 Toward a Knowledge Sharing Media System 
Media barriers hinder the effectuation of knowledge sharing efforts and hence have to be 
managed. To share knowledge effectively and efficiently on an intracorporate basis, front-line 
managers must be able to tune the richness of the transfer medium to the particular complexity 
of their knowledge transfer effort. Corporate management in its task to facilitate should reduce 
the media barriers by institutionalizing a Knowledge Sharing Media System. As a conceptual 
construct, however, a knowledge sharing media system is not directly observable in practical 
settings and has therefore to be defined on the basis of observable management tools. The 
management tools described and discussed in this section are the most representative spurs 
presented in the literature regarding knowledge transfer media3. 
Three management tools of a knowledge sharing media system are reviewed. Under the 
assumptions that front-line managers are free in their choice to select whatever transfer 
channel they want to use (e.g., phone, company visit, inter-unit management meetings), we 
argue that a firm's top management in its task to develop a knowledge sharing media system 
can take action regarding the development of knowledge transfer and adoption skills 
throughout the organization, the application of advanced communication technologies, and the 
formulation of a deliberate expatriation strategy (see Exhibit 5.2). Linking the management 
tools to the factors underlying the media barriers (see Table 5.4), shows a match between tools 
and determinants of media barriers. 
Although the extent to which a management tool is representative remains somewhat subjective, its 
representative nature has been verified by logical reasoning based on the factors underlying the media barriers 
and early checks and pilot studies in practical settings. 
Preparation 
Stage 
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T H E KNOWLEDGE SHARING MEDIA S Y S T E M 
A Set of Management Tools 
A Knowledge Sharing Media System can be given form and content by using one or 
more of the following management tools. The most suitable set of tools for a particular 
firm and the best way of implementing them are supposed to be situation-specific. 
(1) KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER SKILL DEVELOPMENT 
Facilitate the effectuation of intracorporate knowledge sharing projects by advancing the knowledge 
transfer skills of the firm's employees 
(2) APPLICATION OF ADVANCED COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 
Extending the available set of applicable transfer tools by implementing and facilitating the 
use of new advanced communication technologies 
(3) EXPATRIATION STRATEGY 
Extending the available set of applicable transfer tools by developing a carefully managed 
expatriation strategy 
Exhibit 5.2: Management Tools of a Knowledge Sharing Media System. 
TOOL # / : DEVELOPING THE EMPLOYEES' TRANSFER SKILLS 
Intracorporate knowledge sharing can be effectuated more smoothly if the donor and recipient 
possess the requisite knowledge transfer skills. A sharing effort is more likely to succeed if the 
donor is able to organize, package, and convey its know-how in a user-friendly way and if the 
recipient possesses the skill to listen, analyse, and interpret the transferred information. 
Corporate management has a few options to facilitate the development of these skills. They 
can stress the particular complexities in sharing knowledge and emphasize the need to allocate 
skillful knowledge transferors and acceptors to intracorporate knowledge sharing projects. 
Corporate management can also arrange internal management courses or seminars to improve 
the critical transfer and adoption skills of the key knowledge workers throughout the 
organization. By organizing such management courses the importance of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing is stressed and front-line managers are made more conscious regarding the 
possible knowledge transfer pitfalls. As argued above, top management can also expand the 
number and diversity of people in international management meetings to improve their 
sociability and intercultural skills. 
TOOL #2: APPLICATION OF ADVANCED COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 
In its task to facilitate, a firm's top management can extend the number of transfer channels by 
exploiting recent developments in the information technology and telecommunications area. It 
has become apparent from research of many organizational and management researchers 
(Huber, 1990; Martins, 1994) that the nature and effectiveness of many organizational 
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Table 5.2: Matching Management Tools and Factors underlying Media Barriers. 
processes are changed when advanced information technologies are employed. Consequently, 
it seems logical to assume that the process of intracorporate knowledge sharing is also affected 
by these new communication technologies. New computer-aided systems can operate as the 
shared memory of all organizational members and thus give shape to the knowledge sharing 
awareness system of an enterprise. Besides these properties, however, advanced 
communication technologies can also facilitate fast and efficient communication and can 
furthermore operate as a mechanism whereby multiple members can dynamically exchange 
solutions to problems (Goodman and Darr, 1996). 
Huber (1990: 48) defines advanced information technology as: "devices (a) that transmit, 
manipulate, analyze, or exploit information; (b) in which a digital computer processes 
information integral to the user's communication or decision task; and (c) that have either 
made their appearance since 1970 or exist in a form that aids in communication or decision 
task to a significant greater degree than did pre-1971 forms." A good example of an advanced 
information technology with significant implications for the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process is electronic mail (E-mail). Electronic mail is the computer-to-computer exchange of 
messages or structured information. The message is send to one or more persons directly in a 
fast and efficient way. Moreover, with a portable computer and modem one has access to a 
global communication network for retrieving messages and sending key documents at any time 
in any place while one does not need to bother about time-zone problems in communicating 
internationally. A drawback of E-mail communication is that there is no physical interaction 
and is therefore only suitable for simple communication processes with a low amount of 
information exchanged. Moreover, electronic mail is ideal for interpersonal communication, 
but creates filing and retrieval problems for diffusing corporate-wide information (Kusekoski, 
1989). 
Another advanced information tool, the Electronic Bulletin Board, offers a solution for the 
filing and retrieval problems of the electronic mail application. An Electronic Bulletin Board is 
a knowledge base through which information can be made accessible for the corporation's 
employees. An electronic bulletin board distributes document-based information across the 
same corporate-wide network needed for electronic mail. It reduces paper production and time 
and costs of locating and scrapping obsolete documents are eliminated. An electronic bulletin 
board provides responsive, consistent access to the information employees need in support of 
their business activities, but lacks the personalization and interaction of personal contact and 
requires a commitment to maintain the amount, the timeliness, and accuracy of information. 
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Too much, outdated, or inaccurate information on an electronic bulletin board will quickly kill 
off the use of the application and can undermine the viability of the entire system. 
Electronic conferencing is another advanced information application which is just taking off 
within many corporations and has major implications for the effectuation of knowledge 
transfers. In electronic conferencing (e.g., videoconferencing, desk-to-desk conferencing) one 
uses transmission channels to transmit audio and video information between groups of people 
which are geographically separated. Most electronic conferencing systems are introduced in 
organizations by groups that have been formed initially through face-to-face interaction and 
which then turn to electronic meetings to augment the conventional ones, often dictated by 
time pressures, convenience, or task demands (Hamon, Schneer, and Hoffman, 1995). Within a 
few years, personal products vendors are expected to start integrating electronic conferencing 
capability into their products and hence corporations will be able to put video conferencing 
opportunities on the desk of an executive or engineer for less than the costs of a single airline 
ticket. Although the weakness of this communication tool is still in the problems concerned 
with handling tremendous volumes of information generated by multiple data streams from 
audio, video, text, and data, new applications for satellite-business conferencing are likely to 
enhance its value in the coming years. Research suggests that a video conferencing system is 
somewhere between conventional telephone and face-to-face meetings in terms of media 
richness (Kydd and Ferry, 1994). Electronic conferencing, however, due to the lack of other 
communication signals (e.g., smell, hand shake), is not and will probably never be a full 
substitute for in-person contact. 
Advanced information and communication technologies like EDI, cellular telephone, E-
mail, group ware, voice-mail, desk-top computing, and video-conferencing can enable an 
improvement of the effectuation of intracorporate knowledge transfer processes. The new 
technologies enable "any-time-any-place" communication and are a valuable addition to the 
current set of communication channels. Owing to this extension of the set of knowledge 
transfer channels it will become ever more easy to adapt the applied channel to the complexity 
of the particular situation and hence to use the organization's resources as efficient and 
effective as possible. 
TOOL #3: EXPATRIATION STRATEGY 
Finally, in its attempt to reduce media barriers a firm's top management can rely upon the 
expatriation of front-line managers based on a deliberate expatriation strategy. In some 
situations, the leverage of existing knowledge items requires a very rich transfer channel. The 
expatriation of front-line managers will then be the only capable transfer channel to leverage 
existing knowledge. The knowledge at stake in a knowledge transfer effort, for example, can 
be too complex to be codified and exploitation of the human-embodied knowledge item can 
only be achieved by transferring its "owner." Although companies need to realize that 
expatriates are expensive (two to three times the cost of the same employee in its home state), 
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the leverage of their know-how and experience can be valuable enough to facilitate the transfer 
of personnel abroad. 
Expatriates carry with them a wealth of home company knowledge. They may understand 
the systems and processes of the home office. They know the people in the home office and 
whom to contact to get things done. They understand the company's overall strategies and 
goals. Consequently, expatriation can be the preferred knowledge transfer channel in particular 
situations and hence a deliberate expatriation policy must be formulated by corporate 
management to facilitate this process and improve the chances for success in those cases. 
Following Zetlin (1994), three elements of a successful expatriation assignment are: choosing 
the right candidate, properly preparing the executive and the executive's family for the 
overseas assignment, and providing ample support and contact with the home office while the 
executive is abroad. 
First of all, corporate management needs to understand that although someone may be the 
most suitable person for an assignment abroad based on his or her functional know-how, 
certain types of persons are more likely to perform well in an overseas assignment than others. 
Consequently, a well-structured selection procedure needs to be in place which evaluates 
possible candidates regarding their know-how on the subject area, but also on their personality 
profile. Standard personality tests have to be developed to profile the required traits of a 
successful expatriate (e.g., adventurous, flexible, open-minded, stable family life). Moreover, 
it is very important to understand that it is not recommendable to force employees to accept an 
expatriation assignment. Only highly motivated people who are willing to sacrifice personal 
comfort for longer-term personal growth will be able to succeed in an environment which 
strongly differs from the situation at home. 
A second prerequisite condition for successful expatriation is to properly prepare the 
executive and the executive's family for an overseas assignment (Black and Mendenhall, 1989; 
Park, Hwan, and Harrison, 1996). Both will be confronted with significant cultural differences 
and it is therefore necessary to prepare them and make them recognize these cultural 
differences. The management process in each country, for example, is shaped at least partially 
by the culture of the country which affects how management decisions are made, how 
consensus is reached, and how employees are expected to interact with one another. In some 
countries, as argued by Richardson and Rullo (1992), agreement on the surface may mean 
nothing. In others, open debate and criticism of ideas are welcomed. In still other countries, the 
same thing will be seen as a personal affront to the individual's competency and integrity. 
Consequently, although one can be technically speaking the best financial manager in a 
corporation, without cultural he or she will be likely to struggle in accomplishing his or her 
goals. Corporations can prepare their managers for overseas assignments by sending them to 
courses, providing them relevant literature, and facilitating the consultation of local managers 
or their predecessors in that region. To circumvent communication problems while being 
abroad, Park, Hwan, and Harrison (1996:95) advise that "foreign language training should 
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become a key aspect of expatriation training in order to facilitate more effective 
communication within foreign subsidiaries." 
Finally, an expatriation strategy must also ensure that the expatriate is provided with ample 
support from the home office. Expatriates tend to lose touch with the home office when they 
are abroad. Being geographically far away often also means that people tend to leave expats 
out of various information flows and hence corporate news often reaches them weeks after the 
fact, if they hear it at all. If corporate management decides to send someone abroad, it has also 
the responsibility to keep that manager informed. Although corporate management may not 
need to do this task itself, it should occasionally monitor the communication channels to check 
their effectiveness. 
S.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The decision to start an intracorporate knowledge sharing project and its subsequent execution 
have been split for analytical purposes in this research project. While the decision phase has 
been studied in chapter four, the execution phase of intracorporate knowledge sharing has been 
investigated in this chapter. The execution phase commences rather directly after the decision 
phase, unless it is held up by some logistical or resource problem, and comprises a preparation 
and a transfer stage. In managing the execution phase, a firm's top management can focus its 
task to facilitate in two directions. On the one hand, corporate management can take action 
with respect to the antecedents of the complexity of intracorporate knowledge sharing projects 
to reduce the complexity barriers and hence, on average, the complexity to share knowledge. 
On the other hand, corporate management can invest in the firm's transfer media to reduce the 
media barriers and enable the front-line managers to deal with the particular complexity of the 
knowledge sharing effort. 
Based on the assumption that numerous complexity barriers hinder the effectuation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts, in this chapter it has been posed that the successful 
effectuation of an intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is more likely when there is a 
management system, called Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System, reducing the 
complicating influence of the complexity barriers. By giving content and form to a knowledge 
sharing complexity reduction system, corporate management can neutralize and reduce the 
hindering influence of the complexity barriers and hence smooth the knowledge transfer 
efforts of their front-line managers lower down the hierarchy. As a theoretical construct, a 
knowledge sharing complexity reduction system can be developed by implementing one or a 
combination of the following management tools: knowledge abstraction policies, increased 
user involvement in knowledge development, increased triability of knowledge items, a 
corporate-wide language, regular management meetings, a dominant corporate culture, 
financial measures and rewards, formal statements by top management, organizing for 
knowledge interdependencies, institutionalizing knowledge champions, and a corporate culture 
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activating a social pressure to share. These tools are the most representative spurs presented in 
the literature regarding the complexity of knowledge transfer efforts. 
No matter how advanced and effective the prevailing knowledge sharing complexity 
reduction system in a company, effectuating the transfer, application, and integration of 
knowledge remains a complex assignment. This remaining complexity can be managed, a task 
which is hindered by various skill and resource-related media barriers. For effective and 
efficient knowledge sharing, front-line managers must be able to tune the richness of the 
transfer medium to the characteristics and complexity of a particular knowledge transfer 
situation. Consequently, a second but related way corporate management can influence the 
success of the effectuation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing effort between managers 
throughout the hierarchy is by implementing a Knowledge Sharing Media System reducing the 
media barriers to effectuation. A knowledge sharing media system could be given content and 
form by implementing one or a combination of the enumerated management tools, being the 
development of knowledge transfer and adoption skills throughout the organization, the 
application of advanced communication technologies, and the formulation of a deliberate 
expatriation strategy. 
We are now able to integrate the key findings of the theoretical part of this study in an 
integrated framework (see Figure 5.10). Building upon a review of the existing literature and 
an analysis of the outcomes of former research projects, we have presented a conceptualization 
of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process, a managerial classification of the assumed 
barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing, and an integrated set of propositions on the 
various management systems stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
An integrated framework including these key contributions encompasses many of the variables 
that effect the intracorporate knowledge sharing process. Therefore, the framework captures a 
lot of the complexity involved in actual managing intracorporate knowledge sharing between 
the affiliates of a multinational enterprise. The integrated framework allows the observation, 
analysis, understanding, and normative assessment of the managerial problems and 
responsibilities involved and could act as a tool for future endeavours in practical settings to 
increase the stimulating and facilitating properties of a firm's corporate context regarding 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
In its responsibility to stimulate and facilitate intracorporate knowledge sharing, corporate 
management should aim at removing and reducing the assumed barriers to initiation (i.e., 
awareness barriers, interest barriers) and effectuation (i.e., complexity barriers, media barriers) 
by implementing a bundle of knowledge sharing systems for coping with awareness, 
persuasion, complexity reduction, and media matters. These management systems are 
theoretical constructs and hence should be developed by implementing one or a combination 
of the related management tools enlisted in this study. Interesting to note in this respect, as we 
also did at the end of chapter four, is the overlap which exists between the management tools 
underlying both management systems. For example, the management tools giving form and 
content to a Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System can also be used to establish a Knowledge 
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Sharing Complexity Reduction System in that these tools can help in reducing the 
complicating influence of the lack of motivation on the effectuation of an intracorporate 
knowledge sharing effort. By using some distinct management tools, both management 
systems can be activated at the same time. This not only shows that the management systems 
are highly interrelated and should be highly integrated where possible, but also points to the 
mutual reinforcing nature of these management systems. 
By implementing the knowledge sharing management systems, top management can onset a 
dynamic process. Transfer success has a positive influence on subsequent intracorporate 
knowledge sharing projects by affecting the barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing and 
contributing to the development of the management systems. With respect to the barriers to 
intracorporate knowledge sharing, transfer success improves the motivation of the actors 
involved, increases the level of trust, and reduces the heterogeneity inside the firm and hence 
decreases the obstructing and complicating effects on knowledge sharing efforts in future. 
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Regarding the management systems, transfer success strongly adds to the development of a 
stimulating and facilitating corporate culture. Therefore, it can be stated that if a firm is able to 
increase the number of knowledge transfer "successes" the stimulating and facilitating efforts 
start to reinforce themselves. 
Summarizing, chapter four and five have indicated that it is not an easy task for top 
management to stimulate and facilitate intracorporate knowledge sharing but that's probably 
the reason why managing intracorporate knowledge sharing can add enormous value to the 
corporation. Top management has to implement a bundle of strongly interrelated management 
systems by selecting those management tools which best suit the firm-specific circumstances. 
Notwithstanding the enumeration of numerous management tools giving content and form to 
one of the four management systems, no conclusions were formulated in the theoretical part of 
this thesis on suitable combinations of management tools and the best way to implement them. 
Besides the illustrative properties of the case studies, the empirical research, as presented in 
the next four chapters, could provide this research with a significant contribution in this 
respect. 

6 
Managing Intracorporate 
Knowledge Sharing in Three 
Practical Settings in Europe 
Methodology 
"As long as the building of frameworks is based on in-depth empirical research, it has the 
potential to not only inform practice but to push the development of more rigorous theory." 
-M.E.Porter (1991: 98). 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this research project, the empirical research has been preceded by a conceptual phase in 
which an attempt was made to formulate some preliminary propositions. Instead of a research 
approach aimed at the generation of grounded theory, the integrated framework and the related 
propositions have been deducted from an extensive review of the literature complemented by 
some early checks and pilot studies in practical settings. In search of the management systems 
stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing between internationally 
dispersed companies of the multinational enterprise, it has been argued that the leverage of a 
firm's knowledge reservoir can reinforce and strengthen its units' competitive strategies by 
savings in development expenses, pro-active marketing strategies, the achievement of best 
practice levels, and faster product innovation. To exploit these advantages and to establish a fit 
between the required and actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing, corporate 
management should institutionalize management tools which reduce or remove barriers 
blocking, hindering, and complicating the transfer of knowledge inside their firms. Four 
propositions have been posed regarding the requisite management systems for managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. As conceptual constructs, however, these management 
systems are not directly observable in practical settings and hence have been defined on the 
basis of observable management tools. 
Based on and structured by the theoretical groundwork, the next three chapters present 
knowledge sharing practices, barriers, stimulators, and facilitators in some practical settings. 
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Figure 6.1: A Process Description of the Research Project. 
Case study research has been done in order to learn how managers think about and manage the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process inside the companies they work in. By explicating 
the research design, this sixth chapter operates as the "linking pin" between the theoretical and 
empirical parts of this study. A strictly defined and well structured research methodology is 
necessary to ensure that the research findings of the three case studies can be compared. 
Moreover, the aim of this research project is to come up with some well-grounded conclusions 
on managing intracorporate knowledge sharing and this requires an aggregation and 
integration of the theoretical and empirical inferences. Without a strict and well structured 
research design, the groundwork would be loosely integrated and hence too weak for stating 
concluding remarks. 
In the next section, a description of the research design is presented, linking the empirical 
part of the research project to its theoretical foundation (see Figure 6.1). Here, the key 
constructs of the theoretical groundwork are operationalized, the number and selection of the 
case study objects explained, and the applied methods for data collection explicated. 
Thereafter, the key characteristics of a "European style of management" are investigated. As 
stated and explained in the introductory chapter, the empirical research focuses on the process 
of intracorporate knowledge sharing in multinational enterprises in Europe and in this respect 
we distinguish the particular implications of managing the knowledge exploitation process in a 
European context. 
6.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The empirical part of the research project "Managing Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing" 
consists of case studies that investigate the complex social phenomena of managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. A case study is "a history of a past or current phenomenon, 
which is often drawn from multiple sources of evidence" (Leonard-Barton, 1990: 249) and 
focuses on learning to understand the dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 
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1989). The case study strategy has been applied in this particular research project because its 
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context and because the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident yet (Yin, 1989). The 
existing knowledge base on managing intracorporate knowledge sharing faces a lack of 
structure, and a lot of relationships between various variables are still unknown or unclear. The 
possibility to retain holistic and meaningful characteristics of managing intracorporate 
knowledge sharing in the day-to-day reality of a number of multinational enterprises makes it 
easy to see why the case study approach is the most appropriate research strategy for this 
research project. 
So, if one wants to describe how multinational enterprises manage the process of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing between their internationally dispersed companies one is 
forced to conduct what in the final analysis would be a history or a case study. It is not 
appropriate to rely on a survey or an examination of archival records because many 
interrelationships between variables are still unclear. If carefully performed, a case study can 
devise a case description against which researchers and managers can compare their own 
theoretical constructs and practical experiences. Our case study descriptions illustrate 
knowledge sharing practices, barriers, stimulators, and facilitators in practical settings. This 
enables us to learn how practical managers think about and manage the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process inside their companies. Apart from the illustrative purposes of the 
case study strategy, a cross-case analysis enables us to draw conclusions on prevailing 
combinations of management tools and ways of implementing them. 
In giving structure and content to the case study methodology, decisions have been made 
with respect to the following issues: 
• Operationalization of Key Constructs; 
• Number of Case Objects; 
• Selection of Case Companies; and 
• Data Collection Methods. 
In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on these issues and explicate the details of the 
decisions made. 
ISSUE #1: OPERA TIONAHZATION OF KEY CONSTRUCTS 
The aim of this research project, as argued in the introductory chapter, has never been the 
development of a universally applicable and all-encompassing theory of managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. More modestly, the aim has been to develop an integrated 
framework proposing a set of constructs that are related to each other by some preliminary 
propositions, bounded by the author's assumptions. The set of constructs and propositions 
enables both scientists and managers to structure and communicate their thoughts, 
observations, and experiences regarding managing intracorporate knowledge sharing in 
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multinational enterprises. Operationalization of the key constructs has an important role to play 
in this respect by defining the key constructs of the theoretical part of this study in observable 
variables. 
Operationalization means that meaning is assigned to a construct or a variable by specifying 
the activities necessary to measure it. An operational definition gives meaning to a construct or 
variable by spelling out what the investigator must do to measure it (Kerlinger, 1986). 
Operationalization makes it possible to shuttle and establish a link between the theoretical and 
empirical part of the research project. Strangely enough, operationalization in case study 
research is a methodological issue that has received very little attention in the strongly growing 
literature on the case study method (De Man, 1996). While a key issue in giving structure and 
PI: Knowledge Sharing Awareness System 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing project is more likely to occur when there 
is a management system which makes employees 
aware of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
prospects. 
MANAGEMENT TOOLS: 
Knowledge Codification, Registering, and Storage 
Networking 
Assigning Knowledge Exploration Responsibilities 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Sharing Intermediaries 
Implementing Internal Benchmark Procedures 
P3: KS Complexity Reduction System 
The successful effectuation of an intracorporate 
knowledge transfer effort is more likely when there 
is a management system reducing the complexity of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
MANAGEMENT TOOLS: 
Knowledge Abstraction & Codification 
Increasing the User Involvement & Triability 
Establishing a Corporate-Wide Language 
Arranging Regular Management Meetings 
Dominant Corporate Culture 
Financial Measures and Rewards 
Commitment of and Formal Statements by Top Mgt. 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependencies 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Creating a Strong Corporate Culture 
P2: Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing 
project is more likely to occur when there is a 
management system encouraging employees' interest 
to participate in the exploitation of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing prospects. 
MANAGEMENT TOOLS: 
Financial Measures and Rewards for Knowledge Sharing 
Commitment and Formal Statements by Top Management 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependencies 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure to Share 
P4: Knowledge Sharing Media System 
The successful effectuation of an intracorporate 
knowledge transfer effort is more likely to occur 
when there is a management system extending the 
possibilities to tune the richness of the transfer 
medium to the complexity of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing situation. 
MANAGEMENT TOOLS; 
Knowledge Transfer Skill Development 
Application of Advanced Communication Technologies 
Expatriation Strategy 
Note: Some management tools can activate more management systems at the same time. All the management tools linked to the 
Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System, for example, can also be used to give form and content to a Knowledge Sharing 
Complexity Reduction System as a way to increase the motivation of the actors involved. 
Table 6.1 Tool Table for Four Knowledge Sharing Management Systems. 
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form to a quantitative research approach, operationalization has until now been of less concern 
for a research strategy that focuses on more qualitative evidence. 
Sooner or later, scientific investigators must face the necessity of measuring the variables of 
the relations they are studying. Sometimes measurement is easy, sometimes difficult. 
Operational definitions, however, are indispensable ingredients of scientific research and for 
case studies they can operate as important and useful bridges between theory and empirical 
observations. Despite the complexity inherent in real-life cases, these observations must be 
brought back to a generic contribution to our scientific knowledge base. The ultimate aim 
remains to validate or falsify the content of this knowledge base and this kind of analysis 
becomes impossible if key constructs are not operationalized. Despite the dangers of extreme 
operationalization in the social sciences and the growing emphasis on firm-specific 
circumstances (Mahoney, 1993), it can be safely said that operationalization is a healthy step 
to take in every field of study. "To insist, however, that every term we use in scientific 
discourse be operationally defined," Kerlinger (1986: 30) argues, "would be too narrowing, 
too restrictive, and ... scientifically unsound." 
In search of management systems stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge 
sharing between internationally dispersed companies of the multinational enterprise. Four 
propositions were posed on the required management systems for managing intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. Knowledge sharing awareness systems, knowledge sharing persuasion 
systems, knowledge sharing complexity reduction systems, and knowledge sharing media 
systems, however, are, as mentioned above, not directly observational. Therefore, they have to 
be operationalized to determine how these management systems are implemented in practical 
settings. The management tools comprising the management systems, as presented in chapter 
four and chapter five, are helpful in this respect and act as the "linking pin" between the 
theoretical and empirical parts of the research project. Table 6.1 presents the management tools 
giving form and content to the various management systems stimulating and facilitating 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
The case studies in this research project are used to illustrate the validity of the theoretically 
deduced propositions. Each case description concludes with an examination of the extent to 
which the presented management systems for managing intracorporate knowledge sharing are 
given content and form. The registered management tools within the case company are 
confronted with the tools of the knowledge sharing management systems. By reviewing which 
and how many management system's management tools can be discerned within the confines 
of the case company, some tentative conclusions are formulated on the barriers still obstructing 
and hindering the intracorporate knowledge sharing process. 
ISSUE #2: NUMBER OF CASE OBJECTS 
A critical decision facing the researcher in doing case study research, as Dyer and Wilkins 
(1991) argue, is specifying the population and hence the set of case study objects. Every 
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researcher effectuating case study research has to make a trade-off between the benefits of 
comparative insights and the deep understanding of a particular social setting. On the one 
hand, Eisenhardt (1989: 545) argues that a single case study is often not sufficient to create and 
highlight theoretical constructs. She states: "With fewer than 4 cases, it is often difficult to 
generate theory with much complexity, and its empirical grounding is likely to be 
unconvincing, unless the case has several mini-cases within it." Effectuating and comparing 
multiple case studies provides the researcher with contrasting or identical observations which 
further verify or falsify the theoretical constructs. On the other hand, Dyer and Wilkins (1991) 
argue, the focus on building and testing general constructs in multiple settings can harm the 
visibility of the interrelations with the context of a particular setting while the aim of any 
management researcher needs to be to get as close as possible to the world of managers and to 
interpret this world and its problems from the inside. A single case study can give more 
attention to the unique and typical characteristics of the particular social scene and reveal the 
deep structure of social behavior. By using a limited number of well-elaborated cases, one 
gives the reader the chance to understand the social setting and to become aware of the 
complex set of interrelated variables that gives shape to political behavior in that particular 
situation. 
This research project focuses on what kind of management systems stimulate and facilitate 
intracorporate knowledge sharing between the internationally dispersed companies of the 
multinational enterprise. The primary unit of analysis is the multinational corporation. The 
unstructured nature of the central research topic asks for an in-depth study of the phenomenon 
in a real life setting. The observations of and insights into the issues surrounding managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing in one particular corporation would have formed a 
significant empirical contribution on its own because few management scientists have 
investigated this particular issue in detail in the past. In Yin's terminology (1989), the single-
case design would be eminently justifiable in this particular situation because the case serves a 
revelatory purpose. 
Arguments, however, can also be brought up to include more than a single case in this 
research project. As Yin (1989: 52) states, "the evidence from multiple cases is often 
considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust." 
Multiple cases justify a stronger contribution to the scientific knowledge base because they 
permit replication and extension among individual cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; 1991). Multiple 
cases can extent the diversity in the research findings and through this diversity contribute to 
the understanding of the investigated phenomenon. Our strategic "fit" model, as presented in 
chapter two, indicates that a diverse set of approaches can be expected based on differences in 
a firm's knowledge environment, corporate strategy, and administrative heritage. As a 
consequence, cases which are selected based on these differences instead of their communality 
could generate a wide and rich set of empirical illustrations of the phenomenon of managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
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Regarding the research project "Managing Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing," the 
decision has been made to effectuate a comparative case study of three case companies. All 
three case companies are described in rather general terms in line with the strategic "fit" 
model. This means that each firm's knowledge environment, corporate strategy, administrative 
heritage, and implemented management tools have been described from an intracorporate 
knowledge sharing point of view. To generate a better understanding on how some of the 
management tools stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing can be 
implemented, one in-depth study was performed on the largest enterprise by adding an 
additional unit of analysis. Within this particular case the general description on managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing is complemented by an in-depth analysis of some of the 
implemented management tools. The conduct of embedded case studies (Yin, 1989) in all 
three companies would require resources and time beyond the means of the researcher. 
Moreover, because the in-depth study has been performed before the other two case-studies 
commenced, the researcher was able to distinguish more efficiently and effectively the most 
interesting and discriminating issues in the two remaining case companies. 
ISSUE #3: SELECTION OF CASE COMPANIES 
In selecting the objects for the comparative case study research, a theoretical sampling plan has 
been followed, meaning that cases were chosen for theoretical rather than statistical reasons 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990). The three case study companies (i.e., Unilever, Canon Europe N.V., 
and ITT World Directories, Inc.) were chosen based on their differences, as enumerated in 
Table 6.2. They varied significantly on the key dimensions of the strategic "fit" model on 
managing intracorporate knowledge sharing, being a firm's knowledge environment, corporate 
strategy, and administrative heritage. The diversity in the cases gives rise to alternative 
perspectives on and approaches regarding the issue of managing intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. Moreover, the differences between the case study objects can provide us with research 
findings indicating the variety in the possible combinations of management tools and ways of 
implementing them. 
Case study Objects 
Key Characteristics 
Products 
Revenues Worldwide 
Number of Employees 
Corporate Background 
Inquiry focused on: 
Unilever 
Food 
Personal Products 
Detergents 
Chemicals 
$ 45 billion 
± 304,000 
Anglo-Dutch 
Foods Europe 
Personal Products Europe 
Canon 
Business Machines 
Cameras 
Optical Products 
Chemicals 
$ 19 billion 
± 70,000 
Japan 
Canon Europe N.V. 
ITT World Directories 
Directory Products 
(Yellow Pages) 
$500 million 
± 2,300 
USA 
ITT World Directories' 
operations in Europe 
Table 6.2: A Comparison of the Selected Case Companies. 
126 • CHAPTER SIX 
1 
Importance Market Knowledge 
LOW HIGH 
LOW 
HIGH 
ITT WD Unilever 
• ^ I 
Canon 
Figure 6.2: Knowledge Environment of Case Study Objects. 
With respect to the knowledge environment of the three firms (see Figure 6.2), for example, 
Unilever has always differentiated itself by local adaptation strategies (high importance market 
knowledge, low importance expertise), Canon has been well known for leveraging its 
technological excellence (high importance expertise, low importance market knowledge), and 
ITT World Directories has sustained its above average profit margins based on their 
governmentally granted monopoly positions (low importance of both market knowledge and 
expertise). Although all three firms are now moving to the right lower corner, their "starting 
position" differs. Another important decision criteria in selecting the case study objects 
concerned the differences in administrative heritage. The American background of ITT, the 
Japanese background of Canon, and the Anglo-Dutch background of Unilever have a strong 
influence on the case companies' European operations and the way they manage their 
businesses in this region. 
After the three firms were contacted and informed about the details of the research project, 
each corporation was willing to cooperate and allowed the researcher to collect the required 
information through interviews and analysis of internal documentation. Unilever also agreed to 
perform the inquiry in two divisions: Unilever Foods and Unilever Personal Products. By 
replicating the investigation in Unilever Foods and Unilever Personal Products, we were able 
to study the internal differentiation in perspectives and approaches regarding the management 
of intracorporate knowledge sharing. Moreover, doing research in these two divisions provided 
us with the opportunity to compare the implementation of the same set of management tools in 
two quite autonomous operating organizations. 
ISSUE #4: DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
Before entering the field, our data collection instruments had to be chosen. The case study's 
unique strength versus other research strategies like experiments, surveys, and histories is its 
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ability to deal with a full variety of evidence - documents, questionnaires, interviews, and 
observations. Case studies typically combine data collection methods (Eisenhardt, 1989) which 
was recognized in this research project as we have used multiple sources of evidence (see 
Table 6.3): review of publications of "outsiders" giving their perspective on the case company 
(external documents), analysis of documents of "insiders" regarding all kinds of issues 
concerning the case company (internal documents), and interviews with a selected number of 
corporate and front-line managers. The data collection process in each case study started with a 
review of articles in newspapers and journals on the corporation and a scan of the firm's 
externally oriented documents (e.g., annual reports, company descriptions). The general 
information on the history of the corporation and the various developments in its business 
environment was helpful in generating a first perspective on the firm. It was also a useful 
foundation for the more internally oriented data collection processes, and was furthermore 
valuable in conjunction with other sources of information in producing the case description of 
the corporation. 
After a general overview had been created, interviews were held with the most appropriate 
employees. In the Unilever corporation, the researcher interviewed, in the period between 
December 1994 and February 1996, 35 employees ranging from operational managers to one 
of the co-chairmen. Canon Europe facilitated 13 interviews with the president, vice-presidents, 
staff members, and divisional managers of Canon Europe in the period from January 1995 
U n i l e v e r 
C a n o n 
I T T W D * 
Period 
December '94 
February '96 
January '95 
July '96 
July '95 
February '96 
Number 
of 
Interviewees 
35 Interviewees 
13 Interviewees 
10 Interviewees 
Corporate Management 
versus 
Front-tine Management 
Corporate Management: 20 
-1 Co-Chairman 
-12 Product Group Managers 
- 7 Process Leaders 
Front-line Management: 15 
- 4 Marketing Managers 
- 4 Sales Managers 
- 4 Operations Managers 
- 3 Innovation Center Managers 
Corporate Management: 13 
-1 President Canon Europe 
- 5 Vice-Presidents Canon Europe 
- 7 Product & Process Leaders 
Front-line Management: 0 
Corporate Management: 5 
- 1 ATLAS Project-Leader 
- 4 Product & Process Leaders 
Front-line Management: 5 
- 1 Marketing Manager 
- 1 Financial Manager 
- 1 Operations Manager 
- 1 Sales Manager 
- 1 Manager Strategic Planning 
Number of 
Internal versus 
External 
Documents 
54 Internal 
7 External 
11 Internal 
5 External 
34 Internal 
3 External 
* Apart from the formal research activities as reported in this Table, the researcher worked for this organization for 
several years in a job not related to the subject area of this s tudy and hence without influencing the organizational 
processes in this respect. 
Table 6.3: The Nature of the Data Collection: Interviews and Document Analysis. 
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until July 1996. In the ITT World Directories firm 10 meetings were arranged with divisional 
and company managers in the period between July 1995 and February 1996. The interviews 
held within the case companies were all, using Yin's terminology (1989: 89), of an open-ended 
nature. This means that the investigator asked key respondents for the facts of a matter as well 
as for the respondents' opinions about events. A report was drawn up of each meeting based on 
a tape of the conversation. The report was always sent to the interviewee guided by a request 
for his or her comments. In most cases, a follow-up meeting was arranged to discuss the report 
of the meeting and to allow the researcher to scan and review some internal documents on the 
subject area. 
A cascade process was applied in arranging the interviews, meaning that the interviews 
were organized in such a way that we went down the organizational hierarchy over time during 
the case study. The investigation always commenced with some meetings with senior 
management, subsequently interviews were arranged with those corporate managers 
responsible for the implementation of a particular management tool of effect on the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process, and finally the researcher planned some meetings 
with front-line managers in the subsidiaries. The interviews with front-line managers have not 
been effectuated within the case study of Canon Europe N.V. and hence the case study 
description of this firm is dominated by a corporate management perspective on the process of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. Apart from the interviews, each interviewee has been asked 
to provide the researcher with related internal documentation. For this research project, 
Unilever, Canon Europe, and ITT Word Directories have provided access to respectively 54, 
11, and 34 internal documents most often regarding particular management tools stimulating 
or facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
The initial interviews with the senior managers of the corporate center focused on collecting 
the required data concerning the four dimensions of the strategic fit model, being the firm's 
knowledge environment, corporate strategy, administrative heritage, and implemented 
management tools. These senior managers provided the researcher with their perspective on 
the key strategic thrusts and the vision underlying the firm's corporate strategy in the past, 
today, and for the future. They also explicated the perceived importance of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing for their organization and gave some indications on the most important 
management tools in this respect. Subsequently, meetings were arranged with those corporate 
managers responsible for the implementation of particular management tools of effect on the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process. The interviews with these managers were limited to 
an in-depth discussion and review of a particular management tool and their influence on the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process in the organization. Finally, interviewees at the 
front-line level in the organization have been asked to describe the perceived barriers 
obstructing and complicating their intracorporate knowledge transfer efforts and the prevalent 
management tools assisting them in the initiation and effectuation of this process. Front-line 
managers gave their viewpoint on the stimulating or facilitating properties of particular 
management tools at lower levels down the organizational hierarchy. The interviews with 
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front-line managers were used to validate the tentative conclusions regarding the barriers still 
obstructing and hindering the intracorporate knowledge sharing process. The tentative 
conclusions were formulated on the basis of the inquiry concerning and interviews with 
corporate management regarding those implemented management tools that stimulate and 
facilitate intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
The case descriptions, as depicted in Figure 6.3, were roughly structured according to the 
concepts determining the actual and required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing as 
presented in chapter two. After a short introduction, a description is given of the knowledge 
environment of the corporation and the various changes in the characteristics of products and 
competitive strategies in recent years. Next, the "value added" strategy, size, and scope of the 
corporation are exhibited and implications on the importance of intracorporate corporate 
knowledge sharing explained. After an indication is formulated on the required level of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing, the administrative heritage of the corporate context is 
Figure 6.3: The Prescribed Structure of the Case Descriptions. 
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analyzed and its influence on the intracorporate knowledge sharing process specified. In the 
fifth section a description is given of the implemented management tools forming the 
particular management systems for managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. Finally, the 
particular situation in a case company is compared and confronted with the integrated 
framework on managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. Conclusions are formulated and 
validated on the underdeveloped management systems and hence on the barriers still blocking 
or hindering the intracorporate knowledge sharing process in these firms. 
6.3 RESEARCH CONTEXT: MANAGING IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
The empirical research activities have been limited and focused on European operations of 
three multinational enterprises. To be able to distinguish the particular implications of 
managing intracorporate knowledge sharing in a European context, the key characteristics of a 
"European style of management" are investigated in this section. Thurley and Wirdenius 
(1991) claim that international companies operating in European countries can and should 
make a strategic choice whether or not to develop a "European" approach or style of 
management. After the acceptance of the Threaty of Maastricht, and with the new European 
Union preparing to absorb applicants from the European Free Trade Association, their claim is 
becoming even more important. In a reaction to this statement, Boone and Van den Bosch 
(1996) studied the emerging field of European Management and tried to discern key 
characteristics of a European style of management. 
In order to detect particular characteristics of European Management, Boone and Van den 
Bosch (1996) briefly review the literature on this topic and identify at least two recurring 
discussions labelled as the "integration opportunity" and the "constraining diversity" issue. The 
integration opportunity issue stresses the managerial and organizational implications of the 
changing business environment due to European integration. A short-term, discipline-oriented 
perspective makes various business topics perceptible. In this connection a prominent view 
about the single European market is that it will lead to greater opportunities for realizing 
economies of scale, increased possibilities to transfer personnel and intermediary products 
over national borders, and new opportunities for strategic partnerships that straddle the 
national borders. The constraining diversity issue in the literature, however, emphasizes the 
fact that the main characteristic of this region, its diversity, still prevails. Although the 
European integration process of the last decade has facilitated the need to work across national 
borders, firms are still confronted with various important and structural forms of diversity in 
the European context. Differences in preferences, habits, language, and cultures are inherited 
and, as stated by Trompenaars (1993: 8), "Nowhere do cultures differ so much as inside 
Europe." 
In an attempt to structure the diversity concept, Boone and Van den Bosch (1996) propose 
to distinguish three types of diversity: diversity in the negotiated environment, administrative 
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Types of Diversity 
Diversity in Negotiated Environment 
Administrative Diversity 
Inherited Diversity 
Examples 
Tax rules 
Subsidization practices 
Financial report requirements 
Quality and product standards 
Internal accounting rules 
Information systems 
Manufacturing systems 
Customer Preferences 
Employee characteristics 
Business Systems 
Table 6.3: Three Types of Diversity. 
diversity, and inherited diversity (see Table 6.3). The diversity in the negotiated environment 
relates to differences which are still prevalent because the European integration process is still 
ongoing (e.g., differences in standards, testing and certification procedures). Although 
gradually decreasing because of a harmonization policy of the European Commission, major 
obstacles for eliminating this type of diversity are based on differences in legislation, 
regulations, and governmental policies between the member states of the European Union. The 
label administrative diversity has been chosen for the type of diversity which can be reduced at 
least in principle by an active or, even better, pro-active strategic role played by the company 
itself or by a combination of companies. Examples of administrative diversity are diversity of 
internal accounting rules, diversity of information systems, and inconsistencies in the 
definition of data-elements and information structures. The inherited diversity is the most 
resistant to change and is rooted in the distinctive historical differences between member 
states, regions, and ethnic groups of the European Union. Removing the formal barriers to 
trade will not be sufficient to overcome such barriers as consumer tastes, preferences, and 
habits. Moreover, most of the institutions that structure broad configurations of firm-market 
relations are cultural and national rather than sectoral as described by Whitley (1992). 
Based on this conceptualization of diversity, it is logical to criticize the idea that the 
ongoing internationalization of firms and markets in Europe would establish a kind of 
distinctive pan-European business system in which there is no place for diversity. In this 
connection, Whitley (1994: 118-119) observes: "[The] international standardization of forms 
of economic organization and transfer of managerial practices vary greatly between economies 
with different degrees of institutional integration and state coordination, according to the 
relative strengths of each economy and centrality of particular sectors to them, and between 
business system characteristics with different degrees of interdependence with dominant 
institutions. Thus, the internationalization of firms and markets does not lead necessarily to the 
establishment of a single most efficient way of organizing economic activities, but rather has 
different consequences for different economies and different kinds of managerial practices 
132 • CHAPTER SIX 
depending on the nature, strength and cohesion of social institutions." Boone and Van den 
Bosch (1996) agree with Whitley's analysis and stress that managing diversity in Europe will 
not be a temporary issue. On the contrary, it seems to be a long-lasting challenge. 
Referring to the observation by Boone and Van den Bosch (1996) of an existing tension 
between the integration opportunities and the constraining diversity, managers active in the 
European context are confronted with a challenging problem because this tension cannot be 
ignored and needs to be managed. In managing this tension, a combination of both an 
externally and internally oriented managerial perspective seems to be essential (see Figure 
6.4). On the one hand, the reduction of the negotiated and administrative diversity requires a 
reaction of firms regarding their European operations, a reaction which is referred to as an 
external-oriented managerial perspective by Boone and Van den Bosch (1996). These 
managerial responses are induced by the numerous changes in the European business 
environment and are often aimed at the exploitation of potential scale economies such as the 
External Oriented 
Managerial Perspective 
Internal Oriented 
Managerial Perspective 
Focus on Changing 
Characteristics of European 
Business Environment 
J 
Changes in Environment 
Demand 
Reactions of Firms 
\ 
Focus upon Separate 
Functional Areas of 
Management 
I 
Importance of Results 
Interdependent 
Processes 
I 
Focus on Stable Characteristics 
of European Business 
Environment 
J 
Increasing Diversity for Firms 
Demands 
'New Managerial Capabilities' 
I 
Focus upon 
Coordination between 
Functional Areas of Management 
I 
Importance of Learning 
Resulting in Development of Dynamic 
Capabilities to Manage Diversity 
as a Key Characteristic of a European Style 
of Management 
Figure 6.4: Conceptual Model for Reconciling the Tension. 
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integration of various production plants, the establishment of European-wide logistics system, 
and the harmonization of the firm's European product portfolio. On the other hand, firms need 
to develop the managerial capabilities to make a European firm really work. Successful 
management within a European context depends upon the development of context-related 
managerial capabilities based on an internal-oriented managerial perspective. Managerial 
capabilities are needed to cope with the remaining diversity as a stable characteristic of the 
European context. 
The knowledge created due to operating in Europe can be considered as residing in 
organizational routines, meaning regular and predictable behaviour patterns of firms (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). Boone and Van den Bosch (1996) suggest as a proposition that these 
organizational routines and the managerial capabilities to call upon the organization to perform 
and coordinate them, represent a key characteristic of a "European style of management." A 
key characteristic which has major implications for the management of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process. The changing European business environment has significantly 
increased the required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing for firms active in this region. 
Intensified competition on a European scale has enforced firms to internationalize, leave their 
one-dimensional strategies, and exploit the existing synergies between their subsidiaries. Firms 
need to boost their actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing, but this endeavour is 
significantly obstructed, hindered, and complicated by the diversity in the negotiated 
environment, the administrative diversity, and the inherited diversity. 
Following the model as depicted in Figure 6.4, firms in Europe have to react to this 
changing business environment in Europe. Harmonization of standards, vanishing trade 
barriers, and the increased ease to transfer personnel over national boundaries provide 
opportunities to boost the actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing and hence should 
be exploited. Intracorporate knowledge sharing on a pan-European scale, however, is 
complicated by the remaining diversity and firms must develop the skills and capabilities to 
manage this additional complexity. If a firm reduces its administrative diversity and learns to 
deal with the differences in terms of customer preferences, employee habits, and business 
systems, however, a valuable competence is developed which can become an important 
corporate advantage vis-a-vis multinationals with less experience in this respect. 
6.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter the design of the empirical work has been presented, linking the empirical part 
of the research project to its theoretical foundation (see Figure 6.1). The key constructs of the 
theoretical groundwork have been operationalized, the number and selection of the case study 
objects explained, and the applied methods for data collection enlisted. Moreover, the 
managerial implications of the European context on the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process have been enumerated and discussed. 

7 
Unilever 
In Search of a "Qualified" Set of 
Management Tools for Managing 
Intracorporate Knowledge 
Sharing in a Decentralized Way 
If Unilever only knew what Unilever knows. 
- Sir Michael Perry, co-chairman of Unilever, 19921. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
"// Unilever only knew what Unilever knows" Sir Michael Perry sighed during an annual 
meeting of international Unilever managers in 1992. In an attempt to remind and convince his 
managers of the potential value inherent in the exploitation of the company's reservoir of 
knowledge, the co-chairman of the Unilever Corporation referred to all the unleveraged 
knowledge residing unstructured throughout the Unilever organization. "Every company of 
Unilever," Mr. Perry continued, "already has stored in one form or another, a vast amount of 
useful knowledge that could benefit others within the concern. Not only the information with 
respect to product development, process innovation, market research, and the effectiveness of 
national promotions but also visual material such as whole libraries of recent and current TV 
commercials - both of Unilever and its competitors." 
"We have made progress in implementing new team processes and systems but we really 
have to make it work now," Sir Michael Perry proceeded at the 1994 IT Conference of 
Unilever. "If we combine these strengths with the ability to share information rapidly across 
our global network we can create a strong global competitiveness which can also bring 
Eight of the thirty-five interviewees pointed out spontaneously to this statement of Mr. Perry. Although most 
of the interviewees could not exactly tell the interviewer when and where the statement was pronounced, this 
sentence has become well known throughout the organization and is felt as a strong verbalization of the 
importance of intracorporate knowledge sharing for the Unilever organization. 
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substantial benefit to local markets." Once again, Unilever's co-chairman stressed the 
significant importance of intracorporate knowledge sharing for the well-being of the 
corporation at large and instilled a growing recognition throughout the organization for the 
enormous "knowledge base" which remained unexploited too often. "Every week I am 
confronted with issues which, I assume, have been studied and solved before somewhere 
throughout the Unilever corporation," a national account manager of one of the operating 
companies in the Netherlands explained, confirming the argument of Mr. Perry. "Too often we 
start exploring new problem areas on our own as if we are the only one. [...] More coordination 
and a growing eagerness to share knowledge could save the individual companies a lot of their 
management time and lower the expenses with respect to research and development activities." 
The increased emphasis on intracorporate knowledge sharing within the Unilever 
organization was the outcome of a strongly changing context in both competitive and 
corporate terms. Owing to the globalization of many of Unilever's businesses, growing price 
pressures, declining trade conditions in Europe and North America, and the need to rapidly 
build market positions in emerging markets, the necessity to achieve scale economies was 
gradually swelling. Instead of a focus on local differentiation strategies based on a well-
grounded market feeling, large advertisement budgets, and advanced marketing techniques, 
Unilever was forced to integrate and coordinate its business activities more strongly to reduce 
costs and keep margins in the European region stable. Innovation resources had to be 
combined and exploited more intensively to boost output and reduce unnecessary duplication 
in this respect. Moreover, Unilever realized that managers building their businesses in the 
emerging markets of Asia, Africa, and South America could, with the right systems and 
structures in place, learn an awful lot from the experiences, know-how, and skills of their 
colleagues in the more developed regions. 
So, Unilever's management cadre started to envision most of the benefits that could arise 
from sharing internally existing knowledge items. Corporate management, however, was 
confronted with a tremendous management challenge and still had many problems to 
overcome. Unilever has always been a rather decentralized company and has never been 
looking in an extensive way for the benefits of integration. With more than 1000 brands in the 
branded consumer goods business (foods, detergents, and personal products), approximately 
308.000 employees working in over 90 countries in which Unilever is represented by one or 
more operating companies, and two European parent companies (The Netherlands and the 
U.K.) operating as nearly as is practicable as a single entity, Unilever makes, so to speak, a 
living out of diversity. Unilever consists, as a former co-chairman of Unilever once stated, "of 
hundreds of individual operation companies - each with their own identity" (Maljcrs, 1990: 
64). 
Corporate management, however, endorsed the task to increase intracorporate knowledge 
sharing and started to think in terms of solutions in the beginning of the 1990s. Not only the 
innovation diffusion from Unilever's R&D centers (see Exhibit 7.1), but also the transfer of 
knowledge within and between various functions, product groups, and product categories had 
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to be improved with the help and persistence of all the Unilever employees. Concerned, 
however, that any drastic change in the management processes might threaten the strong 
internalized values and powerful information relationships that had historically linked 
organizational units, Unilever's management realized that it had to do more than changing just 
the "blueprint" of the organizational structure. The key task was to reshape the core decision-
making systems by changing the organizational context in which decisions were made, and in 
doing so, the management processes of the corporation. Hence, Unilever's managers would 
need tools for managing such a change that had to be more subtle but also more effective than 
the simple creation of a formal organizational structure or the institutionalization of a more 
dominant and top-down oriented corporate management culture. 
Unilever's growing obligations, inevitable problems, and chosen solutions with respect to 
managing intracorporate knowledge sharing are reviewed in this chapter. Particularly its 
management tools stimulating and facilitating the intracorporate knowledge sharing process 
were of interest for this research project and are described in detail in this case description. By 
identifying, developing, and institutionalizing these management tools, Unilever's top 
Unilever Research & Development 
Unilever commits several hundred of millions US dollars each year to research and development. 
Amounting to about 2% of global sales, this expenditure is divided among the development 
departments of its larger operating companies and its five research laboratories in Europe, the 
USA and India 
Vlaardmgen <NL) Coluiorth (UK) Port Sunlight (UK) Edgewater (USA) Andhm (India) 
Established 1954 1947 1912 1952 1958 
Employees 1100 1100 1300 380 260 
Main Research Areas Food Products Food Products Detergents Detergents Food Products 
Detergents Personal Products Personal Products Persona! Products Chemicals 
Manufact. Techn. Manufact. Techn. Chemicals Safety Safety 
Agribusiness Manufact. Techn. Detergents 
Safety Engineering 
Though the corporate laboratories each employ research teams covering many scientific 
disciplines, over the years areas of specialism have been developed at each location. This 
expertise is shared to maximize the benefits of corporate research. 
Effective communication remains essential to the operation of research. Day-to-day 
communication between laboratories uses state-of-the-art information technology. Unilever's own 
data network links the laboratories, Unilever Engineering and corporate headquarters allowing 
information to flow freely across the Division. Other channels of communication are available to 
promote the spread of scientific ideas. Meetings and seminars are regular features of life at each 
laboratory. Scientists, academics and colleagues from Unilever businesses often meet to exchange 
ideas. 
The rapid spread of scientific and technical ideas and information is critical to Unilever. The 
Technical Information Service located in London and Rotterdam assists in gathering and collating 
all relevant information and making it available to technical managers throughout the Unilever 
organization. 
Adapted from several internal documents on Unilever's R&D activities. 
Exhibit 7.1: Unilever Research and Development. 
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management tried to increase the actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing between its 
operating companies. In section 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 the case description elaborates on, 
respectively, Unilever's changing knowledge environment, its reorientation with respect to 
corporate strategy in the period 1983 to 1995, and its administrative heritage. These three 
sections point out why intracorporate knowledge sharing has become a strategic issue for 
Unilever, what factors determine the required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing for 
Unilever, and how the particular background of this corporation at the same time complicates 
and facilitates an increase of knowledge sharing between its companies. 
Section 7.5 scrutinizes the management tools within the Unilever organization which have 
influenced the transfer and exchange of information since their implementation. The high 
degree of differentiation with which these tools have been worked out and implemented 
throughout product groups, categories, and functional areas of the Unilever organization, made 
us decide to use broad descriptions of the management tools in the body of the main text and to 
provide the reader with a more detailed analysis of some mechanisms in the exhibits. We 
analyzed the development and application of advanced information and telecommunications 
technology used to connect Unilever managers around the world and the firm's definition of 
common data-elements and information structures. Furthermore, we shed our light on the 
growing process orientation within Unilever and the embodiment of the Innovation Funnel 
concept as a way to manage dispersed innovation projects. Finally, we investigated Unilever's 
creation of an international network of interdependent operating companies by delegating and 
concentrating knowledge exploration responsibilities. 
In the concluding section, the empirical findings of the Unilever case are reviewed on their 
fit and illustrative power with respect to the theoretically deduced propositions on the 
prerequisite management systems for managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. Unilever's 
implemented management tools are compared with the management tools giving form and 
content, as argued in chapter four and five, to a knowledge sharing awareness, persuasion, 
complexity reduction, and media system and some tentative conclusions arc formulated on the 
barriers still obstructing and complicating the initiation and effectuation of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing within the Unilever corporation. 
7.2 UNILEVER'S CHANGING KNOWLEDGE ENVIRONMENT 
Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch corporation belonging to the 20 largest companies in the world, 
aims to be the foremost company in the world in meeting daily needs of consumers across the 
world in branded consumer foods (see Exhibit 7.2), personal products (see Exhibit 7.3) and 
detergents (see Exhibit 7.4). The other major activity is in specialty chemicals, mostly 
technologically related to the consumer products. Unilever is a multinational company which 
was established in 1930 when the Margarine Unie and Lever Brothers decided to merge their 
interests. Today, the Unilever group comprises two separate entities, known as Unilever N.V. 
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and Unilever P.L.C., with headoffices located in Rotterdam and London respectively. These 
parent companies share the same set of directors and are linked by a series of agreements that 
make all shareholders, whether in N.V. or PLC, participate in the prosperity of the entire 
company. Both entities have agreed to cooperate in every possible manner to maintain a 
common policy in all fields of operation, to exchange all relevant information with regard to 
their businesses and to ensure that all group companies act accordingly. 
The Unilever Group employs approximately 308.000 people across the world, including 
22.000 managers, with some 500 operating companies in more than 90 countries producing 
and marketing over 1,000 brands worldwide. In 1995 Unilever's total turnover and operating 
profit were US$ 49.7 billion and US$ 4.0 billion respectively. Although the European and 
North-American operations still account for 52 and 19 per cent of annual turnover and 50 and 
17 per cent of operating profits respectively, the contribution from Asia, South-America, and 
Africa (rest of the world) has shown a strong growth during the past few years. The product 
group foods is by far the largest operation of Unilever with 52 per cent of turnover (43% of the 
operating profit) related to 22 (18%), 14 (21%) and 9 (15%) per cent of turnover (operating 
profit) contributed by respectively the product group detergents, personal product and special 
chemicals (see Table 7.1). Expenditures on research & development and advertising & 
promotions were US$ 923 million (1.8% of turnover) and US$ 5.4 billion (10.8% of turnover) 
respectively. Generally, Unilever's performance in recent years is, compared with the main 
competitors, below general expectations. For full year 1996, operating margins were expected 
to rise slightly. 
Historically, competition in the branded packaged goods industry was a game of positioning 
and distinctive competitive advantage was often the outcome of "intelligently" constructed 
Unilever FOODS 
Half of Unilever's business is in packaged food and drinks, an area which has developed and 
expanded greatly from its original base in edible fats, established in the Netherlands nearly 
125 years ago by Simon van den Bergh and Anton Jurgens. 
Direction 
Based on its historical foundation in Europe, Unilever is now progressively growing and 
strengthening its foods interests in North America and the rest of the world. Although not every 
part of Unilever's portfolio is transferable to other continents, some categories like ice cream, tea, 
and tomato-based products have a broader and sometimes global appeal. Unilever wants to use its 
expertise in these categories as drivers of growth in the global market. 
Product Categories 
Includes margarines (e.g. Flora, Becel, Rama, Blue Band), olive oils and seed oils (e.g. Bertolli, La 
Masia), dressings and other sauces (Wishbone, Calve), cheeses (e.g. Boursin, Milkana), ice-cream 
(e.g. Ola, Wall's), beverages (e.g. Lipton), savoury snacks (e.g. Peperami, Bi-Fi), frozen products 
(e.g. Iglo, Birds Eye), pasta and meal sauces (e.g. Kagy, Chicken Tonight), meat & delicatessen 
products (e.g.Lipton side dishes, Cup-a-Soup, Unox), food service, and bakery. 
Global Competitors 
Nestle, Philip Morris, Mars, BSN, CPC International, and Sara Lee. 
Exhibit 7.2: Unilever Foods. 
Percentage of Sales Contribution by Product Group (Operating Profit Contribution) 
Foods 
Detergents 
Personal Products 
Speciality Chemicals 
Other Operations 
50 (55) 
22(17) 
6(5) 
1(12) 
15(11) 
51(5/) 
22 (20) 
9(10) 
8 (/J) 
10(6) 
51 (54) 
22(17) 
10(7/) 
9(15) 
8(3) 
51(57) 
22(17) 
11 (/3) 
9(13) 
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51(5/) 
22(18) 
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8(/2) 
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12(72) 
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6(5) 
51(5/) 
24 (20) 
13(75) 
8(77) 
4(3) 
51 (52) 
23 (15) 
15(75) 
8(72) 
3(3) 
51 (48) 
22(18) 
15(79) 
9(72) 
3(3) 
52 (43) 
22 (2Sj 
14(27) 
9(75) 
3(3) 
R&D Expenditure 
(x million US$) 
451 617 601 615 728 750 816 779 831 923 
Number of Employees (x 1000) 302 301 295 296 301 298 287 294 304 308 
Europe 
North America 
Rest of World 
122 
22 
158 
117 
27 
157 
110 
28 
157 
108 
32 
156 
no 
35 
156 
109 
34 
155 
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32 
150 
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32 
160 
101 
32 
171 
101 
29 
178 
4^ 
O 
Total Sales (x USS mill.) 
Europe (% Total Sales) 
North America(% Total Sales) 
Rest of World (% Total Sales) 
Op. Profit (x USSm) 
Europe (% Total OP) 
North America (% Total OP) 
Rest of World (% Total OP) 
1986 
25,368 
61 
18 
21 
1,652 
56 
10 
34 
1987 
31,661 
61 
18 
21 
2,447 
54 
18 
28 
1988 
31,900 
58 
19 
23 
2,614 
55 
19 
26 
1989 
34.378 
56 
22 
22 
2,980 
49 
24 
27 
1990 
40,466 
59 
20 
21 
3,549 
58 
18 
24 
1991 
40.767 
58 
21 
21 
3,522 
60 
17 
23 
1992 
43,719 
57 
20 
23 
3,767 
57 
18 
25 
1993 
41,878 
52 
21 
27 
2.922 
52 
13 
35 
1994 
45,419 
51 
20 
29 
3,866 
49 
20 
31 
1995 
49,732 
52 
19 
29 
3,987 
50 
17 
33 
g 
Si 
t*i I 
Table 7.1: Unilever: Ten-Year Financial Summary (Adapted from Unilever Charts 1984 - 1994). 
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marketing programs based on distinctive market knowledge, advanced marketing techniques, 
and significant advertising budgets. Firms focused and competed on their abilities to adapt 
their product offerings to local market circumstances and in this respect one could consider 
Unilever's marketing skills and resources as notable. By differentiating its products, Unilever 
earned above-average returns, attained market leadership in many segments of this industry, 
and established a high-quality image for most of its brands. Although other competitive 
dimensions like costs and innovation were not ignored, differentiation was indeed the primary 
strategic target of most operating companies within Unilever. Companies were allowed to 
retain their own operational and trading identities to meet different consumer requirements in 
the markets they served. 
Since a number of years, the competitive battle in this line of business has been changing 
dramatically. The European integration process, increased price pressures, a growing trade 
concentration, and quickly evaporating consumer demands have forced many firms to rethink 
and adapt their competitive strategies. Competitive success could not be built any longer on 
one-dimensional strategies like the ability to adapt to local circumstances or upgrading skills 
and resources in marketing. More and more, firms were forced to compete on such grounds as 
operational efficiency, speed of action, operational flexibility, and product innovation. 
"Particularly our ability to innovate more effectively and efficiently than our global 
competitors pervades many of our competitive strategies nowadays," a general manager in the 
Personal Products business stressed during the interview. "While competition with the DOBs -
Distributor-Own-Brands - and small local competitors focuses on costs and service 
customization, the global players in this industry have started to outperform each other on 
creativity and innovativeness in all aspects of their business." As a consequence, the ability to 
Unilever PERSONAL PRODUCTS 
The product group Personal Products added 14 percent to Unilever's total turnover and 21 percent to 
its operating profit in 1995. From its origin in the early 18th century when famous brand names like 
Atkinsons and Pears were first introduced in the UK, Unilever's Personal Products business has 
developed into a diverse and internationally successful business leader. 
Direction 
Unilever PP has an overriding objective for the year 2000: to be number one in the world. Today the 
global market is large, diverse and fast-growing, and Unilever PP's products hold strong positions. 
Unilever PP's strategy in the competitive battle with its main rivals is a constant barrage of 
unique, significant innovations that consumers want and competitors cannot match. 
Product Categories 
Unilever PP makes a distinction between mass-market toiletries and prestige sectors. Mass-market 
toiletries include toothpastes (e.g. Signal, Pepsodent, Mentadent and Close-Up), hair products (e.g. 
Timotei, Clinic, Sunsilk, Organics), deodorants (e.g. Rexona, Axe), bodyspray (e.g. Impulse), soap 
(e.g. Pears, Dove), skin care and perfumes (e.g. Vaseline, Pond's, Faberge Brut). 
The prestige sectors comprise such well-known brands as Elizabeth Arden and Calvin Klein. 
Global Competitors 
Procter & Gamble, Colgate Palmolive, Johnson & Johnson, L'Oreal, Beiersdorf, Kao, and Shiseido. 
Exhibit 7.3: Unilever Personal Products. 
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Unilever DETERGENTS 
The product group Detergents added 22 percent to Unilever's total turnover and 28 percent to its 
operating profit in 1995. More than 100 years ago Willaim Hesketh Lever opened his first 
factory in the UK and launched the famous Sunlight soap brand. From its origins in Europe and 
North America, Unilever's detergent business has grown internationally into extensive 
operations throughout the fast-growing regions of the world, like Latin America and South East 
Asia. 
Direction 
Unilever Detergents still shares the vision of its founder, William Hesketh Lever, who wanted 
to make cleanliness commonplace. Today, Unilever's detergents business wants to create the 
world's leading business devoted to cleaning, care and hygiene of fabrics, people and the places 
where they live or work. By harnessing its combined world knowledge, Unilever is able to create 
brands with universal appeal. 
Product Categories 
Unilever's detergents business is grouped into four categories: fabrics cleaning and conditioning 
(e.g. Omo, Skip, Wisk), personal wash (e.g. Lux, Dove, Caress), home care (e.g. Jif, Sun), and 
Lever Industrial International. Of these four categories, fabrics cleaning and conditioning is the 
largest. 
Global Competitors 
Procter & Gamble, Johnson & Johnson, Colgate-Palmolive, Arm & Hammer, and Henkel. 
Exhibit 7.4: Unilever Detergents. 
sustain a constant stream of process and product innovations, the primary concern of 
companies in high-tech industries in the past, has become a critical success factor in the 
branded packaged goods industry as well. 
The new competitive demands induced Unilever to synthesize its businesses more strongly 
on a regional and global level. Although many managers strongly resisted the idea of increased 
integration, Unilever was forced to complement local adaptation competences with a strategy 
that was aimed at combining internal strengths and exploiting scale economies. "If we want to 
remain a 'big' player in our industry," a senior manager of Unilever's foods business stated in 
his meeting with the researcher, "we should develop the capability to manage both scale and 
diversity simultaneously. [...] The diversity with which this corporation is confronted is not as 
large as is often argued by managers both in the operating companies and the center. If you use 
a top-down approach you can discern a large variety of representations for serving the same 
market need. This variety, however, is built from a small number of standard elements. [...] 
Too often we assume that differences in the demands of customers inevitably obstruct the 
realization of operational and strategic synergy. Although our soup, for example, tastes 
different in Belgium than in the Netherlands, both variants are made of the same tomatoes and 
are packed in the same can. In most cases we market a large variety of the same. Hence, we 
need to manage the diversity and exploit the possible synergies from the point where consumer 
needs are the same. The coherence at the foundation provides enough opportunities to create 
significant scale economies without harming the requirements for local adaptation." 
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"Our aim is to have something unique, that brings to the global or regional consumer 
something she cannot get any place else," a senior manager of the Personal Products 
Coordination further explained the need for more integration. "We look constantly for top-
class scientific innovations or for novel packaging that delivers fun, satisfaction or sensory 
pleasure to the purchaser. [...] Inevitably, many will be copied once they are on the market and 
this process is accelerating quickly. The only appropriate response to that is having a constant 
flow of new ideas coming in at the top which are leveraged as quickly as possible in our 
markets. [...] In the past it was possible to launch a product in Sweden and measure its 
performance for three years and then, if successful, move it to other countries in Europe. 
Today, returns on innovations must be collected quickly or competitors will imitate you and 
steal your gain. We need to acknowledge that the ability to rapidly transfer and hence exploit 
innovations over our network of operating companies is becoming a critical success factor. A 
disciplined way of developing and leveraging our innovations, however, implies more 
integration and intensified international coordination." 
Although Unilever remains convinced that its tradition of keeping close to its markets is key 
in transforming innovation into competitive advantage, the importance of Unilever's product 
and process-oriented expertise is strongly growing and changing Unilever's position on the 
knowledge environment grid (see Figure 7.1). To sustain a dominant position in the branded 
packaged good business, Unilever's differentiation strategy needs to be complemented by a 
constant stream of product and process-innovations. Although market knowledge will remain 
critical, the importance of exploration and exploitation of firm-specific expertise has increased 
significantly. Expertise is necessary for the attainment of best-practice levels in the operating 
companies, for the establishment of lean and flexible sourcing, production, and distribution 
systems, and for the development of distinctive product innovations. 
By moving to the right lower corner on the knowledge environment grid, the required level 
of intracorporate knowledge sharing tends to increase. The possibilities for intracorporate 
knowledge sharing are extended and consequently the inherent opportunities for corporate 
1 
Importance Market Knowledge 
HIGH 
HIGH 
f 
Figure 7.1: Unilever's Knowledge Environment Grid. 
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value creation enlarged. Whether these opportunities are exploited, however, is strongly 
dependent on the firm's corporate strategy and its perspective on the value-added role of the 
corporate whole. 
7.3 UNILEVERS CORPORATE STRATEGY IN THE PAST DECADE 
A long time before the changing knowledge environment forced Unilever to increase the 
leverage of its knowledge base, Unilever's top management initiated a strategic reorientation 
program which had major implications for Unilever's ability to exploit its knowledge 
exploration activities today and in the future. In the beginning of the 1980s, a time in which 
resource-based perspectives to corporate strategy were rarely used, a transformation process 
was started which had to refocus and realign Unilever's business activities or, as Mr. Maljers2, 
co-chairman of Unilever from 1984 to 1994, said, "to refocus Unilever on those areas it was 
really good at." After operating as a financial holding for many years, the so-called Core 
Strategy was aimed at reducing the scope of Unilever's business activities and bringing 
Unilever back to those business areas which seemed attractive from a market perspective and 
in which the firm had considerable expertise in technology, marketing, sales, customer service, 
etc. By promoting the core business concept, synergies would grow and the generation of 
corporate value would become more feasible through the exchange of product, marketing, and 
technological know-how and skills. In the period from 1986 until 1995, Unilever actualized 
487 transactions in which companies were acquired or disposed (see Figure 7.2). 
Historically, the clearly understood role of the board was to approve plans and budgets, 
control capital expenditure, and appoint and develop executives. Although the main part of the 
business activities were concentrated in the fast moving consumer goods business, a clear 
definition of the scope of business activities was lacking until the mid-1980s. A decade earlier 
Unilever had formulated a strategy clearly outlining its geographical ambitions. Unilever 
wanted to strengthen its position and to gain significant market share in North America. The 
strategy was much less explicit in those years, however, in stating product portfolio objectives. 
Analyzing the acquisitions of the late seventies and early eighties, investments in a large 
number of activities were peripheral to the main businesses and large remnants existed of the 
vertical integration policies of the past such as carton making, printing and packaging, oil 
milling, advertising agencies, a market research group and a fast growing transport division. 
These non-core activities of Unilever accounted for over 20% of total turnover in 1983. 
In the early eighties, it became obvious that Unilever's traditional strategy was inadequate 
and that it was necessary to add a product dimension to the geographical one (Maljers, Baden-
Fuller, and Van den Bosch, 1996: 556-557). The fundamental reorientation of Unilever's 
The quoted statements from Mr. Maljers in this section are derived from a presentation of Mr. Maljers at the 
Strategic Management Conference in Paris in 1994 on "Maintaining Strategic Momentum" and from a 
personal interview. 
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strategy that followed, however, was not solely the product of a philosophy, Mr. Maljers said 
while looking back on the previous decade. "There was a practical catalyst, namely a proposal 
in the mid-1983 that more than £40 million should be invested in one of Unilever's transport 
subsidiaries, Norfolk Line, which ran "roll on/roll off" ships between the UK and the 
Netherlands. There was a sudden realization that nobody on the Special Committee, or indeed 
anywhere else in Unilever, had any real experience or expertise in this line of business. This in 
turn led to a re-assessment of the company's capabilities and skills in all the areas in which we 
were involved." The product groups on which the Unilever corporation had to concentrate 
were selected but, at this moment, just in very broad terms: foods, personal products, 
detergents, and specialty chemicals. 
Adding the product dimension proved to be a considerable improvement but it was 
essentially a first step that marked the beginning of a process of defining product priorities. 
Around 1988, a new impulse was given to Unilever's strategic reorientation process under the 
code name "Starfish." There was consensus among Unilever's corporate management that the 
four chosen areas offered considerable opportunities for growth. Consequently, the existing 
strategy was reconfirmed, but a few new dimensions with respect to Unilever's product 
portfolio were added. It was decided, for example, to continue the formulation of product 
priorities. Unilever started to realize that the four core areas were each composed of a number 
of sub-groups, called product categories, and that some of these were more interesting for 
Unilever's future than others. Moreover, the geographical dimension received heightened 
attention once again. New markets were emerging in regions as Latin America, East Asia and 
the Mediterranean. Although less attractive on the short term, these markets were expected to 
Acquisitions Disposals No. of Transactions 
'95 
•94 
'93 
'92 
'91 
'90 
'89 
'88 
'87 
'86 
-2 491 [~ 
3 000 
-1622 
-2000 
-1168 [ 
-920 | 
-876 |_ 
-504 C 
-396 
-696 f 
-616 f 
1 
-572 [~J 
-1 000 ous$ 
1 186 
| 164 
71 
| 177 
• 195 
| 136 
1 248 
1 232 
| 294 
million 
708 
55 
40 
36 
43 
40 
72 
71 
45 
34 
51 
Adapted from the Unilever Publication 'Charts 1985-1995' 
Figure 7.2: Acquisitions and Disposals of Unilever in the period 1986-1995. 
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grow significantly over time and hence market positions had to be built as fast as possible to 
be ahead of competition and gain first-mover advantage. 
The impelling force behind the third phase in the strategic reorientation process since the 
early 1980s was, Mr. Maljers stressed, "not so much an inner urge but more a necessity due to 
the fast changing business environment." This third phase, initiated in the beginning of 1992 
was based on a widely-felt need throughout Unilever to further refine both product priorities 
and geographical opportunities. "A growing need to exploit our expertise and skills forced us 
again to further narrow the product focus in terms of the number of products covered," Mr. 
Maljers explained. "Within foods, for example, we always had a subgroup beverages. This was 
virtually only tea in practice, in which we are the world's leading manufacturer. However, 
there were periodic studies about the possibilities of the coffee market, and indeed some coffee 
was sold in a few countries. However, the competitive structure of the coffee industry has been 
such that the chances for a major worldwide profitable entry appeared to be remote. The third 
phase was the point where we decided to give up any major global coffee ambitions and to 
concentrate on tea. This in turn led to the decision to put more emphasis on tea, for instance, 
by extending the American habit of drinking iced tea to Europe where a successful business is 
being build under the name Liptonice." 
Apart from a re-definition of the product priorities based upon a recognition of the possible 
synergies which would emerge due to a more limited scope of Unilever's business activities, 
various developments in the international business environment have also forced Unilever to 
review its capital commitments since the beginning of the 1990s. On the one hand, the 
formation of new geopolitical groupings such as the European Union, NAFTA, the Andean 
Pact, and Asean often necessitated a complete re-configuration of regional supply and 
production facilities. Without major restructuring programs local competitive strategies would 
suffer from the confrontation with strongly integrated regional or global competitors affecting 
the cost-competitive position of Unilever's product offerings. On the other hand, the opening 
up of new markets in the post-Marxist period resulted in an almost bewildering array of 
opportunities for investments. By building market positions in emerging markets, attractive 
points of departure would be created in the "markets of tomorrow" while enlarging 
opportunities to exploit Unilever's skills and know-how in such areas as brand management, 
distribution, and sales. 
a) Unilever's Product Portfolio Strategy b) Unilever's Internationalization Strategy 
Figure 7.3: Illustration of Unilever's Strategic Reorientation Process. 
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As a consequence, Unilever's product focus increasingly narrowed while the geographic 
spread of its products extended (see Figure 7.3), with the direct result that in each product area 
strategies became more clear and, at the same time, the need for knowledge sharing became 
more apparent. Unilever wanted to give priorities to those categories in which opportunities 
existed to exploit both its global reach and its special regional and local expertise. As Goold et 
al (1994: 157) state, "by creating a network of operating companies in fast moving consumer 
goods businesses in different countries, a parent can generate value through the exchange of 
product, marketing, and technological information, ideas, and skills." Global competitiveness 
would be achieved, Unilever's top managers reasoned, if Unilever's employees would develop 
the capability to share information and know-how rapidly between companies across a global 
network. An increase of the actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing, however, would 
be restricted by the company's administrative heritage and would require the implementation 
of management systems stimulating and facilitating the transfer of knowledge. 
7.4 UNILEVER'S ADMINISTRATIVE HERITAGE 
The Unilever organization incorporates many examples of good practice which should be 
identified, transferred, and adopted systematically. The description of the changing knowledge 
environment and the strategic reorientation process makes clear that the required level of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing is strongly growing and is becoming a critical element in 
Unilever's strive for competitive and corporate success. The need to ensure rapid and effective 
transfer of its core resource, knowledge, was acknowledged by Unilever's top management, 
but, as Mr. Maljers stated on the Strategic Management Conference in Paris in 1994, 
"formulating strategy is easy, everybody with common sense can do that... It is far more 
difficult to implement a new strategy, certainly in a company the size of Unilever." In learning 
the particulars of Unilever's endeavour to increase the actual level of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing, it is therefore necessary to study the firm's administrative heritage and the way this 
firm is organized today. 
Unilever has always been an internationally oriented corporation. Especially Lever Brothers 
was early in internationalizing its business activities. Already in the mid-1880s William Lever 
assigned personal representatives to Africa, India, the Far East, and South America to build 
market share in these foreign markets. Although tight control was initially strongly appreciated 
by William Lever, the necessity of giving local autonomy to overseas managers has been 
acknowledged from early in Unilever's history. The first chairman of the in 1926 established 
Overseas Committee already felt that the role of the Overseas Committee was to provide 
guidance instead of instruction, to approve the annual estimates of sales and profits, and to 
monitor the regular flow of financial data and correspondence from the field. A strong 
corporate norm resulted: the task in managing overseas companies was to develop and manage 
people rather than to analyze and resolve problems. 
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The company emerged in the postwar era with a strong philosophy of management built 
around independent operating companies whose managers were given maximum responsibility 
and freedom. The growing number and sophistication of local competitors, rising trade 
barriers, and substantial country-to-country differences in terms of consumer preferences, 
distribution channels, and local regulations reinforced the trend towards decentralization of 
responsibility. Unilever's large national companies became fully integrated and self-sufficient 
operations. The clearly understood role of the board was to approve plans and budgets, to 
control capital expenditure, and to appoint and develop executives. At the operating level, 
local managers had great latitude to develop and implement strategies that reflected the 
opportunities and constraints of their particular environments. Unilever operated through local 
or regional subsidiaries which had a fair degree of independence and autonomy. Responsibility 
was given to the individual companies for their own operations. 
This considerable operational leeway has been complemented by a corporate norm to keep 
the formal communication lines as short as possible. Usually, no more than four layers exist 
between Unilever's chairmen and their brand managers. As Goold el al (1994: 157) argue: 
"Unilever aims to achieve networking and coordination without building a bureaucracy or 
making central management top heavy." Process and product coordinators at the corporate 
center act as an advisory facility to companies throughout the world and bring front-line 
managers with shared business problems together. To execute these liaison and coordination 
responsibilities, these managers need to keep in close contact with a broad span of chief 
executives, marketing directors, and product managers obscuring excessive interference. They 
have to provide a vehicle for linkages between countries, guidance on worldwide product 
strategy, and a mechanism for best practice transfer (Goold el al, 1994: 158). 
Until 1 September 1996, Unilever's top-structure consisted of a Board of Directors which 
was headed by a Special Committee (see Figure 7.4). The Special Committee embraced the 
chairmen of Unilever PLC and Unilever NV, complemented, in most periods, by the 
prospective successor of one of them. The Special Committee was responsible for formulating 
long-term strategies for Unilever as a whole, approving strategics for parts of Unilever, 
monitoring the performance, and formulating overall financial policy. Besides the members of 
the Special Committee, the Board of Directors comprised 6 product-group Directors, 3 
regional Directors, and 3 functional Directors. Central control was deliberately kept over three 
business areas, being research, finance, and management development. 
The original top structure, however, involved a decision-making process which was often 
too complicated and time consuming because of fuzziness surrounding management 
responsibilities and decision-making authorities. Too many people were often involved in 
major business decisions, responsibilities for strategic leadership and operational execution not 
clearly allocated, and many solutions tended to be sub-optimal due to the strive for consensus. 
"Still too often," one general manager of the Foods Executive stated, "we tend to act too 
slowly. If we want to gain market share and leverage our skills and know-how in such markets 
as China, Vietnam, and Brazil, we need to accelerate our decision-making processes. Without 
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this flexibility I am seriously concerned about our ability to act and invest quickly if 
opportunities unfold." 
As a consequence, Unilever decided in the beginning of 1996 to restructure and simplify its 
top-structure in order to achieve clear roles and single point responsibility. The new 
organization would allow strong regional focus within a framework of agreed category 
strategies. Going into effect on 1 September 1996, the Special Committee has been removed as 
a separate institution to be integrated in a small Executive Committee. Instead of the 15 
Directors in the "old" Board, a smaller and highly integrated team of 7 members has been 
implemented responsible for the overall strategy and corporate development of Unilever. 
Directly under this newly formed Executive Committee, 14 Business Groups were 
institutionalized with profit responsibility for their businesses. Located at the Center or at the 
Extended Centers, various functional experts, product category experts, and process leaders 
(liaison members) are still responsible for securing and exploiting the non-Business Group 
aligned synergies. 
After 10 years of strategic reorientation and driven by the need to build market positions in 
the emerging regions, Unilever's new top-structure had to make responsibilities more clear and 
improve the speed and clarity of decision-making (NRC Handelsblad, 13 March 1996: 1). To 
keep operational decision-taking close to the market, Unilever must be able to communicate a 
shared and unequivocal vision regarding the corporate purpose and objectives. Instead of 
aiming for consensus, single point responsibilities should enable the business groups to act 
quickly and effectively. The Corporate Center is responsible for formulating the firm's 
strategic direction and hence provides a strategic framework within which front-line managers 
must learn to act and take their responsibilities for operational execution. 
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Figure 7.4: Re-design of Unilever's Top-structure. 
150 • CHAPTER SEVEN 
Unilever's formal organization and hence formal communication lines have traditionally 
been complemented by a strong corporate culture. Surprisingly for such a large organization, 
an important feature of the Unilever culture is its informality. The company does not maintain 
heavily documented systems. Much depends on informal relationships across the organization. 
One member of the Personal Products Coordination described Unilever as a "tight-knit but 
free-flow management structure in which, despite its size, good and bad news travels swiftly 
and undisturbed to every corner of the Unilever universe." The informal relationships are 
formed very early on in people's careers. A considerable culture and a strong informal network 
The Ice Cream Academy 
Unilever is planning a rapid expansion of its ice cream business throughout the world over 
the period leading up to 2003. Outside Western Europe and North America, this will 
require the training of a large number of managers in order to ensure that the growing 
business is competitive. Meanwhile, in Europe and North America Unilever needs to 
maintain its competitiveness by speeding up innovation and ensuring a constistently high 
quality of its products. The Ice Cream Academy is targeted at both types of operation so 
that a consistent high quality reservoir of human resources is created throughout the 
business over the next few years. 
Objective of the IC Academy 
The Academy is a total concept and not just a series of courses held in a building. It is 
about constant learning, training the trainers, training assignments on location, and 
transferring best practice. It is also about building the ice cream network, a common 
culture and a passion for ice cream. 
The Ice Cream Academy should fulfil the following objectives: analyse training needs, set 
the standards of training, develop appropriate training packages, facilitate the delivery of 
training, evaluate the benefits of training, and facilitate the coaching of individuals. 
Methods of delivering training 
The major activity of the Academy will be to facilitate training delivery. This can be done 
in a number of ways: courses and workshops, documents and reading material, videos, 
and other distance learning material (e.g. interactive CD-ROMs). 
The IC Academy acknowledges that courses are very costly. A one-week international 
course will typically cost an overseas unit about 2000 BP per head for travel, 
accomodation, etc. Courses and workshops, however, are attractive from many points of 
view (e.g. interaction, motivation, impact on trainee) and hence will be one of the major 
tools in the training program. For training large numbers of people (distance learning 
packages are expensive to create) new technologies can become interesting in the near 
future. 
Organization of Academy 
The Academy Chairman is the chairman of Iglo-Ola BV in the Netherlands who has taken 
on the role of championing the Academy. Unilever has made the choice for locating the 
Academy in a operating company, with its chairman championing the Academy, because 
of market closeness, the operating environment, organizational support, and focused 
leadership and responsibility of a Chairman. In order to keep in touch with the business, 
to remain up to date and confer credibility, the Academy must have strong links with the 
ICG and have close contacts with customers. 
Adapted from Internal Documents and Letters on the Institutionalization of the Ice Cream Academy 
Exhibit 7.5: The Ice Cream Academy. 
UNILEVER m 151 
among its managers exist to hold the organization together and to integrate managers 
responsible for different areas and functions. This common culture within Unilever relies on 
the careful recruitment, development, and acculturation of the key decision makers in the 
corporation. A senior personnel manager stated: "There is a need for a positive corporate 
culture within Unilever which does not challenge or replace, or even transcend the local 
manager's identity. Ideally," he said, "managers should feel fully nationals of their own 
country, yet equally fully members of the corporate club." 
Unilever believes in recruiting high-quality talent and providing career development which 
is useful for both the company and the recruit. Quality of recruitment continues to be a basic 
concern and the company invests a great deal of time and effort in this activity. Despite its 
international orientation, Unilever does not necessarily look for an international aspect of the 
person's background during the recruiting process. It believes firmly that in their early 20s, 
people have plenty of scope to change and develop. "We are looking for those managers," the 
personnel manager argued, "who are prepared to cross boundaries." Moreover, Unilever is not 
interested in creating a separate cadre of international managers, but tries to get a large number 
of managers to be international. Unilever managers obtain international experience through 
expatriation, involvement in an international projects, an international role in their home 
countries, and participation in international courses, seminars, and workshops. 
The responsibility for training rests with the head of the operating company, normally the 
Company Chairman. The central training effort is primarily concerned with the development 
of managers with the potential to reach senior levels within Unilever. Every year well over a 
thousand managers from Unilever companies and departments throughout the world attend 
programs on a central location near London, called Four Acres. This permanent residential 
training center of Unilever established in 1954 tries to provide the best possible environment to 
enable course participants to study, to learn, and to exchange their ideas. Apart from central 
programs (e.g., general management programs, functional programs, awareness programs), 
numerous product or process-related initiatives are taken. An example is the 
institutionalization of the Ice Cream Academy (see Exhibit 7.5) to develop its managers, to 
facilitate the creation of personal networks, and to stimulate passion for the business and the 
corporation. 
7.5 UNILEVERS MANAGEMENT TOOLS TO MANAGE KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
In an industry in which local responsiveness has always been the dominant strategic task, 
Unilever's strategy of strong decentralization provided a natural fit with the emphasis en local 
adaptation. The company had a long history of building strong national companies that were 
sensitive to local needs and opportunities, allowing them the freedom to manage their local 
businesses in an entrepreneurial way, with minimum direction from the headquarters. 
However, various changes in Unilever's business environment forced the corporation to pursue 
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Managemen t System Knowledge Sharing Knowledge Sharing Knowledge Sharing Knowledge Sharing 
Awareness System Persuasion System Complexity Reduction Media System 
Implemented Tools within Unilever System 
Unison 
Managing a Corporate Language 
A Growing Process Orientation 
The "Innovation Funnel" 
Creating Interdependent Knowledge Networks 
Table 7.2: Some of Unilever's Management Tools. 
major shifts in its strategic orientation. Due to such changes as the integration of the European 
market, the growing confrontation with global competitors, and the heightened pace of 
innovation, Unilever needed to increasingly exploit the potential synergies its portfolio offered 
without ignoring the demands and advantages of diversity in the international business 
environment. More integration, however, unavoidably affected the managerial autonomy of the 
operating companies and hence necessitated a dramatic alteration in the way Unilever had 
operated "in the old days." 
Concerned with the possibility that any drastic change in management processes might 
threaten the strong internalized values and powerful information relationships that had 
historically linked organizational units, Unilever's management realized that it had to do more 
than changing the "blueprint" of its organizational structure. The key task was to reshape the 
core decision-making systems, and in doing so, the management processes of the corporation. 
Hence, Unilever's managers needed tools for managing such change that were more subtle but 
also more effective than the creation of a formal organizational structure. Identifying, 
developing, and implementing these management tools came to be the major challenge for 
reacting to the volatility of environmental demands and the consequential growing need for 
integration between the operating companies. 
In the search for illustrations of mechanisms comprising the prerequisite management 
systems for managing intracorporate knowledge sharing, five recently implemented 
management tools offered substantial value in this respect (see Table 7.2). An in-depth study 
of these management tools has been performed, resulting in a brief description and evaluation 
of these tools which will be presented in the following five sections3. The first section will 
elaborate on the implementation of UNISON, an information technology & 
telecommunications project with the objective to extend the set of transfer mechanisms and to 
No exact implementation date can be given with respect to these five management tools. Unilever often uses 
lead companies or lead product groups in testing their organizational innovations and, if successful, rolls out 
the concept throughout the firm via a cascade process. The roll-out can take many years and hence large 
differences exist with respect to the decision and effectuation date between subparts of Unilever. The order of 
presentation, however, strongly represents the line of discussion in several product groups during the period 
1991 to 1996. 
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develop a corporate memory. The following section describes another effort by corporate 
management to facilitate communication between its companies, being its effort to achieve 
consensus on the definitions of common data-elements and information structures. The third 
section elaborates on the shift within Unilever to a more extensive focus on organizational 
processes instead of the traditional functional perspective. This shift to an extended focus on 
businesses processes has made it possible to better identify and exploit the non-product aligned 
opportunities for intracorporate knowledge sharing and discern common phases in the 
transition of some of these processes over the years. While the roll-out of a new way for 
managing dispersed innovation projects is the focal point in the fourth section, the final section 
emphasizes the increased practice within Unilever to create an interdependent network of 
companies in their regions by concentrating research & development resources. All these 
management tools have been reviewed and gradually implemented during the period from 
1991 to 1996. All of them created major implications on managers throughout Unilever to 
share and adopt the available knowledge in their corporation. 
TOOL #1: UNISON GLOBAL NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE 
In 1991 Unilever's corporate management authorized investment in a project aimed at the 
development of a seamless, flexible and securely managed Global Network infrastructure. This 
so-called UNISON project was initiated to implement a corporate "intranet" which enabled 
managers around the world to retrieve access to all of the firm's employees and information. 
UNISON aimed at facilitating effective interpersonal communication and smoothing the 
integration process of many of Unilever's businesses. Moreover, UNISON promised to offer 
the opportunity to record a corporate memory, whereby everyone in the company could tap 
into the problem-solving records of the past as well as pose questions in real-time. The notion 
that the entire knowledge base could be brought to bear on geographically widely scattered 
business problems seemed to be a very powerful concept. 
UNISON would enable the sharing of ideas, internal and external research, formal and 
informal information, virlually instantaneously across geographic regions. Special interest 
groups concerned with product development, market development, innovation, etc. would be 
able to create computer conferences in UNISON to share and develop the best Unilever 
knowledge - unrestrained by location. Repetition of a similar development or problem 
resolution would be avoided and lessons learnt would be shared effectively. Moreover, using 
UNISON workstations, team members around the world would be able to work on the same 
information, package design, product development etc. as though they were all in the same 
office. Unilever managers would be able to work on the same issues together instead of 
solving identical problems alone. UNISON would enable the flow of information about an 
event directly to everyone concerned. This means that activities devoted to gathering and 
distributing information could be eliminated in an efficient manner, allowing the focus to be 
on adding value to information instead of reinventing it again. 
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Based on a recognition of the needs to realize more integration between the firm's 
companies, Unilever's top management authorized the kick-off of the UNISON project at the 
end of 1991. UNISON had to engender changes in working practice by providing Unilever's 
managers with a whole set of additional communication tools. UNISON aimed at exploiting 
new developments in the information technology and telecommunications area to build a 
system around a network of desk-top computers linking managers both with each other and 
with remote databases. The main components of UNISON were: (1) Global Electronic Mail 
Services; (2) Access to Corporate Databases (e.g. Research Databases, Competitor Monitoring 
Database, Advertising Library, Database on Legal Issues, "Hot Topic" Database); (3) 
Computer Conferencing and Desk-to-Desk Video Conferencing; and (4) Access to Operating 
Company Databases with facilities for data-sharing (e.g. market research, product 
development, materials sourcing, effectiveness of national promotions, TV commercials -
including those of competitors). Next to these main components, various smaller initiatives 
were taken within the boundaries of the UNISON project like Networked Document 
Management (see Exhibit 7.6). 
An investment in information technology and telecommunications, however, supports the 
activity of finding new ways of working and is not a solution in itself. Consequently, the most 
critical phase in the implementation process of the UNISON applications has not been the 
formation and installation phase, but the organization phase in which the changes in working 
Document Management 
Another initiative of the information technology group of Unilever is Networked Document 
Management. The increased use of word processing and electronic mail has caused a major 
increase in the number of key business documents which are being created and distributed 
electronically. Within the traditional office environment these electronic documents are either 
translated to paper and manually filed or are left on the local PC, only available to a single 
user. 
Networked Document Management can be of benefit for different reasons: 
* The individual computer user will find it easier to work with his own documents and, should 
he leave the company or be absent, his work will not be "lost" on his PC. 
* Document Management enables a team to work together on the creation of reports and is a 
repository for all their supporting documentation. 
* Information libraries will be able to respond more quickly to requests for information and will 
be able to retrieve information based on powerful search requests that would not be possible 
with paper or simple PC filing systems. Additionally, library users will be able to access the 
library directly from their own PC screens making access to the information faster and more 
efficient. 
The use of Document Management is not, of course, limited to just word-processed documents or 
"images." Any electronic file can be managed by a Document Management System, including 
video clips, sound bites and program code. 
Adapted from Internal Documents. 
Exhibit 7.6: Document Management within Unilever 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
E-Mail 3,500 8,000 18,000 35,000 55,000 
Lotus Notes 300 1,500 5,000 12,000 20,000 
Adapted from Internal Documents. 
Table 7.3: Estimate of Number of Employees Technically Connected to the Network. 
practice engendered by UNISON became apparent. After a few years of experience with the 
new applications from UNISON, the implications and results of the UNISON project are 
ambiguous as observed by both IT managers in the Foods and Personal Products business. 
While the E-mail and data-sharing capabilities of UNISON are being used increasingly and, in 
some cases, intensively, one of the key components of UNISON, the Lotus Notes application, 
is less successful and has not been exploited yet to its full potential by Unilever's managers 
around the world. 
Lotus Notes is a client-server application that enhances group productivity by allowing 
users to share information, while also allowing individuals easy customization of this 
information to suit their individual needs. Lotus Notes allows a user to create custom 
applications, to send and receive messages, and to access multiple databases of documents, 
facts, figures, records, memos, and ideas. Using Lotus Notes, a group of people can share 
information, even if those people are in different locations. Notes is interactive, one can reply, 
comment and expand on the information provided. The software itself can best be compared 
with a "file cabinet" containing documents. The difference is that the documents can contain 
any kind of information: text, numbers, graphics, spreadsheets, photos, etc. With a number of 
"keys" one can sort the information and show extracts of it in overviews. When applicable one 
can edit the information, compose new documents, make remarks, etc. Often the applications 
are menu driven and button controlled. One does not need specific skills; a basic Lotus Notes 
training is sufficient to understand the concepts, learn the basic commands and work with the 
software. 
"Technically," an information member of Unilever's Personal Products Coordination stated, 
"Lotus Notes is implemented successfully with approximately 20,000 managers connected at 
the end of 1995. In contrast to electronic mail, however, which has become a phenomenal 
success, the use of Lotus Notes (e.g., access rate approximately 5 percent) is not as high as 
expected based on its advanced features. Probably," the information member argued, "this can 
be partially explained by a misfit between Lotus Notes and the Unilever culture. The Unilever 
culture is a very broad network of contacts, often one-to-one, sometimes one-to-few. Members 
of our organization feel comfortable with sharing on an one-to-one basis and with persons you 
know. [...) With the telephone and electronic mail both the provider and the receiver of the 
knowledge are in control. The telephone and electronic mail comes to you on your desk and is 
directed to you personally. Consequently, the telephone and electronic mail closely fit the 
Unilever culture. [...] In contrast, with Lotus Notes you do not know who receives your 
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information and it is information to all. We experience within the Unilever organization the 
reluctance of people to share their information and experiences with an unknown audience and 
this misfit of the Lotus Notes application with the Unilever culture has probably very strong 
implications for the unsatisfactory exploitation of this advanced communication tool till this 
moment." 
"Besides the use of Lotus Notes as an additional communication channel, Notes can also be 
used for the identification of knowledge sharing opportunities," the information member 
further explains the potential value of this application. "There are a great number of Global 
Lotus Notes conferences on most of the common issues in our businesses. Most of the topics 
are fully explained, the corporate policy given, and implementation guidelines presented." 
Overloaded by the enormous amount of available information in the Lotus Notes databases, 
however, many managers throughout Unilever hesitate to log into these information sources. 
As one of the marketing managers of a company in the Personal Products division stated: "I 
still give priority to exploit my informal network and our coordinations in an attempt to serve 
my knowledge needs within Unilever. Although this approach will probably be less time-
efficient, the personal contact with my colleagues will make my problem well known 
throughout Unilever and will provide me with their thoughts on my problem and the available 
knowledge sources internally. But even if I do not need these additional qualifications, the 
chance that I will find the required information via the electronic network is too uncertain yet 
and the information is in most cases not customized to my specific needs at all." 
"Moreover, you have to be realistic," the information member of Unilever's Personal 
Products Coordination stressed. "Given that we have more than 300,000 employees, is there 
any reason why the managers within Unilever should be any different from the rest of the 
population at large? How many of the population at large is sharing information electronically? 
[...] Given that Unilever's human resource policy does not include prerequisite 1T&T skills in 
their selection process of new employees, why should Unilever be any different than the rest of 
the world? We do not recruit people on familiarity and ability in this area and therefore there is 
no reason to believe that we should be better in this respect than the normal population. [...] 
There are a number of early adopters in the world and we see the same phenomenon within 
Unilever." 
As a consequence of the UNISON project, Unilever is currently in a leading position in the 
exploitation of certain communication technologies. The UNISON project defined the IT 
standards, products, and infrastructure to support new ways of working. Early experiences with 
the UNISON applications made it clear that various applications are an important addition to 
the set of communication channels managers could use for the transfer of information and data. 
As a Corporate IT manager stated, "Unilever has built an infrastructure which enables 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. We do not have, however, an electronic sharing community 
yet. The major way knowledge is shared is still through personal ad hoc contact. [...] Although 
the use of electronic media is growing, it is disappointing to see the rate with which it is 
growing. " 
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Unilever's Open System Policy 
To be able to react to the various future trends and leverage the development 
activities within Unilever quickly, Unilever has decided to create an infrastructure 
which can rapidly respond to any opportunity that arises. The Unilever organization 
has to evolve to meet changing business needs, enabling the exploitation of new 
opportunities. This means a continuous shift in the balance between product, region, 
and functional management. The infrastructure must enable rather than present a 
barrier to these changes. With this in mind, Unilever decided to migrate its operating 
companies to Open Software Foundations (OSF) protocols. The OSF standard will 
allow several operating companies to share the costs of software systems that none 
could afford to develop alone. The Unilever IT Policies for Open Systems are 
developed with the specific goal of supporting Unilever's increasingly transnational 
business operations and business priority for rapidly sharing business innovation 
and best practice across the corporation. As such these policies provide a standard 
global infrastructure for the sharing of information and knowledge (sharing 
applications between companies to exploit proven success and facilitating the 
sharing of structured and unstructured information between companies, Management 
Groups and Corporate Functions). 
Policies are classified into three categories: mandatory policy, recognised policies, 
and referred policies. The key points from the present policies are: the policies are 
based upon client-server computing, all servers must be open-system computers 
(UNIX) purchased from IBM, DEC or HP, client computers will largerly be PCs, 
Oracle has been approved as the standard database system and a number of 
products have been specified to be used to develop new applications. The policies 
mandate products for: word processing, spreadsheet applications, electronic mail, 
computer conferencing, and business graphics. The vision behind the open system 
policy is the improved possibilities for technology migration. It must be able to 
implement developed or acquired applications within 10 days all over the world. For 
the end of the century all sites have to migrate to the UNIX environment. 
The ability to transfer applications systems rapidly between companies is one of the 
principal benefits of Unilever's open system strategy. Compliance with the open 
policy definition provides assurance that software will execute on any of Unilever's 
approved hardware/operating system platforms. The open system policy 
invalidates the excuse of operating sites not to implement certain applications from 
the viewpoint of technological differences. In addition, compliant software 
applications will be able to interoperate, transferring data at speeds appropriate to 
business need and thereby achieving the systems integration necessary to support 
changing business practices. 
The functional richness and quality of commercially available packaged software 
make it increasingly unnecessary to develop mainstream transaction systems 
in-house. The trend will be to target internal development effort upon applications 
which can provide unique added value for Unilever's businesses, integrating with, or 
bridging between, packaged software to provide information or functionality not 
otherwise available. By decomplying with the open system criteria, and adhering to 
the Unilever Systems Development Methodology, internally developed software will 
be fully portable within Unilever. In time, Unilever companies will therefore 
themselves be an important source of packaged software; by giving other Unilever 
companies a fast start to the use of innovative applications, such software is a 
potential source of competitive advantage. 
Adapted from Internal Documents. 
Exhibit 7.7: Unilever's Open System Policy 
158 • CHAPTER SEVEN 
Unilever's World Class Applications Policy 
As Unilever companies move increasingly to the use of packaged software for their 
mainstream transaction systems, there is a clear risk that very large numbers of different 
packages could be installed. There will as a consequence be no opportunities to create 
core skills and transfer the best business ideas between companies, or to share 
investment in the best of the known solutions. It has been agreed on a corporate basis 
that a small number of software packages will be approved for use in each business 
area, so that companies may focus their energies upon quick, high quality 
implementations which build upon the experience gained elsewhere in Unilever. The 
number of approved packages in each area is determined by the functional scope 
implied by the range of Unilever business processes. It is expected that within each 
functional area there will be a mixture of broad scope, fully integrated packages, and 
"best of breed" packages highly specialized for the function. 
The primary requirement for all software products purchased in future by Unilever 
companies is that they must adhere to the Open Software Foundation. Moreover, for 
packages to be able to meet Unilever's needs globally, each must be able to accomodate 
the needs of multi-site transnational businesses. For example, multiple natural languages 
and currencies must be supported, and vendors must be able to provide an international 
distribution and support organization. The term "World Class" has been coined to 
describe the criteria which embody these considerations and the software products 
which conform to them. 
A corporate team acts as a clearing house for information about such developments and 
will be able to bring together people with a shared interest. Selection of a specific 
applications software package for use within a particular mainstream context will be 
made only from the set of Candidate World Class Applications as prepared by the 
Corporate IT Policies Committee. A database is being established by the World Class 
Applications Working Group to store details of all leading software vendors in our areas 
of interest. The basic details of all software qualifying as Open will be kept up to date 
within this database by ITG, including global distribution contacts and details of 
Unilever users. In addition, there will be facilities to record and disseminate information 
about companies' implementations of packaged software and the business context in 
which such implementations are taking place. The database will progressively be made 
available on-line to Unilever locations by means of the Shared Information Network. 
Adapted from Internal Documents. 
Exhibit 7.8: Unilever's World Class Application Policy. 
TOOL #2: MANAGING A CORPORATE IANGUAGE 
Apart from authorizing the effectuation of the UNISON project and hence advancing the 
possibilities to track knowledge sharing prospects, Unilever's corporate management also 
facilitated intracorporate knowledge sharing by institutionalizing a jointly understandable 
"language." Companies communicate internally through their own phrases and concepts - their 
own language (Von Krogh and Roos, 1995: 390). Due to years of operating independently, 
each company has developed its own definitions. The local meaning of that language is very 
difficult to transpose into another company's language and hence complicates the exchange of 
information notably. The only information component Unilever has standardized and properly 
defined in the past was the "top line" (e.g., revenues, costs, profits). Unilever acknowledged, 
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however, that without a common language, knowledge could not easily flow from person to 
person. The availability of mutually understandable definitions of data-elements and 
information structures was a prerequisite condition for sharing knowledge. 
"We needed to create a common language if we wanted to integrate our companies," one of 
the senior sourcing member of the Foods Executive urged. "Without standardized systems (see 
Exhibit 7.7), preferred software packages (see Exhibit 7.8), and common definitions of data-
elements and information structures, communication and thus knowledge sharing between our 
people within Unilever will be very difficult. [...] The lack of common definitions is one of the 
major barriers to knowledge sharing and the exploitation of other economies of scale within 
Unilever. The more time and resources we spent on the development of a common 'language' 
the more Unilever will be able to integrate, share the 'Best Practice,' communicate about 
common business issues, and jointly develop standardized business solutions." The increased 
use of such concepts like the Product Group Hierarchies, the Brand Architectures, and 
Information Supply Structures indicates that Unilever is serious about their objective to 
develop more communality in the utilized definitions throughout the Unilever organization and 
aims for the establishment of a corporate language. 
For a high-level standardization of the applied information structures, Unilever increasingly 
applies so-called Product Group Hierarchies. In the Product Group Hierarchy three levels can 
be discerned, namely the product group, the product category, and the product category 
segment (see Figure 7.5). In the past, discussions on operational and strategic issues were less 
structured and less comparable because no common conception of the market existed. The 
Product Group Hierarchy provides a notion of Unilever's business in a particular product group 
and hence a strategic planning architecture which facilitates communication on the portfolio of 
business activities, new product concepts, and opportunities for integration. Besides its use for 
strategic analysis and decision-making, the Product Group Hierarchy assists in the aggregation 
of data and is useful in the informal communication process. By using the hierarchy, 
companies can be compared and opportunities for knowledge exchange detected. In the 
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Figure 7.5: The "Hierarchy " of Unilever Personal Products' Hair Business. 
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Positioning 
Communication Vehicle 
The particular characteristics of the brand are discerned and these 
characteristics act as input for the fomularion of a core positioning strategy 
for the Brand. 
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Figure 7.6: A Hypothetical Brand Architecture. 
particular case of Unilever Personal Products, the registration of the product group hierarchy 
and the aggregated company data is done in a system called PREMISE. The PREMISE system 
is a single system which is placed on a server in Unilever House in London and can be 
remotely accessed from anywhere in the world since the beginning of 1995. 
Brand architectures are increasingly used to ease communication on brand strategies and 
management of the portfolio of core variants of a specific brand. So, while the Product Group 
Hierarchy is applied to conceptualize the structure of the market, a Brand Architectures 
provides a notion of the functionality of the brand and gives a description of the positioning of 
the brand in the market. A regular brand architecture comprises four elements: basic brand 
positioning, communication vehicle (advertising framework), the various platforms that exist 
for the brand, and the core variants (see Figure 7.6). "The brand architecture," a senior 
marketing member of Unilever Ice Cream, explains, "describes the ongoing experience of the 
consumer with the brand and connects strategy to products and projects. Moreover, the brand 
architecture allows for a discussion of the relationship between brands and provides a context 
for the evolution of the product portfolio over time." 
Apart from the definition of these high-level information structures to smooth 
communication, the standardization on the data level has become a major issue within 
Unilever to enable connectivity between the companies' databases and operating systems. The 
Unilever standard Information Supply Structure (ISS) is a design that has been built to deal 
with the corporation-wide interface between applications, sites, management groups, and 
regions. It is positioned as a re-usable component of any lead project and facilitates the sharing 
of data between any two applications that have this component built in. Before information 
shared via the ISS makes sense, however, management agreement must exist on the Data 
UNILEVER • 161 
Architectures that explicate the structure and meaning of data components. Applications that 
are ISS enabled can share data easily but only if the same business definitions and objects are 
used in both places. Because the ISS cannot stop "garbage in, garbage out," the only way to get 
comparable information is to provide appropriate ownership, covering business definitions and 
procedures for creating and maintaining them. Without information owners seriously fulfilling 
their ownership responsibilities, the information exchange processes in the organization can be 
significantly blurred and frustrated. 
TOOL #3: A GROWING PROCESS ORIENTATION 
Historically, the Board organization of a typical Unilever company was defined on the basis of 
functional directors. The functions were defined as marketing, sales, commercial, technical and 
personnel. The functional structure has evolved over time, but largely in response to the 
various stages and needs which have been addressed in the company's history. Looking ahead, 
it is apparent that some of the factors that determined the organization structure in the past, 
will not be so important in the future. Consequently, to be able to analyze and improve its 
operations in the future, Unilever has moved to a more extensive focus on organizational 
processes instead of functional areas. Although most companies are still structured based on 
functions, managers throughout Unilever gradually start to communicate in terms of business 
processes. 
The most important conceptual switch for Unilever managers when thinking process-
oriented is represented by the fact that work activities (processes) overwhelmingly flow 
horizontally across an organization, whereas organizational structures are predominantly 
vertical in nature. Unilever has experienced over the years that any division of work or 
definition of reporting lines creates boundaries. Managing the boundaries between different 
parts of the organization is one of the most important tasks of Unilever's management. The 
ideal situation to which this corporation is trying to move, is when boundaries are clearly 
defined in order to understand who is responsible for which activity. However, those 
boundaries should be open with regard to information flows, an understanding of customer 
needs, requirements from suppliers, and a widely shared understanding of long-term goals and 
values. 
"If the ideal boundary conditions are not present in our organization," one of the senior 
members of Unilever's Foods Executive stated, "simply changing the departmental reporting 
lines will not by itself improve the quality of boundary management. [...] We are not in the 
process of simply swapping one set of boundaries for another. We are defining what we 
consider to be the "best" position for boundaries and then we must go on to ensure that the 
quality of the new boundaries is as we ideally wish them to be. [...] The best way to keep open 
boundaries between processes and departments," the senior member of Unilever's Foods 
Executive stressed, "is to encourage management and employees to raise their understanding 
and awareness of work flows within the business." 
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Although such a process orientation is growing in Unilever at large, differences exist 
between the product groups considering the importance of this approach. A senior manager 
who made the move from Personal Products to Foods in the beginning of 1996, explains: "The 
urge to focus on processes on an inter-company level is much larger in Foods than in Personal 
Products because it provides the Foods group with the opportunity to identify and exploit the 
non-category aligned synergies of their operations. [...] Unlike foods where you have separate 
companies for separate categories, Personal Product has one company in each country 
effectively for all their product categories. So, unlike foods where little communication can 
exist between, for example, the Tea companies and the Ice Cream companies, there is 
absolutely no danger of lack of communication between the categories in Personal Products. 
Personal Products is much smaller and far less complicated than the Foods Product Group. 
Because the six categories are all marketed and sold through the same company, intracorporate 
knowledge sharing has never been obstructed significantly between the product categories of 
Personal Products. [...] For the communication and knowledge sharing between the product 
groups, however, the process orientation can probably become an important management 
concept. There are various processes in our foods, detergents, and personal products businesses 
which are common. Value could be created by sharing the existing knowledge on these 
processes among our product groups." 
A senior manager of the Foods Executive confirmed these statements. "Our abilities to 
exploit the inter-company synergies," he argued, "are dramatically increased because of the 
growing process orientation in our foods business. [...1 We are now able to bring people 
together based on their category expertise or their knowledge of a particular business process. 
In the past the functional directors came together, but often their perspective on the business 
1
 Brand Development Chain • 
Natural 
Resources 
Brand Devt. innovation Marketing Trade Consumer Marketing Product 
Planning Management Evaluation Mkt. Res. Mkt. Res. Planning Promotion 
Supplier 
Support 
Product 
Sourcing 
Supply 
Mgl. 
Strategic 
Business 
Planning 
Sales 
Planning 
& 
Forecasting ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . 
Sales Customer Consumers 
Ac
™""' Development
 r ,
& 
Mgt. r Customers 
Order 
Mgl 
Material Operations Materials
 M . n „r a r i „r in n S t o c k Physical 
<i,,.,rrino i-i:,„.,m„ \t„, ''•"""'" '"' "'• M „ . Distribution lnv"'Cin8 Sourcing Planning Mgt gt 
Supply Chain 
People 
Mgt. 
Technology 
Mgt. 
information 
Mgt. 
Finance 
Mgt. 
Quality 
Mgt. 
Enabling/Support Processes 
Adapted from Internal Documents. 
Figure 7.7: The Process Definition of Unilever Foods. 
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was too generic to identify the opportunities for intracorporate knowledge sharing. [...] Not the 
functional directors, but their subordinates often possess the needed understanding and 
awareness of the issues of specific business processes to discern these opportunities. By 
bringing people together based on their knowledge of a particular business process our hope is 
to improve our abilities to generate synergies beyond our product categories. Of course, we are 
still in a process of transition and many processes still have to be defined more clearly, but the 
early results are promising." 
Unilever's conception of the business processes in its foods business, as depicted in Figure 
7.7, comprises three main processes (i.e., supply chain, brand development, customer 
development) and five enabling processes. Management tools have been developed and 
institutionalized to detect, register, and transfer best practices with respect to most of these 
business processes. In the following of this section, however, particular attention is given to 
those management tools stimulating and facilitating the leverage of skills and know-how in the 
Customer Development area. The customer development process is of particular interest for 
this study of intracorporate knowledge sharing because the sales area is one of the few areas in 
which the deliberate choice was made not to concentrate knowledge development resources. 
The need for local adaptation and hence operational leeway in this area necessitates the 
management of scattered knowledge items. Instead of implementing lead companies or 
competence centers to be discussed in the fifth section, management tools have been created to 
motivate front-line managers to share best practices with their colleagues around the world. 
Although markets and sales operations differ strongly between countries, a lot of the tools and 
basic sales techniques are based on common grounds and need to be shared to prevent the 
issue that "the wheel is reinvented" all over the place. 
As a Sales Member of Unilever Foods stated: "In the past, there has been less inclination to 
spread and impose common practice in the sales area. We used such mechanisms like 
expatriation, central training activities, the informal network, and functional experts like me. 
[...] The best practice within the sales area was exploited piecemeal with no effective 
mechanism in place to ensure timely transfer of skills and experience. Hence, each company 
was confronted with common issues in this area but went primarily individually through the 
learning process of developing their customer (e.g., retail, gas stations) approach. No or very 
few opportunities to share our knowledge were exploited." 
"Starting with the focus on processes, however," the sales member continued, "we 
increasingly acknowledge the communality of many of our business issues. We felt the need to 
exchange the best practices between the operating units and we in the center tried to stimulate 
and facilitate that process. [...] In contrast to audits, identifying best practice is a program that 
focuses people's attention on the way processes are managed, rather than on results. The best 
practice approach views improvements as a continuous process of discovery, not an 
intermittent series of solutions to overwhelming problems. [,..] Due to major increases in the 
tempo of worldwide customer management developments and the variety of initiatives which 
have sprung up within Unilever, sales coordination has decided to establish a better foundation 
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for avoiding very expensive and recurring duplications of mistakes and successes." As a 
consequence of this ambition and within the confines of the growing process orientation, 
several aids were developed to detect, register, and transfer best practices (e.g., booklets on 
existing practices, registration in Lotus Notes of best practice locations). Two particular aids, 
the so-called Customer Management Roadmap and Customer Management Benchmark, both 
implemented at the end of 1995, strongly stimulated and facilitated the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process in this particular area and are therefore both briefly discussed 
below. 
The Customer Management Roadmap assists chief executives to plot the future course of 
their company with respect to customer management and identifies missed turnings that may 
be slowing the progress. In applying the Roadmap, chief executives are asked to assess the 
business environment and competitive positioning of the company, set goals for the next two 
to three years, evaluate the current capability versus future needs to establish development 
priorities, and establish an action plan for the ongoing development of customer management 
capabilities. The Roadmap is designed to help chief executives carry out these tasks by 
describing the prerequisite conditions in various areas of their business. As depicted in Figure 
7.8, the customer management process can be upgraded in a gradual way. During the evolution 
of the firm's customer management process new demands are put upon the firm's performance 
in such areas as human resources, supply chain, and innovation. The Roadmap describes the 
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Figure 7.9: Benchmarking Profile. 
prerequisite changes in the functional areas to evolve, for example, from a field sales to a key 
account focus or from category management to integrated supply management. By filling in 
the included questionnaire, companies can make a self assessment of their current capabilities 
and identify areas for management action. 
The Customer Management Benchmark complements the Roadmap and is increasingly 
used to register current performance levels and to point to a desired course of action. The 
"Benchmark" identifies ten sub-processes necessary to achieve the overall purpose of customer 
management. The related questionnaire requires the company team to assess actual practice for 
each sub-process against a number of success criteria (see Figure 7.9). The success criteria are 
based on process benchmarks with Unilever companies and non-Unilever companies with 
related process requirements in the customer management area. The benchmarking process 
helps companies to self-audit their customer management process and compare their practices 
and organizational inputs with those of other Unilever companies. By focusing on the inputs or 
practices that determine the performance achieved rather than on process outcomes or 
performance data, valuable conclusions can be distracted from this benchmark on the required 
management actions. Moreover, the benchmark helps to identify where best-of-class 
performances are being achieved and to develop an action plan for improvements using a 
network of Unilever contacts worldwide to help them achieve their improvement actions. 
"Both the Customer Management Roadmap and the Benchmark document were received 
very enthusiastically by the three fast-moving-consumer-good product groups of Unilever," a 
senior sales member of the Foods business argued. "Besides the document's assistance in 
identifying knowledge for serving a prevalent knowledge need, managers often have a problem 
with defining their knowledge requirements. Both the Roadmap and the Benchmark can 
provide you with valuable ideas for further advancement of your company. [...] Moreover, 
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both documents can be used by the coordinations in the Center of Unilever to identify Best 
Practice and increase the pressure on companies to participate in the provision and deployment 
of available knowledge within Unilever. [...] The assessment given by each document 
identifies improvement options by comparing the business situation in the companies. Profiles 
are made up which enable the results of the assessment to be pictorially displayed, and for 
current and targeted practice levels to be compared. [...] 1 think we have two powerful 
techniques added to our "tool box" for stimulating and facilitating knowledge sharing 
throughout Unilever." 
TOOL #4: THE "INNOVATION FUNNEL" 
Unilever companies invest millions of US dollars in innovation projects for the development 
of new ideas or the implementation of new concepts. Historically, all companies within 
Unilever were encouraged to innovate drawing on ideas from themselves, suppliers or others. 
It was emphasized that innovation can come from anywhere and that successful innovation 
needs to be anchored in local markets and in companies where the necessary partnerships 
between marketing and development exist. While these notions are still valid, Unilever started 
to recognize in the beginning of the 1990s that in order to meet its growth requirements and to 
maintain its competitive position, the corporation not only needed innovation of the highest 
significance, originality and merit. Unilever also needed innovations which could be utilized as 
widely and quickly as possible via existing and new brands. Unilever's view came to be that a 
continuous flow of day-to-day innovations would always be needed but that significant 
additional business could only come from new "big" ideas and concepts to be exploited 
internationally on a timely basis. 
Apart from enabling communication between its managers and putting pressure on this 
process, Unilever's corporate management came to be convinced that it had to play a central 
role in creaming off its cornucopia of creative ideas within the corporation. "In the past," a 
Senior Marketing Member in the Ice Cream business of Unilever Foods argued, "there was the 
tendency to launch too many new brands and fritter away money behind too many small 
properties. For example, we had at a certain moment in time about 300 development projects 
within the Ice Cream Business if you added them all up. That is nonsense, certainly when you 
think that we are confronted with two mega global competitors. [...] We had the deliberate 
policy to let 'flowers' grow and if they were beautiful we picked them and spread them over 
our companies. This philosophy, however, led to a situation in which a lot of small activities 
were going on in our companies, but real innovations were not realized. Obviously, the 
portfolio of each company needs to be tailored to the local needs, but building much bigger, 
more powerful brands which can be rolled out quickly, efficiently, and effectively was a step 
Unilever was forced to take." 
To improve the management of the innovation projects, a set of new tools (e.g., innovation 
funnel, consumer/technology matrix, resource demand chart) has been implemented gradually 
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Figure 7.10: Unilever's Innovation Funnel. 
throughout the Unilever group. All product management groups have incorporated a strategy 
for innovation through new product development as part of their overall business plan, and 
recognized the need for a system to evaluate and select projects to support key business 
objectives. A core element of the formal innovation process was the "innovation funnel" 
concept. The input to the funnel includes new product ideas and enabling science and 
technology, all driven by business strategy. These ideas are progressively developed through a 
scries of formalized decision gates at which the product and process ideas are accepted or 
rejected. In this way, only the most innovative and successful ideas will be taken further and 
converted into new products or processes (see Figure 7.10). 
Any new idea can enter the funnel, no matter where they originate. Ideas then go through a 
series of phases, from initial idea to roll-out of the finished product into the market. To 
graduate from one phase to the next, however, a project must be approved by gatekeepers, 
drawn from appropriate senior management, who have wide experience of innovation. The 
gatekeepers will only consider allowing a project through to the next phase if certain specified 
tasks have been completed by the project manager and his team. The gatekeeper looks at the 
results of the tasks and assesses whether the project is worthy of entering the next phase. 
168 • CHAPTER SEVEN 
Gatekeepers make their decisions not just on the merits of the project itself but also in the 
wider context of the whole of Unilever's business strategies. To do this they refer to the 
Aggregate Project Plan, which displays the portfolio of innovation projects and the business 
impact that they are likely to yield. The Aggregate Project Plan has a number of aspects, for 
example, the Consumer Perception/Technology Matrix, a Risk Profile Figure, and the 
Resource Demand Chart which provide gatekeepers with the necessary and most relevant 
information. 
The new set of innovation tools resulted in a formalized innovation process with defined 
decision points, a system for evaluation, selection, and prioritization of projects, performance 
measures for innovation, and a culture that encourages creativity and a passion to win. These 
innovation projects could yield either a new or revised product or a new capability applicable 
to current and/or future products that would support future business needs. A Research & 
Engineering manager said: "the new set of tools are attractive because it provides a visible and 
universal opportunity to collect ideas from all parts of Unilever. It rigorously forces one to 
decide priorities by elaborating the risks and opportunities. It shifts the balance from gut-feel 
and subjectivity to a system of greater discipline and accountability without stifling creativity." 
"Unilever has always been good at generating ideas," a strategy member of the Personal 
Products Coordination added, "but it had problems deciding when to stop work on an idea and 
concentrate resources on other projects. Now, though, we have begun to prune our projects 
judiciously by using the funnel and its associates tools at senior level. And good pruning 
produces a fine rose garden." 
"It is not difficult for us in the Ice Cream business to innovate," a senior marketing member 
in the Frozen Foods business said while explaining the value of the new set of tools for 
managing the innovation process. "You can change almost every aspect of an ice-cream. [...] 
More difficult and critical, however, is identifying the ones that are really going to be good for 
our business. [...] With the new set of innovation tools we can now pull forward on a 
consistent basis everything what they are doing in a certain segment or product category. This 
implies more central control because you cannot invent a new brand without the agreement of 
the Center. [...] However, we hope to become able to manage a portfolio of global, regional, 
and local projects which will lead to the right balance between scale and local adaptation." 
Besides the value of the innovation funnel to select and concentrate the development 
resources on the most promising projects, the innovation funnel is of great help in accelerating 
the global roll-out of innovative products. "In the Ice Cream business," the senior marketing 
manager reflected, "it took us more than 20 years to roll-out the Cornctto internationally, 
Vicnnctta about six years, and Magnum about 5 years. Because we now got our act together 
we launched Solero in Europe in one year in 1995. Because competition will copy it, it is just 
an absolute necessity to effectuate a quick roll-out." The discipline of the funnel will 
encourage the use of a common language when describing projects. Moreover, by 
communicating the status of projects and asking for early feedback on development activities 
and test results, the hope is that all the prospective "adopters" are going to be committed to the 
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work done in the innovation projects and will allocate the required local resources for the roll-
out of the outcomes. Without sufficient commitment and funds at the front-line level the 
launch of an innovation will most expectedly fail. The operating plan cycles are increasingly 
used by corporate management as an effective tool for controlling and putting pressure on the 
companies in this respect. 
TOOL #5: CREATING INTERDEPENDENT KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS 
Although knowledge sharing can be stimulated and facilitated by the tools presented in the 
previous sections, managing dispersed development resources, however, remains a difficult 
task and is strongly dependent on the willingness of the company managers to cooperate. 
Consequently, Unilever tries to force its managers to increase their adoption of knowledge by 
concentrating development resources and activities. While the other tools facilitate and put 
pressure on the companies to transfer and adopt knowledge to and from other companies, the 
notion of lead company, competence center, innovation center, and center of excellence makes 
knowledge sharing inescapable. By concentrating the knowledge development resources, 
interdependencies are created between companies. Bringing together the best people in a 
certain area should result into "better" solutions and should lead to the reduction of duplication 
in knowledge exploration activities. 
The importance of these kind of knowledge networks made the researcher decide to 
investigate the concept in two functional areas, being the information technology area and the 
marketing & development area. Each of the functional areas has its own particular needs and 
demands and these differences should be integrated in the implementation approach. 
THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AREA 
"Today, the willingness to share within the IT function in Unilever Foods," an information 
member of Unilever Foods stated, "is quite high. On the one hand, this is caused by the fact 
that the main issues related to information technology are quite universal and often require 
only minor adaptations to the particular company systems and circumstances locally. 
Consequently, IT managers are much stronger oriented to their functional colleagues than 
managers in other disciplines. [...] On the other hand," the information member stressed, "the 
willingness to share knowledge has grown due to a deliberate corporate IT policy during the 
past few years. At this moment we still have in each company a fully-equipped, independent 
Information Technology department. A department with an IT director, and several system-
analysts, system-developers, and people for the maintenance of the systems. [...] These 
departments can operate totally independent of the other IT departments within Unilever and 
possess all the resources they need to operate effectively. In other words, all the resources are 
locally possessed to "side-step" the demand to share available knowledge internationally. [...] 
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Figure 7.11: IT structure in the Unilever Foods Area since 1993. 
Consequently, a corporate IT policy was needed to reduce the duplication of knowledge 
acquisition and learning experiences." 
Over the past few years, several actions have been taken by the corporate center to increase 
the exploitation of internally available knowledge. For example, compulsory policies regarding 
preferred systems and applications have been formulated to increase the eommunality and 
interconnectivity throughout the organization and Implementation Groups have been 
established to put pressure on the implementation of certain preferred systems and to control 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation processes. Moreover, the Corporate IT 
Group started to institutionalize what are called International Competence Centers to 
concentrate the knowledge development activities on specific applications in 1993. "We have 
tried," the information member of the Foods Executive explains, "to create a kind of service 
centers which could assist the local companies with the implementation of their key 
applications." Four International Competence Centers were created with the responsibility to 
lead the developments on six key applications of the food business operations. These 
Competence Centers are not funded by the operating companies. Although corporate 
management acknowledged the advantages of establishing a kind of "buyer-seller" 
relationships between the companies and the competence centers, they wanted to circumvent 
the difficult and political sensitive internal payment issues and did not want lo create an 
additional barrier to the transfer of knowledge. 
"We try to provide added value to the implementation and use of our application," a 
manager of one of the Competence Centers stated, "by developing and promoting common 
implementation approaches, assisting in implementation plans at operating companies, and 
facilitating the transfer of knowledge and information from the ICC to the operating companies 
and between operating companies. Based on the required functionality, we advise companies 
commencing with the implementation process of the application regarding the most suitable 
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consultant, the optimal project team, the strengths and weaknesses of the package, the standard 
use, and the key elements of a appropriate project plan. Moreover, we are the main 
communication and coordination group for Unilever with the suppliers. [...] Effectuating the 
implementation of the application in the operating company, however," the manager of the 
International Competence Center continued, "remains the responsibility and task of the local 
project team. Although we try to identify the needs and demands of the operating companies in 
which we assist during the implementation process, the local team, assisted by a local 
consultant, develops the system for the local company. [...] Much of the knowledge acquired in 
the implementation process remains unexploited in this way." 
Especially for this latter reason the Foods Executive Information Group has decided to 
gradually implement what arc called Process Implementation Teams (PITs). Notwithstanding 
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Figure 7.12: The Responsibilities of the Process Implementation Teams. 
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the growing exploitation of knowledge on typical mistakes, preferable solutions, and reliable 
consultants via company visits, seminars, and newsletters (see Table 7.4), probably the largest 
amount of knowledge remains unleveraged due to the use of local implementation teams. 
Instead of employing the experience of projects teams which have gone through the 
implementation process before, local implementation teams are going through the same 
learning curve with all the related and thus wasted expenses. Consequently, the foods 
executive implementation structure will most expectedly evolve in the coming years to a 
situation in which Process Implementation Teams will take care of both the development and 
implementation of a particular IT application. A Process Implementation Team will become 
responsible for all the IT systems with respect to one particular business process (see Figure 
7.12) in a certain region. The Process Implementation Team will be located in a operating 
company to remain close to the users and be headed by a "Head of PIT" and a "Process 
Leader." "In this way," the information member argued, "we hope to become better able to 
take advantage of the experience and expertise gained in the implementation stage [... and] 
achieve a better integration and interconnectivity of the operating companies ." 
THE MARKETING & DEVELOPMENT AREA 
In the past, the philosophy of Unilever with respect to the innovation process in the marketing 
& development area was that innovation could come from anywhere and that successful 
innovation needed to be anchored in markets and in companies where the necessary 
partnership between Marketing and Development exists. Starting in 1991, however, Unilever 
began to change both the way it manages the innovation projects, as described in the former 
section, and the structure of the roles and responsibilities in the innovation process. The 
Personal Products Coordination undertook the first steps in this process in 1991 by 
communicating the decision that specific companies would be designated by the Personal 
Products Coordination to assume innovative leadership in particular core areas for their region. 
For each category of the Personal Products business a Regional Innovation Center was 
established. These centers' innovative work would be targeted on local market requirements 
but would also increasingly provide the major part of innovation to meet the regional needs of 
the Personal Products business. The selected companies would be expected to provide 
marketing, development, and other resources in the quantity and of the quality necessary to 
undertake this task. 
By grouping the best marketing and development staff in these leadership core areas and by 
integrating high-calibre international managers to grasp an international perspective to 
innovations, the aim was to generate less but better innovations in each category and to reduce 
the duplication of development work. Innovative leadership of this kind would not preclude 
other companies from innovating with known technologies but the Personal Products 
Coordination would expect the leader to identify opportunities and establish a center of 
Marketing and Development excellence. The marketing and development excellence should 
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enable the operating companies to innovate on a scale which would in fact meet not only their 
own local needs but, because of merit, the needs of other as well. 
In this situation, the French company, for example, did not any longer spread its marketing 
and development resources over the three categories in which it had a significant market share 
in France (i.e., dental, deodorant, hair), but instead concentrated the development and 
marketing work on the category hair for which it got the Regional Innovation Center status. 
So, instead of spending one-third of the resources on each category, 80 % of development 
work under the new system was done on hair and only 10% on both dental and deodorant. For 
innovation and product development in the deodorant and dental business, the French became 
dependent on the Regional Innovation Center in respectively the UK and Italy. 
The new system further evolved near the end of 1994. After three years of experience with 
the innovation centers it was decided by the Personal Products Coordination that there would 
be one Lead Innovation Center, called Core Innovation Center, in each of their core categories 
- Skin, Hair, Oral Care and Deodorant/Male fragrance. Instead of one Innovation Center for 
each region, one lead company was institutionalized to ensure the exploitation of innovations, 
both centrally and locally developed, in the marketing and development area on a global scale. 
The responsibility of the Core Innovation Center was the management of master brands within 
their category. Managing a master brand meant controlling and directing the projects in the 
innovation funnel, orchestrating of the contacts with research, and ensuring that there was 
sufficient activity on each of the master brands. The Core Innovation Centers were instructed 
to concentrate on so-called platform and breakthrough projects. The head of the Core 
Innovation Center reported directly to the Coordinator (head) of Unilever Personal Products on 
matters relating to the output of the Core Innovation Center. 
In addition to the Core Innovation Centers, Regional Support Centers (RSCs) were 
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Figure 7.13: The Hair Innovation Network. 
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established to accomplish the required adaptations or innovations for the category withiin their 
particular region. These Regional Support Centers had to become experts on the needs <of their 
regions, to ensure that the regional needs were properly represented in the global pdan for 
innovations in their category, and to coordinate the regional activities. To accomplisn tlhis, the 
Regional Support Centers had to engage in a two-way dialogue with the Innovaticn Centers 
and their own region. Moreover, the Regional Support Centers had to lead harmonization 
where appropriate to allow faster exploitation of innovations and to reduce costs. In regions 
not covered by the Core and Regional Support Centers, a regional liaison member was 
appointed to implement Personal Products' strategies. Figure 7.13 shows, as an examplle, how 
corporate management envisioned the Hair Innovation network and Figure 7.14 illustrates the 
role of the centers in various stages of the innovation funnel. 
"Although early experiences with the new global system for managing innovation projects 
seemed to be promising," a senior development manager stressed, "concerns emerged with 
respect to the understanding and motivation of the non-IC companies. The new global 
structure was a dramatic break with the historical way of independent companies with a high 
degree of freedom in the marketing and development area. [...] In the past, companies were 
confronted with new innovations on the international management meetings, but they had the 
freedom to select and develop those innovations which they perceived as most suitable for 
their own local market." "In the new situation," a marketing manager of the French innovation 
center for Hair added, "we need to be careful not to create a situation in which the non-IC 
companies perceive themselves primarily as 'receivers of innovations.' We need these non-IC 
companies as a source of both the creative ideas and the development managers of the future. 
[...] The feeling by the non-IC companies to be in the 'Second Division' has to be taken away 
to make the institutionalization of innovation centers in the marketing and development area 
successful." 
To motivate the non-IC companies to generate and communicate a sufficient number of 
ideas, the corporate center took another initiative during 1994 by implementing what was 
called Innovation Pads or Innopads. The idea underlying Innopads is that it is the task of 
everyone in all countries to contribute new ideas for the development of the business. These 
ideas should be made available easily to the whole business so that the best of them can be 
incorporated in the Regional and Global portfolio of Unilever Personal Products. Essentially, 
Innopads allows every company in Unilever to actively participate in innovation by 
establishing a process that will be common across categories and regions, and establishes 
guidance as to how ideas will be evaluated. Innopads is a structured and easy way to expose 
ideas. It is based on clear principles of doing very early rough and inexpensive prototyping and 
then getting quick consumer feedback through a variety of qualitative research techniques. The 
whole process is communicated and tied together via Lotus Notes. "With Innopads and 
additional tools like an Innovation Prize," a Senior Marketing and Operations manager of 
Personal Products Europe argued, "we hope to be able to counter the potential drawbacks from 
concentrating the development resources. By increasing the transparency and extending the 
UNILEVER m 175 
possibilities to contribute to the innovation process, we are trying to develop stronger and 
better exploited product innovations." 
Apart from the generation of ideas and their subsequent development in powerful new 
product concepts, probably the most important step in the exploitation of the marketing and 
development activities of the Innovation Centers and Regional Support Centers is to reach for 
an agreement with the companies on the launch of product innovations. "To ensure that the 
product innovations are implemented locally with the backing of the required local resources," 
the Senior Marketing and Operations manager stated, "we of the Personal Product 
Coordination have developed and gradually implemented a well-elaborated planning process 
based on the 8 Quarters Activity Plan." The 8 Quarters Activity Plan depicts all strategic 
activities within the Personal Products companies and shows the various product introductions 
and major advertising campaigns for the next 8 quarters. The 8 Quarters Activity Plan is 
always one of the central topics during the annual operating planning cycle. Based on a 
proposal by corporate management, the companies give their comments on the feasibility of 
the activity planning for their country in the light of other local activities, manufacturing 
capacity, and top- and bottom-line expectations. "By committing the local companies to these 
plans," the Senior Marketing and Production manager explains, "we put pressure on the 
deployment of the work of the Innovation Centers and control the knowledge exploitation 
process." 
After the prerequisite commitment is secured, the innovation needs to be dispersed over the 
companies. The Innovation Center is responsible to document progress with an understanding 
of the scope for harmonization and easy transfer, to explain the idea behind the innovation, and 
to convince local management of the importance of the innovation. The actual transfer of the 
Adapted from Internal Documents. 
Figure 7.14: From Idea Generation to Roll-Out of an Innovation. 
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The Ice Cream Organization of Unilever 
The Ice Cream business of Unilever has gone through dramatic organizational changes 
during the past few years. Ice Cream is one of the seven "starred" categories because it 
is one of those categories which shows an ability to brand internationally which fits 
Unilever's long term strategy. The Ice Cream Group strives to market powerful brands, 
some local, but increasingly international, offering innovation, excellent quality and 
value. 
Competition is now more intense. "It used to be," said a senior Marketing Member of 
Unilever ICG, "that you competed against small local companies. Various 
corporations, however, like Nestle and Mars are now acquiring a lot of ice-cream 
companies what makes the competition more and more a global battle between global 
operators. This means that you must get your efficiencies up and that you must be 
absolutely clear that you understand the consumer better than anyone else. Hence, we 
need to start to use our international strengths. Because it is an internationalizable 
business you can take all the learnings and bring them in. If it works, you can give it out 
back again on a consistent basis." 
The Marketing Member goes on: "If you go back about ten years, there were a lot of 
autonomous little ice-cream companies. However, because Unilever recognized that Ice 
Cream is an area that can grow globally and because we had a few successes with just 
picking up good ideas and rolling them out across the world, the ICG has started to 
institutionalize that process rather more. So, we decided that we have to 'orchestrate' 
the transfer of successful ideas. Why going to 'reinvent the wheel' all over the place if 
you got something that works? It is cheaper and more efficient to roll that out than let 
everyone do its own individual things." 
PHASE I 
In the beginning of 1990, the ICG started to set up what was called International Brand 
Groups for a whole consumer area. This was the first step in the process of creating 
more integration. Although this international brand group was unempowered and 
didn't have full-time members working for the cause of this IBG, these seven people 
basically tried to do two things: (1) harmonize the brand which would enable 
production efficiencies to come; and (2) find out "Best Practice". The IBG reported to 
the Category Board which equally had very little power. 
PHASE II 
In 1994, the ICG moved the first phase on dramatically by actually pointing five 
international brand managers placed within four companies. In this stage the 
international brand managers really started to do work because resources were now 
available to drive things. Moreover, the international brand groups were redefined 
which meant much more focus. 
PHASE II 
In 1996, the ICG is transforming its structure further. There are now 4 Innovation 
Centers located in Italy, Germany,UK, and France. The innovation centers are 
responsible for the strategy development for a defined category/segment, brand 
development for the assigned international brands, research guidance, managing the 
international innovation process and coordinating and optimizing innovation and 
resources in the regional innovation centres and local companies. 
Exhibit 7.9a: A Process Analysis of the ICG Organization. 
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innovation, however, is the responsibility of the Personal Products Application Unit, a 
technical-oriented team located in the research laboratory in Colworth. The Personal Products 
Application Unit has to facilitate the rapid roll-out of new technology from the Innovation 
Centers to other Personal Products companies in accordance with priorities set by the Personal 
Products Coordination. The Personal Products Application Unit takes care of the distribution 
of the technical transfer packages, offers assistance in the adaptation of the innovation to the 
local circumstances, and provides information on best development practices. Moreover, 
where this can be shown to be the most cost effective way of supplementing or meeting their 
development needs, the Personal Products Application Unit gives development support to 
smaller companies on a worldwide basis. In general, however, companies should possess their 
own development resources wherever possible and are fully responsible for the adoption and 
integration of the innovation in local operations and marketing campaigns. 
Concluding, we can state that the idea to concentrate development resources internationally 
in the marketing and development area is still controversial but widely shared and 
implemented throughout the Unilever organization (see Exhibit 7.9 for an elaboration on the 
particular way the concept has been worked out in the Ice Cream area of Unilever Foods). 
Although significant differences can be observed in the specifics of implementation, Unilever's 
top management has decided to introduce the "lead company" concept in all of their product 
groups. "The implementation of the Core and Regional Innovation Centers was not an easy 
task," the Senior Marketing and Operations manager of the Personal Products Coordination 
stressed, "but proved to be a powerful way to improve the exploitation of our innovation and 
development funds and personnel. [...] Although the organization of our innovation process 
will, most expectedly, further evolve over the following years, we learned how to cope 
successfully with the forces for integration and local adaptation during the last five years. [...] 
We have developed a system in which 'big' ideas get the attention they require to become 
globally or regionally exploitable." 
7.6 SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, Unilever has been described from an intracorporate knowledge sharing 
perspective. Its knowledge environment, corporate strategy, administrative heritage, and a 
number of relevant management tools Unilever used in its approach to close the gap between 
the required and actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing have been discussed. It is 
obvious that Unilever is going through turbulent times. In its quest for corporate advantage, 
success can no longer be built on the one-sided differentiation strategies of its companies. 
More and more, Unilever is forced to complement its traditional strengths in marketing with a 
reduction in sourcing and manufacturing costs, a higher speed of action, and entrepreneurship 
throughout its portfolio of businesses. The new competitive demands forces Unilever to 
synthesize its businesses more strongly, something for which the groundwork was laid by 
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Unilever's deliberate core business strategy in the late 1980s. This strategy aimed at reducing 
the firm's scope and increasing the international spread of its business activities. Only in this 
way could global competitiveness be achieved, while at the same time top management knew 
that the development of Unilever's capability to share information and know-how rapidly 
between companies on a global basis would be a prerequisite for the strategy's success. 
The endeavour to increase the actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing, however, 
has been considerably hindered and complicated by Unilever's background. For various 
decades, the Unilever organization has been represented by the company chairman who was 
single-handedly responsible for the profit of his business and who controlled almost 
everything what was going on in the company. A strong corporate philosophy had been 
established in which management of independent operating companies held a high degree of 
operating autonomy and this philosophy had created numerous obstructing barriers to 
possibilities of intracorporate knowledge sharing lower down the hierarchy. Through the 
adaptation of the firm's management structure and the implementation of various management 
tools, corporate management has been working on the integration of its businesses during the 
last five to ten years. The implemented management tools have affected, directly or indirectly, 
the process of intracorporate knowledge sharing, and five of them were described and analyzed 
to illustrate how intracorporate knowledge sharing is stimulated and facilitated in a practical 
setting. 
In the remainder of this chapter, an attempt is made to illustrate the validity of the 
theoretical propositions presented in chapter four and chapter five. The argumentation starts 
off with an examination of the extent to which the management systems for managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing have been shaped and given substance within the Unilever 
corporation. The registered management tools within the Unilever organization are confronted 
with the presented management tools of the knowledge sharing management systems in the 
theoretical part of this study. Such a step enables the formulation of tentative conclusions 
regarding the barriers still obstructing and hindering the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process within the Unilever organization. The validity of these tentative conclusions has been 
checked by comparing them with the enumerated barriers by Unilever's front-line managers 
and the observed barriers in a review of five intracorporate knowledge sharing projects4 within 
the confines of the Unilever organization. 
PROPOSITION #1: KNOWLEDGE SHARING A WARENESS SYSTEM 
Traditionally, the main part of Unilever's knowledge reservoir constitutes human-embodied 
knowledge. Unilever managers value the flexibility related to low levels of knowledge 
abstraction and therefore, although increasing recently, the degree of knowledge codification 
For reasons of strategic confidentiality, only two of the five investigated intracorporate knowledge sharing 
projects could be briefly described (see Box 7.11 and Box 7.12). 
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and registration overall is relatively low. In their search for knowledge donors of particular 
knowledge items throughout the organization, Unilever managers tend to use their informal 
relationships. The informality in the Unilever corporation, which is deliberately created by 
regular international management meetings, management courses, expatriation programmes, 
and a large variety of workshops and seminars, comprises powerful information relationships 
which are highly valued by those managers having a place in this informal network. Although 
often time consuming, the informal network is quite effective in linking those with a 
knowledge need with the most appropriate knowledge donor. Moreover, by exploiting the 
informal network Unilever managers often allow others to shape a particular decision before 
embarking upon it. 
Unilever's informal network and management structure brings people with a "high-level" 
conception of their company or business together and this led to the fact that generic ideas are 
widely shared and distributed over the Unilever network. This is strongly in contrast with the 
situation lower down the hierarchy. The knowledge which is procured, developed, and owned 
at these levels too often remains unexploited. The major part of the employees are not or less 
involved in the international management meetings and management development programs of 
Unilever and hence lack a position in the informal network which could link them with 
colleagues who are confronted with related or the same problems. It is at this level, however, 
where most of the solutions for the day-to-day problems concerning organizational processes 
are developed and, most expectedly, where most of the knowledge interesting from a 
intracorporate knowledge sharing perspective resides. 
Linking managers throughout the world by creating a Global Network (UNISON), seems a 
possible and interesting way to improve this situation. Besides making information accessible 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
AWARENESS SYSTEM 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing project is more likely to occur when 
there is a management system which makes 
employees aware of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing prospects 
UNILKVHRS MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
- Informal Network 
- Liaison Members (category members, process 
leaders, etc.) 
- Information Centers (Application Units, the 
Ice Cream Information Center, etc.) 
- Lotus Notes Conferences 
- Workshops/Seminars/Task Forces 
- Registration of Best Practice (brand manuals, 
benchmarks, etc.) 
REIATCD MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Knowledge Codification, Registering, and Storage 
Networking 
Assigning Knowledge Exploration Responsibilities 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Sharing Intermediaries 
Implementing Internal Benchmarking Procedures 
UNILEVER: REMAINING AWARENESS BARRIERS 
(1) Employees lower down the hierarchy are not part 
of the "informality" and hence have problems in 
finding their way to knowledge donors or 
knowledge recipients within Unilever. 
(2) Unilever managers value the flexibility related 
with low levels of knowledge abstraction. 
Although knowledge items are more and more 
codified and registered, the degree of knowledge 
abstraction is overall still very low. 
Table 7.5: The Knowledge Sharing Awareness System. 
UNILEVER m 181 
to all Unilever employees, electronic storage of information could create a knowledge "push," 
meaning that by scanning easily accessible and well organized "libraries," managers can 
become aware of business solutions for issues which have not been identified yet. Until the 
beginning of 1996, however, the access rate of existing Lotus Notes conferences is still 
disappointing. Apart from the need for computer literate employees, the usage of electronically 
stored information can be increased by initiatives as improvement of the organization of 
information, the creation of advanced search engines and information filters, and the 
integration of a mechanism into the system. These will alert a manager if information is added 
to the conferences and this is of particular importance for their work. Not the quantity, but the 
quality of the database must be the focal point in the Unilever's effort to stimulate front-line 
managers in effectuating their search for knowledge in an electronic way. 
Apart from contacting colleagues directly, numerous liaisons (e.g., category members, 
process leaders, brand leaders) exist to assist the knowledge donor and recipient in finding 
each other. On the one hand, the liaison member links Unilever managers around the world 
based on their requests for particular knowledge. An overall view on the area of responsibility 
makes the liaison member capable of bringing managers together who share the same 
problems or guiding managers with a knowledge need to the best practice within Unilever. On 
the other hand, liaison members increasingly effectuate assessments (e.g., benchmark studies) 
to register the best practice and identify knowledge gaps in the Unilever companies. On the 
basis of these assessments, the liaison member can, on his or her own initiative, bring 
managers together who can exchange knowledge and exploit the best practice. A growing 
process orientation helps to identify the non-category aligned opportunities for sharing the 
available knowledge within Unilever. 
Finally, Unilever has strongly improved the awareness of where knowledge resides by 
concentrating innovation and development resources in so-called innovation centers, lead 
companies, and competence centers. Although the institutionalization of the knowledge 
development and intermediation centers is a very complex process, the concentration of 
development funds and personnel is an effective way to inform employees on the location of 
the required systems, skills, and know-how. It provides employees with a stable point of 
reference for particular issues and hence reduces the complexity of the search process for the 
most suitable knowledge donor. 
Concluding, it can be stated that many management tools of a knowledge sharing awareness 
system have been discerned within the confines of the Unilever organization. These 
management tools assist front-line managers in their search for existing knowledge items 
throughout the organization. As a consequence of these implemented management tools, many 
of the awareness barriers have been reduced or taken away. One remaining barrier, however, is 
the low degree of knowledge abstraction. The major part of Unilever's knowledge base is still 
human-embodied and hence difficult to identify. Another awareness barriers is caused by the 
fact that the informal network only interconnects a selective group of top managers within 
Unilever (± top 2,000) and tools are lacking or are not implemented yet to improve upon this 
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A Successful Example of a Knowledge Sharing Effort 
In 1995, Unilever Personal Products launched Organics, a "health" shampoo based on 
the strengthening and revitalizing properties of its special additive, Glucasil. This 
Glucasil, as the advertisement brochures claim, is a key nutrient which plays an 
important role in everyday health and beauty of hair and nourishes the roots of your 
hair. The range includes 13 shampoos, everyday and intensive conditioners, 2-in-ls and 
a strengthening serum. The international roll-out of the Organics shampoo proved that 
strong, global brands could be developed and could lead to major successes. Within five 
months after its launch, Organics was one of the leading brands in most European 
countries. "Thanks to Organics," the Marketing Manager of the Inovation Center Hair in 
Paris, argued, "we could prove that we were able to develop and transfer global ideas, 
take lessons of launches for next times, and roll-out a product innovation very, very 
quickly." 
The idea for the development of a new "health" shampoo orginates from the early 
1990s. In those years, Unilever Personal Products' management was frustrated by the 
lack of innovativeness in Personal Products. The 1980s had shown a dramatic growth 
of the Personal Products Group, but this growth was realized by a global spread of 
activities in the early 1980s and major acquisitions in the late 1980s. A lot of small 
activities were going on (more than 600 projects), but real innovations were not realized. 
Corporate management perceived the need for a strong, global hair product. 
The Personal Products Coordination decided to send a brief to the four big European 
countries (e.g., France, Italy, Germany, UK) and the company in the US, to come up 
with a proposal for a new hair brand in the beginning of 1991. One of the proposals, the 
Organics concept as developed by the French company, came out of the tests as an 
interesting idea, but one which would require further study and development before a 
significant market share could be guarenteed. Consequently, the French company, just 
assigned the Innovation Centre status in 1992, continued the development of the 
Organics concept. The harmonization process of the European portfolio, however, took 
away a lot of time and resources and hence the launch of the Organics concept in 
Europe seemed still far away. 
During a meeting with the other Innovation Centers, however, the new product idea and 
the test results were shared with the other regions. What happened was that the 
Innovation Center from Asia (Thailand) saw the idea and test results in Europe and 
immediately recognized, based on their business judgement, that it was an important 
new idea. The Innovation Center in Thailand continued the work on the Organics 
concept to introduce it as quickly as possible in its region. In 1992, however, brand 
managers were thinking in Thailand not of the introduction of a new brand, but of a 
variant of existing brands. Although the technical principle was the same and the Thai 
did an excellent development job, they took something coming from the original 
Organics concept and interpreted and worked the concept out in a totally different 
way. 
Confronted with the intention of the Thai to use the Organics concept for a new variant 
of an existing brand in Thailand, the Personal Product Coordination took an important 
decision which gave a clear signal to the whole Personal Products group. PPC saw that 
the people in Thailand tried to launch a variant while they also saw the Organics 
concept as a potential big idea. A product idea which had the potential, if developed 
appropriately, to become the new big, global hair brand they were waiting for. So, PPC 
ordered the Thai IC to stop doing their local "small" thing. If the Thai wanted to exploit 
this new idea they had to do it "Big" or, at least, test it also as a big new brand instead 
of a variant. PPC forced the Thai IC to think global instead of local and to develop a 
strong new brand. 
Exhibit 7.10: The Sharing of Knowledge with respect to the Organics Shampoo. 
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(Continued) 
This message from the top was very important.The Personal Products Coordination 
believed there was something that was more interesting than the local variant of an existing 
brand. They argued that the Thai had to prove that they were not messing up a global 
idea. Athough Europe was not ready to launch and had other priorities at that time, the 
head of PPC still forced the Thai to work the product concept out as a Global Brand. He 
gave the concept a chance to become a Core Global Brand. It was the first time in Personal 
Products that a single idea was recognized as a potential global idea, and the other ICs 
were asked to contribute to the thinking and development work to make it a "Big" idea. 
After the Thai tested the Organics concept as a new brand and its launch proved to be a 
tremendous success, the brand was adapted to the European market by the Innovation 
Center and prepared for its launch in the UK, Ireland, and Norway in 1994. Although the 
marketing mix remained almost the same and no changes were made to the core 
technology, the advertisement campaign and the formula were adjusted to European 
requirements. 
The success of the UK launch and the market share gained in Norway and Ireland 
convinced PPC that the launch of Organics in Europe needed to be a priority for the 
operating plans of 1995 and hence included the launch of the Organics brand in the 8 
Quarters Activity Model of most companies in Europe. "The main task of our managers in 
the Innovation Centers," the marketing manager of the hair innovation centre urged, "is to 
convince the country managers of the new product concept. Convincing the companies of 
the importance of the new concept is important not directly for the decision to launch the 
new product because that is often a decision of PPE with the companies, but more a 
matter of convincing them to provide the needed resources and the right skills to make it 
work in their country. You need to give them evidence. Of course, the results in the other 
countries helped us strongly in this task." 
"After the adoption decision has been made and the Launch Plan formulated, the 
marketing manager continued, "the Innovation Center had an important role in making the 
marketing managers really understand the Product Mix and Communication Package of 
the Organics brand. We have organized workshops and kick-off meetings and provided 
the companies with a Organics package which included Claim Support and instructions 
for the communication strategy. [...] Moreover, lessons are transfered from previous 
launches. The sampling strategy which was used in the UK, for example, was very 
successful and hence exploited during the Organics launch in the other European 
countries." 
The roll-out of Organics in Europe (except for Italy) took approximately five months. 
Such a fast roll-out has never been realized before within Personal Products and added 
strongly to the exploitation of the product innovation in Europe. The Organics brand has 
proved to be a successful conjunction of technological and marketing knowledge which 
was exploited efficiently and effectively on a European scale. 
Improvements with respect to the roll-out of product innovations, however, remain 
feasible. Primarily the inflexibility of the whole system to react to particular problems or 
demands in each country was seen as one of the main drawbacks by local marketing 
managers. Procter & Gamble, for example, had been able to pre-empt the core message of 
the Organics Mix, namely "nourishing the roots of your hair," for more than four months in 
many countries. Before Unilever was able to roll-out the Organics brand in the rest of 
Europe, P&G had adapted its promotion campaign of an existing brand (i.e., Panthene 
ProV) to claim the same influence on the roots of hair. The inability of local brand 
managers to adapt the introduction package and respond appropriately to the changing 
circumstances in local markets affected, some marketing managers argued, the success of 
the launch significantly. 
Exhibit 7.10: The Sharing of Knowledge with respect to the Organics Shampoo. 
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situation. Consequently, the knowledge which resides lower down the hierarchy is still 
unexploited in many cases. 
PROPOSITION #2: KNOWLEDGE SHARING PERSUASION SYSTEM 
In general, most Unilever managers have signalled a growing pressure on corporate 
management to increase the level of intracorporate knowledge sharing. Formal statements of 
Unilever's top management, compulsory policies, and the implementation of various 
management tools have made clear that corporate management is more than serious about 
increasing the actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing. The strongest pressure to 
participate in the exchange of available knowledge, however, is caused by a tool which has 
been developed over various decades, namely the corporate culture. The corporate culture 
instils in the firm's employees a shared responsibility for the well-being of the corporation at 
large. Refusing to participate in intracorporate knowledge sharing projects can have the 
repercussion of becoming socially excluded and hence losing the powerful information 
relationships with colleagues throughout Unilever. As a consequence, intracorporate 
knowledge sharing is seen by many managers as an investment in long-term relationships with 
their "peers" internally. 
Apart from the corporate culture, many other management tools of a knowledge sharing 
persuasion system can be discerned within Unilever. Although the right balance is not found 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
PERSUASION SYSTEM 
The initiation of an intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project is more likely to 
occur when there is a management system 
encouraging employees' interest to 
participate in the exploitation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects 
UNILEVER'S MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
• Management of Dispersed Innovation Projects 
j (e.g.. Innovation Funnel, Consumer/ 
Technology Matrix) 
- Concentration of Development Resources (e.g.. 
Innovation Centers, Centers of Excellence) 
- Benchmark studies and other kind of 
assessments have increased the pressure of the 
- Coordinations and liaison members to share 
1 "Best Practices" 
- Statements of Top Managers in favour of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing 
- Strong corporate culture putting a pressure on 
employees to participate in intracorporate 
knowledge sharing projects 
RELATED MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Financial Measures and Rewards for Knowledge Sharing 
Commitment and Formal Statements by Top Management 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependences 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure to Share 1 
UNILEVER: REMAINING INTEREST BARRIERS [ 
(1) Intracorporate knowledge sharing is not rewarded 
explicitly and the general feeling is still that the 
inventors are the "heroes" within Unilever not the 
exploiters. This led to the situation in which the 
hindering force in the knowledge transfer is 
primarily situated at the receiving side 
(Not-Invented-Here) and not at the "owners" end. 
(2) The lack of strong central decision making has 
hindered the exploitation of knowledge j 
development activities significantly in the past. 
Adoption decisions were and could not be enforced. 
Table 7.6: The Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System. 
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High 
Need lor 
Global 
Coordination 
and 
Integration 
Chemicals 
Detergents 
Personal 
Products 
Packaged^ 
Foods 
Research 
Product 
Development 
Manufacturing 
Marketing 
Sales 
Product 
Policy 
Advertising 
Pricing 
Distribution 
Promotion 
High Low H i9h Low 
Need for National Differentiation and Responsiveness 
High 
Adapted from Bartlett and Ghosal (1989) 
Figure 7.15: Integration and Differentiation Needs at Unilever. 
yet in each area of the Unilever group, the increased process orientation, the management of 
dispersed innovation projects, and the growing concentration of knowledge development 
resources are all contributing to a reduction of the interest barriers to intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. Unilever experiences more and more that the establishment of institutions which have 
the power to formulate compulsory or mandatory policies with respect to knowledge 
exploration and knowledge exploitation is critical for success (see Exhibit 7.10 and Exhibit 
7.11). The organizational changes in Unilever's top-structure will probably create more 
transparency in the distribution of responsibilities and empower the Center and numerous 
Extended Centers to enforce adoption decisions and give more direction to the knowledge 
exploration and exploitation activities throughout the organization. It remains important to 
acknowledge, however, that each product, functional, and geographical area has its own 
particular demands for integration and differentiation (see Figure 7.15). As shown in the case 
on the Organics Launch (see Exhibit 7.10), it can be necessary to coordinate product 
development on a regional or global level and, simultaneously, grant front-line managers more 
operating leeway in the advertisement and promotion area to enable them to respond quickly 
and effectively to particular events or circumstances in the local market. 
Notwithstanding these numerous management tools related to a knowledge sharing 
persuasion system, many managers still perceive various factors reducing the willingness to 
actively look for intracorporate knowledge sharing opportunities. For example, the feeling that 
inventors are still seen as the "heroes" within Unilever compared to the more inferior role of 
the exploiters, creates a focus on realizing innovations which are better than the available 
solutions. Unilever managers are sometimes more concerned with proving that they are better 
than their "internal competitors" in their functional area than with achieving the best solution 
for the company from a business point of view. As a consequence, the knowledge owners are, 
in general, glad to share their knowledge, while a large part of the resistance to share 
knowledge is located at the receiving end. Another conclusion which can be drawn is that 
turnkey operations are still rare, often the result of the perception that local circumstances 
require fully adapted business solutions. Recipients tend to investment in the improvement of 
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an adopted knowledge item instead of just applying it in the way the donor provided it. The 
firm as a whole, however, could become more knowledgeable if the local resources invested in 
knowledge adaptation and customization were reallocated and invested in the exploration of 
unexplored areas. Finally, resistance to share knowledge exists because Unilever has no 
explicit rewards for giving and taking knowledge. 
PROPOSITION #3: KNOWLEDGE SHARING COMPLEXITY REDUCTION SYSTEM 
After a knowledge sharing project has been initiated, several factors can complicate the actual 
transfer of knowledge. Without doubt, Unilever's main complexity barrier is the administrative 
diversity inherited from the management philosophy built around independent operating 
companies. Differences in applied systems, applications, and data architectures hinder the 
effective and efficient transfer and deployment of knowledge items. Apart from the complexity 
of the transfer, the existing or perceived diversity enforces the knowledge recipient to 
effectuate often expensive changes to the acquired solution in order to customize it to the 
particular circumstances of a company. Notwithstanding major investments in several 
harmonization and standardization efforts, companies still (perceive to) differ in several 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
COMPLEXITY REDUCTION 
SYSTEM 
The successful effectuation of an 
intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is 
more likely when there is a management 
system reducing the complexity of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing 
UNILEVER'S MANAGEMENT TOOI5 
- Creation of a common "language" by defining 
common definitions of data-elements and 
information structures 
- System and Process Harmonization 
- Knowledge abstraction (e.g.technical 
manuals, brnnd manuals, visibility manuals, 
category manuals, category business models) 
1 - Personnel policy ("creating the international 
manager") 
1 - Corporate training programs and product or 
category-related management courses 
1 - Regular international management meetings 
1 - Corporate Culture creating a strong corporate 
1 identity and some communality in values and 
norms 
RE1 ATF.D MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Knowledge Abstraction & Codification 
Increasing User Involvement & Triability 
Establishing a Corporate-Wide Language 
Arranging Regular Management Meetings 
Dominant Corporate Culture 
Financial Measures and Rewards for Knowledge Sharing 
Commitment and Formal Statements by Top Management 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependencies 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure to Share 
UNILEVER: REMAINING COMPLEXITY BARRIERS 
(1) Although knowledge items are more and more 
codified and registered, the main part of Unilever's 
knowledge base is still human-embodied. The 
tacitness and equivocality of human-embodied 
knowledge is higher and hence more difficult to 
transfer. 
(2) Existing and perceived diversity between the 
companies inherited from the philosophy of 
management built around independent operating 
companies complicates intracorporate knowledge 
sharing projects significantly. 
(3) Language problems and cultural distance still 
complicate many intracorporate knowledge sharing 
projects, 
(4) The lack of explicit rewards reduces the motivation 
of the knowledge donors. 
Table 7.7: The Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System. 
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aspects of their business. Two other factors which significantly complicate and hinder the 
effectuation of intracorporate knowledge sharing projects are the low degree of knowledge 
abstraction and the lack of tangible rewards and incentives for the knowledge donor. 
At the moment, however, that Unilever achieves a situation in which it learns to manage the 
existing diversity and to exploit possible synergies from the point where consumer and 
company needs are the same, facilitating conditions are in place for the effectuation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing projects (see Table 7.7). For example, Unilever's perspective 
not to create a separate cadre of international managers, but instead to develop managers to be 
international has culminated into a strong Unilever culture characterized by a high level of 
trust between its managers. Although Unilever has always adhered to a so-called "ization" (if 
the required capabilities exist, local management is appointed on the management positions in 
the local companies), a strong informal network exist between Unilever managers. By 
appointing local management to lead Unilever companies abroad, the increased complexity is 
deliberately accepted to improve adaptation to the local market. Intensive training and 
socialization programs facilitate the communication between Unilever managers and give them 
the feeling that they belong to the "Unilever Club." 
PROPOSITION #4: KNOWLEDGE SHARING MEDIA SYSTEM 
Historically, one of the important ways to transfer skills and experience in a certain area has 
always been the expatriation of management. The movement of managers among management 
groups is an important aspect of Unilever's culture. Category-specific skills and resources were 
made available at the right time to meet planned growth in certain geographic areas. Moreover, 
management expatriation has been an important part of management development programs 
and has led to international-oriented and strongly networked management resources. This 
position, however, is no longer tenable because of the costs of expatriation, the problems of 
repatriating managers to their home country, and the need for localisation. As a consequence, 
Unilever is critically reviewing its expatriation policy. Unilever must become more business-
needs driven in its approach towards expatriation by using other ways to internationalize its 
management (e.g., being an international team member, managing an international brand, 
international responsibilities such as sourcing, buying). So, if Unilever decides to bring back 
the re-deployment of human-embodied knowledge by the expatriation of its managers, 
knowledge should be transferred more and more in a disembodied form and hence should be 
extracted from the knowledge donor and codified to enable its transfer to the knowledge 
recipient. 
The role of the corporate center in effectuating the transfer of knowledge within Unilever 
has changed. In the past, knowledge travelled in most cases first through the center before the 
it was sent out again to the appropriate companies. At this moment, however, this is an 
impossible task because the center lacks the resources and capabilities to manage such a 
process any longer. Although the liaison members still play a significant role in bringing 
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A Less Successful Example of a Knowledge Sharing Effort 
In the late 1980s it became prevalent that a very resource-intensive investment needed 
to be made in upgrading the production system of most of the European Foods 
companies of Unilever. In this respect, the Computer Integrated Manufacturing concept 
was perceived as one of the most promising lines of thinking by both operating and 
corporate management. It seemed logical to unite internal strengths and exploit a CIM 
solution which could be exploited on a European or Global scale. In reality, however, 
the knowledge leverage practices with respect to the CIM framework would become 
one of the less successful examples on how to manage intracorporate knowledge 
sharing caused by the lack of clear compulsory policies and a blurred decision-making 
process. 
The key element of the Computer Integrated Manufacturing framework is the power of 
the computer to act as as an "omniscient observer" of a production system, capturing 
information about every possible event that affects process outcomes. Applying CIM 
to its full extent can result in a highly automated factory, where the role of labor is 
largely restricted to computer programming, engineering support, and maintenance of 
robotic machinery. Athough the factors which firms need to consider in making CIM 
decisions are very broad and complex, the CIM framework seemed a very interesting 
investment option for a large manufacturer in the foods business. The amounts at stake 
in CIM decisions, however, can be large - bilions of dollars for a company as Unilever. 
Consequently, it seemed a sensible decision from the Foods Executive Information 
Committee to assign the "Lead Company" status in this respect to two of its 
companies, Van den Bergh en Jurgens in Rotterdam and UVGN in Oss, both in the 
Netherlands. 
A Lead Company invests heavily and focuses its exploration activities in the direction 
agreed with headquarters. The Lead Company has to pioneer the area for which it got 
the additional responsibilities. Both Lead Companies for the CIM framework were 
obliged to implement all the prescribed software modules, create facilities for 
demonstration to the other companies, communicate to the Foods Executive the key 
demands for implementing the CIM framework, replace or improve the software 
modules, and provide input for the preparation of standardized guidelines for 
implementation of the CIM framework (Smeulders and Van Tulder, 1995). 
"A Lead Company status provides you with the leeway to invest and offers 
opportunities to get assistance from the functional specialists of the Center," the 
technical director of Van den Bergh en Jurgens reflected on his reasons for acquiring the 
Lead Company status for the CIM framework in the early 1990s. "The danger of being 
a Lead Company, however," the technical director proceeded, "is that you invest 
heavily in a certain direction while the returns are often very uncertain. [..,] The Lead 
Company status is given to explore a new area which is unknown for the Unilever 
corporation and hence it is possible that you develop and invest in a system which 
proves in the end not to be the most suitable system for your company." In October 
1994, however, Van den Bergh en Jurgens was the first "sourcing unit" of the Food 
Management Group having the Computer Integrated Manufacturing system fully 
operational. A learning process of more than ten years has taken place within this 
company. A large knowledge reservoir was created which was ready to be exploited by 
the other units. 
"The Van den Bergh en Jurgens company has taken its full responsibility by inviting 
people from other companies, presenting the results on Unilever seminars and 
workshops, and creating a video tape on which the changes and operations were 
shown," the technical director emphasizes its attempts to transfer his knowledge to 
other companies. "In reality, however, colleagues visit our plant regularly and probably 
collect ideas on possible improvements and pitfalls which they have to circumvent. 
Exhibit 7.11: Sharing the Computer Integrated Manufacturing Framework. 
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Very rarely, however, other companies asked for the systems which we have 
developed, assistance from our experts, or our detailed documentation on the 
organization and operation of our production processes. [...] Although we could 
implement the same system now in half the time and against one-tenth of the costs in 
the case of a turnkey operation, Unilever managers often take small elements of the 
whole system with them and develop and implement a unique production system in 
their own company." 
"This lack of interest in the available knowledge in the lead company," the technical 
director further explains, "is partly the result of differences between the operations 
and organization of the companies but mostly the outcome of less rational motives. 
First, within the margarine category of Unilever we are confronted with a structural 
overcapacity in Europe. Although we know for many years now that a few of our 
companies need to be closed, corporate management has not made or communicated 
a decision on which companies will be shut down. [...] Acknowledging the expertise 
available in other units can position your own company in a less favourable position." 
"A second less rational reason for the lack of intracorporate knowledge sharing," the 
technical director continued, "is the lack of entrepreneurs within the Unilever 
companies who acknowledge the opportunity and advantages of adopting knowledge 
from other Unilever companies.[...] We promote and reward those people within 
Unilever who distinguish themselves within their functional area by generating new, 
very intellectual ideas and concepts. We don't admire as much those who apply the 
knowledge. [...] If you really understand and value the essentials of your business and 
acknowledge that only the consumer in the marketplace will eventually decide over 
the success of your company, you will be willing to 'steal' as much as possible from 
others to improve this situation. [...] We must not try to solve the same problem more 
brilliantly and intellectually than our colleagues, we can better try to solve all the 
other problems which we still have to solve and apply the existing knowledge as 
much as possible to serve our consumers." 
"The most important reason for the lack of exchange and transfer of knowledge with 
respect to the CIM framework, however," the technical director stressed, "was 
probably the role and confusion created by Unilever's headquarters. The process of 
defining a compulsory policy on the CIM framework was very obscure and took 
almost a decade. [...] Moreover, various parties within the headquarters of Unilever 
were communicating conflicting directives. In the end, when the Foods Executive came 
with a policy statement in the beginning of 1990, the food companies were forced to 
implement the CIM framework before the end of 1994 while the time you need for full 
implementation is 2 to 3 years." 
The knowledge activities surrounding the CIM framework were chosen as a less 
successful example of an intracorporate knowledge sharing project because some 
typical barriers were prevalent in this situation which caused the fact that major 
opportunities for corporate value creation remained unexploited. 
The final situation in this particular case was that most of the 52 companies of 
Unilever foods in Europe were going through the same learning curve for implementing 
the CIM framework at the same moment and did not exploit the opportunities to 
share. This case makes perfectly clear the importance of transparency in the decision 
making process surrounding innovation projects. If Unilever's top management had 
mandated a particular systems early on, the Lead Companies could have taken the 
lead in investigating the main issues related to the implementation of a CIM 
framework and transfer their knowledge in a systematic way to the other operating 
companies. 
Exhibit 7.11: Sharing the Computer Integrated Manufacturing Framework. 
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employees together for knowledge sharing purposes, Unilever increasingly stimulates the 
operating companies to communicate directly with their colleagues in other companies. As one 
manager stated: "Historically, the headquarters has been like a 'railway junction' with 
knowledge coming in and coming out. Now the center is more a 'signal box' attempting to 
route the knowledge from one place to another without the knowledge necessarily coming 
through the center." In general, however, managers in the center still tempt to be copied on 
knowledge transfers efforts between companies. In this way they remain informed about the 
problems they are dealing with and the kind of knowledge transferred. More and more, 
however, transfer mechanisms are needed to facilitate the decentralized transfer of knowledge 
between the companies. 
Unison is one of the systems which could facilitate these decentralized transfers of 
knowledge between the companies. The aim of UNISON was the facilitation of access to all 
people, information, and knowledge throughout the Unilever world. A system was built around 
a network of desk-top computers linking managers both with each other and with remote 
databases. The Unilever culture, however, with its very broad network of contacts, often one-
to-one, sometimes one-to-few, had strong implications for the successful implementation of 
advanced communication technologies like E-mail, Lotus Notes, and video conferencing. 
Members of the Unilever group feel comfortable with sharing on an one-to-one basis and with 
persons they know. The wide network of relationships, built up during a tradition of 
expatriation, international workshops and training courses, is, as stated by many interviewees, 
the foundation on which knowledge transfer projects throughout Unilever are initiated in most 
cases. Consequently, the telephone, electronic mail, and desk top computing closely fit the 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
MEDIA SYSTEM 
The successful effectuation of an 
intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is 
more likely to occur when there is a 
management system extending the 
possibilities to tune the richness of the 
transfer medium to the complexity of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing situation 
UNILEVHR'S MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
- Although plans exist to reduce the number of 
expatriates, traditionally Unilever makes 
intensive use of expatriates to transfer 
knowledge. 
- Set of commnication channels is extended by 
adding electronic media (e.g., e-mail, Lotus 
Notes, desk-top computing, 
video-conferencing). 
- Unilever invests in the creation of the 
international manager who needs to possess 
strong intercultural skills 
RKI-ATED MANAGEMENTTOOLS 
Knowledge Transfer Skill Development 
Advanced Communication Technologies ! 
Expatriation Strategy 
UNILEVER: REMAINING MEDIA HARRIERS 
(1) No particular management courses exist to 
develop skills for transferring and receiving 
knowledge from internal colleagues. 
(2) Although many investments are done in the 
implementation of a Global "electronic" 
network, an "electronic" sharing community 
does not exist yet. Personal, ad hoc contact is 
still the main way through which knowledge is 
exchanged throughout the Unilever 
organization 
Table 7.8: The Knowledge Sharing Media System. 
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Unilever culture. Information retrieval through Lotus Notes, however, to share information, 
ideas, and concepts on a one-to-many basis is still disappointing. Apart from the misfit with 
the Unilever culture, Unilever managers have problems in finding their way through the 
enormous amount of information which is available within the Lotus Notes databases. 
Although the use of Lotus Notes is growing and is often perceived as a valuable additive to the 
set of communication channels, the rate with which it is growing is disappointing. 
So although Unilever has built an electronic infrastructure which enables intracorporate 
knowledge sharing, Unilever does not have an electronic sharing community yet. The set of 
communication channels has significantly increased over the past few years, but the major way 
of transferring knowledge is still personal ad hoc contact. This means that, on average, 
Unilever manages the complexity of its intracorporate knowledge sharing projects 
inefficiently. Personal ad hoc contact is a rich transfer medium which is very time consuming. 
Many intracorporate knowledge sharing projects could be more efficiently managed with a less 
rich transfer medium. 
Concluding, we can state that today Unilever is a company that has established an 
organizational context which enables stimulation and facilitation of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. Although barriers still exist and hinder the intracorporate knowledge sharing process 
within the confines of the Unilever organization, over the years Unilever's top management has 
authorized the implementation of numerous management tools that have reduced various of the 
prevailing awareness, interest, complexity, and media barriers. Notwithstanding these 
significant investments to foster the transfer and exploitation of valuable knowledge items, 
Unilever's actual total value created by intracorporate knowledge sharing is still relatively low 
due to the particular obstructing influence of barriers to initiation. Complexity and media 
barriers are still prevalent but could be overcome by using numerous facilitating conditions if 
only more knowledge donors and recipients would agree on their involvement in a knowledge 
transfer endeavour. Unilever's top management should aim at finding the balance between its 
task to stimulate and its task to facilitate instead of concentrating on one of these 
responsibilities. Top management should pay equal attention to barriers to initiate and 
effectuate intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts. If one exaggerates the attention for one of 
these tasks without weighty attention for the other, the end results and returns on investments 
will be suboptimal. 

8 
Canon Europe NV 
Beyond Leveraging Technological 
Excellence toward a Cross Fertilization 
with Market Knowledge 
"In the past our competence in the research and development area dominated our product 
strategy. A strategy that perfectly matched the requirements of the high-tech industry in 
those years. In the future, however, we will be increasingly forced to adapt our products to 
the particular demands in our markets. The consumer asks for customized products and 
hence collecting and processing market-information is becoming more and more important 
for Canon Europe." 
- Masahiro Tanaka - President and General Manager Canon Europe NV. 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Canon Inc. is often mentioned as a corporation with unique strengths in the leverage and 
upgrading of its corporate resources (Ghoshal and Ackenhusen, 1992; Goold, Campbell, and 
Alexander, 1995). On the basis of a corporate portfolio of strongly related businesses and 
expensive, but focused research and development programs, Canon would add corporate value 
to its businesses by exploiting its technological knowledge on a global scale. Shared resources 
in core technologies would allow all of Canon's businesses to benefit from relevant expertise 
that they could not afford individually. "Canon's many innovative products which enables the 
company to grow quickly in the seventies and eighties," Ghoshal and Ackenhusen (1992: 698) 
stated, "are in large part the result of a carefully orchestrated use of technology and the 
capacity for managing rapid technological change." A competence which provided Canon with 
the means to be market leader in many of the high-tech industries in which this firm operates 
(e.g., cameras, copiers, and mask aligners). Considering Pucik's (1991) statement that many 
Japanese firms have developed a systematic approach to organizational learning which 
involves more than an explicit rejection of the parochial "not-invented-here" syndrome and 
which is centered on the value of invisible assets, the study of Canon's knowledge sharing 
activities in Europe proved to be highly interesting. 
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The experiences, perceptions, and visions of Canon's employees in Europe regarding their 
organizational ability to share knowledge, explicated during the various interviews throughout 
this firm, were very important, informing, and inspiring for this research project. These images 
were much more ambiguous, however, than one could infer from former publications on the 
Canon organization1 (e.g., Ghoshal and Ackenhusen, 1992; Goold, Campbell, and Alexander, 
1995). From a financial perspective, Canon Inc. is still performing well. Canon's top and 
middle management, however, are quite hesitant to attribute this to the facilitating role of the 
parent to "create linkages and cross-fertilization between different areas of technology, 
between technologists and market needs, and between different markets," as argued by Goold, 
Campbell, and Alexander (1995: 26). "Canon still reaps the benefits from the successful 
strategy in the seventies and eighties to optimize and enhance existing product concepts," as 
stated by one manager. "Like many other Japanese companies, Canon did not invent or 
develop new product concepts but produced existing ones efficiently and enhanced them 
successfully." A well orchestrated export strategy and a successful Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM)2 business stimulates and facilitates the exploitation of Canon's highly 
advanced and product-embodied expertise on a global scale. 
Canon managers perceive intracorporate knowledge sharing as one of the critical business 
processes for the coming years but also as a problematic activity within the firm due to 
Canon's traditional difficulties in cross-fertilization. First of all, Canon appears to be weak in 
reaping cross-divisional synergies. Particularly in a time in which many of Canon's industries 
are converging and consumers are demanding integrated solutions (e.g., office equipment), 
barriers to transcend divisional boundaries are becoming an ever-more serious problem which 
deserves serious management attention. Second, many of the Canon products, especially BJ 
printers, cameras and copiers, serve mature markets (see Figure 8.1). Canon needs products 
that will carry them into the future, and considerations in developing these new products 
require a consciousness with respect to consumer demands. As one of the key managers 
argued, "... instead of focusing on our own ability to develop and produce. Canon must become 
more eager on collecting information and becoming knowledgeable on the needs of the 
' Notwithstanding differences in the number and set of interviewees, one could place serious doubts to the way 
in which some management researchers write the specifics of their cases as based upon the "facts" in practical 
settings. When Ghoshal & Ackenhusen (1992), for example, present the G1NGA system as "information 
technology to integrate its world-wide operations" (704), it would have been more valuable if they had 
described not only what Canon wanted to develop but also what actually came to be developed. The 
researcher asked eight managers in Europe about their experiences with the GINGA system. Only one 
manager responsible for international information technology and telecommunications applications was able 
to tell the researcher that GINGA is a simple corporate telephone line, implemented to cut telephone expenses 
but having less capacity than a regular one. The other seven interviewees had never heard from the GINGA 
system and used public telephone lines for their internal calls. 
2 Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) business means that Canon's patented know-how is sold to third 
parties. These third parties take care of the commercialization of the patented technologies in the marketplace. 
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customers and how these will be like in the future." The current Canon organization is not 
capable yet to achieve the necessary cross-fertilization between market and technological 
knowledge effectively and efficiently, particularly outside Japan. Dramatic organizational 
change seems to be necessary to consolidate or expand Canon's market position in "overseas" 
regions in the next millennium. 
The case study of Canon in Europe focuses primarily on the second issue. Instead of relying 
on a one-sided emphasis on the firm's technological strengths, Canon has to acknowledge the 
need to establish a structural integration between its technological expertise and market 
knowledge and is thus forced to manage the flow of knowledge. Although we were forced to 
expand the scope of the analysis to the corporate level (i.e., Canon Inc.) on some points, the 
study's focus is on Canon's European organization. Like the other two case studies, the case 
description of Canon incorporates the elements of our strategic "fit" model. In the next section, 
we present an analysis regarding the particular knowledge environment of Canon by 
describing the characteristics and configuration of its product portfolio, the industry's 
competitive success factors, and the various changes in the firm's business environment. In 
section 8.3, we focus on Canon Inc's corporate strategy. We describe the perspective of this 
corporation towards the scope of its business portfolio, the internationalization strategy, and 
the importance of leveraging internal knowledge resources in the past and for the future. 
Thereafter, we explicate the organizations of Canon Inc. and Canon Europe and scrutinize its 
administrative heritage. Subsequently, in section 8.5, the management tools relevant from an 
intracorporate knowledge sharing point of view are enlisted and investigated. The last section 
confronts the theoretical propositions and the empirical observations of the Canon organization 
with respect to managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. We systematically review the 
identified management tools of the knowledge sharing awareness, persuasion, complexity 
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Figure 8.1: Canon's BCG Product Matrix and the Need for Question Marks. 
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reduction, and media system. This is followed by the formulation of some tentative 
conclusions on the barriers that still obstruct and complicate the initiation and effectuation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing within Canon's European organization. 
8.2 CANON'S CHANGING KNOWLEDGE ENVIRONMENT 
Canon's origins date back to 1933, when a group of young men gathered in Tokyo to establish 
Seiki Kogaku Kenkyusho (Precision Optical Instruments Laboratory), Canon's predecessor. In 
1935, they introduced atrial model of Japan's first 35mm focal plane shutter camera, called the 
Kwanon. A year later the laboratory was relocated, and two years later the enterprise's name 
changed to Seiki Kogaku Kogyo, K.K. (Precision Optical Industry Co., Ltd.), marking Canon's 
official beginning. Today, Canon is one of the world's leading manufacturers and marketers of 
precision instruments and business machines. Canon is dedicated to the sale of user-friendly, 
innovative products and technologies that improve (visual) communication between people 
and provide tangible documents for present and future reference. The company's capital 
amount to more than USS 23 billion and, with up to 70,000 employees in countries around the 
world, its activities span the globe. 
Financially, Canon Inc. is doing quite well during the past few years. After a decline in total 
sales and net income in 1993, Canon's total turnover and net profit, comprising respectively 
US$ 21.0 billion and US$ 534 million in 1995, have strongly recovered in 1994 and 1995 and 
were expected to further expand in 1996. The product group Business Machines (see Exhibit 
8.1) is by far the largest product group with a 84 percent contribution to total sales related to 
8.2 percent and 7.7 percent by respectively the divisions Cameras and Optical Products (see 
Exhibits 8.2 and 8.3). Divisional sales forecasts for 1996 project a 10.5% sales increase in the 
copier division, a 10.4% rise in computer peripheral equipment sales, an 11.1% jump in sales 
of information and data communications equipment, and a 31.4% surge in sales of optical and 
Canon CAMERAS 
Canon's technological contribution to the camera industry has been profound. With products as, for 
example, single-lens reflex cameras, compact cameras, 8mm camcorders, and lenses the Canon 
Cameras division contributed approximately 8% to total sales in 1995. 
Competition in the camera business is tough and puts a downward pressure on price levels and hence 
on profits. In this market, however, consumer demands start to differ strongly over the world. The 
introduction of the world's first camcorder model to feature eye-controlled focus, for example, was 
very successful in Japan, but much less in Europe. Consequently, questions have risen whether 
Canon's strategy of adding valuable features to its camcordors in order to maintain its position in 
this market will be very effective in Europe. Concerning the future Canon expects to make progress in 
the digital cameras market. 
The main competitors are: Contax, Nikon, Rollei, Olympus, Pentax, Minolta, Metz, and Yashica. 
Adapted front Internal Documents 
Exhibit 8.2: The Product Group Cameras. 
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Canon BUSINESS MACHNINES 
The largest product group of the Canon Corporation is by far the product group Business 
Machines which contributes more than 84 % to Canon's Total Sales. Consequently, a distinction 
is often made between the Copier, the Computer Peripherals, and the Business Systems part of 
the Business Machines Division. 
A: THE COPIER BUSINESS 
The Copier business of Canon is still accountable for more than a 36% share of consolidated 
sales. The main products are full-color copiers, office copiers, personal copiers, and consumables. 
Overall, the copier market is a mature market. With a 50% share of the strongly expanding 
market for color copiers,however, total sales is growing in this segment and a considerable 
growth in demand, as more and more offices move over to color documentation, is still expected. 
Moreover, impressive gains are made by personal copiers as more people use copiers at home. 
For the future, the outlook is bright for the digital copier market which is likely to demand 
higher-speed full-color copiers. Image processing and compression for high-speed links with 
computers is an area of R&D Canon continues to focus on, since these are important issues when 
reproducing color originals or trial-run printing from multimedia equipment. 
The main competitors in this segment are: Rank Xerox, Minolta, Mita, Nashua, Ricoh, Toshiba, 
and Sharp. 
B: THE COMPUTER PERIPHERALS BUSINESS 
The Computer Peripherals business of Canon contributes approximately 30% to total revenues. 
The main products are Laser beam printers, Bubble Jet printers, and Image scanners. Although 
competition is strong in the printer segment, Canon is still the largest manufacturer of Laser 
beam printer engines with a 70% market share. 
The next few years are certain to be marked by dramatic growth in demand for color printers in 
the office and at home. Besides use in conventional printers, Canon's Bubble Jet printing 
technology now finds commercial application in other exciting fields such as full-color textile 
printing in more than 16 million colors. Canon's most promising technology in this segment, 
however, is the ferroelectric liquid crystal display. Canon's development workers are convinced 
that the inherent advantages of this technology can change the face of the next generation of 
information systems. 
The main competitors in this segment are: Hewlett-Packard, Minolta, Oki, and Rank Xerox. 
C: THE BUSINESS SYSTEMS BUSINESS 
The Business System segment of Canon takes approximately an 18% share of total sales 
annually. The main products are computers, faxes, word processors, micrographics, personal 
information equipment, and electronic typewriters. Strategic products in Canon's line-up of 
business systems, such as notebook computers and handy terminals, are perfoming quite well. 
Because Canon lacks experience and know-how in producing computers, Canon markets IBM and 
Apple computers in Japan to be able to provide the "one-stop" shopping service to the consumer. 
The next few years will see a further demand for "anywhere, anytime" communication and 
hence a further growth of the portable computer market. Although notebook computers with 
built-in printers are still new to to consumer, Canon expects that the built-in color printing 
market will further expand in the next years. 
The main competitors in this segment are: Nashua, Oki, Ricoh, Sharp, and Rank Xerox. 
Adapted front Internal Documents 
Exhibit 8.1: The Product Group Business Machines. 
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Canon OPTICAL PRODUCTS 
Canon became involved in the mask aligner business more than 20 years ago. The main products 
of this division are semiconductor production equipment, broadcasting equipment, and medical 
equipment. Optical products was accountable for a 7.7% share of Canon Inc.'s total sales in 1995. 
The key to future success in the stepper market is the ability to continually update the 
technology. Next on the horizon are machines that will expose the silicon surface with excimer 
lasers, and Canon is working to develop a marketable product of this type. In the meantime, 
strong growth in the market is expected to continue in the coming years and hte current i-line 
products should continue to sell well. Moreover, Canon is actively pursuing further development 
of large-sized screens for aligners used for LCDs, and carrying out pioneering research in electron 
beams and element technology for steppers. 
In the TV broadcast equipment segment prospects for the Canobeam transmission system - which 
uses a laser-based optical system instead of an electronic system to transmit video and audio 
signals - looks promising. 
Looking to the future of medical equipment, the technology is moving from analog to digital 
processing. Images will be exchanged between hospitals and other locations through a digital 
network. Canon will focus, based on its expertise in digital technology, on product development 
in this area. 
Adapted from Internal Documents 
Exhibit 8.3: The Product Group Optical Products. 
other equipment (Salomon Brothers, June 26, 1996). On a geographical basis, the Japanese, the 
American, and the European region contributed respectively 33%, 31%, and 28% respectively 
to Canon's total sales in 1995. Although strongly growing, the total contribution of the other 
regions in the world is still very small (8%). 
Historically, Canon's strategy towards its product-markets has been strongly based upon its 
technological leadership. As stated by Goold el al (1995: 174): "R&D drives Canon's strategic 
thinking and is central to Canon's behavior and management style." Canon sees its R&D 
performance as its main strength on the assumption that Canon's competitive advantage and 
market success start at the research level. "Canon often pursues technologies," one Senior 
Managing Director explained Canon's philosophy, "that others in the industry may initially 
overlook. Among them are ferro-electric liquid crystal and LB films. [...] We want to 
distinguish ourselves from our competitors in terms of the products we sell. [...] We can 
always start from a market niche even if it is specialized and very small; if you have a great 
technology with which to penetrate that market, it will someday become mainstream. [...] 
Technologies such as bubble jet, FLC, and magneto-optics are only the lip of the iceberg. [...] 
Drawing on these elementary technologies, we can expect to see a technology explosion in the 
21st century that will result in a vast array of entirely new business opportunities."3 
The commitment to R&D has been driving the firm since its beginnings. Canon's Japanese 
founders instilled into their employees a strong dedication to technological development. This 
These quotes were taken from an interview with Canon Inc.'s Senior Managing Director Hajime Mitarai, the 
company's top executive in charge of R&D, as published in the Canon Chronicle in 1993 (No. 172: 12-13). 
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Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1993 
Company 
IBM 
Toshiba 
Canon 
Eastman Kodak 
General Electric 
Mitsubishi Electric 
Hitachi 
Motorola 
Matsushita Electric 
Fuji Photo Film 
No. 
1,085 
1,040 
1,038 
1,007 
932 
926 
912 
729 
712 
632 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1994 
Company 
IBM 
Canon 
Hitachi 
General Electric 
Mitsubishi Electric 
Toshiba 
NEC 
Eastman Kodak 
Motorola 
Matsushita Electric 
No. 
1,298 
1,096 
976 
970 
970 
968 
897 
888 
837 
771 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1995 
Company 
IBM 
Canon 
Motorola 
NEC 
Mitsubishi Electric 
Toshiba 
Hitachi 
Matsushita Electric 
Eastman Kodak 
General Electric 
No. 
1,383 
1,087 
1,012 
1,005 
973 
969 
910 
854 
772 
758 
Table 8.1: Top 10 Corporations receiving US Patents in 1993-1995. 
tradition spurred the company to introduce numerous new products during the course of its 
history. It also provided the impetus for diversification into areas as medical diagnostic 
equipment and business machines during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. With a R&D budget of 
approximately 10% of Canon Inc.'s total sales, the R&D expenditures are, proportionally, very 
high. As a result of this policy, Canon is ranked on a continuous basis in the corporate top 5 in 
terms of the number of received U.S. patents (see Table 8.1). The emphasis on product 
standardization combined with their technological skills and know-how has enabled Canon to 
outperform competitors regarding product development and production efficiency. For 
example, Canon rewrote in the 1980s, as described by Ghoshal and Ackenhusen (1992), the 
rule book on how copiers were supposed to be produced and surpassed Xerox in the number of 
units sold after being market leader for more than two decades. On the basis of exploitation of 
their technological know-how and experience, Canon was able to optimize the product concept 
of the copier and overwhelm the main competitors in this industry. 
So, based on an emphasis and commitment towards R&D, Canon became well known 
throughout the world as a provider of many highly advanced products and intermediaries. Its 
cameras, printers, mask aligners, and copiers came to be highly appreciated and very well sold 
globally. "Notwithstanding this innovative image, we have to admit," one of Canon's managers 
stressed, "that until recently the main thrust of Canon's technological development has been 
taking, refining, and upgrading foreign technology. It is often claimed that the Japanese are not 
creative and tend to be copiers and I really think they are true. Japanese didn't invent the car or 
didn't invent the engine. They only optimized the components by making it faster, smaller, or 
more convenient and they had a process of manufacturing and assembling based upon such 
concepts as just-in-time, quality circles, and teamwork in which they were the best." 
At the start of the 1990s, however, Canon Europe was confronted with various changes in 
its business environment which made the company wonder whether the strategy of the past 
was still the most appropriate strategy for the future in order to keep its competitive strength. 
First, the integration process took away the economic borders between the member states of 
the European Community. Instead of working along the lines of language and currency, pan-
European marketing and distribution strategies became essential. Canon had to transform its 
European distribution center into a genuine European headquarters with more responsibilities 
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in terms of directing, coordinating, and controlling the scattered operations throughout the 
region. Second, the rising yen put major pressures on Canon's global performance because 
Canon still exports a major share of its products (75%). Short-term measures like raising 
prices, vastly expanding sales channels, and cutting costs only created further problems instead 
of solving the existing ones and hence more drastic decisions like expanding overseas 
production seemed inevitable. Third, Canon was forced to become more market-oriented. Due 
to a growing need to customize and adapt standardized products, an increased difference 
between customer demands among regions, and the need to create new product concepts to 
continue the success of the more mature product categories, the one-sided emphasis on 
Canon's technological expertise no longer sufficed. 
As one manager of Canon Europe expressed: "Canon's technological knowledge is good 
and advanced and this know-how has been the foundation of our success in Europe for many 
years. Recently, however, we are detecting a growing problem to sell our products in Europe. 
These products are developed, produced, and tested in Japan by Japanese for the Japanese 
market and hence do not perfectly match the needs of the European consumer. [...] Moreover, 
most of our current products are maturing and a feeling of uncertainty can be detected 
throughout the organization that our current products do not fit the needs of the so-called 
digital age. Many of our products are analogue and stand-alone products, while our 'electronic' 
future is described in terms as networks, digitalization, and systems. [...] We are forced by 
these trends to think how our products will fit in this environment and we need to acknowledge 
that we have no choice but to create and develop new product concepts for which no role 
model exists yet." 
"In the past we could exploit our ability to optimize existing product concepts," an other 
manager complemented the argumentation of his colleague. "We were always strong in 
miniaturizing, for example, but we can not make things smaller anymore and hence we are 
forced to develop new product concepts perfectly adapted to the particular needs of the 
consumer. These consumer demands, however, differ strongly between Japan and Europe. The 
Japanese, for example, value the number of features on their camera and are very eager to have 
the newest version of the product while the European consumers are satisfied with a few 
buttons, appreciate a superior design, and only buy a new camera if the old one is broken. [...] 
Although we arc trying to find the appropriate balance between standardization and 
differentiation, the European consumer forces us to leave our old strategy of standardization 
and start to adapt and customize more intensively to the local demands throughout Europe." 
Mr. Tanaka, President of Canon Europe, strongly agreed with his subordinates. "In the 
past," he claimed, "our competitive success was founded on our unparalleled capabilities in 
product development. Hugh investments and dedicated taskforces added distinctive product 
and process know-how to our efforts to optimize existing product concepts like copiers and 
cameras. [...J Our technology-related competences perfectly matched the requirements of the 
high-tech industry. [...] More and more, however, we are forced to adapt our products to the 
particular demands in our markets. If you make a distinction between industrial products, 
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Figure 8.3: Canon's Knowledge Environment Grid. 
business products, and consumer products, the need for local adaptation is particularly severe 
in the consumer segment. Of course, we need to adjust to the differences in standards, 
language, and laws in each country in the industrial and business products areas, but the 
pressure for customization is by far the most intensive in the consumer products segment of 
our business. [...] The consumer asks for customized products. We need to improve our ability 
to collect, process, and aggregate information on the particular market circumstances in the 
European region." 
So, Canon's knowledge environment appears to be strongly in transition during the 1990s. 
Although most of Canon's products are still competing in high-tech industries and the 
continuous development of the corporation's technological knowledge base remains a critical 
success factor in the competitive battle with competitors, the need for market knowledge and 
its cross-fertilization with the skills and know-how within the research & development area 
seems evident. While more and more competitors are able to match Canon's technological 
capabilities, a customer focus enforces the nature of competition to concentrate on product 
adaptation and customization strategies. Tailoring your products to what consumers want has 
become a necessity. Moreover, Canon has to invent new concepts to replace the maturing 
products and has to prepare itself on competing in the "digital age" as we enter the next 
millennium. All these developments imply that the importance to collect, aggregate, and 
exchange market knowledge is growing fast, while at the same time Canon has to keep its edge 
in technological excellence (see Figure 8.3). As one manager stated, "We really need to learn 
to serve the needs of the consumer and because we need to secure our scale economies, this is 
where knowledge sharing becomes more important for us." 
8.3 CANON EUROPE NV WITHIN CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Observing what Canon has achieved thus far as well as how Canon wants to continue to 
conduct its business, it is interesting to learn the role of Canon's corporate strategy in these 
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achievements and how this strategy aims to reinforce the business strategies in the near and 
distant future. According to the Canon Handbook, a firm document specifying the corporate 
philosophy and code of conduct, success depends on "... synergistic management of the total 
technological capabilities of the company, combining the full measure of Canon's know-how 
in fine optics, precision mechanics, electronics and fine chemicals." Top management's strive 
to generate corporate value by leveraging the firm's knowledge reservoir has been the 
foundation for Canon's parenting advantage in the past three to four decades. Without any 
doubt, Canon's focus on and performances in research & development and the continuous 
upgrading and leveraging of its technological skills have been distinctive elements in Canon's 
competitive success in a multitude of regional and national product markets. 
A corporate strategy, however, embraces more than the preferred parenting advantage. In 
defining a strategy concerning the corporate whole, a firm's top management has to decide on 
the firm's scale and scope and hence on the diversification and internationalization of the 
firm's business activities. With respect to Canon's scope, the firm has gone through a gradual 
diversification process based upon its technological expertise. As depicted in Figure 8.4, 
Canon has been adjusting and extending its product portfolio over the past four decades. In the 
earliest era, based on 3mm focal plane shutter camera, Canon established a solid reputation for 
the quality of its still and X-ray cameras. During the 1950s, the first steps were taken on the 
road to product diversification by marketing 8mm movie cameras, television lenses, 
micrographic equipment, and components. By introducing products like the copier, mask 
aligners, electronic typewriters, laser beam printers, facsimile transceivers, and business 
imaging systems, Canon built and consolidated its position as an integrated business machine 
maker in the 1960s to 1980s. 
Canon's Diversification Strategy 
A Look into the Past, Present and Future 
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Adapted from an Internal Document. 
Figure 8.4: Canon's Diversification Strategy: From 1933 to 2000. 
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Concerning the coming decade, characterized by the start of the digital age, Canon wants to 
position itself as providing the input and output devices through which people interact with 
technology and each other. A growing demand exists for integrated system providers, serving 
the customer's complete demand for office automatization. In practice, however, Canon tends 
to affect the opportunities for intracorporate knowledge sharing by not making "hard choices" 
regarding their core business. Although now tied together by the developments in the research 
& development area and hence by a definition of their core skills and know-how, Canon is 
often inclined to extent its product portfolio to new areas in which it has a limited amount of 
experience. Recently, for example, Canon entered the textile business to leverage its distinctive 
knowledge in printing. The textile industry, however, differs strongly on various aspects from 
the high-tech industries in which Canon is historically involved and printing technology is at 
most one of the critical success factors in this business. 
The internationalization of Canon started early in the company's history. To further increase 
the leverage of its R&D expenses and to boost sales and profit figures, Canon expanded its 
business gradually to the "overseas markets" in the late 1950s (e.g., marketing arms in US 
1955, Switzerland 1957, Latin America 1962). Instead of spreading the product and process 
know-how and experience by acquiring or opening fully equipped foreign subsidiaries4, Canon 
Inc. deliberately kept strong centralized control over knowledge development and knowledge 
application responsibilities, and retained the associated resources in or close to Japan. By 
exporting the end products to the fully or partially owned sales branches abroad, Canon 
commercialized and exploited its reservoir of knowledge on a pure technological level. Canon 
created a clear division between its product groups (R&D, manufacturing) and its sales & 
marketing operations. Standardized products were developed, produced, tested, and shipped in 
Japan to reduce the need and complexities of managing the transfer of product and process 
know-how. Canon created a maximum operational leeway for its sales & marketing 
subsidiaries to enable these firms to do whatever was necessary to sell Canon's products 
throughout the respective regions. 
Apart from advantages like economies of scale and the low value of the yen, Canon's export 
strategy has strongly added to its ability to exploit its extensive investments in research and 
development. As a result of concentrating the dominant part of its knowledge exploration 
activities, Canon keeps tight control over knowledge resources, achieves cost efficiencies by 
reducing duplication of focused knowledge development efforts, and circumvents devaluation 
of knowledge items due to an absence of managing the complexity related to the transfer of 
technological know-how and experience. Sharing of intangible and human-embodied 
knowledge items encompasses, as this study has stressed numerous times before (and as 
proved by Canon's current quality and efficiency problems in its recently established 
production plants in some low-wage countries), numerous complexities that are difficult to 
eliminate and govern. By incorporating the available knowledge directly into end products and 
The strong centralized control over development resources is typical for Canon and in this respect Canon 
differs from the other two case study companies, Unilever and ITT. 
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shipping them to overseas markets where marketing and sales were its only activities, Canon 
has successfully circumvented numerous problems related to managing intracorporate 
knowledge sharing for many years. 
The growing request for more customized products, a significant and increasing difference 
between consumer demands in Japan and Europe, and the fact that the main part of Canon's 
portfolio is maturing, however, made corporate and European headquarters wonder whether 
the one-dimensional, technology-oriented export strategy of Canon was still the most 
appropriate strategy for the future. Questions were raised within the Canon organization about 
the limited role of the European organization in terms of product specification, development, 
and production. Moreover, European managers were convinced that the know-how and market 
information residing in the various sales companies had to be exploited more intensively to be 
able to react appropriately to the changing circumstances in Europe. 
Canon's difficulties with systematically collecting and aggregating market information 
regarding the overseas regions jeopardize its global business seriously. Without the availability 
of a well-grounded market feeling at the home-based research and development sites, no 
effective cross-fertilization is achievable between Canon's highly valued technological 
expertise and the demands in the numerous marketplaces. A market feeling, however, as 
argued in chapter 2, is often difficult to codify and hence transfer. As stated by Johanson and 
Vahlne (1977), market knowledge is experimental in nature, which means that it is obtained 
through operating in the market and hence through the confrontation with all kinds of market 
signals. It is this type of knowledge that gives a decision maker feeling for the market and 
allows the identification of concrete opportunities (as distinct from theoretical opportunities 
which may be apparent from objective or codifiable knowledge). Primarily for this latter 
reason, Canon Inc. reviews the possibilities to decentralize more of its business functions to 
regional levels, strongly inspired by the "Triad Power" philosophy of Kenichi Ohmae (1985). 
Moreover, the last decade has shown a much stronger yen and this strong yen has made both 
foreign production and foreign sourcing of raw material much more attractive. 
In an interview Mr. Tanaka explained his plans for Canon Europe: "Today, there are 2 
research centres, 5 factories, and 20 sales companies in Europe. [...] Currently, about 30 
percent of Canon products sold in Europe are locally produced, with the majority imported 
from Japan. In a situation in which Canon's products were primarily advancements for serving 
known market needs this spread of responsibilities suited the requirements of the demands in 
most high-tech businesses and secured the exploitation of Canon's knowledge exploration 
activities. In a time, however, in which companies in our industry compete on their ability to 
innovate to serve new market needs, Canon's organization requires some closer fit with the 
local market circumstances and hence a dramatic adaptation of its regional operations. [...] My 
target in Europe is to establish a truly European organization which is accountable for 
marketing, sales, production, and product development. [.,.] This requires, however, a drastic 
change of the way we operate today, a different role for our sales companies, and more 
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intensified communication, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, with our colleagues 
from Canon Inc." 
So, consumers and other stakeholders still perceive Canon to be a high-quality supplier of 
high-tech products which has been very successful throughout the world for many years. 
Changes in its knowledge environment, however, obligate Canon to achieve a cross-
fertilization between its market and technological knowledge. Combining this observation 
regarding Canon's changing knowledge environment with one of the key assumption in this 
study that the need to share knowledge increases along each dimension of the knowledge 
environment grid, particularly when a multinational enterprise is confronted with a growing 
need to achieve a balance between expertise and market knowledge, made us conclude that 
Canon has no choice but to manage the flow of knowledge within its organization. 
When asked for current and prospective responses to this emerging need to accomplish a 
successful integration between its technological expertise and demands in the marketplace, top 
management referred to a distinction between a short and long term reaction. On the short 
term, Canon will try to improve the organizational capabilities of its regional operations to 
collect, share, and aggregate market information and the transfer of this knowledge to the 
engineers and marketing managers of the centralized knowledge development departments of 
Canon Inc. Top management has directed and authorized the implementation of new 
management tools, as described in section 8.5, to stimulate and facilitate the front-line 
Adapted from an Internal Document. 
Figure 8.5: Canon in Europe: Group Companies and Distributors. 
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managers to procure and communicate their findings and experiences. On the long term, 
however, Canon's organizational strategy is to decentralize most of its business functions to 
three dominant regions, being Asia, the United States, and Europe. Accepting the increased 
complexity to control, exploit, and manage its technological expertise and acknowledging the 
need to improve its organizational ability to share regionally dispersed expertise, Canon shifts 
to operating more closely to market in the future in order to become better able to customize 
the firm's product offerings to local consumer demands. 
8.4 CANON EUROPE'S ADMINISTRATIVE HERITAGE 
Canon has no luminous past record for crossing divisional or company boundaries for sharing 
best practice, technological achievements, or information on particular market circumstances 
on an inter-subsidiary basis. Home-based research, development, and production processes 
have gained, as many Japanese companies have done during the past decade (Hedlund and 
Nonaka, 1993), from talent and the strong tolerance for working with tacit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge is shared through regular and intensive interaction, allowing transfer and expansion 
of those knowledge items which are difficult to articulate such as market feeling, skills, and 
capabilities. In contrast to Western attitudes, the Japanese orientation and motivation are 
strongly directed at the organizational and group level (Whitehill, 1991) and hence are more 
concerned with the intraorganizational domain in knowledge management. Quality circles, 
ring systems, long working hours followed by collegia! after-hours talk and drinking are all 
mechanisms to encourage sharing of knowledge and have led to powerful and efficiently 
manufactured advancements of existing product concepts. 
Notwithstanding their corporate successes during the late 1980s and early 1990s, strongly 
based on their ability to work with tacit knowledge and to establish highly integrated work 
settings, Japanese companies have often proved weaker in fields where sales of products had to 
be complemented with complex services and other non-standardized ingredients and where 
integration of very large systems and complex system management were a necessity (Hedlund 
and Nonaka, 1993: 137). The reliance on internal dialogue, largely at the tacit level, seems to 
be less effective in more dynamic, non-standardized businesses and in situations when 
complex, non-routine tasks have to be coordinated. This probably explains why Canon has not 
managed to establish a successful track record in sharing internal knowledge resources on an 
international basis. The Japanese model tends to be too time-consuming, is reluctant regarding 
short-term and unstable cooperative relationships, and often is strongly inward looking. 
"Communication," as argued by Whitehill (1991: 212), "is a particularly hazardous affair both 
because of the language itself and the inner-directed orientation of the people." 
In our view and more or less in conflict with the observations of other strategic management 
theorists (e.g., Ghoshal and Ackenhusen, 1992; Goold, Campbell, and Alexander, 1994), 
Canon's top management has been confronted with significant difficulties in achieving 
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Figure 8.6: The Canon Organization. 
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linkages and cross-fertilization between different areas of technology, between technologists 
and market needs, and between different markets. As concluded before, Canon's main 
corporate and competitive strength is based upon research & development. With a 
proportionally very high budget for knowledge exploration activities, Canon is strongly 
committed to the enhancement of its technological expertise and strives to be a worldleader in 
this respect. The exploitation of this primarily home-based knowledge well is achieved by a 
well-orchestrated export and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) business. More 
problematic for Canon, however, is the leverage of knowledge items residing unstructured in 
the individual divisions or companies, especially in the heterogeneous European region. 
During the last two decades, the number of employees working for Canon across the world 
has more than doubled to approximately 70,000 employees. Due to this rapid expansion of the 
Canon corporation, the internal organization which was primarily organized via Canon's 
product lines needed to be adapted. In 1976, the Premier Company Plan posed a dynamic 
management strategy designed to maintain the spirit of challenge regardless of how large 
Canon's operations would become, and to ensure the company's unity, no matter how it 
diversified. By proposing the implementation of three systems to enhance research and 
development, manufacturing, and sales operations, the corporate management system was 
completely restructured (see Figure 8.6). The Global Canon Development System (G-CDS), 
the Global Canon Production System (G-CPS), and the Global Canon Marketing System (G-
CMS) became the horizontal links between the vertical pillars of Canon's three product groups: 
cameras, business machines, and optical products. In the day-to-day coordination activities, 
however, the formal organizational chart tends to be less important for the Canon organization 
than it often is in many Western corporations.5 
"Although formally existing," one manager argued, "this organizational chart does not 
represent the way we operate in practice. Till today, we orientate ourselves totally according to 
our product lines. [•••] Besides some training, incidental task forces, or informal meetings, 
managers from different product groups do not have many opportunities to meet each other 
and only a few systems are in place to facilitate the cross-divisional coordination and 
communication." The product groups have much autonomy with respect to their responsibility 
for product development and process improvement, and development projects are therefore 
often redundant or overlapping. This lack of cross-divisional communication creates problems 
with respect to maintaining unity and allowing the groups to exploit complementary know-
how and expertise. Particularly because the technology used by a number of Canon product 
groups has been converging strongly, much value could be realized by establishing more 
cross-divisional coordination. 
"The way this organization operates is difficult to depict in an organizational chart," one 
manager added. "For the Japanese the informal organization is often more important than the 
-' The observation that the coordination and communication linkages in the formal organizational chart differ 
from those in practical settings has been confirmed by other interviewees. Moreover, it is a phenomenon 
which could be observed in many Japanese organizations (Whitehill, 1991). 
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formal one and hence a great deal of manoeuvrability exists in the corporate organization of 
the Canon organization." The basic unit in the organization is a collectivity, not an individual, 
and this feature clearly reflects the group orientation so characteristic of Japanese society 
(Casson and Nicholas, 1989; Whitehill, 1991; Sai, 1995). In contrast to Western individualism, 
Japanese are typically fond of doing things together in groups. They are socialized from early 
childhood to consider themselves to be members of a group. Groupism requires subordination 
of individuals to the goals and norms of a collectivity. This may be one's family, class of 
school, corporation, organization's department, or Japan itself. It is considered right and good 
to be dedicated and loyal to such groups, and to be satisfied with basking in the glories and 
accomplishments gained through collective efforts. At the same moment, however, this 
groupism and orientation to the own product division can be the main barrier to cross-
divisional orientation and coordination. 
"More threatening than these difficulties on a cross-divisional level, however," one 
European manager stressed, "are our problems with integrating our operations on the front-line 
level. The marketing and sales function within Canon operates quite independently with a 
minimal level of coordination with the other functions and product groups. The basic 
philosophy of Canon with respect to its sales and marketing operations has always been to give 
the front-line units as much operational space as possible to accomplish the primarily task they 
have, namely selling the Canon products. Due to the growing competition and the European 
integration which enforce a reduction of costs and a request for more customized products, we 
need to integrate more strongly and reap the available economies of scale. Particularly in 
Europe, however, the integration of our operations is significantly complicated by the way we 
have built up our organization in this region." 
In Europe, Canon Camera Co. Inc. opened a sales office in Geneva, Switzerland in 1957 to 
distribute the Canon products continent-wide. In 1967, however, rapid sales growth led to 
chronic space shortages at the Geneva facilities which underlined the need to find a more 
efficient business "hub" in Europe. Canon's central warehouse location and pan-European 
administration activities were relocated to a place near Amsterdam in the Netherlands. In 
contrast to competitors like Hewlett-Packard and Xerox, however, which have established 
fully-owned sales and marketing subsidiaries throughout Europe, Canon has gradually 
integrated vertically by acquiring full or partial ownership over its distributors during the past 
two decades. Sixteen companies with their own operational and administrative heritage were 
attained and "Canonized." By building on firm-owned sales organizations, Canon hoped to get 
more control over its operations in Europe. 
In reality, however, Canon's influence over these companies remained very small. The 
companies which had acted independently for many years developed and institutionalized their 
own unique ways of doing business, their own management systems and procedures, and iheir 
own terminology. Moreover, each company in each country defined its business differently 
and hence covered different parts of the value chain regarding such areas as consumer service 
and distribution structure. For instance, Canon UK deals directly with the customer, while 
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Canon Germany acts as a wholesaler. Canon UK gets its real return from servicing because 
this organization tries to agree with the customer on a service contract, while Canon Germany 
does not employ a service organization at all. So the diversity which is so characteristic for the 
European region also resides very strongly in the Canon organization itself. Moreover, the 
independent background of the distributors limited the company's ability to think beyond the 
boundaries of their own organization and hence conceive the various corporate advantages. 
"In an attempt to let our voice heard within the Canon organization and stimulate and 
facilitate more unity between our European companies on the longer term," Mr. Tanaka said, 
"we have decided in 1993 to act more strongly as a European Headquarters. Although we still 
lack the power to enforce certain changes, definitely with respect to our largest companies in 
the UK, France, Germany, and Italy, we increasingly try to formulate strategies and 
institutionalize business processes on a pan-European basis. [...] In the past, we were never 
involved in the organizational issues of our sales companies and acted more or less as a 
European warehouse. [...] Although some scepticism still exist with regard to the value added 
role of a European headquarters, particularly the smaller countries are eager to cooperate more 
strongly." 
In 1993, a new organization was established to coordinate Canon's operations in Europe. 
While the big four companies are still fully equipped to operate in their own country with 
limited interference from Canon Europe NV, the smaller countries like Finland, Switzerland, 
and Portugal are reporting to and coordinated by a separate headquarters group, called Trade 
Operations (see Figure 8.7). The Trade Operations Group, comprising 165 people located at 
the headquarters in the Netherlands, has a responsibility for various functions like distribution, 
warehousing, pan-European advertisement campaigns, and sales planning. A strongly 
structured meeting program exists to coordinate the operations. During these meetings the 
The History of Canon in Europe 
1957 Canon sales agency established in Geneva 
1963 Canon SA Geneve established 
1968 Canon Amsterdam N.V. established 
1972 Canon Giessen GmbH, a copier production facility, established in W. 
Germany 
1982 Canon Europe N.V. formed in Amsterdam to serve as European Headquarters 
1983 Canon Bretagne SA established for the production of PC copiers in France 
1987 Ing. C. Olivetti & C S.p.A. and Canon set up a joint venture, Olivetti-Canon 
Industriale S.p.A. to manufacture office equipment 
1988 Canon Research Centre Europe Ltd. established in the UK. 
1991 Canon Audio Ltd. opens at the Surrey Research Park, UK International 
Service Parts Center opens near Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam 
1992 A second European research center, Canon Research Centre France SA, opens 
in Rennes 
1993 Canon Manufacturing U.K. Ltd. in Glenrothes, Scotland established. 
1993 Trade Operations established to coordinate the operations of the smaller 
countries in Europe. 
Adapted from the Document "Canon in Europe - Looking Forward to the Next 25 years * 
Table 8.2: History of Canon in Europe. 
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Figure 8.7: The European Organization since 1993. 
participants discuss about competitors (e.g., their strategy, their achievements), share ideas, 
and create a European way of thinking. Moreover, headquarters employs so-called marketing 
and sales coordinators who operate as liaisons between the companies based on their 
knowledge where best practice and key business information resides. 
Notwithstanding the institutionalization of the Trade Operations group, the allocation of 
more and stronger decision power to the European headquarters, Canon acknowledged, could 
only become of effect if supported by the sales & marketing companies. "We increasingly 
expect from our sales branches," one of the managers at the European headquarters stated, 
"that they help us in building a European organization and a European voice within the global 
Canon corporation. [...] On the one hand, we ask them to tell us what kind of products they 
would like to sell based on their knowledge of the market. [...] In the past, our sales branches 
in Europe were just shipping the products to the dealers and negotiated on the margins. That's 
where their responsibilities ended. Now, more and more Canon Inc. is asking for the help of 
the Canon organization in defining the required products. This means that the companies are 
becoming true marketing organizations. Instead of being responsible for the sales of the 
products, they are going to participate more and more in the specification and development of 
new products. [...] On the other hand, the transition from a European sales engine to a real 
European organization with the additional responsibilities for product development and 
production, would imply that the transfer of product and process knowledge from Japan to 
Europe and between the companies in Europe would become a more serious management 
issue. The various sales and marketing companies, although differing strongly, could learn a 
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lot from each other and increasingly cooperate with respect to their knowledge development 
activities." 
8.5 CANON'S MANAGEMENT TOOLS TO MANAGE KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
Canon is increasingly forced to cherish and systematically exploit both its technological 
expertise and information on developments in local consumer markets. At this moment, 
however, Canon still lacks an effective "knowledge sharing culture" in Europe. In its attempt 
to stimulate and facilitate intracorporate knowledge sharing, Canon's top management meets 
great opposition as the outcome of the firm's administrative heritage but has available a broad 
repertoire of management tools that provides an infrastructure for shaping and for changing the 
behavior of managers throughout the organizational hierarchy. Five of Canon's implemented 
management tools are described and analyzed in this section. In the following order, we 
elaborate briefly on the corporate culture and socialization program, the flexible formation of 
project teams, regular international management meetings, information collection and 
dissemination roles, and the expatriation of Japanese managers to occupy key nodes in the 
European information network. 
TOOL #1: CORPORATE CULTURE & SOCIALIZATION 
Canon has a strong organizational culture, particularly in the native part of its organization. A 
dominant corporate culture has the potential to overcome centralization problems in terms of 
headquarters overload and formalization problems like inflexibility, and in this respect can 
stimulate and facilitate the decentralization of knowledge sharing responsibilities. The 
organizational culture communicates to employees the acceptability of neglecting and 
opposing intracorporate knowledge sharing and hence increases behavioral consistency. A 
unifying culture can create an important backdrop in the search for linkages and their effective 
realization (Goold, Campbell, and Alexander, 1995: 172). Hence, a strong culture can be a 
powerful means in giving direction to an organization's intracorporate knowledge sharing 
M a n a g e m e n t Sys tem Knowledge Sharing Knowledge Sharing Knowledge Sharing Knowledge Sharing 
Awareness System Persuasion System Complexity Reduction Media System 
Implemented Tools within Canon ' System 
Corporate Culture & Socialization 
Flexible Formation of Project Teams 
Structured Meeting Agenda 
Information Collection & Dissemination Roles 
Japanese Expatriates on Key Positions 
Table 8.3: The Management Tools Affecting the Actual Level of Knowledge Sharing. 
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Canon's Corporate Culture 
Philosophy 
Canon's operations worldwide are guided by the company's kyosei philosophy - living and 
working together for the common good. Our 67,000 employees respect this ideal as we bring more 
pleasant working conditions to the office, a better quality of life to individuals, and greater 
productivity to industry through innovation in cameras, business machines, and optical products 
along with our dedication to Customer Satisfaction. 
Approach 
We approach kyosei through what we call tsushin - heart-to-heart and mind-to-mind 
communication between two parties. By taking a tsushin approach to business, we aim to build a 
relationship of trust with our customers. Tsushin is a prerequisite to success in our business, and 
because our most successful product lines are computer related and provide input and output tools 
enabling people to interact with technology and each other, this trend toward tsushin business 
will further benefit the company. 
Responsibility 
A truly global corporation has a responsibility to the peoples and nations it operates among, as 
well as to our natural heritage. Canon takes these obligations seriously. We understand that E 
(meaning ecology or environment) stands above the business basics of QCD (quality, cost, and 
delivery), and we also realize the importance of contributing to local communities everywhere. 
From Canon Annual Report 1994. 
Exhibit 8.4: Corporate Culture Profile of Canon, Inc. 
activities and in building into the organization an implicit control mechanism. In one of its 
corporate documents, Canon characterizes its organization as "a tightly knit group of like-
minded persons who seek mutual understanding through frank communications, share each 
other's joys and sorrows, and proceed as one toward common goals." Canon expects from its 
employees solidarity, mutual trust, and teamwork in the spirit of "kyosei," the basic philosophy 
to which all employees are supposed to be committed (see Exhibit 8.4). 
In communicating the overall philosophy of the corporation, Canon's statement of mission 
is one particularly significant tool in creating the organizational culture within which most 
employees will spend their working lives. For example, stressing the importance of tsushin, 
defined as "a synthesis of heart-to-heart communication and mind-to-mind communication," 
makes employees aware of the importance to learn to understand each other and create mutual 
trust. Although the attention given to the tsushin philosophy has been reduced recently, it has 
stimulated Canon's managers to establish mutual understanding in their communication with 
internal colleagues. In spite of numerous language and cultural barriers, tsushin emphasizes the 
importance to listen and communicate carefully to achieve an effective transfer of messages. 
This kind of sweeping statements of corporate philosophy gives employees a sense of direction 
and hence a feeling to belong to a group that shares a common goal. 
Apart from the formulation of an appealing and stimulating mission statement, Canon 
deliberately directs the development and institutionalization of a corporate culture by giving 
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much attention to the socialization of its employees. Although formed continuously throughout 
their careers, socialization is an important part of the training and introductory programs for 
those people starting their professional career in the Canon organization. Immediately upon 
entering the company, new employees in Japan will undergo for the period of at least a month 
orientation exercises and attend several meetings led by the president and other top-level 
executives. As in many other Japanese companies, these meetings tend to resemble pep rallies, 
with strong moral and spiritual overtones. "Team spirit," one of the Japanese expatriates stated, 
"is encouraged through singing up-beat company songs and reciting statements of company 
philosophy in unison." 
Notwithstanding the importance and value for the native part of the organization, our study 
indicated that this unifying corporate culture was much less developed and dominant in 
Europe. Regarding the Canon organization, the European managers themselves felt much less 
involved than their Japanese colleagues. On the one hand, the lack of a corporate spirit in the 
European part of the organization is caused by the way Canon has built its European 
organization during the past two decades. The process of acquiring and merging a set of 
independent companies throughout Europe institutionalized much diversity in the internal 
organization. Each distributor has inherited its own company culture and is not used to adhere 
to and be committed to an internationally shared corporate culture. On the other hand, the less 
powerful corporate culture in the European organization is probably caused by the fact that 
most of the European managers, the Japanese expatriates excluded, are not involved in 
corporate management development or socialization programs. Canon has never developed an 
introductory course or a socialization program for its managers in Europe. Just recently, Canon 
announced a new training program (i.e., the Canon-Nijenrode MBA Program) for its key 
The Canon-Nijenrode MBA Program 
In October 1995, Canon Europe's top management announced the start of a new training program, 
the Canon-Nijenrode Masters of Business Administration, for key managers throughout the 
European organization. Staff of Canon Europe with the appropriate qualifications (e.g., working 
experience, education) will be selected to join a one year MBA program at the Nijenrode 
University in the Netherlands. The program will emphasize management development and 
international business developments in Europe. 
The senior management of Canon Europe expects that this kind of program will make a major 
contribution to further developing the potential qualities of its staff. HQ considers this program 
very important for the continuing development of Canon Europe and thinks that this program 
will add to its ability to deal with the challenges and complexities of its business. 
The main focus will be on Canon's own businesses - and more specifically - marketing skills. 
However, other fields to be addressed in the MBA course are market communications, logistics, 
sales, finance & accounting, manufacturing, etc. Moreover, the program should result in creating 
a network with fellow students throughout the company. As stated by Mr. Tanaka: "The 
program represents a very strong push towards a different way of managing our business and 
increasing the mutual understanding between our key managers." 
Adapted from Canon in Focus, Volume 38, October 1995. 
Exhibit 8.5: Canon-Nijenrode MBA Program. 
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managers in Europe (see Exhibit 8.5). "The program," as stated by Mr. Tanaka, "represents a 
strong push towards a different way of managing our business and increasing the mutual 
understanding between our key managers." 
By creating differences in the development and socialization of Japanese and non-Japanese 
employees, Canon has created an additional barrier to share knowledge. Language, values, and 
customs will always hinder inter-subsidiary integration, but a shared corporate culture can 
assist front-line managers in their attempt to overcome these barriers. A management 
development program including key managers from all over the world could stimulate and 
facilitate intracorporate knowledge sharing on a global scale and institutionalize a stronger 
corporate identification in the non-native part of the organization. A strong corporate culture 
which increases behavioral consistency throughout the global organization can be of 
significant value in achieving tsushin, in other words trying to understand each other and 
sharing internally available expertise and experience successfully. 
TOOL #2: FLEXIBLE FORMATION OF PROJECT TEAMS 
Canon often formates taskforces after identifying a particular knowledge need or generic 
business problem in its organization. These taskforces tend to cross both functional and 
divisional boundaries and have proved to be effective tools in stimulating the exploitation of 
knowledge exploration activities. A taskforce is a temporary structure formed to accomplish a 
specific, well-defined and complex task that involves a number of organizational subunits 
(Robbins, 1990: 348) and can be a suitable tool for resolving significant decision situations 
regarding future happenings (Altier, 1986). Setting product development priorities, selecting 
target markets, determining organizational structure, choosing product design, making pricing 
and positioning decisions, planning new product introductions, choosing capital equipment and 
facilities, determining strategic direction, and making systems decisions are some typical 
examples, as enlisted by Altier (1986: 69), where a taskforce could be a productive tool. 
Particularly within Canon where people still think too often in terms of products and hesitate 
to transcend divisional boundaries, a cross-divisional taskforce is helpful in crossing these 
lines. 
In contrast to the lightweight project teams that are often prevalent in Western companies, 
Canon's task forces arc often extremely well-equipped central groups with much authority. 
These taskforces are often chaired by senior top management, given high visibility in the 
organization, and getting top management's full commitment. As a consequence, taskforces 
possess in many cases a high status in the organization and retain the power to effectuate 
organizational change. Top management expects from these taskforces a concrete, well-
thought-out course of action. Moreover, top management ensures that these taskforces are 
well-known throughout the Canon organization to make clear to all its employees where 
worldclass know-how on a particular issue resides. Where particular knowledge exploration 
activities are proceeding and where the know-how on a particular issue is developed, 
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accumulated, and stored is emphasized by Canon's top management and communicated 
throughout the corporation. Duplication of exploration work is thus reduced, the best people in 
terms of relevant know-how and experience are brought together, and the exploitation of 
carefully developed business solutions are ensured based on the consensus-building abilities of 
these taskforces. 
One of the most successful taskforces which has been widely described in the literature is 
the multidisciplinary and cross-divisional team that was assigned to develop the "AE-1 of 
copiers" in the beginning of the 1980s (Ghoshal and Ackenhusen, 1992; Goold, Campbell, and 
Alexander, 1995). The AE-1 was a very compact single-lens reflex camera that used a 
microprocessor to control electronically functions of exposure, film rewind, and strobe and 
was launched with great success in 1976 on the basis of its size and user friendliness. Inspired 
by the successful launch of this camera, Canon formated Taskforce X. This taskforce got the 
assignment to develop a new copier which would be as innovative and successful as the AE-1 
camera. Taskforce X comprised around 200 members divided over two development groups 
and six staff groups. Building upon the firm's resources, dedication, and commitment, this 
taskforce came up eventually with a new revolutionary personal copier. The developed copier 
was the smallest, lightest copier ever marketed and reinforced Canon's leadership in the copier 
market. 
A more recent implemented taskforce is the Customer Satisfaction Committee which was 
set up in January 1995 (see Figure 8.8). Canon wanted to add customer satisfaction to its 
technology-oriented policy and positioned its corporate activities as an axle, with a technology 
wheel at one end and a customer satisfaction wheel at the other. The committee comprised 28 
members, was chaired by Hiroshi Tanaka, executive vice president of Canon Inc., and 
equipped with both budgetary and decision-making power. Apart from these 28 members, 26 
customer satisfaction promotion departments were started every division to promote 
understanding of the committee's activities. Canon Europe charged the heads of the CS 
1995 1996 1997 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
NO. 1 in 
CUSTOMER 
SATISFACTION 
Adapted from Internal Documents. 
Figure 8.8: Customer Satisfaction Activities Calendar. 
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Promotion Departments with leading the deployment of CS activities within their respective 
divisions and headquarters. The CS Promotion Departments were split up in five working 
groups: CS Vision, CS Product Planning, CS Quality, CS Sales/Service, and CS Evaluation 
System. 
Canon stimulates intracorporate knowledge sharing through the flexible formation of 
multidisciplinary and cross-divisional taskforces in order to bring both awareness and interest 
barriers down. By giving high visibility to exclusively assigned knowledge exploration 
responsibilities, it becomes well known where particular knowledge resides. Moreover, the 
subsidiaries are not allowed to invest in the particular problem area and hence the exclusivity 
makes them dependent on and eager to adopt the outcomes of the taskforce's development 
work. 
TOOL #3: REGULAR INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT MEETINGS 
In general, Japanese are used to communicate regularly and intensively with each other and 
written communication is, in a sense, a last resort for Japanese business executives. Japanese, 
if possible, will prefer to talk directly with another individual or group and therefore tend to 
spend a great deal of time in management meetings. The physical gathering of managers is of 
particular importance for the Japanese because they tend to enrich their communication by 
using a figurative language full of metaphors and by using many body movements (Nonaka, 
1995). This non-verbal way of communicating contributes to their strength in transferring tacit 
knowledge. Because non-verbal communication is such a continuous, subtle process among 
the Japanese, it is an important part of the total communication process. 
In communicating with their Western colleagues, however, Japanese have difficulties to get 
the same richness of knowledge across in an effective way. Both language and cultural barriers 
affect this process and hence international management meetings have always been scarce 
until recently. In its strive to build a more integrated European organization, Canon has 
significantly intensified the gathering of its international management since 1993. Regular 
international management meetings are now arranged by region, product group, function, and 
management level. International management meetings like the presidents meeting, the annual 
general meeting, the G5 marketing meeting6, and the product planning meeting are now 
becoming important occasions to gather information, share ideas, and discuss on particular 
issues7. These gatherings of key managers in Europe help to inform colleagues on existing 
knowledge resources and knowledge exploration activities and tend to increase the level of 
trust and understanding among the managers involved. 
The G5 marketing meeting is a gathering of the marketing managers of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and 
the Trade Organization with the coordinators and liaison members of the European headquarters. 
All the 13 interviewees mentioned the management meeting as one of the most important tools to stimulate 
and facilitate intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
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"Although restricted by a topic-related agenda for this kind of meetings" as stated by one 
manager, "a significant part of our time we discuss what others would be interested in knowing 
before discussing or making decisions as suggested by agenda. [...] Often, some colleagues are 
asked to give a presentation on current developments in their units or on a particular business 
issue that could be of interest for all the participants. [...] Quite often, one splits up the total 
group involved in a meeting (ranging from 25 to 60 managers) in several workgroups to 
stimulate interaction between the participants. These workgroups are asked to study on and 
discuss a certain business issue and to present their conclusions in a plenary session." "Besides 
the direct transfer and exchange of knowledge," an other manager added, "the participants 
have an opportunity during these meetings to learn their colleagues and develop some informal 
relationships throughout the European organization. Moreover, they are enforced during those 
international management meetings to think beyond the boundaries of their own organization 
and conceive the opportunities of thinking and operating on a Global or European scale." 
TOOL #4: INFORMATION COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION ROLES 
Coordinators, liaisons, and boundary spanners, as argued in the theoretical part of this study, 
are organizational roles which could assist front-line managers in their search for knowledge. 
Individuals or teams occupying these roles bring front-line managers together in their attempt 
to stimulate intracorporate knowledge sharing. Canon also created and institutionalized many 
liaison roles in its organization, but gave them sole responsibility to effectuate knowledge 
exchange efforts. So in contrast to what we assumed in the theoretical part of this research 
project, Canon does not believe that the size and complexity of its organization inhibit an 
active role for corporate management in the initiation, effectuation, and application tasks of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process. Instead of adopting a kind of decentralized network 
organization, Canon's top management is convinced that the hierarchical way of directing its 
independent sales and marketing companies suits its needs today and in the near future. Front-
line managers are responsible for taking action, while the European headquarters remains 
solely responsible for taking the lead in solving and sharing key business issues. Mr. Tanaka 
stated with respect to inter-unit communication lines that "there is no communication between 
the companies directly. All communication needs to be routed through the European 
headquarters and for this purpose we have assigned a large cadre of liaison members." 
Although Canon Europe works on the implementation of a more advanced information 
system to link employees and resources more easily in the future, the basic philosophy will 
remain that the marketing and sales coordinators at the headquarters are always involved in 
inter-company knowledge sharing. "Only in this way," Mr. Tanaka stressed, "we make sure 
that we keep well informed about the key business issues and the concerns of our company 
managers. By being well informed we ensure that we are able to control the performance of 
our companies and react quickly to their key problems." One manager of European origin, 
however, also believes that this eagerness to keep closely in touch with the information flows 
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in the organization is something which is strongly related to the personal traits of the Japanese. 
He stated: "The Japanese, in general, place much value on learning and perceive their 
information as the main 'power base' underlying their position in the organization. [...] This 
thirst for information, however, makes them antipathetic regarding the stimulation and 
facilitation of decentralized communication between the companies. They want to be involved 
to be able to keep their information up to date." 
Consequently, within Canon there are at least two persons responsible for the coordination 
and management of the information flow for each of the six product areas (i.e., Cameras, 
Copiers, Peripherals, Business Systems, optical products, chemical products) and at least one 
person per geographic area. The marketing and sales coordinators are visiting operating 
companies, on average, more than 50 days each year to learn about their concerns and the most 
recent developments. Besides company visits the liaison members use telephone and fax to 
communicate with the companies and their colleagues of Canon Inc. Although an E-mail 
application is now available for communication with the HQ in Japan, Canon has not 
implemented advanced communication tools yet to facilitate the communication with and 
between its companies. 
TOOL #5: JAPANESE EXPATRIATES ON KEY POSITIONS 
Traditionally, Canon has operated using a significant cadre of expatriates in its overseas 
markets. By assigning Japanese managers to most of the liaison positions and top management 
functions at the headquarters, Canon tried to make sure that not only the link but also the 
quality of the communication with Japan would not suffer too much from the physical and 
cultural distance. As argued before, Japanese value the "richness" of their communication. 
Both oral communication and body language are used to make themselves understood and this 
process is harmed if non-Japanese employees are involved. Expatriation is a worthwhile 
attempt to reduce the media barriers and hence facilitate the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process. Expatriates have valuable knowledge on the systems and processes of the home 
office. They possess a network of informal relationships and are knowledgeable on where 
knowledge resides in the home country. For this reason, Canon often has more than 200 of its 
managers working in the European region. These managers occupy many of the top 
management and liaison functions at headquarters and some of the general management 
functions in the main operating companies and research centers throughout Europe. 
The backdrop of such a large amount of expatriates, however, is that localization strategics 
can be less smoothly formulated. Without any doubt, local management tends to understand 
the local demands and developments much better than their Japanese colleagues. Although the 
Japanese expatriates do their best to operate as close to the market and society as possible, the 
cultural background of the Japanese obstructs a full understanding of the European 
circumstances. Perceptions are formed by one's values and norms and Japanese differ strongly 
in this respect from many nationalities in Europe. On the basis of the difficulties to collect, 
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aggregate, and integrate a well-grounded knowledge of local markets, Canon has started to 
internationalize its management in Europe during recent years. Accepting the growing 
complexity to communicate, Canon appoints local management in its subsidiaries wherever 
possible and integrates European managers in its top structure. 
8.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Canon's main competitive and corporate strength is represented by its leverage of 
technological excellence. By concentrating research & development and production activities 
in or close to the home country and selling products through wholly or partially owned sales 
branches throughout the world, Canon deliberately institutionalized a "technology-push" 
instead of a "technology pull" strategy. Many successful products were launched based on 
Canon's ability to improve existing product concepts. Intracorporate knowledge sharing 
requirements were strongly reduced based upon a well orchestrated export and Original 
Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) business. The major part of Canon's product and process 
knowledge was concentrated in a product embodied way and exploitation of Canon's 
knowledge base could in this respect simply be improved by extending the sales volume of 
Canon's end products. 
Today, however, Canon is forced to rethink its traditional export strategy. Consumers are 
demanding more customized products as European and Japanese buyers start to differ 
significantly in their product feature preferences. Moreover, most of Canon's products are 
maturing and new market-oriented product innovations are becoming a necessity. On the short 
term, Canon has reacted to these challenges by advancing its abilities to collect, share, and 
aggregate market information on a European scale. In this way, Canon wants to go beyond the 
leverage of its technological excellence towards a cross-fertilization with the market 
knowledge residing in Canon's marketing and sales companies. On the longer term, Canon is 
inclined to believe that "overseas" product development and production activities have to be 
extended. Internationalized and scattered product and process expertise, however, imply the 
need for a drastic change of the organizational context to increase the actual level of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing, which calls for an extension of the set of management tools. 
A major business transformation process is necessary, especially because Canon's 
administrative history in Europe is one of operating through highly independent, sometimes 
partially owned distributors with whom product orders and invoices were the only lines of 
communication. 
In the final section of this chapter we discuss the outcomes of a review of Canon Europe's 
management capabilities regarding intracorporate knowledge sharing. The implemented 
management tools stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing are enlisted 
and confronted with the presented management tools of the knowledge sharing management 
systems in the theoretical part of this study. By reviewing whether, which, and how many 
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management tools of these management systems can be discerned within the confines of the 
Canon organization, some tentative conclusions are formulated on the barriers still obstructing 
and hindering the intracorporate knowledge sharing process in the Canon organization in 
Europe. 
PROPOSITION #1: KNOWLEDGE SHARING AWARENESS SYSTEM 
Historically, Canon perceived its European companies primarily as sales outlets and not as 
valuable sources of expertise which could be exploited on an international scale. The 
companies were given a great extent of operational leeway to sell their products in their own 
country and European headquarters operated more or less as a European warehouse. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, however, perspectives and functions are changing. Canon Europe is 
building a more integrated group of subsidiaries which is able to let its voice heard to Canon 
Inc. Notwithstanding the current variety in the way each company defines its own business and 
processes, many of the problems of the companies in, for example, the IT, logistics, and 
marketing area are shared. These common issues are worthwhile to evaluate considering 
possibilities to unite development resources, coordinate and complement exploration activities, 
and exploit existing solutions and best practices. In practice, however, a focus on existing 
differences between the companies is still obstructing the identification of many intracorporate 
knowledge sharing opportunities. The companies are perceived to be too idiosyncratic to come 
up with standardized solutions, and without an awareness of the existing communality 
knowledge transfer efforts will be hard to initiate. 
Notwithstanding the blocking influence of the emphasis on differences instead of shared 
elements between the companies, management of Canon Europe's headquarters is 
progressively trying to stimulate the detection of cooperative relationships on a European 
scale. Since 1993, international management meetings have been regularly arranged to talk on 
topics as past achievement, market developments, and prospective product introductions. 
Moreover, workshops and seminars have been organized on a regular basis on particular areas 
of interest for the whole group. Marketing and sales coordinators, primarily Japanese, have 
been institutionalized to operate as central experts who possess knowledge on current trends, 
have a direct link to Canon Inc., and could function as a liaison between knowledge donor and 
knowledge recipient. With respect to the registration and codification of knowledge items, a 
number of initiatives have been taken by corporate management to improve the existing 
situation. The European corporate planning department, for example, started in 1995 with a 
newsletter, including general information on market developments throughout the region, 
innovative solutions to general problems, and descriptions of European or local development 
projects. 
In contrast to one of the key assumptions of this research project, the dominant perspective 
at the top of the Canon organization is that all knowledge sharing initiatives should be 
coordinated and effectuated by the managers of headquarters. The liaisons do not take a 
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facilitating role, but are very dominant and want to be actively involved in the adoption, 
preparation, and effectuation of intracorporate knowledge sharing projects. While we assumed 
that the complexity of many multinational enterprises inhibits a direct role for corporate 
management in establishing linkages between knowledge donors and knowledge recipients, 
Canon's top management has no intention to limit itself to the more indirect tasks of 
stimulating and facilitating. "By being involved," Mr. Tanaka argued, "we circumvent a 
situation where certain problems are hidden away. [...] By being involved, we might be able to 
detect the big issues and react pro-actively to these issues in other companies. [...] This top-
down approach will not change. We are happy with the current way of sharing our knowledge. 
The hierarchical way works well and does not need to be adapted in the near future. [...] People 
in the center are concerned with knowledge issues, the local responsibility is in taking action." 
In line with this view, the existing and the prospective information systems within the Canon 
Europe organization connect the various companies to the headquarters and not to each other. 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
AWARENESS SYSTEM 
1
 The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing project is more likely to occur when 
there is a management system which makes 
employees aware of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing prospects 
CANON'S MANAGEMKNT TOOIS 
- Liaison Members (since 1993 more 
dominant headquarters function and hence 
more dominant role for the Coordinators); 
- Formation of taskforces for prevalent 
knowledge needs; 
- Management meetings (e.g.. Presidents 
meeting, product planning meetings) 
bringing together key managers of the 
i Canon Europe organization; 
- Management training sessions, workshops, 
and seminars; 
- Newsletters (e.g., Canon Chronicle. Canon 
in Focus, What Strategy!). 
RFIATFD MANAGEMENT TOOI .S 
Knowledge Codification, Registering, and Storage 
Networking 
Assigning Knowledge Exploration Responsibilities 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Sharing Intermediaries 
Implementing Internal Benchmarking Procedures 
CANON- REMAINING AWARFNRSS RARRIERS 
(1) Knowledge is widely scattered throughout the 
organization, is often human embodied, and no 
systematic procedure or incentive exists yet to 
explicate and registrate knowledge items. 
(2) Although the subsidiaries still differ 
significantly in many respects of their business, 
the prevalent communalities and hence 
opportunities to share knowledge are often not 
perceived. 
(3) Liaisons are bounded by their own constraints 
(e.g., time, observational) and hence are often 
unable to identify and perceive all intracorporate 
knowledge sharing opportunities. Canon, 
however, has exclusively assigned the 
responsibility to initiate knowledge sharing 
efforts to these liaisons. 
(4) Inter-subsidiary linkages are rare and are in most 
cases intermediated by HQ management. Direct 
links betweeen the business units could make 
front-line managers aware of the existing 
communality and confront them with valuable 
knowledge items which could advance their own 
operations. 
Table 8.4: The Knowledge Sharing Awareness System. 
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So Canon Europe gradually implements some of the attributes of a knowledge sharing 
awareness system. Many awareness barriers, however, still remain. The lack of a systematic 
procedure or incentive to codify or register valuable knowledge items makes knowledge 
sharing opportunities very difficult to detect. Moreover, liaisons are bounded by their own 
constraints (e.g., time, observational) and hence are often unable to perceive and identify all 
intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects. A network linking the front-line managers 
directly could be more dynamically responsive for managers who have a need to know or who 
control valuable knowledge to exploit. 
PROPOSITION #2. KNOWLEDGE SHARING PERSUASION SYSTEM 
Canon Europe has not invested on a large scale in the implementation of management tools to 
increase the willingness of its front-line managers to share knowledge. Although the awareness 
barriers have a more obstructive influence than the interest barriers on the initiation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing projects, the independent histories of the local companies 
has resulted in a resistance to corporate interference. Particularly the "big four" (UK, Italy, 
France, Germany) operate quite independently and are not eager to accept policies that limit 
their degree of freedom. The local companies are obliged to sell Canon's products and a 
maximum of operational leeway has been created to do whatever is necessary to sell Canon's 
products throughout the region. Overall, however, we can observe that the willingness to adopt 
and transfer knowledge is growing in spite of limited investments in the development of a 
Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System. Due to more regular and intensified international 
management meetings, workshops, seminars and the like, a corporate identity is slowly 
growing in the Canon Europe organization, increasing the eagerness of the companies towards 
existing knowledge items and exploration activities in the corporation as a whole. 
Intracorporate knowledge sharing is not explicitly rewarded in the Canon organization and 
no intention exists to institutionalize monetary or other kinds of incentives. In this respect it is 
valuable to stress the difference in orientation between Japanese and Western managers. As 
described by Whitehill (1991), Japanese business people cooperate and compete with one 
another simultaneously to contribute to the upper-level goals of the group as a whole and, by 
performing better than other team members, get the appreciation of higher level management 
on the longer term. Japanese are more eager to gain the more desirable assignments and special 
considerations in long-term career development rather than at getting an immediate promotion 
or salary increase. Japanese place a high value on things like honor, trust, and personal worth. 
Each Japanese seeks out his own personal source of value often transcending value of a 
monetary kind. Consequently, Mr. Tanaka, confronted with our question regarding the 
existence of incentives for sharing knowledge, looked surprised and stressed that there was no 
need at all to reward his managers in monetary terms. "Managers are eager and happy to share 
their knowledge with their colleagues," Mr. Tanaka emphasized. "We feel no need at all to 
implement incentives in this respect." 
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KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
PERSUASION SYSTEM 
The initiation of an intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project is more likely to 
occur when there is a management system 
encouraging employees' interest to 
participate in the exploitation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects 
RELATED MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Financial Measures and Rewards for Knowledge Sharing 
Commitment and Formal Statements by Top Management 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependencies 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure to Share 
CANON'S MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
. Incidentally, centralized projects are initiated 
by CENV headquarters to concentrate 
development resources and ensure the optimal 
exploitation of the knowledge exploration 
activities. 
- Subsidiaries are increasingly stimulated to 
provide CENV with information on trends in 
their market and business environment. 
Moreover, their input is asked regarding the 
perceived needs of local consumers. 
. Coordinators at the HQ inform front-line 
managers regarding opportunities to share 
particular knowledge items and stimulate them 
to participate in these endeavours. 
CANON: REMAINING INTEREST BARRIERS 
(1) The independent background of the companies 
instills an urge to defend the own identity of the 
organization and keep as much local autonomy as 
possible. This is particularly true for the four "big 
ones" (Germany, France, Italy, UK). 
(2) Top management does not perceive the 
management of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
as one of their top priorities and this affects the 
initiation of knowledge transfer efforts. 
(3) Canon Europe puts no incentive on the initiation 
of intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts and 
hence employees are not explicitly rewarded in 
this respect. 
(4) European managers are not affected by a dominant 
corporate culture and hence no or a limited 
corporate identity is felt by them. 
Table 8.5: The Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System. 
Overall, we can conclude that some management tools of a knowledge sharing persuasion 
system can be detected, but that various interest barriers still obstruct the initiation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts. The independent background of the operating 
companies instils an urge to defend their own identity and keep as much local autonomy as 
possible. Moreover, Canon puts no tangible pressure on both knowledge donors and recipients 
to transfer and adopt internally available knowledge. Canon thinks that all employees are eager 
and willing to contribute to the well being of the corporate whole and is not willing to accept 
the fact that Western managers tend to be more individualistic and motivated by monetary 
rewards than their Japanese colleagues. 
PROPOSITION #3: KNOWLEDGE SHARING COMPLEXITY REDUCTION SYSTEM 
Canon Europe experiences major problems in effectuating knowledge transfer efforts 
successfully. Several complexity barriers still prevail and a very limited number of steps have 
been taken by corporate management to reduce them. Besides the lack of any incentive or 
pressure to reduce the tacitness or equivocality of the available and developed knowledge 
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items, knowledge sharing is significantly complicated by the restricted managerial attention 
and actions regarding harmonization. Each company active under the "umbrella" of Canon 
Europe NV, as argued before, has its own independent history and these differences in 
administrative heritage have resulted in strong differences in the administrative and operational 
procedures and activities. Each company, for example, defines its business in a different way, 
utilizes different information systems, and has developed its own language in terms of data-
elements, information structures, and conceptualizations. This heterogeneity in prior 
knowledge obstructs communication notably and hence limits the successful transfer of 
knowledge within the confines of the Canon organization. 
The influence of Japanese expatriates on the heterogeneity dimension in Canon's European 
organization is ambiguous. On the one hand, by placing Japanese expatriates on most of the 
key nodes in the European information network, communication and information exchange 
both within Europe and between Europe and Japan is facilitated. Japanese are used to 
communicate regularly and intensively with each other and language and cultural barriers 
would affect this process. Japanese, following Nonaka (1995), enrich their communication by 
1 KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
1 COMPLEXITY REDUCTION 
l a SYSTEM 
EgS The successful effectuation of an 
U intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is 
fhM more likely when there is a management 
F J system reducing the complexity of 
Ijjfl intrai orporate knowledge sharing 
1 CANON'S MANAGHMENTTOOLS 
1 . A significant part of Canon's knowledge 
^ H reservoir is embodied in their products. By 
i^H exporting the products, knowledge 
' ^ H exploration activities are exploited and the 
^ H complexities of transfering knowledge 
^ H circumvented; 
WSk - Training programs and workshops reduce 
Bjs9 the heterogeneity of prior knowledge (see 
K M also Canon- Nijenrode MBA programme); 
K 9 lapanese expatriates occupy the key nodes 
BBM in the European Information Network. This 
E f l reduces the complexity of the 
• ^ 1 communication between a key node and 
^ H Canon Inc. and between the key nodes; 
1 . Regular management meetings, seminars, 
^ H workshops create gradually a corporate 
B l identity and more trust between the 
^ H front-line managers. 
RELATED MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Knowledge Abstraction & Codification 
Increasing User Involvement & Triability 
Establishing a Corporate-Wide Language 
Arranging Regular Management Meetings 
Dominant Corporate Culture 
Financial Measures and Rewards for Knowledge Sharing [ 
Commitment and Formal Statements by Top Management 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependences 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure to Share 
CANON: REMAINING COMPLEXITY BARRIERS 
(1) Knowledge remains of a tacit nature and highly 
equivocal due to the lack of codification, 
explication, and demonstration practices. 1 
(2) The differences between the companies in the 
definition of the businesses and core processes ; 
strongly complicate the intracorporate knowledge 
sharing process. 
(3) Besides the intercultural difficulties between 
European managers, the intracorporate knowledge 
sharing process is often complicated due to the 
involvement of Japanese managers. 
(4) Knowledge donors and recipients arc not stimulated 
to share knowledge by monetary rewards or a strong 
\ corporate culture. 
(5) The level of trust inherent between the Japanese in 
Canon organization is quite high. Trust between 
European managers is growing due to regular formal 
meetings. 
Table 8.6: The Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System. 
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using a figurative language full of metaphors and body language. Richness which gets across 
less effectively in the communication with their Western colleagues. On the other hand, the 
Japanese expatriates active in the European organization are a distinctive group which acts on 
a distance from the rest of the employees. The Japanese cluster strongly, communicate with 
each other in their own language, often experience difficulties in making themselves 
understood to their European colleagues, and hence create an additional complexity barrier to 
effectuate intracorporate knowledge transfer efforts. 
A corporate initiative which would have the potential to reduce some of the heterogeneity in 
prior knowledge was announced at the end of 1995. Corporate management launched the one-
year Canon-Nijenrode Masters in Business Administration (MBA) program in which a 
selected group of managers of Canon Europe could participate. Senior management expected 
that this kind of program would make a major contribution to further developing the potential 
qualities of its staff. Headquarters considered this program very important for the continuing 
development of Canon Europe and was convinced that this program would add to its ability to 
deal with the challenges and complexities of its business. Moreover, the program would create 
a network of fellow students throughout the company and would increase the mutual 
understanding between them. "The program," Mr. Tanaka argued, "represents a very strong 
push towards a different way of managing our business." 
Mutual understanding has also been growing in recent years due to the increased number of 
international management meetings, seminars, and workshops. The growing number of 
management meetings in Canon Europe has established a stronger corporate identity that 
motivates people to cooperate and stimulates them in believing that their colleagues will make 
efforts consistent with mutual goals. Apart from the arrangement of more regular management 
meetings, however, no deliberate actions have been taken regarding the level of motivation and 
trust. Because trust is an intrinsic element of Japanese cultures and motivation is primarily 
defined on the group level, the complicating influence of both factors are restricted in a 
Japanese context, and are therefore less perceived as an issue by the Japanese. The fact that 
many nationalities in Europe strongly appreciate a contractual basis before they trust a partner 
and the fact that they tend to be more strongly motivated by monetary rewards than their 
Japanese colleagues has not changed the perspective of Canon Europe's Japanese top 
management in this respect. 
Concluding, we can state that complexity reduction is achieved by integration of a 
significant part of Canon's expertise in the export of their equipment, tooling, intermediate 
goods, and end products. However, Canon still experiences significant problems in managing 
the efficient and effective effectuation of knowledge sharing efforts throughout its 
organization. With respect to the tacitness and equivocality of knowledge, the heterogeneity of 
prior knowledge, the level of motivation, and existence of trust between the front-line manager 
of the Canon Europe organization, only a few, mostly unintended, actions have been taken. 
Consequently, the hindering influence of the complexity barriers is still quite severe which 
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makes the leverage of knowledge items scattered throughout Canon Europe's organization in 
most cases a rather complex assignment. 
PROPOSITION #4: KNOWLEDGE SHARING MEDIA SYSTEM 
"Communication," as stated by Whitehill (1991: 212), "is a uniquely difficult and challenging 
aspect of the Japanese management system. Communication in Japan, whether in-company, 
between companies, or on an international level, is a particularly hazardous affair both because 
of the language itself and the inner-directed orientation of the people." In making a trade-off 
between written, oral, and non-verbal ways of communication, writing is, in a sense, a last 
resort for Japanese business executives. If possible, they will choose to talk directly with 
another individual or group. Consequently, a great deal of time and attention in Japanese firms 
is devoted to personal communication, in which non-verbal communication (a continuous and 
subtle process among the Japanese) represents an important part of the total communication 
process. Overall, however, one can conclude that Japanese have difficulties to make 
themselves understood to foreigners (Ohmae, 1987: 43). 
The implications of these general characteristics of Japanese communication can also be 
observed in the Canon organization in Europe. Group or person-to-person meetings are 
regularly arranged and very time-consuming. Japanese is the normal language during high-
KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
MEDIA SYSTEM 
' The successful effectuation of an 
i intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is 
more likely to occur when there is a 
management system extending the 
possibilities to tune the richness of the 
j transfer medium to the complexity of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing situation 
CANON'S MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
- Intercultural management skills are still very 
limited, but are now gradually developed 
j during the training programmes, international 
management meetings, seminars, and 
workshops; 
- Electronic mail and videoconferencing system 
is effective between Canon Inc. and CENV 
headquarters. Canon Europe is developing an 
Electronic Bulletin Board; 
• Canon Inc. has always a large number of 
j Japanese expatriates active in its "overseas" 
! regions. 
RELATED MANAGEMENT TOOLS 1 
Knowledge Transfer Skill Development 1 
Advanced Communication Technologies 
Expatriation Strategy 
CANON: REMAINING MEDIA BARRIERS 
(1) Canon Europe starts just recently to operate 
more strongly on a European scale. 
Consequently, the front-line managers are still 
lacking the prerequisite transfer and adoption 
skills. Moreover, intercultural management 
skills are still very limited. 
(2) Canon Europe is definitely more concerned with 
the existence of an appropriate and hence 
advanced communication line with Canon Inc. 
than with the companies or between the 
companies. The subsidiaries are not linked with 
each other via advanced information or 
telecommunication technologies. 
Table 8.7: The Knowledge Sharing Media System. 
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level management meetings which excludes European managers from participation or enforce 
them to learn the Japanese language. Many Japanese expatriates, as stated before, occupy the 
key nodes in the European information network and while other companies are implementing 
or intensively using electronic variants to facilitate communication, Canon's main way of 
communication remains face-to-face contact complemented by telephone and fax. Although 
the increased number of international management meetings gradually reduces the cultural 
distance, intercultural skills are still limited. 
So we can state that within the prevailing situation of Canon Europe with respect to the 
management of media barriers, appropriate media and sufficient resources are available to 
facilitate a limited number of communication lines perceived as important by Canon's top 
management (e.g., Canon Inc. - Canon Europe NV). Latent communication lines which reside 
unstructured lower down the hierarchy, however, lack these resources and need to exploit 
conventional communication tools like telephone, fax, and company visits. 
Concluding, it is interesting to refer to a publication by Hediund and Nonaka (1993) who 
specifically address the primary distinctions of knowledge management practices in the West 
(i.e., Europe, USA) and Japan. Hediund and Nonaka (1993: 137) argue that "The ideal 
Japanese industry [...] should be one with readily-existing and articulated input (components 
and technology elements), but entailing, a throughput process with strong tacit elements, and 
requiring much intra and interorganizational dialogue. [...] Much of this implies success in 
relatively 'mature' technological fields, or at least fields where results have 'materialized' into 
components, formulas, etc." Moreover, Hediund and Nonaka indicate that Japanese are weaker 
in fields where sales of products have to be complemented with complex service and other 
non-standardized ingredients and where integration of very large systems and hence complex 
system management is a necessity. The reliance on internal dialogue, largely at the tacit level 
seems to be less effective in more dynamic, non-standardized businesses and when complex 
tasks have to be coordinated. The Japanese model of throughput is simply too time-consuming 
in these fields. 
Our findings are strongly in line with the argumentation of Hediund and Nonaka (1993). 
Canon has been and is still successful in the European region based on its knowledge 
management capabilities in the native part of its organization. Home-based research, 
development, and production processes have gained from talent and a strong tolerance for 
working with tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is shared through regular and intensive 
interaction, allowing transfer and expansion of those knowledge items which are difficult to 
articulate such as market feeling, skills, and capabilities. Moreover, the Japanese orientate 
themselves and are motivated more than their Western colleagues at the organizational and 
group level and hence put more emphasis on the interorganizational domain in knowledge 
management. Quality circles, ring systems, long working hours followed by collegial after-
hours talk and drinking arc all mechanisms to encourage and facilitate sharing of knowledge 
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and which have led to "powerful" and efficiently manufactured advancements of existing 
product concepts. 
In the global marketplace, however, Canon has to compete in more complex and more 
dynamic business environments. Canon's products are more and more evaluated on their 
adaptation to continuously changing and regionally differentiated consumer demands. 
Moreover, many of the traditional products are maturing or need to be merged in the 
"integrated business system" product concept. As a consequence of these trends, Canon is 
challenged to develop an organizational capability that exploits its technological excellence 
even when a large amount of product development, interpretation and prototyping is still to be 
done. To succeed on all these aspects, Canon must find a way to cope with geographically 
scattered market knowledge in its organization and achieve a cross-fertilization between 
technology-based expertise and available information on the needs and developments in the 
international marketplace. Moreover, more effective, efficient, flexible, and less time-
consuming knowledge sharing efforts should be stimulated and facilitated in order to exploit 
cross-divisional synergies. 
Canon Europe NV thinks, in line with our theoretical arguments, that a further 
decentralization of business activities is inevitable on the longer term. A concept like market 
feeling is difficult to articulate and communicate, especially in an organization in which the 
key nodes of the information network are occupied by Japanese managers. Japanese have 
problems in making themselves comprehended and in gathering know-how from "foreigners." 
This foreign intellect, however, is essential in product innovation, product differentiation, and 
local adaptation activities which are prerequisite for the survival and competitive success in 
European and other non-Japanese markets. 
9 
ITT World Directories, Inc. 
A Major Transformation Effort to 
Bring Down the Inherited Barriers 
to Cross-Unit Cooperation 
"We all agree and acknowledge that ITT World Directories lacks a history of strong 
cross-unit cooperation. [...] To survive, however, we need to unite our forces and 
challenge our current conception of working together. A dramatic and fundamental 
change is necessary which requires a major investment in both financial and emotional 
terms of all our employees." 
- A. Cohen, ATLAS Project Leader, ITT World Directories, Inc. 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the beginning of 1995, ITT World Directories Inc., a world expert in international directory 
sales and publishing, was provoked to transform its traditional philosophy of managing its 
geographically scattered business operations. Dramatic changes in the contextual and task 
environment combined with a strategic reorientation process of the corporation as a whole1, 
enforced ITT World Directories to establish an organization which would be capable to react 
with great flexibility to intensified competition, changes in regulation, technological 
developments, and altered consumer demands. The objective was to create "mean and lean" 
operations in each country to optimize the financial performance of the affiliates. Moreover, 
ITT World Directories' business transformation process was aimed at making the total group 
more than its subparts. Corporate value, as was assumed by ITT's top management, could be 
generated by merging operational activities and leveraging the existing knowledge in terms of 
experience, skills, operating systems, and product innovations. The prospective "corporate 
' In June 1995, the board of directors approved and announced a long-studied plan to divide ITT into three 
separate publicly traded companies: an insurance company, an industrial group, and a hotel and gaming 
company. The corporation which for decades embodied the idea of the conglomerate rounded off an era by 
breaking itself up. 
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umbrella" should be able to strengthen the competitive strategies of its subsidiaries and enable 
an internationalization strategy to further leverage the corporate resources. 
The managerial alteration implied a dramatic rift with the past. Synergy has never been an 
issue within ITT World Directories. During the previous 25 years, each company governed by 
ITT World Directories has been highly successful and profitable based on a legally protected 
monopoly position in a highly attractive Yellow Pages market. The governmentally granted 
monopoly positions meant that competitive forces were lacking and that efforts could be 
focused on "creaming-off" the full potential in terms of top and bottom-line improvements. 
Business diversification, product development, cost reduction, and process transformation 
projects were, in general, locally initiated and effectuated. Attempts to integrate more strongly 
have never led to any tangible results and often failed due to the existence of numerous 
"hidden agendas." As one manager stated: "In the past, we have always acted as if our units 
differed too much to be comparable. In reality, however, I honestly believe that our business 
processes comprise for more than 80 percent the same activities. We only define our 
businesses differently and put emphasis on other aspects of our operations." 
Consequently, by acknowledging the dominance of communality over diversity, ITT World 
Directories provoked its administrative heritage and confronted itself with the complex task to 
adapt its management processes both vertically, between the center and the companies, as well 
as horizontally, between the companies. The most important challenge was not to redefine 
these processes, but to make them work. A feeling of distrust, caused by the corporate effort to 
"squeeze" the most out of its Yellow Pages businesses, resided strongly lower down the 
hierarchy. In line with the management philosophy of the ITT Corporation, ITT World 
Directories has always operated more or less as a financial holding company2 with efficient 
coordination among its business units being largely a matter of disciplined resource allocation. 
An advanced and well elaborated financial control system assisted corporate management in 
monitoring their ongoing capital commitments. The threats of disposal or enforced cost cutting 
operations were always prevalent and dependent on regular assessments whether or not the 
expected returns of a particular business activity still compensated capital for the involved 
risks and opportunity costs. In this sense, the corporate office served a function similar to the 
external capital market. Corporate management did not feel a real need to utilize and exploit 
the particular coordinative properties of the governance structure. Some rare attempts in the 
past to stimulate and facilitate the leverage and exploitation of knowledge exploration 
activities failed dramatically (see Exhibit 9.1 for an example). 
' The financial holding management style is one of the three corporate management styles as presented by 
Goold & Campbell (1987), meaning that the company is built up from a portfolio of businesses which are all 
evaluated on their financial performance. The various business units are functioning in an autonomous way 
and all have unique identities. In this way a tension exists within the company to disintegrate. When business 
units are only financially and not emotionally connected to their parent company, business units will try to 
build "walls" around their own operations and will try to function with as little as possible interference of 
other people within the parent company. 
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ITT Publitec: 
ITT WD's Service Centre on Information Technology 
Information Technology (IT) is a strategic tool necessary for the information delivery 
business. ITT World Directories considers IT to be a key factor in the growth of a 
successful business. Business-oriented management methods, strategic focus for 
technology investments, and building a sound technical architecture are succcess 
factors to support IT. ITT World Directories, however, has a traditional culture of 
unit independence. Hence, unit systems have evolved independent of each other and 
were not designed to be easily adapted to other units. The environments within 
which the systems are developed are all different. In many cases, similar systems 
have been developed in multiple units. 
At the end of the 1980s, ITT World Directories made an attempt to centralize 
development by institutionalizing a Service Centre, ITT Publitec. ITT Publitec's 
mission was to develop systems and software products that provided functionality 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness of ITT World Directories businesses. 
Moreover, ITT Publitec would scan the developments in the IT field and monitor 
emerging requirements of the affiliates. A distinction was made between three 
functions of the central development unit: 
(1) Research & Development - the Central Unit would monitor technological and 
business trends and provide ITT World Directories with general awareness and 
initial evaluations of relevant developments under the guidance of ITT WD. 
(2) Specialist Skills provider - The Central Unit woul provide specialist skills to 
work in the units under the control of the units who would fund the activity. 
(3) Software House to carry out one-off developments on behalf of a single unit. 
The unit was expected to fund this development. 
Attempts to centralize research and development in the IT area, however, failed. 
ADTEC, the proposed common system which was developed by ITT Publitec, was 
not successful and is used today in only one unit. Although a communality study in 
1993 has shown that there are significant opportunities for units to jointly develop 
systems and share expertise, duplicate developments of very similar systems still 
exist within ITT World Directories. Knowledge sharing is rare and hindered and 
complicated by numerous interest and complexity barriers (the awareness barriers 
are low due to the limited size of the ITT World Directories Group). 
Interviews with several information technology managers within ITT World 
Directories, indicated that the main problems with Publitec were caused by a lack of 
user involvement and distance from operations. Athough Publitec developed the 
most advanced tools, systems, and products, they resided too much in their "ivory" 
tower and lost the "feeling" with the problems, issues, and concerns of the front-line 
managers in the operating companies. Moreover, units valued their autonomy highly 
and resisted corporate interference. 
Eventually, the inflexibility and user-hostile way of operating, made the individual 
companies decide to keep or re-equip their local IT departments, making the 
assistance of ITT Publitec superfluous. 
Adapted from Internal Documents and Interviezus. 
Exhibit 9.1: ITT Publitec: An Attempt to Increase the Degree of Knowledge Exploitation. 
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So, by recognizing the growing interdependence and acknowledging the need to ciange the 
corporate management style, ITT World Directories was confronted with a conplex and 
demanding transformation endeavour. Because integration has never been a major is:ue within 
this corporation and the management philosophy has always obscured or demotvated the 
development of an horizontal strategy, ITT World Directories had to overcome lumerous 
organizational barriers to cross-unit cooperation to achieve synergy and strengthen he group 
as a whole. As the quote heading this chapter states, a dramatic and fundamental ciange was 
necessary requiring a major investment in both financial and emotional terms )f all the 
employees. This change process was intended to influence ITT World Drectories' 
intracorporate knowledge sharing activities and hence was of interest for this research project. 
In contrast with the previous two cases in which we described the stimulating and hcilitating 
role of corporate management within organizations in a steady-state situation, the IIT World 
Directories case focuses particularly on the process dimension over a two year ptriod. The 
possibility to study the managerial actions affecting the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process over a period of two years provided this research project with an addiional and 
interesting viewpoint on the key managerial issues and challenges surrourding this 
organizational activity. 
Like the other two case studies, the case description of ITT World Directories is structured 
around the elements of the strategic "fit" model. In the following order, we review ITT World 
Directories' changing business environment, analyze the current alterations in ITTs and ITT 
World Directories' corporate strategy and philosophy, describe the firm's history and 
administrative heritage, and elaborate on ITT World Directories' recent efforts to lecome, as 
one slogan stated, "Stronger Together" by establishing an interdependent network o:'directory 
publishers throughout Europe. Finally, we conclude this chapter with a confrontaion of the 
particular organizational situation within ITT World Directories with the framework as 
presented in the theoretical part of this study. The empirical findings of the ITT World 
Directories case are reviewed on their fit and illustrative "power" regarding the theoretically 
deducted propositions on the prerequisite management systems for managing intricorporatc 
knowledge sharing. The identified management tools of the knowledge sharing awareness, 
persuasion, complexity reduction, and media system are systematically reviewed and some 
tentative conclusions are formulated on the barriers still obstructing and compl.eating the 
initiation and effectuation of intracorporate knowledge sharing within the organization of ITT 
World Directories, Inc. 
9.2 ITT WORLD DIRECTORIES' CHANGING KNOWLEDGE ENVIRONMENT 
ITT World Directories, Inc., established as a subsidiary of ITT corporation in 1967, has 
become the largest independent Yellow Pages publisher in the world with roughly IS$ 600 
and US$ 135 million in respectively worldwide revenues and operating income in 1994, 
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approximately 2,300 employees, and interests in eight countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Ireland, Norway, Puerto Rico, South Africa, and Japan). As a Yellow Pages 
publisher, ITT World Directories is functioning as an advertising and information medium 
between suppliers and potential buyers in the marketplace. Besides standardized information 
which is the same for all market segments (e.g., name, address, telephone number), businesses 
can advertise in the Yellow Pages to distinguish themselves from their competitors and to 
reach their targeted customers. Businesses advertise in the Yellow Pages because they perceive 
that doing so will bring them profit by generating new business. 
The Yellow Pages business has been a successful and profitable operation for a long period 
of time by creating value for both consumers and advertisers. In virtually all countries 
throughout the world, a quasi-governmental telecommunications authority had (and in some 
cases still has) the exclusive right to provide telecommunications services. The obligation to 
publish White and Yellow Pages telephone directories was mandated along with that right. In 
some countries the White and Yellow Pages were published under full control of the local 
telephone corporations, in other countries the local telephone corporation subcontracted that 
right to another corporation for which it received a fixed telco fee or a share of the profits. The 
main three full-service Yellow Pages operations of ITT World Directories in Europe - ITT 
Promedia in Belgium, ITT Gouden Gids in the Netherlands, and ITT Paginas Amarelas in 
Portugal - have operated for many years by a subcontracting arrangement with the national 
telecommunications services. The right to publish Yellow Pages was exclusive and hence each 
local Yellow Pages market was more or less a monopolistic one. 
From the beginning of 1994, it became clear that the exclusive relations with the local PTTs 
in Europe and hence the granted monopoly positions of the companies of ITT World 
Directories were no longer accepted by the Commission of the European Union. From its 
publication in 1987, the EC Green Paper on the development of a common market for 
telecommunications services and equipment made the regulatory environment in which the 
majority of the traditional telecommunications organizations had operated completely different 
through the application of the objectives to harmonize and liberalize3. Consequently, the PTT 
monopolies have given place to broader competition and the policy of the Commission of the 
European Community regarding competition in telephone directory publishing is based on the 
premise that all services should have the opportunity to be provided under competition. 
Specifically regarding directory information, the Commission has underlined several times that 
the access to information is not a matter of copyright law. Article 86 always applies where a 
dominant company abusively refuses access to such information or restricts unreasonably such 
access. 
The legal construction of competition is based on the strict understanding of a number of principles, in 
particular those contained in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. These aim to prohibit: concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States; more generally, any kind of practices which may 
create distortions of competition (such as discrimination); and any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the common market. 
Tota l Sa les (x million US$) 
Insurance 
Products 
Services 
I n c o m e / (Loss) (x million USS) 
Total Asse t s (x million USS) 
1985 
18,705 
6,834 
10.314 
1.557 
294 
37.849 
1986 
16,076 
8,480 
5,870 
1,726 
494 
35,805 
1987 
18,058 
9,507 
6.626 
1,925 
1,085 
39.983 
1988 
17,876 
8,553 
7,464 
1,859 
817 
41.941 
1989 
18,248 
8,689 
7,741 
1,818 
922 
45,503 
1990 
18,698 
8,836 
8,057 
1,805 
958 
49.043 
1991 
18,395 
9,242 
7,342 
1,811 
817 
53.867 
1992 
19,634 
9,862 
7,767 
2,005 
(260) 
58.764 
1993 
21.129 
10,338 
6,529 
4,262 
913 
70.560 
1994 
23,620 
11.102 
7,647 
4,871 
1,022 
100,854 
Sales Contribution by Region 
U.S. 
Western Europe 
Canada and Other 
13,125 13,773 
6,169 5,543 
1.666 1,813 
15,835 
5,811 
1,974 
Income Contribution by Region 
U.S. 
Western Europe 
Canada and Other 
(622) 
202 
156 
810 
353 
471 
992 
471 
156 
Number of Employees (x 1.000) 232 123 120 117 119 114 110 106 98 110 
Table 9.1: ITT: Ten-Year Financial Summary till the Split-up (Adapted from ITT Annual Report 1994). 
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As a consequence of these regulative alterations, ITT World Directories has been 
confronted with aggressive rivalry in two of its main local directory markets since 1995, while 
competition is anticipated in most other markets, and the key success factor of international 
expansion in Europe has shifted from negotiation to competitive skills. ITT World Directories 
must learn to react to head on competition in its local directory markets to maintain market 
leadership and current operating performance. Much of the 1990s will be a period of laying 
foundations for directory competition, rather than seeing full-fledged competition emerge. 
Nevertheless, it is generally expected that such competition will eventually emerge in the 
various countries throughout Europe. Competition always flows to markets in which 
participants can earn high returns. And no publishing medium has had higher returns than the 
yellow pages industry with operating margins of more than 25% in some markets (e.g., The 
Netherlands, Portugal). 
For ITT World Directories, the shift from being a contractual Yellow Pages publisher to a 
publisher of proprietary Yellow Pages requires a significant change in its market orientation 
and market approach. In the past, growth targets were often achieved by price increases (i.e., 
often more than 6 % annually) and aggressive sales techniques. Customers did not have an 
alternative provider of Yellow Pages and hence could be put under major pressure by the ITT 
World Directories' salesmen. Under competitive circumstances, however, the market approach 
can not afford to be based on an aggressive "push" strategy. "Soft" sales approaches, customer 
care, and relationship marketing need to dominate and should be complemented by a high 
quality directory product, advanced advertisement campaigns, and a perfect feeling of needs 
and developments in the market. So instead of distracting competitive advantage from a 
USERS 
More sophisticated 
users -both domestic 
and business 
Lifestyle changes 
Increasingly focusing 
on 
convenience, 
reliability, portability, 
accuracy 
and low cost 
Demand for multi-
functional services 
(e.g. product/ service 
information, 
competitor 
comparisons, billing) 
Greater awareness of 
environmental issues 
Adapted from Internal Dot 
TECHNOLOGY 
New electronic 
interactive 
systems 
opening up new 
possibilities 
Merging of 
directive and 
broadcasting 
segments 
Possibility of 
transaction-based 
services and 
information 
services 
•uments and Interviews. 
ADVERTISERS 
Large 
sophisticated 
players looking for 
new innovative 
channels 
Move to direct 
marketing 
Greater focus on 
performance 
measurement 
Concentration of 
advertisers 
Growing 
divergence of 
advertiser groups 
REGULATORY 
Deregulation and 
other moves to 
increase 
competition 
Greater focus on 
green issues 
Increasing 
difficulty to 
regulate the new 
emerging 
information 
environment 
COMPETITION 
Saturation of 
traditional 
Yellow Pages 
markets 
National Players 
looking for new 
international 
opportunities 
Emergence of small 
indepdendent 
publishers 
in some markets 
New emerging 
electronic 
channels, including 
cable TV 
Direct marketing 
becoming 
a stronger competitor 
Table 9.2: Changing Elements in the European Yellow Pages Business. 
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Business & Consumer Functions 
Adminstrative 
services / Education 
Interfaces 
Enablers 
Info 
Stored in 
digital 
database 
'wireless' 
Adapted from Internal Documents. 
Figure 9.1: Business and Consumer Information Services. 
governmentally granted monopoly position, the subsidiaries of ITT World Directories are 
increasingly forced to create and sustain a distinctive advantage vis-a-vis new entrants in what 
used to be their directory market. 
Besides the threat of direct competition, however, many other trends in the contextual 
environment have also enforced ITT World Directories to adapt its strategy and to invest in the 
development of its internal organization (see Table 9.2 for numerous trends affecting directory 
publishing). Particularly the dramatic convergence of electronics, publishing and networking 
industries strongly challenges the Yellow Pages operations in many countries. New electronic 
information media, both off-line (e.g., diskettes, CD-ROM, CD-I) and on-line (e.g., cable, 
internet), are becoming available challenging traditional paper-based directories and making 
more elaborate Yellow Pages information services possible (see Figure 9.1). For persons used 
to computers (a growing segment of the population) electronic queries elicit more options than 
paper queries and hence these persons prefer to access the information in an electronic way. 
"Certain purchases in the future will be made via electronic media," one marketing manager 
stressed. "Although this will differ per heading and per segment of population, a number of 
users will not use the paper product anymore within a certain period of time. [...] Transfer of 
information becomes increasingly more easy through automated information services and the 
distinction between directory publishers and other information providers is going to 
evaporate." 
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The ultimate vision for the buying process of consumers is a sort of video mall, where 
shoppers will browse through channels as through individual stores, ask for information and 
advise, order, and pay - all without leaving the comforts of home. Consumers as well as 
business men will be overloaded with information. In this case, the number of choices required 
of the individual consumer will reach impossible levels. As the range of consumer options 
expands, "information overload" will become a major difficulty both for the consumer and for 
the marketer attempting to reach them. The need for a "broker" service to match a prospect's 
needs with a likely niche service provider will grow. Moreover, as the number of consumption 
and leisure options grows, the perceived time constraints upon the individual will expand as 
well. Time-saving services like a "smart" Yellow Pages will experience strong demand in the 
future. 
"The essence of our business today and in the future," one general manager stressed, "is not 
targeted at the advertiser, however important he might be for our revenue How. The essence of 
our business is the usage of our product. Businesses advertise because they perceive that 
advertising in the Yellow Pages will bring them profit by generating new business. And new 
business is generated as a result of usage." "Because usage is so important," one of the front-
line managers added, "competition will battle for the user. Competition will come from 
traditional paper directories, and from other media too. It is therefore essential that in the field 
of product development (both paper and electronic) maximum attention is paid to what the 
user wants today and what he will demand in the future. [...] The only way to combat 
competition is to make sure that our products meet the needs of the user better than those of 
our competitors. Consequently, heavy investments will need to be made in the further 
improvement of the paper product, the increased breadth and depth of the information, 
providing the user with more information on which to base his choice from the range of 
suppliers, and the launch of several information delivery modes in addition to the paper 
medium." 
By enhancing its service, ITT World Directories differentiates its products from those of 
competitors. Moreover, a differentiation strategy increases the position of ITT World 
Directories' products vis-a-vis substitute products. Various products enhancements have been 
introduced during the past two to three years (e.g., directory on diskettes, CD-ROM, and 
Internet) and are being planned for the coming years. The differentiation strategy is 
complemented by a rationalization strategy to improve the firm's cost position and to sustain 
cash-Hows from operations. This objective will be met through increased efficiency and a 
decrease in overhead expenses. Continued investments in information technology have to 
facilitate the efficient effectuation of the newly developed business processes. 
Concluding we can state that numerous recent trends in the contextual and task environment 
have significantly changed ITT World Directories' knowledge environment (see Figure 9.2). 
Competition exists or is anticipated in most of its marketplaces, substitutes and niche players 
become more threatening, and users are increasingly demanding electronic variants of the 
traditional paper-based product. Besides the growing importance of local adaptation and 
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Figure 9.2: The Knowledge Environment Grid of ITT World Directories. 
customization strategies and hence the increased importance of market knowledge, expertise in 
product development, information technology, and several other functional areas (e.g., 
graphics, distribution, sales approaches) becomes more and more essential in achieving 
sustainable competitive advantage. Both market knowledge and expertise are simultaneously 
becoming more important and hence put a pressure on ITT World Directories' knowledge 
management abilities. 
7.3 ITT WORLD DIRECTORIES WITHIN CORPORATE STRATEGY 
The International Telephone Corporation (ITT) was founded by Sosthenes Behn as a Puerto 
Ricon Telephone Company in 1920. The growth expectations for telephone services were 
very high in those times and until Harold Geneen became Chief Executive Officer, telephony 
was ITT's core business. Under the 23-year stewardship of Geneen in the 1960s and 1970s, 
however, ITT achieved the classic conglomerate status for which this firm is well known. 
Instead of strengthening and extending its strongly internationalized network of telephone 
companies, Geneen wanted to establish a more US-based corporation in which it was safe to 
invest for the primarily American shareholders. In 1959, more than eighty percent of ITT's 
revenues originated from foreign operations while performance levels were often affected by 
currency fluctuations and political instability abroad. An investment program was started 
focused on the acquisition of primarily American companies. In this period revenues went 
from US$ 800 million to US$ 22 billion, and earnings rose from US$ 30 million to US$ 560 
million. A diversified portfolio of investments was built with stakes in insurance, financial 
services, defence, electronics, fluid technology, automotive products, hotels, telephone 
directories, and educational services. In 1979, when Harold Geneen stepped down as Chairman 
of the Board, ITT had made more than 250 acquisitions in less than two decades (Porter, 
1987). 
LOW 
HIGH 
4* 
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ITT Fluid 
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ITT Information 
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Figure 9.3: ITT Corporation till 1996: One Strongly Diversified Corporation. 
A vast confederation of 2,000 working units were handed over to Geneen's successor 
Araskog, including a US$ 5 billion debt, accrued, in part, by the merger and acquisition 
activities. The debt became a heavy cost burden at the moment interest levels started to rise 
significantly in the US in the beginning of the 1980s. These interest costs combined with the 
restructuring of several of its operations made ITT vulnerable to several hostile take-over bids. 
Some authors and journalists started to describe ITT as a "museum of the investment and 
management ideas of the sixties." Confronted with the threat of unwilling corporate take-over, 
Araskog took a number of steps to reduce the size of ITT's corporate debt. He streamlined the 
holding into a more limited number of product and service areas and sold more than 200 
operating units. The aim was to build an organization around a strongly reduced number of 
industries with the geographical emphasis on the US. His most dramatic steps until June 1995 
were the 1986 sale of the original core business of the company, the telephone business, to 
CGE of France. leading to the creation of Alcatel, and the US$ 13 billion sale of the financial 
services division in 1994. Notwithstanding the numerous disposals, ITT remained a typical 
conglomerate with an unrelated portfolio of business investments. 
In June 1995, the year in which ITT celebrated its 75th anniversary, the board of directors 
approved and announced a plan to divide ITT into three separate publicly traded companies: an 
insurance company, an industrial group, and a hotel and gaming company (see Figures 9.3 to 
9.5). The corporation which for decades embodied the concept of the conglomerate rounded 
off an era by breaking itself up. The demerger of the company, accounting for a sales figure of 
US$ 24 billion in 1994, is claimed to be the largest in the US since the enforced break-up of 
AT&T a decade ago. The companies have now separate boards and arc traded separately on 
the New York Stock Exchange. Mr. Araskog argued that the move would make it easier to 
raise capital, recruit staff, and create synergies between its operations. The greater focus could 
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Corporation I 
Leading international 
hotel company 
Revenues: $3,927m 
EBITDA: $258 
Recognized name in 
gambling 
Revenues: $ 1,005m 
EBITDA: $193 
A New York 
Entertainment Asset 
Revenues: $353m 
EBITDA: $12 
Largest publisher of 
Yellow Page 
directories outside the 
U.S. 
Revenues: $646m 
EBITDA: $163 
Leading provider of 
technical 
post-secondary 
degrees 
Revenues: $187m 
EBITDA: $18 
Corporation U 
Worldwide leader in design, 
development, production and 
sale of products, systems and 
services used to move, handle, 
transfer, and control fluids. 
Revenues: $1,125m 
Op. Income: $99 
ITT Industries 
One of the largest 
independent suppliers of 
systems and components 
to vehicle manufacturers 
worldwide. 
Revenues: $4,784m 
Op. Income: $1328 
Defense & 
Electronics 
Develops, manufactures 
and supports high 
technology electronics 
systems and components 
worldwide. 
Revenues $ 1,496m 
Op. Income: $196 
Corporation III 
7th largest US Properly & 
Casually insurance provider. 
Revenues: $6,308m 
Op. Income: $538 
ITT Hartford 
1 Ith largest US life 
insurer. 
Revenues: $3,o09m 
Op. Income: $246 
Major market position in 
UK and the Netherlands. 
Revenues: $1.185m 
Op. Income: $67 
Figure 9.5: ITT Corporation after 1996: Three Separate Companies. 
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Revenues 1994 
Total: $23,620 million 
Hospitality 
Industries 
Insurance 
Costs 1994 
Total: $22,115 million 
Hospitality 
Industries 
Insurance 
Figure 9.4: ITT Corporation Splitting into Three Businesses. 
lead to better performance of the underlying businesses. Instead of spreading its capital 
resources and management attention over a range of disconnected businesses, a focused 
company could concentrate on one line of business. A core business strategy could be 
developed for each corporation and each of them could be managed in a way that would make 
the total group more than the sum of its subparts. "It's the end of an era." Mr. Araskog stated. 
"The split up of the ITT Corporation is the end of a case study regarding the evolution of a 
conglomerate." 
ITT World Directories was brought under the "umbrella" of ITT Corporation, the company 
primarily concerned with entertainment, leisure, and travelling businesses. In emphasizing the 
value of the new ITT Corporation, corporate management pointed to the quality of its assets -
the ITT Sheraton Hotel chain, its gambling casinos, Manhattan's Madison Square Garden, and 
a consistently profitable telephone directory business. Having spent some $4.5 billion over the 
past two years to buy assets, Araskog, who chose to run the hotel and entertainment business, 
has yet to prove that he can make good returns from them and some critics seriously doubt 
ITT's ability in this respect due to the loosely defined core business of this group. As 
Chakravarty and Lubove stated in Forbes (March 25, 1996): "It appears that Araskog and 
Bowman have put together, not an integrated business, but a somewhat sexy-looking 
Gaming 
Hotels 
World Directories 
Educational Svc. 
Madison SG 
Others 
Total 
Revenues 
1,232.1 
3,896.0 
646.0 
187.0 
5,961.1 
1994 
%of 
Total 
20.7% 
65.4% 
10.8% 
3.1% 
100% 
EBITDA 
211.7 
263.0 
162.0 
19.0 
12.0 
-64.0 
603.7 
%of 
Total 
27.7% 
43.6% 
26.8% 
3.1% 
2.0% 
-10.6% 
100% 
Revenues 
1,452.3 
4,120.0 
654.0 
202.0 
6,428.3 
199 
%of 
Total 
22.3% 
64.1% 
10.2% 
3.1% 
100% 
EBITDA 
316.0 
383.0 
209.0 
28.0 
78.0 
-122.0 
892.0 
%of 
Total 
35.4% 
42.9% 
23.4% 
3.1% 
8.7% 
-13.7% 
100% 
Table 9.3: ITT Corporation - Revenues and EBITDA by Business Segment 1994-1995. 
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ITT World Directories' Strategic Vision 
ITT World Directories will develop, sell, and distribute enhanced business information 
in formats that can be tailored to meet the specific advertising needs of our customers. 
We will grow by concentrating on small and medium-sized businesses in geographic 
markets that have a developed communications and business infrastructure. We will 
become a major player with current, comprehensive, easy to use and accurate products 
that bring premium prices and margins. 
We will strive to anticipate the evolving needs of our customer base through constant 
product improvement and an effective and responsive sales force. 
Adapted from an Internal Document. 
Figure 9.6: ITT World Directories' Vision Statement. 
conglomerate that makes acquisitions on an opportunistic basis rather than on a strategic 
basis."4 ITT World Directories is seen by capital investors as an important addition to this 
group in terms of the generated cash flow but certainly outside the scope of the firm. Because 
cash flow from gambling and hotels tends to get reabsorbed in capital spending, the directory 
business is ITT's principal source of the free cash flow it will need to reduce debt and make 
acquisitions. Therefore, the emerging competition in local directory markets is seen as a 
serious threat for this group as a whole. 
In this respect, ITT World Directories, Inc. was stimulated to develop a corporate vision and 
to establish action plans to consolidate and, if possible, further expand its highly profitable 
business in a more competitive and dynamic business environment. Caused by the dramatic 
changes in its business environment, ITT World Directories was forced to adapt its 
organization to increase the firm's flexibility. This flexibility was required to enable the firm to 
react to the various market changes, technological developments, and emerging competition. 
While "milking" its yellow pages businesses and hence generating a significant cash (low for 
ITT was affordable and reasonable in a stable market, a rejuvenation of its Yellow Pages 
operations seemed now inevitable in improving its chances for survival on the longer term. 
The traditional emphasis on cost-cutting operations, manpower reductions, and improved top-
line performance would in these more dynamic environmental circumstances be destructive. 
Besides optimizing the local operations, ITT World Directories needed to make the total group 
more than its subparts. Corporate value, as was assumed by ITT's top management, could be 
generated by merging operational activities and leveraging the existing knowledge in terms of 
experience, skills, operating systems, and product innovations. Moreover, the prospective 
4
 Interesting to note is that Hilton Hotels launched a hostile $6.5bn takeover bid for ITT at the end of January 
1997. To be able to finance the deal, Hilton Hotels was expected to raise a significant amount of money 
(approximately $1.5bn) by selling ITT's non-core interest World Directories. In a reaction, also ITT said it 
considered selling its World Directories unit as a part of its plan to shed non-core assets. 
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"corporate umbrella" should be able to strengthen the competitive strategies of its subsidiaries 
and enable an internationalization strategy to further leverage corporate resources. 
In 1995, ITT World Directories formulated a mission statement to guide the company into 
the future (see Figure 9.6). In response to Yellow Pages advertising's flattening growth and 
numerous changes in the contextual environment of the Yellow Pages contractors, ITT World 
Directories' management group developed a new strategic vision containing two central 
elements (see Figure 9.7). On the one hand, ITT World Directories' position in the yellow 
pages business should be further expanded and refined. Here the principal objective was to 
ensure sustained cash flow from operations and to enhance operations, thereby increasing 
shareholder value. On the other hand, ITT World Directories should diversify into other 
marketing and advertising areas where the distribution of enhanced business information offers 
growth opportunities, sustainable returns and attractive returns on investment. This strategic 
thrust would permit ITT World Directories to migrate from a paper-based product to an 
electronic product. 
Above all, most managers started to acknowledge the necessity for the operating units to 
unite their forces in order to maintain market leadership in their local yellow pages markets. 
Management throughout the hierarchy was forced to challenge its existing conception of 
working together. A dramatic and fundamental change was necessary which required a major 
investment in both financial and emotional terms, and in line with these changes intracorporate 
knowledge sharing moved from a non-issue to a strategic necessity. Individual companies 
could not afford the investments prerequisite to rejuvenate their own directory business and 
come up with innovations to differentiate their products and services from competitors. In 
contrast with the prevailing situation in which a lot of duplication in knowledge exploration 
activities still existed (see Exhibit 9.2), knowledge resources had to be shared and investments 
in research and development activities coordinated. Moreover, corporate management 
stretched its corporate goals by formulating the objective to gradually increase the scale of ITT 
World Directories by an active internationalization strategy to leverage the corporate resources 
< ^ YELLOW PAGES ^ > (^DIVERSIFICATION ~^> 
Enhance Pursue Develop Marketing Electronic Major 
Existing New YP Anchor Service Joint Buyer-Seller Infocosm 
Operations Opportunities Relationships Ventures Forums Acquisitions 
Adapted from an Internal Document. 
Figure 9.7: ITT World Directories' Strategic Direction. 
246 • CHAPTER NINE 
Electronic Media: 
Unexploited Opportunities for Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing 
The migration of ITT World Directories' print directories to electronic media is a 
transition that the company has been working on for several years. Because many 
different avenues of development are available for such a service, it is difficult to 
take a single strategic approach. Flexibility and experimentation are the essence of 
this component of strategy. Essentially the company will seek a wide variety of 
experiences and ventures that minimize cost and capital outlays as consumer 
acceptance and usage patterns become apparent. 
In line with these objectives, all ITT World Directories companies have introduced 
several new information products providing customers with computer access to 
directory services. ITT Gouden Gids, ITT Paginas Amarelas, and ITT Promedia have 
joined the information age by offering access to their databases through computer 
diskettes, CD-ROMs, and Internet. In The Netherlands, each of the company's 26 
paper directories has been reproduced on diskettes for DOS or Windows users and 
on CD-ROM for multimedia access. Moreover, ITT Gouden Gids has put the Dutch 
Yellow Pages directories on-line by developing one of the most comprehensive Web 
sites developed by an ITT company. In Portugal, ITT Paginas Amarelas developed a 
special facsimile directory on CD-ROM. The new directory listed business and their 
facsimile numbers throughout the country for convenient access. The company also 
offers Paginas Amarelas Electronica, an operator-assisted Yellow Pages service for 
voice telephone access to directory services. In Belgium, ITT Promedia began 
providing CD-ROM versions of its directories in May 1995. 
"Our new diskettes and CD-ROMs have been well received," reported the General 
Manager of ITT Paginas Amarelas. "They are attracting considerable media attention 
and are quite popular with advertisers and users." "Users gain the convenience and 
speed of computer access," remarked the ITT Gouden Gids General Manager. "They 
can browse through the diskettes, CD-ROM, or our internet site by their choice of 
specific or related headings, key words, alphabetical listings, and geography. The 
geographic search provides the names, addresses and telephone and fascimile 
numbers of businesses within 5, 10, 15, 25, and 50 kilometers." The General Manager 
of ITT Promedia explained, "We see these electronic directories as a natural 
evolution in the market-place. They are one additional means for us to help bring 
buyers and sellers together, only now we are doing it with an eye on future 
technology." 
Strangely enough, however, exchange of knowledge has been limited while working 
together would have saved development costs and could have helped the smaller 
units of World Directories. The units have been developing, each with the help of 
outside consultants, their electronic applications independently from the other ITT 
World Directories subsidiaries. Similar applications were developed in multiple 
units while at a functional level many of the problems and their possible solutions 
are quite universal. Differences in development approaches and hardware 
environments made aggregation of experiences for prospective advancements of the 
applications almost impossible. 
So ITT World Directories was confronted with a lot of duplicate development work 
in an area which has proved to be susceptible for knowledge sharing and joint 
development of systems in other firms. Moreover, none of the electronic applications 
were designed to be easily transmittable and adapted to the requirements of other 
units of ITT World Directories. 
Adapted from Internal Documents and Interviews. 
Exhibit 9.2: Electronic Media: Unexploited IKS Opportunities. 
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and to achieve a critical mass for future investments. In this respect, ITT Corporation 
announced in February 1997 that it was bidding to buy SEAT SpA, an Italian publisher of 
telephone directories. Including SEAT would make World Directories a stronger company and 
worth more due to the opportunities to share expertise and resources (Reuters, 21 February 
1997). 
9.4 ITT WORLD DIRECTORIES' ADMINISTRATIVE HERITAGE 
Historically, the main task of ITT World Directories' management at the global headquarters in 
New York and the European headquarters in Brussels was to review, discuss, and consolidate 
the strategic and operating plans of the subsidiaries. Communication in this organization, 
which governs more than 2,300 employees worldwide, took place in quantitative terms without 
long deliberations regarding the way these financial targets should be accomplished. 
Dominated by accountants and controllers, headquarters of ITT World Directories had always 
focused on past and forecasted performance levels, agreed and to-be agreed budgets, and 
capital investment proposals. Like many other companies (Johnson, 1992), corporate 
management of this firm often behaved as if the pursuit of accounting goals was the 
underlying force driving business competition. Goals and reviews dominated by accounting 
information have been constricting management's thinking. Moreover, the manipulation of 
business strategies and processes by front-line managers to achieve top and bottom-line targets 
has often led to the destruction instead of the creation of corporate value. 
In line with the changing management philosophy within the ITT Corporation and due to 
the increased pressure on operating units to gain competitive strength, ITT World Directories' 
corporate management started to acknowledge the number of pressing issues it had to resolve 
regarding its value-added role to the businesses in the beginning of 1995. The management 
style of ITT World Directories has always been strongly influenced by the management 
practices of its "parent." Harold Geneen was not only responsible for the impressive 
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Adapted from an Internal Document. 
Exhibit 9.3: ITT World Directories' Key Business Processes. 
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acquisition strategy in the 1960s and 1970s but was also the "founding father" of ITT's 
management control system which was based, as said by himself (Geneen, 1984), on his 
professional background as an accountant. The central element of ITT's control system is a 
growth objective of 10 percent annually of the earnings per share. Such a quantitative target 
was the only directive which could be commonly understood by all of ITT's business groups. 
In managing an unrelated diversified portfolio of business operations, financial targets are 
unequivocal and provide managers with clear objectives and a focused motivation. Variances 
against an agreed plan invoked penetrating questions from the top managers in the 
organization, could seriously damage the position of the responsible manager, and commanded 
speedy action from the bottom. 
Although the "growth" target remained the ultimate objective of the ITT Corporation as a 
whole, Geneen acknowledged that financial targets could only be achieved by well-developed 
company strategies. The annual results were the consequence of the operations and actions of 
the companies in that specific year and the management of key ratios has the threat of losing 
the link with and control over those local action plans. The large diversity of businesses in 
which ITT had invested made it very difficult to have an intimate knowledge of each unit's 
competitors and marketplace and hence to direct the businesses strategically. Geneen, 
however, wanted more control over its corporation. A management control system was 
developed which had to get the facts behind the figures and operate as an early warning system 
for unexpected developments. A control system was developed which was based on three key 
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Adapted from an Internal Document. 
Figure 9.8: Organization Chart of ITT World Directories, Inc. 
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Key Principles of ITT's Corporate Control System 
ITT's Corporate Control System is recognized throughout the world as a unique 
control system which is very effective for managing a conglomerate of strongly 
unrelated investments. This control system has made it possible for ITT to 
accomplished its key objective of 10 percent growth of the earnings per share for 
many years. The control system is developed to get the facts behind the figures and to 
prevent the corporation for unexpected (negative) suprises. ITT's Corporate Control 
System comprises three key principles which will be explained shortly below. 
Principle 1: The Planning Cycle 
Although the content and focal points have been changed and adapted through the 
years, the characteristic element of planning within ITT, namely planning the whole 
year around, remained the same. A distinction is made between a strategic plan and 
an operating plan. The first part of each year (Januari - June) the strategic plans with 
figures on the past year, the current year, and the next five years are written down, 
discussed, and decided upon. The adapted prognosis of the current year is classified 
as "forecast." The second part of each year (July - December) the figures on the past 
year, the current year, and the next five years are presented again in the the 
operating plan and reviewed, compared with the budgets, and consolidated by 
corporate management. Budgets are very important in discussions within ITT. Not 
only because it is an indication of next year's performance, but also because it 
includes a commitment of local management. ITT's budgets are very detailed and 
require a lot of analysis work. 
Principle 2: Motrthly Reports 
Although ITT took leave of its bi- weakly reports, reports on the budgets in relation to 
the forcecast and the situation last year are reviewed by corporate management and 
hence provided by company management on a montly basis. Focal points in the 
monthly reports are the deviations from budget, some key financial figures (P&L, 
balance-sheet, cash flow review), and a "Controllers Letter." The Controllers Letter is 
a description of the main deviations in the P&L and balance-sheet from the forecast 
and the previous year. Moreover, an enumeration is given in the CL of the main 
developments in the company. 
Not only the Controller has to report on a regular basis. Each and every manager 
within ITT must write a monthly report each month. In this report a manager describes 
and explains the main developments in his area of responsibility. Too circumvent that 
the "bad news" is hidden away in the narrative, the first page of each report includes 
a list of problems ("red flags") and positive developments ("green flags"). Giving an 
early warning for "bad news" is highly valued within ITT. 
Principle 3: Organization of the Controllers 
ITT's Corporate control system is dependent on the provision of the financial data by 
the companies and needs to guarantee that these figures are correct. Geneen believed 
that by emphasizing the importance of the correctness and exactness of the "facts" the 
decision-making process would improve in the end. Not the "apparent facts", the 
"assumed facts," the "reported facts," or "hoped-for facts" were important, as argued 
by Geneen, but the "unshakable facts" needed to be the foundation on which decisions 
were made. To secure the provision of these "unshakable facts," ITT has 
institutionalized an organizational structure in which the controller in each company 
reports directly to corporate controller and not to the genera! manager of the company 
(see Figure 9.9). By making the controller directly responsible for the correctness of the 
facts and figures, the General Manager would never be tempted to deform the facts or 
make a "window dressing" of the situation of his company. 
Adapted from Internal Documents and Verbeek (1994). 
Exhibit 9.4: Key Principles of ITT's Control System in 1995. 
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Figure 9.9: Organizational Structure of Each Operating Unit. 
foundations (see Exhibit 9.4): a very extensive planning cycle, monthly meetings in which the 
center reviewed the details of the company's monthly reports with attention for so-called "red 
flags" and "green flags," and controllers who did not report to the general manager but to 
controllers in the center. 
ITT's control system does not buffer managers from financial pressures. Rather, it imposes a 
more demanding and penetrating discipline than the capital market itself. By putting 
performance pressure on the operating affiliates ITT achieved outstanding performance levels 
for many years. One shortcoming of this system, however, is its bias against strategies and 
investments with long lead times and paybacks. Managing financial ratios on a company-level 
(e.g., manpower, cost, ROI) can affect the long-term performance of their business. 
Management behavior is strongly influenced by the measures on which their appraisals are 
based. Moreover, blind adherence to last year's budget targets can preclude adaptive strategies 
and advantageous moves. Particularly in businesses where circumstances change rapidly, 
controls can become a straitjacket, and opportunities can be missed. At a minimum, this makes 
financial control companies vulnerable to aggressive, committed competitors that can tolerate 
a long-term view. The failure to back aggressive strategies means that growth in financial 
control companies comes more from acquisitions rather than from internal developments. A 
portfolio of business investments is built without a serious concern regarding the exploitation 
of operational and strategic synergies between the firm's businesses and this particular 
strategy, as argued before, is increasingly abandoned by investors on the capital market. 
The bias against strategies and investments with long lead times and paybacks has not only 
stimulated the rise of a conglomerate of unrelated businesses, but has also obscured the 
effectuation of horizontal strategies between the individual companies. The focus on the 
performance of each business unit and the customary way of putting local management fully 
responsible for the achievement of its targets, has led to an organizational culture in which 
very few synergetic opportunities were exploited. In their strive to achieve top and bottom-line 
targets, company managers could not afford and were not motivated to built long-term 
cooperative relationships with their internal colleagues. Moreover, corporate management 
often put a pressure on and created tensions among the individual companies by benchmarking 
them against each other on weakly defined parameters. Consequently, "helping your internal 
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competitors" was not perceived by many of ITT's company managers as an effort with an 
interesting return on investments. 
So, intracorporate knowledge sharing was only achieved incidentally and was certainly not 
a systematic activity in ITT World Directories. In theory, of course, this problem could be 
solved by taking stimulating and facilitating measures. ITT World Directories, however, 
preferred to tear businesses apart in the quest to weed out low-profit activities instead of 
building coordinated global positions. This division decided to focus on segments or niches 
and avoid integrated strategies across a broad business area. Many opportunities to share 
knowledge internally remained unexploited and many attempts to increase the leverage of 
available knowledge failed due to the organizational culture and the administrative processes 
within ITT World Directories. 
9.5 MANAGEMENT TOOLS APPLIED BY ITT WORLD DIRECTORIES 
Notwithstanding the enormous conflict with the traditional way of managing the individual 
companies, ITT World Directories formulated the objective to make of the group as a whole 
more than the sum of the individual business units in the beginning of 1995. Creating more 
unity within a structure which has provided limited focus and help to look at the common 
problems and solutions for many years, seemed to be a rather complicated assignment but the 
circumstances enforced ITT World Directories to adopt a strategy aimed at exploiting the 
existing synergies. It was clear from the start that establishing a more integrated group of 
companies would require a dramatic adaptation of the organizational context. A new 
management philosophy, new management tools, and a stronger corporate identity had to be 
implemented to take away or reduce many of the barriers to cross-unit cooperation. Barriers 
which had become particular strong due to a deep institutionalized feeling of distrust and the 
lack of effective tools to manage the awareness, interest, complexity, and media barriers 
between the dispersed Yellow Pages operations. 
ITT World Directories decided to commit itself to a dramatic business transformation 
process, involving considerable costs but hopefully resulting in a significant improvement in 
multiple aspects of the business units' operating performance (e.g., productivity, stakeholder 
satisfaction, increased revenues, best practice levels). A new European organization had to be 
built, grounded on totally different business principles than the traditional organization. In the 
following of this section, a process description will be given of the various steps ITT World 
Directories has taken during recent years in trying to make the business transformation effort 
succeed. Instead of enlisting and describing the various implemented management tools having 
an impact on the intracorporate knowledge sharing process, as we did in the Unilever and 
Canon case, a longitudinal study is presented of the subsequent actions ITT World Directories' 
management effectuated in its aim to establish an integrated business in Europe. A mutually 
consistent set of initiatives had to be taken to accomplish the corporate goals. By taking these 
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initiatives various inherited barriers obstructing or complicating the transfer and leverage of 
knowledge within ITT World Directories were, deliberately or not, brought down. As depicted 
in Table 9.4, the management actions can be related to our proposed conceptions of 
prerequisite management systems for managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
ACTION #1: STRATEGIC MAXI-PLAN SEMINARS 
In the beginning of 1995, ITT World Directories' management started a strategic visioning 
process throughout the organization. While a financially oriented perspective has dominated 
the operational and strategic plans of this group for many years, World Directories' top 
management perceived it necessary to develop and share a strategic perspective before 
commencing with the business process redesign project. Many analyses of business 
transformation projects have shown that one of the critical success factors of such a task is the 
alignment of the redesign efforts with the strategy of the company. Business Process 
Reengineering needs to be linked to strategy to circumvent that the strategy and the 
reengineering initiative may be pulling in different directions or may not be mutually 
supportive. Business processes serve as the means to realize business strategies and are the 
means to render strategies explicit and precise, facilitating their operationalization. Without 
this link, neither business strategy nor business reengineering will achieve its potential 
benefits. 
Five of ITT World Directories' subsidiaries participated in the business transformation 
effort and a comparison of their strategic plans learned that significant differences existed in 
their strategic vision and objectives (see Figure 9.10). ITT Gouden Gids, for example, 
perceived a gradual migration from the paper product to other media as prerequisite while ITT 
Promedia was convinced that it was highly unlikely that in the foreseeable future new media 
would emerge that could duplicate the usage and hence the value of the printed directory. ITT 
Promedia preferred to enhance its current paper product and its sales process to optimize profit 
margins, maximize revenue growth both in existing and new markets, improve customer care, 
and gain competitive advantage. Moreover, ITT Paginas Amerelas was not prepared like ITT 
Gouden Gids and ITT Promedia to limit itself to their current product or current market and 
wanted to diversify to new markets with new products. The development of the Portuguese 
advertising market would create attractive investment opportunities which ITT Paginas 
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Amarelas wanted to exploit (e.g., outdoor advertising, alternate segments of the advertising 
market). The main component of Golden Pages' operating strategy was to lower overall costs 
and enhance the core product, while Intermedia wanted to pursue core product enhancements 
and stretch the business to new markets. 
So major differences existed between the strategic priorities of the subsidiaries of ITT 
World Directories and hence these differences had to be explicated. For cross-unit cooperation 
to succeed, it seemed important to create mutual understanding between the business units and 
bring strategic perspectives in line or at least not in conflict with each other. Without such an 
understanding, a discussion on the core processes and their redesign would be much more 
complicated and hence less valuable. A business strategy identifies both the processes the 
organization must have in place to satisfy today's stakeholders and dictates those processes 
which must be in place for future competitiveness. Consequently, business strategy prioritizes 
the importance and the optimal organization of different processes in the organization and 
hence ITT World Directories made an attempt during the Strategic Maxi-plan sessions to 
create and get agreement on a shared strategic perspective. Although local adaptations were 
allowed, a feeling of mutual understanding was necessary to facilitate the discussion in latter 
stages of the business transformation effort. 
Corporate, World Directories and Unit management participated in the development of the 
World Directories Maxi-Plan. The principal elements which were discussed and scrutinized 
during this process were a situational assessment of the competitive environment, the vision 
and strategy at both unit and divisional level, and cost-benefit analyses of the proposed 
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Figure 9.11: The Principal Criteria Employed in the Review of the Maxi-Plan. 
strategic actions. Financial reporting requirements were significantly reduced and the principal 
criteria employed in the review of the plans and overall strategy were now more qualitative in 
nature: growth, competition, usage, advertisers, and electronic migration (see Figure 9.11). In 
the end, the various national and international management meetings resolved in a corporate 
perspective for the ITT World Directories group. Next to the mission statement as presented in 
Figure 9.6, ITT World Directories' management agreed upon five critical tasks for the group as 
a whole. First, a fundamental redesign of core business processes had to lead to the application 
of best business practices to improve both the competitive strength and the top and bottom 
lines of each operating unit. Second, the development and enrichment of the core Yellow 
Pages products to meet or exceed customer expectations, as well as explore innovative product 
extensions to meet new and emerging market demands. Next, the database facilities and 
capabilities had to be improved for the collection and organization of customer data in 
electronic formats to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the affiliates' operations. 
Fourth, diversification was defined as a company-wide effort to identify and develop new 
business opportunities for ITT World Directories that leverage organizational competencies 
and lessen unit dependence on the core Yellow Pages product. Finally, through careful analysis 
of its operations, ITT World Directories wanted to ensure that it is perceived worldwide as an 
environmentally responsible company. 
In the end of the strategic visioning process, a shared understanding of the firm's own 
business, the critical challenges, the key success factors, and the strategic priorities existed 
throughout ITT World Directories. Differences in perspectives were explicated and shared 
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business issues became better known. The foundation was created on which a growing degree 
of integration between the operating companies could be built. 
ACTION #2: DEFINING COMMON PROCESSES - THE EARLY ATLAS STAGES 
Following the strategic visioning sessions, ITT World Directories pursued its business 
transformation endeavour by initiating the project ATLAS. ATLAS was the largest cross-unit 
operation in the history of World Directories, involving 10 consultants, 10 divisional 
managers, and more than 40 key managers of the subsidiaries. Moreover, all management 
layers in the operating companies were notified and familiarized as much as possible to ensure 
corporate-wide commitment. Without this commitment, however, ITT World Directories 
acknowledged that it would be impossible to break through the barriers inherited from the 
traditional culture of unit independence. In the past, the structure of ITT World Directories had 
provided limited focus to look at common problems and their solutions. The lack of a "sharing 
culture" has resulted in major company differences in terms of processes, activities, market 
approaches, and implemented management systems. Moreover, a feeling of distrust resided 
throughout the organization hindering all cooperative efforts on an inter-subsidiary level. 
The aim of ATLAS was to significantly improve customer service levels, increase revenue 
generation, and undercut competitors in cost structure. All subsidiaries were threatened by the 
declining growth in the Yellow Pages market, increased competition, margin pressure, and 
electronic substitutes. Hence, divisional management presented the reengineering effort as one 
of the critical tasks to optimize the net returns from core operations, gain competitive strength, 
explore new business opportunities, and improve organizational flexibility. Notwithstanding 
their severe scepticism, the five full-service Yellow Pages units were asked to formate a cross-
functional project team with in-depth functional understanding. These cross-functional teams 
had to contribute to prioritization of ITT World Directories' key processes and to the unit 
Adapted from Internal Documents. 
Figure 9.12: A Perspective on ITT World Directories' Business Transformation. 
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Figure 9.13: Key Process Selection and the Process Analysis Activities. 
baselining and process profiling activities. Within the confines of the ATLAS project, ITT 
World Directories' core processes had to be examined on key performance indicators (e.g., 
capability delivery, cycle times, service and quality levels, cost drivers) to reveal organization 
inefficiencies and identify the need for new technologies and systems. In this phase of the 
business reengineering process, consultants provided the methodology (see Figure 9.12 and 
Figure 9.13), creative ideas, and their benchmark capabilities. Moreover, these consultants 
would act as a catalyst to build buy-in and create change. 
In September 1995, ATLAS commenced with a Business Transformation Training Program 
for all participants in Brussels. The purpose of this three-day training program was to provide a 
detailed introduction to the Booz, Allen & Hamilton's methodology and allow participants to 
develop intercultural and cooperative skills. The training program had to "rally the troops" and 
lower the resistance to cooperate. Involving people in defining their roles and facilitating two-
way and open communication helps building ownership. Several workshops were arranged to 
led the managers share their ideas, know-how, and comments and create a basis on which trust 
could grow. Moreover, a quick introduction was given on such techniques as benchmarking, 
activity-based costing, and value-added analysis which could be valuable during the analysis 
and redesign phase of the ATLAS project. In short, the training program created a uniform 
understanding and groundwork by all the team members and facilitated employees to establish 
informal relationships with their colleagues in other countries. 
In the agreed project organization, locally focused resources were complemented with 
central coordination and oversight of a Steering Committee (see Figure 9.14). While the local 
teams were responsible for the collection and aggregation of data such as past performance 
levels, alternative customer segmentations, and activity models of prime business processes, 
the Steering Committee selected the core processes, benchmarked the companies, and set the 
targets for each prime business process. Working on the reengineering effort, however, was a 
phenomenal challenge for everyone involved, with valuable skill development, and high 
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visibility at the unit, divisional, and corporate level. As one of the top managers stated, "As 
this is a unit-focused project performed by and for the units, we will ensure that the unit teams 
and individuals contributing to our success shine very brightly." 
During the first 6 months, it became gradually clear that the differences between the 
companies in terms of process configurations were far less than was often assumed. As stated 
by one manager: "In the past, we have always acted as if our units differed too much to be 
comparable. In being confronted with the data on process definitions and activity flows, we 
still see that we define our businesses differently and that we put emphasis on other aspects of 
our operations. [...] However, our business processes comprise for more than 80 percent the 
same activities and hence we need to acknowledge that we have neglected numerous 
opportunities to share knowledge in the past." In line with this observation of the shared 
elements, it proved to be possible to frame the business of each company in three broad 
business processes, namely direction setting & innovation, sales & order management, and 
delivery. Moreover, some uniform support functions were distinguished for all operating 
affiliates. This emphasis on the communality instead of the differences enabled a streamlining 
and optimalization of the resource allocation on a cross-subsidiary basis. A blueprint of the 
new European organization could be developed which challenged conventional thinking, 
ignored traditional organizational boundaries, and helped in cutting out redundant business 
activities. 
Most of the team members, however, remained tremendously suspicious during the early 
stages of the ATLAS project. The divisional superiors to whom local team members had to 
deliver their data were still the same managers which misused benchmarks in the past to 
compare "apples with oranges" and "squeeze" all operational leeway and slack out of the local 
companies. As one manager explained: "ITT World Directories has a history of optimizing 
each individual unit. Working together to make from the group more than the sum of its parts 
Adapted from Project "ATLAS" Documentation. 
Figure 9.14: Project ATLAS Organization Phase I. 
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requires a totally different orientation. [...] It takes time before we will get used to this and 
totally trust our international colleagues." Although tight project targets and deadlines kept the 
"data-generating machine running," ownership was not felt in the units. Although regular team 
meetings on a local and international level were intended to improve this situation and reduce 
the resistance, the basis for implementation was still precarious. 
The early stages of the ATLAS project ended with detailed cost reduction and process 
improvement targets for each core process such as the development of a European competence 
center for direction setting and innovation, sales channel realignments according to new 
market segmentation, and the implementation of digital graphic systems. Moreover, it also 
identified significant revenue enhancement potential across all three units by such measures as 
salesforce specialization, increased face time, improved training, and improved compensation 
packages. The blueprints were based on a set of guiding principles for the core processes 
which were supported by a quantitative and qualitative rationale. The output of the first phase 
combined with the vision of ITT World Directories' top management led to a new 
configuration of European operations driving operational and capability changes throughout 
the European organization. 
ACTION #3: TOWARDS A NEW ORGANIZATION - THE IATTER ATLAS STAGES 
In the beginning of 1996, ITT World Directories announced the intention to break up the 
project structure of the early ATLAS stages and to assemble an ATLAS implementation team 
to develop, test, and implement the blueprint of the prospective European operations. The 
ATLAS implementation team had the challenging task to come up with tangible and common 
solutions in terms of the relocation of activities, human resource transformations, the 
prerequisite administrative procedures, and information systems enabling the coordinative and 
operational actions. Approximately 15 skilful, high-level managers were recruited throughout 
the ITT World Directories hierarchy to participate in the roll out of the accommodated process 
flows and to use their credibility in the organization to make things happen. The ATLAS 
implementation team comprising numerous nationalities was located in a separate building in 
Amsterdam and headed by the General Manager of the Dutch operating company. 
The aim of the implementation team was to work to the institutionalization of a new 
configuration of European operations with both central, country, and field responsibilities for 
direction setting & innovation, sales & order management, and delivery (see Figure 9.15). 
Regarding the first, the intention was to create a Marketing Center of Competence to 
concentrate critical skills and whose mission would be to bring a more uniform and better 
coordinated approach to current markets and channel ideas from local markets. Moreover, the 
Marketing Center of Competence would develop consistent frameworks across countries in 
several areas such as segmentation, competitive intelligence, product planning, and promotion. 
Local marketing resources would take care of the implementation of marketing strategies at the 
local level and would feedback local marketing information to the Center of Competence. For 
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sales and order management the intention was to create a Sales Coordination function that 
centrally optimizes workload distribution while the detailed sales planning activities would 
remain local. Furthermore, sales activities would be streamlined and reorganized but kept 
under local control in an effort to keep these activities as close to the customer as possible. 
Centralized coordination would take care of the integration, central research and development, 
and the detection of knowledge transfer opportunities. With respect to delivery, it was decided 
that book production would remain a locally managed process while the procurement of paper 
and printing services would be centrally coordinated to exploit economies of scale. 
The implementation team that was responsible for the institutionalization of this new 
configuration of the European operations worked within a clear structure (see Figure 9.16). 
The program director had overall management oversight on the program and was responsible 
for defining and imparting the program vision to various project teams, arbitrating and 
resolving conflicts between teams, and working closely with project managers. The program 
director had to take care of the integration of all individual plans into a global change 
management master plan. Per topic area, a project manager got the responsibility to implement 
the ATLAS blueprint. Actively assisted by personnel in the operating companies, the project 
manager has to come up with solutions for the group at large and hence solutions which are 
commonly applicable and easily transmittable. To enable overall ATLAS program 
management (e.g., operating analysis, risk management, shared services support, 
communication), a program office was established to act as the coordination board across 
projects for support from shared services such as information technology, human resources, 
legal, and facilities. 
The rationale behind the establishment of such a centralized implementation team, as 
argued by one of the consultants, was threefold. First, by concentrating critical skills, one can 
make good use of scarce resources and expertise and hence develop optimal solutions. 
Subsequently, these solutions can be optimally exploited because the implementation team 
should have the authority to prescribe methodologies, systems, and best practice procedures to 
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Adapted from Project "ATLAS" Documentation. 
Figure 9.16: Project ATLAS Organization Phase II. 
be followed by countries. Second, the centralized implementation team defines approaches, 
procedures, and formats that allow to compare results (e.g., market research, product 
launches). Comparable measures trigger learning from internal best practices, a major 
imperative to intracorporate knowledge sharing. Third, a centralized knowledge base with best 
practice know-how and commonly applicable support systems, creates opportunities for further 
expansion into other countries and strongly related markets. Once the skills and know-how are 
developed in a universally applicable way, it can be quickly implemented in and supplied to 
new business ventures. 
The concentration of knowledge development activities will become, if successful, a stable 
element of the prospective ITT World Directories organization. "The idea is," as one of the 
team members stated, "that the ATLAS implementation will replace the European 
headquarters in Brussels eventually. [...] The accountants and controllers in Brussels lack the 
appropriate skills and radiation to direct and assist the prospective organization of ITT World 
Directories. Besides the responsibility for top and bottom-line, the operating units will become 
accountable for process organization and innovation adoption in the near future. The members 
of the ATLAS implementation team are most capable to act as the acknowledged superior for 
making any judgements in this respect." So knowledge champion and knowledge liaison roles 
were created which would be able to stimulate and facilitate the intracorporate knowledge 
sharing process in the future. 
^ 
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9.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
For more than thirty years, ITT World Directories has never showed much interest in the 
competitive advantages of its subsidiaries. Based on governmentally granted monopoly 
positions in highly attractive marketplaces, ITT World Directories could "milk" their yellow 
pages operations without harming the continuity of the business. In a more dynamic business 
environment, however, as stressed by Stalk et al. (1992), strategy has to become 
correspondingly more dynamic. Instead of a "war of position," competition becomes a "war of 
movement" in which success depends on the anticipation on market trends and quick responses 
to changing customer needs. Starting from a position where both market knowledge and firm-
specific expertise did not significantly affect operating performance, ITT World Directories 
was forced to develop a new competitive strategy. This strategy not only had to be based on a 
well-informed organization regarding market developments and demands, but also depended 
upon the creation of an organizational groundwork compromising distinctive expertise in 
critical areas for Yellow Pages companies like sales techniques, electronic media, graphics, 
database systems, information management, marketing skills, and directory distribution. 
This changing knowledge environment, combined with the new corporate philosophy 
emerging after the split of ITT into three companies, called for intracorporate knowledge 
sharing as a strategic issue for ITT World Directories. ITT World Directories governs a broad 
spectrum of both market and expertise-specific knowledge items ready to be exploited via its 
network of operating companies. Moreover, the links of ITT World Directories with L.M. 
Berry & Company and BellSouth, its U.S. business partners, provide additional resources and 
access to innovative methods, technologies, and business experience. A history of unit 
independence and headquarters' traditional emphasis on the achievement of financial targets, 
however, have over time created significant barriers to cross-unit cooperation. Additionally, 
ITT World Directories' top management has not been able establish and institutionalize a 
balanced set of management tools to stimulate and facilitate the leverage of internally available 
knowledge items. 
In this case study we did not, like we did in the Unilever and Canon cases, enumerate and 
scrutinize a number of implemented management tools affecting the barriers to intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. Instead we focused on a change process by describing some subsequent 
steps in World Directories' business transformation endeavour. By studying the managerial 
actions that precede the intracorporate knowledge sharing process itself over a period of two 
years, we provided this research project with an additional and interesting viewpoint on the 
key managerial issues surrounding the stimulation and facilitation of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. In the following of this concluding section, the prevailing situation within ITT World 
Directories is confronted with the ideas and propositions as presented in the theoretical part of 
this study. By reviewing whether, which, and how many management tools of the knowledge 
sharing management systems could be discerned within the confines of the ITT World 
Directories organization, some tentative conclusions can be formulated on the barriers that still 
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obstruct and hinder the intracorporate knowledge sharing process in this particular 
organization. 
A very limited number of "stimulators" and "facilitators" exist today in the ITT World 
Directories organization and many barriers are still obstructing and complicating the transfer 
of internally available knowledge items. The prospective organization, implemented in the 
second half of 1997, has the potential to improve upon this situation significantly. ITT World 
Directories, however, is still only at the beginning of a long process of learning to manage 
intracorporate knowledge sharing. Moreover, both managers and employees acknowledge the 
fact that this process is the "lifeblood" of the corporate whole. 
PROPOSITIONS: KNOWLEDGE SHARING AWARENESS SYSTEM 
Although not deliberately institutionalized to stimulate the exchange of internally available 
knowledge, a limited number of management tools decreasing the obstructing influence of the 
awareness barriers can be discerned within the confines of the ITT World Directories 
organization. For example, general managers from headquarters and operating companies meet 
on a regular basis. During these management meetings, they discuss actual performance vis-a-
KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
AWARENESS SYSTEM 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing project is more likely to occur when 
there is a management system which makes 
employees aware of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing prospects 
rrr WD'S MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
- General management meets on a regular basis 
and shares, in very general terms, some of the 
developments going on in their operating 
companies. 
- Although a Centre of Competence in the 
Information Technology area was established at 
the end of the 1980s, the credibility of this 
"knowledge centre" has always been very low 
affecting its effectiveness in reducing duplicate 
developments. 
Some liaison roles in the IT and marketing area 
- were created in the past but have never been very 
effective due to the lack of "decision power". 
RELATED MANAGEMENT TOOLS | 
Knowledge Codification, Registering, and Storage 
Networking 
Assigning Knowledge Exploration Responsibilities 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Sharing Intermediaries 
Implementing Internal Benchmarking Procedures 
rrr WD: REMAINING AWARENESS BARRIERS 
(!) Excluding the general managers, ITT World 
Directories' employees have no or limited chances 
to meet their colleagues of other operating 
subsidiaries. Consequently, no or a very limited 
number of people has built an informal network 
throughout the firm. 
(2) Usually, ITT World Directories' managers tend to 
emphasize and perceive the differences instead of 
the communality between the business processes. 
(3) Knowledge items are not developed with the 
concern to roll them out to other business-units of 
ITT World Directories and are weakly codified. 
(4) The number of procedures you have to go through 
to get the authorization to invest in a development 
project has resulted in the existence of many 
"unreported" and "hidden" R&D project. 
Table 9.5: The Knowledge Sharing Awareness System. 
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vis planned objectives and deliberate on appropriate forecasts. These international 
management meetings can also be suitable for sharing experiences and informing colleagues 
on current business developments inside the operating companies. In practice, however, the 
managers involved in these meetings often lack the detailed functional know-how and 
experience which is most valuable for other affiliates in identifying shared problems and in 
achieving advancement in solving particular business problems. Moreover, business managers 
are often concerned that involving managers from the corporate center or from the other 
operating companies will affect the autonomy of the operating unit. 
Other initiatives which could help in informing front-line managers on opportunities to 
leverage internally available knowledge are the establishment of the Competence Center on 
information technology (i.e., ITT Publitec) and functional liaison members. Within the 
confines of ITT World Directories, however, their effectiveness, as explained before, has been 
very limited. Total accountability for short-term bottom and top-line performance combined 
with a generous management bonus system for reaching targets, made all corporate attempts to 
guide and direct the companies on a functional level susceptive to fail. Moreover, ITT World 
Directories has focused on the perceived differences instead of the communality between its 
subsidiaries for many years. Although all the operating units produced a paper-based yellow 
pages product and acted as an intermediary between suppliers and buyers in their country, 
variance in business strategies and processes made both corporate and front-line management 
emphasize the need for differentiated solutions. Common solutions were refused based upon 
arguments concerning differences between the companies, a lack in their ability to 
acknowledge similarities, and the highly valued autonomy of local operations. 
So, regarding the discerned management tools of a knowledge sharing awareness system 
we can conclude that the number and the effectiveness of the implemented "stimulators" 
within the confines of the ITT World Directories organization were virtually non existent. As a 
consequence, front-line managers are confronted with significant awareness barriers blocking 
their ability to unfold the opportunities to leverage internal knowledge resources. Knowledge 
items, for example, were not registered or documented in a systematic way, front-line 
managers never received instructions to develop solutions with concern for general 
applicability and transferability, and the possibilities to find a way to valuable knowledge 
items scattered over the network of operating companies were very limited. Intentions to 
contact colleagues in other units were often demotivated based on hidden agendas and 
unauthorized investments in exploration and development activities. 
PROPOSITION #2: KNOWLEDGE SHARING PERSUASION SYSTEM 
After becoming aware of an intracorporate knowledge sharing prospect, both the knowledge 
donor and knowledge recipient have to be persuaded to commit themselves to the transfer of 
the knowledge item. In the particular situation of ITT World Directories, the initiation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts was obstructed by significant interest barriers related 
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KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
PERSUASION SYSTEM 
The initiation of an intracorporate 
knowledge sharing project is more likely to 
occur when there is a management system 
encouraging employees' interest to 
participate in the exploitation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects 
ITTWD'S MANAGEMENT TOOI-S 
RF.1 ATFD MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Financial Measures and Rewards for Knowledge Sharing j 
Commitment and Formal Statements by Top Management 1 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependencies 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure to Share 
n T WD: REMAINING INTEREST BARRIERS 
(1) Knowledge donors are not eager to transfer their 
knowledge to other affiliates of ITT World 1 
Directories because corporate management 
demotivates inter-subsidiary cooperation, no 
rewards can be expected for the invested 
management time, and being perceived as being | 
ahead of the rest often creates some advantages in j 
the negotiations with the HQ and during internal 
benchmark efforts. 
(2) Managers in the subsidiaries of ITT World 
Directories are not eager to adopt knowledge 
items from the other affiliates of ITT World 
Directories because of the Not-Invented-Here 
syndrome, it is more "fun" to develop something 
totally new and fully adapted to the company's 
particular needs, no rewards can be expected, and 
the felt need to preserve the status quo. 
Table 9.6: The Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System. 
to both knowledge donor and recipient. On the one hand, knowledge donors were not eager to 
transfer their knowledge to other affiliates of ITT World Directories because corporate 
management never created a corporate culture that stimulated intcr-subsidiary cooperation. No 
incentive was put on the donor's willingness to invest its scarce management time in an effort 
to transfer its knowledge to a recipient. Moreover, being ahead of the "others" was generally 
perceived as being advantageous. Maximum operational leeway could be gained by individual 
companies as these units were being recognized by corporate management as the most 
advanced and leading company in many aspects of the business. Consequently, from the 
perspective of the knowledge donor, advancing internal competitors could reduce this lead 
position and hence affect its development budgets and degrees of freedom. 
On the other hand, the Not-Invented-Hcre syndrome was more than prevalent. Adopting 
solutions from another operating company was generally perceived as "not done." By 
accepting the know-how of a "competing" company, one was accepting its lead status and this 
could seriously affect the firm's budget and autonomy. Moreover, awards and bonuses were 
allocated to persons who had developed major innovations and not to those who exploited 
these innovations. As a consequence, knowledge exploration was felt as more profitable for the 
subsidiary's employees than just exploiting the solutions of someone else. Moreover, front-line 
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managers were sceptical with respect to handing over knowledge development responsibilities 
to "outsiders." They strongly believed that the local adaptation of the knowledge item would 
suffer from handing over the work to an operating company which would develop the solution 
on a distant and probably without consideration of the actual business problem. 
Considering the disinterest of the knowledge donors and recipients, combined with the 
limited need to change due to the stable market circumstances, operating units came to be 
totally self-sufficient and inward-looking. Corporate management implemented no 
"stimulators" to increase the interest throughout the firm to share knowledge. In corporate 
management's attempt to tear companies apart to be able to weed out low-profit activities and 
"squeeze" the most out of the highly profitable ones, cooperative relationships were 
demotivated. 
PROPOSITION #3: KNOWLEDGE SHARING COMPLEXITY REDUCTION SYSTEM 
If a knowledge item is detected and the transferor and acceptor agree upon their involvement, 
the actual transfer process can start. If no measures are taken, however, as was the case in the 
particular situation of ITT World Directories (see Table 9.7), numerous deterrents can 
significantly complicate successful effectuation. As stated before, knowledge items are 
developed and adapted for the local company without any concern for its transferability and 
demonstrability. Solutions are not designed to be easily transmittable to and applicable by 
other operating companies of ITT World Directories. Moreover, the differences in process 
definitions and enabling systems strongly complicate the intracorporate knowledge sharing 
process. In the past, these differences have often led to the situation in which newly developed 
systems were non-compatible with the system configurations of the other operating companies. 
High investments were necessary to adapt the system to the particular requirements of a 
business units while the end result was often sub-optimal. 
Furthermore, the neglect of the cultural differences between the European nationalities and 
the lack of experience to communicate with their international colleagues further complicated 
the knowledge transfer process within ITT World Directories. The lack of inter-cultural 
communication skills has often affected the mutual understanding and a strong feeling of 
distrust resided deeply in the organization regarding intcr-subsidiary cooperation. Combining 
all these complicating barriers with the hesitance of both the knowledge donor and recipient to 
participate in the transfer of internally available knowledge items due to such factors as the 
lack of both monetary and subjective rewards and a strong presence of the Not-Invented-Here 
syndrome, made the transfer of knowledge within the ITT World Directories organization a 
very difficult task. The complexity barriers are significant and strongly affect the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the "sharing" effort. Although some initiatives to share knowledge are 
planned within the setting of the ATLAS project, ITT World Directories needs to acknowledge 
these barriers and their negative influence on the execution phase of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process. 
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1 KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
1 COMPLEXITY REDUCTION 
H SYSTEM 
E l 77ie successful effectuation of an 
E B intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is 
WrM more likely when there is a management 
Wrm system reducing the complexity of 
t j f l intracorporate knowledge sharing 
1 ITTWD'SMANAGEMENTTOOLS 
1^ 
REIATED MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
Knowledge Abstraction & Codification 
Increasing User Involvement & Triability | 
Establishing a Corporate-Wide Language 1 
Arranging Regular Management Meetings I 
Dominant Corporate Culture 
Financial Measures and Rewards for Knowledge Sharing 
Commitment and Formal Statements by Top Management 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependencies 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure to Share 1 
n T WD: REMAINING COMPLEXITY BARRIERS | 
(1) Knowledge items are developed and adapted for the 
local company alone without attention for the 
transferability and demonstrability. Moreover, 
knowledge items are weakly codified. \ 
(2) The differences in process definition and the i 
enabling systems strongly complicates the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing process. 
(3) Due to a lack of experience to communicate with 
their international colleagues, cultural 
understanding affects the mutual understanding. | 
Moreover, US managers to neglect the cultural 
differences. i 
(4) Both the knowledge donor and the possible 
recipients are not eager to participate in the 
transfer of internally available knowledge items 
due to the lack of both monetary and subjective 
rewards, strong presence of the Not-Invented-Here 
syndrome, lack of a corporate identity, etc. 
(5) Strong feeling of distrust resides deeply 
throughout the organization with respect to 
; international colleagues. 
Table 9.7: The Knowledge Sharing Complexity Reduction System. 
PROPOSITION #4: KNOWLEDGE SHARING MEDIA SYSTEM 
In the end, front-line manages will need appropriate media to facilitate their transfer of 
knowledge ranging from a telephone to "on-the-job" teaching activities by the knowledge 
donor. Although the conventional communication tools like fax and telephone can be used, 
ITT World Directories is still missing enhanced management tools in the more rich 
communication transfer channels. Although a selected group of managers is expatriated on an 
almost continuous basis and is highly involved in all kinds of international management 
meetings, 99% of the employees of ITT World Directories has no or very limited contact with 
his or her international colleagues and is also not motivated to intensify these relationships. 
Managers are not deliberately expatriated to other operating companies to leverage their 
particular skills and experience. Only rarely are operational managers brought together to share 
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KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
MEDIA SYSTEM 
The successful effectuation of an 
intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is 
more likely to occur when there is a 
management system extending the 
possibilities to tune the richness of the 
transfer medium to the complexity of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing situation 
ITTWD'.SMANAGF.MF.NTTOOI.S 
- Selected group of managers which is 
expatriated on almost a continuous basis has 
the skills to communicate on an 
inter-company level. 
RH ATHD MANAGEMENT TOOl S 
Knowledge Transfer Skill Development 
Advanced Communication Technologies 
Expatriation Strategy 
ITT WD: REMAINING MEDIA BARRIERS 
(1) Although knowledge transfer media are almost 
never necessary, there are no investments done 
in the development of an advanced 
communication system or the improvement of 
the knowledge transfer skills of the employees. 
Only conventional communication 
technologies are used (e.g., telephone, fax). 
(2) Only a limited set of people possess the 
intercultural skills to effectively and efficiently 
transfer knowledfge on an inter-subsidiary 
basis. 
Table 9.8: The Knowledge Sharing Media System. 
their know-how in a management meeting. Moreover, ITT World Directories has not managed 
to establish a more advanced communication system linking the employees throughout the 
organization and enabling the smooth, flexible, and successful exchange of information, 
experience, and know-how (e.g., teleconferencing, E-mail, videoconferencing). Consequently, 
besides the presence of significant awareness, interest, and complexity barriers, media barriers 
are only reduced in a piecemeal way and hence still hindering the intracorporate knowledge 
transfer process. 
The prospective organization has to improve the stimulating and facilitating properties of ITT 
World Directories regarding intracorporate knowledge sharing. Although not operational yet, 
the unfolding organization seems to be far better capable to manage and balance the 
knowledge exploration and exploitation process than the traditional configuration. A new kind 
of management style will have to be established with a better acknowledgement of both the 
needs for integration and local adaptation. A more integrated network of operating companies 
has to be created with centralized databases, bulletin boards, and electronic communication 
media ensuring an appropriate flow of information on existing problems, knowledge 
development projects, and optional or implemented solutions. Instead of a one-sided focus on 
the achievement of top and bottom-line targets, firms will have to be stimulated and evaluated 
on qualitative measures like their contribution to the generation of corporate value. Corporate 
Competence Centers will have to be institutionalized to concentrate development resources, 
reduce the duplication of development work, and leverage the generated solutions for common 
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business problems. Moreover, the transferability of knowledge items throughout the 
organization will be improved due to the growing mutual understanding in terms of business 
strategy and organizational processes and the implementation of common or compatible 
business systems. 
However, at the end of 1996, the very moment this case study was completed, ITT World 
Directories had still a long way to go. Although the ideas and implementation plans look 
promising at face value, interviews in the operating units learned that a lot of the inherited 
distrust still exists in the organization. Particularly at those employees who were not involved 
in the ATLAS project and hence were not confronted with the changing atmosphere in the ITT 
World Directories organization, scepticism is still predominant. These employees still see the 
same managers heading ITT World Directories who tried to "squeeze" them out year after 
year. Top managers who have to adopt a totally new kind of management style in which 
operating companies and their front-line managers are motivated and rewarded to unite ITT 
World Directories' internal strengths instead of "milking" the most out of each of them. 
Changing the strong scepticism throughout the organization constitutes a major effort. More 
subtle management tools like management recruitment, development, and socialization should 
be exploited to create a corporate identity and reduce the barriers to cross-unit cooperation on 
the longer term. Only by significantly reducing the level of distrust in this organization, the 
prospective changes could succeed. Moreover, as token of their esteem, top management 
should highly commend cooperative efforts in the organization and communicate this clearly 
throughout the organization. Only by creating a corporate culture which strongly approves, 
stimulates, and rewards such activities as intracorporate knowledge sharing, the prospective 
plans could prove to be an effective reaction to the dramatically changing business 
environment of ITT World Directories. 
10 
Summary & Conclusions 
"One characteristic of high-performing organizations is a 'we-can-learn-from-anyone' 
attitude. These organizations are able to accelerate their rates of learning and change by 
borrowing ideas from both internal and external sources. These high-performers then tailor 
the ideas to suit different situations and needs. They have escaped the 'not-invented-here 
syndrome.' Their culture, rewards, and recognition systems support borrowing ideas as 
much as creating ideas. " 
- Bogan and English (1994: 271). 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, the firm has been conceptualized as a set of resources embedded in an 
organi/ational framework. The resources can be seen as having a (theoretical) hierarchy of 
rent-earning uses, bounded at one extreme by a hypothetical "salvage value" and at the other 
by an "optimal use" (Barney, 1986). Managerial value creation takes place when the assets are 
positioned at higher levels in these hierarchies of uses and knowledge is a critical resource in 
this respect. "The possibility of using services," Penrose (1959: 76) states, "changes with 
changes in knowledge. More services become available, previously unused services become 
employed and employed services become unused as knowledge increases about the physical 
characteristics of resources, about ways of using them, or about products it would be profitable 
to use them for." The organizational framework can provide higher-order organizing principles 
such as shared coding schemes, shared values, and a shared language (Kogut and Zander, 
1992) which are prerequisite for successfully managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
Above all, it can be a more efficient organizing mode than the market due to numerous 
knowledge-based transaction costs over and above the opportunistic considerations explored 
by Williamson (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). 
A knowledge-based view seems particularly interesting and complementary to the 
contractual view on the firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) because it can create a 
consistent basis for explaining performance differences between competing firms (Foss, 1996). 
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Competitive advantage is created and sustained by applying knowledge to the firm's resources 
and in this conception intracorporate knowledge sharing reinforces an affiliate's competitive 
strategy. By transferring information, experiences, know-how, and skills between subsidiaries, 
a multi-business firm can attain, if managed appropriately, savings in knowledge procurement 
expenses, contribute to the achievement of "best practice" levels wherever needed and 
appropriate to circumstances, and increase the quantity and quality of innovations of the 
affiliates involved. By securing an efficient and effective provision of the critical input factor 
knowledge, a firm's competitiveness can be strengthened. Competitive advantage in turn 
produces above average operating results and hence value for the firm's shareholders (see 
Figure 10.1). 
The observation that leveraging the corporation's intellect is important, however, is not new 
or distinct from what has been said by other authors (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1990; Prahalad 
and Hamel, 1990). What is stunning is that few academics have systematically attacked and 
investigated the managerial issues surrounding the leverage of the firm's knowledge reservoir 
from a corporate management perspective. Many accounts have been written on strongly 
related topics such as the particular characteristics of the knowledge concept (e.g., Winter, 
1987; Von Krogh and Roos, 1994), on organizational learning processes (e.g., Argyris and 
Schon, 1978; Senge, 1990; Huber, 1991), on organizational defences against technology 
transfer and innovation diffusion (e.g., Glaser, Abelson, and Garrison, 1983; Rogers, 1995), 
on determinants of the stickiness of knowledge (e.g., Von Hippel, 1994; Szulanski, 1995a) and 
on managing the multinational enterprise at large (e.g., Hedlund, 1986; Prahalad and Doz, 
1987). Although some material will undoubtedly exist, publications that systematically address 
the role of corporate management in stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge 
sharing between the firm's internationally dispersed subsidiaries are very hard to find. 
In this thesis it has been tried to acquaint the reader with the managerial issues surrounding 
intracorporate knowledge sharing and to contribute to the strategic management literature by 
creating a ground to steer further theoretical and empirical research on this particular 
knowledge activity. Guided by the principal research question "How to manage intracorporate 
knowledge sharing between the internationally dispersed companies of a multinational 
Knowledge Competitive 
Advantage 
Operating 
Performance 
Shareholder 
Value 
Figure 10.1: A Knowledge-Based Perspective on Value Creation. 
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enterprise?", this research project resulted in the formation of an integrative framework with 
respect to managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. This framework has been designed to 
allow for the observation, analysis, understanding, and normative assessment of the managerial 
tasks and responsibilities regarding the corporation's intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts. 
Embedded in the strategic management and international business field, it integrates three key 
contributions: 
a conceptualization of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process; 
• a managerial classification of the barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing; and 
• an integrated set of propositions on the management systems stimulating and 
facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
Three comparative case studies have been performed to illustrate knowledge sharing 
activities, barriers, and management tools in practical settings. In this way, propositions and 
preliminary conclusions on prevailing combinations of management tools and the alternative 
ways of implementing them achieved the necessary empirical support. 
In this concluding chapter, the main conclusions of this research project are discussed and 
synthesized. After briefly summarizing the content of the theoretical and empirical part of the 
study, some tentative conclusions are drawn without generalizing these findings beyond the 
situation in a particular case company. The inherent strengths and weaknesses of the 
methodology, the added value of the research findings, and suggestions for further research are 
enumerated and discussed in the final section. 
10.2 CONFRONTATION OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Intracorporate knowledge sharing has been defined as the initiation and effectuation of a 
knowledge How between two or more companies legally belonging to the same corporation. It 
is an important process for leveraging valuable knowledge items and serving front-line 
managers' quest for knowledge. The knowledge flow, following Gupta and Govindarajan 
(1991: 773), could comprise either expertise or market knowledge. Expertise is the firm's 
craftsmanship, often referred to as skills, capabilities, and competences, and can be related to 
input processes (e.g., purchasing skills), throughput processes (e.g., product design, process 
designs, packaging designs), or output processes (e.g., marketing know-how, distribution 
expertise). It is the knowledge underlying the firm's ability to produce and market the products 
of today and generate the product and process innovations for the product offerings of 
tomorrow. Market knowledge is the firm's information on and understanding of the 
circumstances and developments in a particular marketplace (e.g., customer demands, strategy 
of competitors, supplier proliferation). Market knowledge underlies the firm's ability to 
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customize and adapt its product offerings and operations to the local needs and demands, and 
to apply expertise in such a way that it makes a difference in the minds of both customers, 
intermediaries, and other stakeholders. Excluded in this research project are the transfers of 
either internal administrative information (e.g., financial data or management accounting 
information) and general management information because these processes are not aimed at 
leveraging internally available knowledge but primarily at influencing the front-line managers 
of the affiliates on management issues of strategic direction, resource allocation, financial 
planning, and control. 
THE THEORETICAL PART OF THE STUDY 
In the theoretical part of this thesis, we stressed that the challenge of managing intracorporate 
knowledge sharing is not one of unlimited promotion. Firms differ regarding the requirements 
put upon intracorporate knowledge sharing and corporate management should acknowledge 
this idiosyncrasy. We presumed that the required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing is 
determined, to a large extent, by two determinants, being a firm's knowledge environment and 
its corporate strategy. A firm's knowledge environment is defined in terms of the emphasis 
placed upon expertise and market knowledge in the affiliates' strive for competitive advantage 
in their product markets. In some industries firms compete on their control over firm-specific 
expertise (e.g., computers, chemicals, consumer electronics, copiers), while in other industries 
the possession of market information and the generation of clear consumer insights is the 
critical and decisive success factor (e.g., foods, cosmetics, recreation). The importance of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing grows, we argued, with the increasing importance of either 
of these types of knowledge, but tends to "explode" if the cross-fertilization between expertise 
and market knowledge becomes a critical success factor. 
Apart from the influence of the knowledge environment, the required level of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing is assumed to be determined by the firm's corporate strategy in terms of 
added value as well as its scale and scope. Intracorporate knowledge sharing is a primary 
knowledge management process and should therefore be treated in accordance with corporate 
objectives regarding other kinds of synergies (e.g., operational integration, knowledge 
exploration). The more top management and corporate strategy emphasize the exploitation of 
the dispersed stock of intellectual property as one of the main sources of corporate value 
creation, the higher the need to share knowledge. The relatedness of the corporation's portfolio 
of business activities and the size of the corporation in terms of the number of governed 
companies were presumed to be both positively related with the required level of knowledge 
sharing between the affiliates of a multinational enterprise. 
Managing intracorporate knowledge sharing means achieving a "fit" and hence matching 
the actual level with the required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing (see Figure 10.2). 
Assuming limitations in its ability to pursue an active role in sharing knowledge, corporate 
management has the responsibility in this particular endeavour to create a structural context 
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within which opportunities for linkages between subunits can arise, be detected, and be 
effectuated. In shaping this context, top management should acknowledge the firm's 
administrative heritage and select the most appropriate management tools to influence the 
behavior of managers lower down the organizational hierarchy. In its ambition to bring the 
actual level of intracorporate knowledge sharing in line with the aspired level, top management 
should target its broad repertoire of management tools at neutralizing and minimizing the 
barriers to the transfer of know-how, skills, and experience. In other words, headquarters 
should enable front-line managers to initiate and effectuate intracorporate knowledge sharing 
efforts. Without these tools, opportunities to share internally available knowledge are less 
likely to be exploited and can resolve into unsatisfactory outcomes. 
In our search for those management tools which a firm's top management can use in 
stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge sharing, the deductive reasoning has 
been built upon an understanding of the barriers obstructing, hindering, and complicating the 
successful initiation and effectuation of knowledge transfer efforts. The existing literature 
enlists numerous barriers to the transfer of knowledge and hence the conceptual and practical 
challenge was not to detect new barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing but to make 
managerial sense of the number and range of possible deterrents. Therefore, the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process has been conceptualized to be able to cluster the voluminous set of 
barriers around particular stages and in this process a distinction has been made between the 
phases of decision and execution. The decision phase comprises an awareness and an interest 
stage, while the execution phase consists of a preparation and a transfer stage. 
The decision phase of the intracorporate knowledge sharing process determines the number 
of times that an attempt is made to share knowledge. The decision phase is a critical phase 
because if one of the parties decides to withdraw and hence block the initiation of an 
intracorporate knowledge transfer effort, knowledge sharing and hence corporate value 
Firm's 
Knowledge Hnvironment 
Firm's 
Corporate Strategy 
ACTUAL 
Level of 
Knowledge 
^ ^ . Sharing 
Administrative Heritage 
Implemented 
Management Tools 
Effectiveness is a function of matching 
the actual level of intracorporate knowledge sfmnng 
with 
the required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
Figure 10.2 A Strategic "Fit" Model on Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing. 
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creation will not onset. Concerning the decision to initiate a knowledge transfer effort, two 
clusters of barriers have been distinguished: (1) Awareness Barriers and (2) Interest Barriers. 
Awareness barriers are deterrents obstructing front-line managers to detect opportunities to 
share knowledge within the boundaries of the enterprise. Awareness barriers cause a passive 
rejection, meaning that the adoption of a particular knowledge item is never accomplished 
because its use is never really considered, and can be caused by tacitness of knowledge, lack of 
"who-knows-what" facility, bootlegging, and cognitive limits to discern knowledge. Interest 
barriers block the initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing effort based on efficiency 
or personal rationales. The efficiency trade-off attempts to put a money value on the tangible 
and intangible costs and benefits related to the initiation and effectuation of a particular 
intracorporate knowledge sharing project, while the personal considerations could be related to 
such factors as the "not-invented-here" syndrome, the lack of rewards, and the existence of 
internal competition. 
In its task to "stimulate," a firm's top management has to enlarge the number of knowledge 
sharing initiatives by influencing the decision-making process of those employees lower down 
the hierarchy to participate in the supply, reception, and application of internally available 
knowledge. On the basis of the distinction between the awareness and interest barriers to the 
initiation of knowledge transfer efforts throughout the organization, two preliminary 
propositions have been deduced: 
Proposition (PI): 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing project is more likely to occur when there is a 
management system which makes employees aware of intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects. 
Proposition (P2): 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge sharing project is more likely to occur when there is a 
management system encouraging employees' interest to participate in the exploitation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects. 
The management system which informs employees throughout the firm regarding 
intracorporate knowledge sharing opportunities and in this way reduces the awareness barriers 
to initiation is called a Knowledge Sharing Awareness System. The management system which 
stimulates employees' interest to participate in intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts and as 
a consequence reduces the interest barriers to initiation is called a Knowledge Sharing 
Persuasion System. 
The execution phase influences the efficiency and effectiveness of the knowledge transfer 
effort and hence the added value of the knowledge sharing initiative. After making the decision 
to initiate an intracorporate knowledge sharing project, the execution phase concerns those 
activities that put the knowledge item into use and ensures its integration in the knowledge 
reservoir of the recipient. Concerning the effectuation of a knowledge transfer effort, two 
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Figure 10.3: Integrated Framework on Managing Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing. 
clusters of barriers have been distinguished: (1) Complexity Barriers and (2) Media Barriers. 
Complexity barriers complicate the effectuation of a knowledge transfer effort from the donor 
to the acceptors. The complexity of intracorporate knowledge sharing can be based on 
numerous factors such as the nature of knowledge, heterogeneity of prior knowledge, personal 
motivation, and the level of trust between the actors involved. Media barriers hinder the ability 
of front-line managers to tunc the richness of the transfer medium to the complexity of the 
intracorporate knowledge sharing situation and hence to cope with the remaining complexity 
in a particular intracorporate knowledge sharing project. Media barriers are caused by resource 
constraints in terms of management time and advanced communication tools and by 
underdeveloped knowledge transfer skills. 
In its task to facilitate, a firm's top management has to take actions to influence the 
successful effectuation of intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts. The appropriate conditions 
have to be created for effectuating the transfer and deployment of knowledge between a firm's 
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front-line managers in a productive way. On the basis of the distinction between the 
complexity and media barriers, two preliminary propositions have been deduced: 
Proposition (P3): 
The successful effectuation of an intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is more likely when there 
is a management system reducing the complexity of intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
Proposition (P4): 
The successful effectuation of an intracorporate knowledge transfer effort is more likely to occur 
when there is a management system extending the possibilities to tune the richness of the transfer 
medium to the complexity of the intracorporate knowledge sharing situation. 
The management system which reduces the complexity of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
and, in this ways, decreases the complexity barriers to effectuation is called a Knowledge 
Sharing Complexity Reduction System. The management system which extends the 
possibilities to tune the richness of the transfer medium to the complexity of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing situation and hence reduces the hindering influence of the media barriers to 
effectuation is called a Knowledge Sharing Media System. 
A firm's top management should take steps in line with the four proposed management 
systems. As conceptual constructs, however, these management systems are not directly 
observable in practical settings and have therefore been defined in terms of observable 
management tools (see Exhibit 10.1). These tools provide corporate management with a broad 
arsenal of concrete weapons to give form and content to the four knowledge sharing 
management systems, adapted to firm-specific circumstances and requirements. The most 
suitable set of management tools and the best way of implementing them are situation-specific 
and hence dependent on unidentified contingencies. 
THE EMPIRICAL PART OF THE STUDY 
With the exception of some early checks and pilot studies, the empirical research succeeded 
the theoretical part of the study and hence started off with the integrated framework, as 
depicted in Exhibit 10.1. The empirical research was aimed at illustrating knowledge sharing 
activities, barriers, and management tools in practical settings. The case study strategy has 
been applied because the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident 
yet. The theoretical part of the study has identified some of the key constructs and variables 
but the issue of how to manage intracorporate knowledge sharing between the internationally 
dispersed companies of a multinational enterprise still faces a lack of structure. If carefully 
performed, a case study can devise a case description against which researchers and managers 
can compare their own theoretical constructs and practical experiences. In specifying the 
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population and hence the number of case study objects, the decision was made to effectuate 
one in-depth study of a large enterprise and a more limited inquiry within two other firms for 
replication purposes. The three case study corporations have been chosen based on contextual 
differences. The diversity among the corporations involved brought into focus differentiated 
perspectives on the issue of managing intracorporate knowledge sharing and, as expected, 
variety in the implemented management tools. 
The case studies have been effectuated by using a variety of data sources, being publication 
in newspapers, magazines, and journals, interviews with corporate and front-line management, 
and many internal documents regarding issues related to managing intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. The case descriptions are roughly structured according to the concepts determining the 
actual and required level of intracorporate knowledge sharing. Due to the focus on and large 
number of interviews with corporate management, a corporate management perspective 
dominates the case study descriptions. If possible, however, the researcher arranged interviews 
with front-line managers in the firm's subsidiaries to validate the tentative conclusions 
regarding the implemented management tools stimulating and facilitating intracorporate 
knowledge sharing in a particular firm inferred from the review of external publications, 
interviews with corporate management and the analysis of internal documentation. 
UNILEVER 
Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch corporation belonging to the 20 largest companies in the world, 
aims to be the foremost company in the world in meeting daily needs of consumers across the 
world in branded consumer foods, personal products and detergents. In this strive, Unilever is 
increasingly forced to complement its traditional strengths in the effectuation of local 
adaptation strategies with a reduction in sourcing and manufacturing costs, a higher speed of 
action, and entrepreneurship throughout its portfolio of businesses. The new competitive 
demands force Unilever to synthesize its businesses more strongly and Unilever's top 
management acknowledges that the development of an organizational capability to share 
information and know-how rapidly between companies on a global basis is prerequisite for the 
strategy's success. Unilever's endeavour to increase the actual level of intracorporate 
knowledge sharing, however, has been considerably hindered and complicated by Unilever's 
administrative heritage. Traditionally, management of independent operating companies hold a 
high degree of operating autonomy and agitate against corporate interference. Through the 
adaptation of the firm's management structure and the implementation of various management 
tools, however, corporate management has been working on the integration of its businesses. 
CANON EUROPE NV 
Canon is a Japanese corporation which is involved in various high-tech industries such as 
cameras and copiers. Canon's many innovative products are in large part the result of their 
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technological excellence and the capacity for managing rapid technological change. 
Increasingly, however, Canon is forced to rethink its traditional technology-oriented business 
strategy. Consumers are demanding more customized products as European and Japanese 
buyers start to differ significantly in their product feature preferences. Moreover, most of 
Canon's products are maturing and new market-oriented product innovations are becoming a 
necessity. On the short term, Canon has reacted to these challenges by advancing its abilities to 
collect, share, and aggregate market information on a European scale. In this way, Canon 
wants to go beyond the leverage of its technological excellence towards a cross-fertilization 
with the market knowledge residing in Canon's marketing and sales companies. On the longer 
term, Canon is inclined to believe that "overseas" product development and production 
activities have to be extended. A major business transformation process is necessary, 
especially because Canon's administrative history in Europe is one of operating through highly 
independent, sometimes partially owned distributors. 
ITT WORLD DIRECTORIES, INC 
For more than thirty years, ITT World Directories, a division of the ITT Corporation, has 
never showed much interest in linking its affiliates in the aim to create corporate advantages. 
On the basis of governmentally granted monopoly positions in highly attractive marketplaces, 
ITT World Directories was able to focus on "squeezing" the most out of its local Yellow Pages 
operations. In the beginning of the 1990s, however, ITT World Directories was forced to 
change its corporate philosophy due to the emergence of head on competition in all its markets 
throughout Europe. Top management formulated the objective to unite the operating 
companies more strongly and work together in the sake of the corporate whole. It was clear 
from the start, however, that such an integration strategy would require a dramatic 
organizational change due to a deep feeling of distrust widely residing throughout the 
corporation regarding this kind of corporate initiatives. ITT World Directories decided to 
commit itself to a dramatic business transformation process, involving considerable costs but 
in the hope that it would significant improve its ability to unite and exploit its corporate 
resources and allow the operating companies to compete more effectively and efficiently in 
local Yellow Pages markets. 
SYNTHESIS OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PART 
The empirical research indicates that the key contributions of this study lie in the various tools 
for analyzing and systematically reviewing the key concerns in managing intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. The strategic "fit" model, the conceptualization of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing process, the managerial classification of the barriers to the initiation and 
effectuation of this process, and the integrated set of management systems that stimulate and 
facilitate intracorporate knowledge sharing have been applied successfully. All helped the 
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researcher in bringing order in this rather complex organizational phenomenon and were of 
assistance in identifying the key managerial issues involved in each organization. Moreover, 
the synthesis of the theoretical and empirical findings of this study led to some interesting 
conclusions. 
With respect to one of the key assumptions underlying this study, we found that it is not 
totally sound to assume that a firm's top management would be willing to fully delegate the 
responsibility to initiate and effectuate intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts to their 
subordinates. We presumed that the complexity of many multinational enterprises inhibits an 
active role of corporate management in the intracorporate knowledge sharing process. Instead 
of being directly involved, we argued that the main task of corporate management comprises 
the stimulation and facilitation of this process between managers lower down the 
organizational hierarchy. In all case companies, however, top management was still involved 
in many if not all knowledge transfer efforts throughout the organization. Very rarely were 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts initiated and effectuated without the involvement of 
corporate management. Within Canon Europe NV it was even prohibited to exclude 
headquarters in attempts to share knowledge. As stated by Mr. Tanaka, President of Canon 
Europe NV, "... there is no communication between the companies directly. All 
communication needs to be routed through the European headquarters and for this purpose we 
have assigned a large cadre of liaison members. [...] Only in this way," Mr. Tanaka continued, 
"we make sure that we keep well informed about the key business issues and the concerns of 
our company managers. By being well informed we ensure that we are able to control the 
performance of our companies and react quickly to their key problems." 
Unilever headquarters was attracted to the idea of delegating the responsibilities to initiate 
and effectuate, but had only slightly changed its attitude in this respect. In the past, knowledge 
always passed through the Center before it was transported to the appropriate companies. More 
and more, however, corporate managers experience that this is an impossible task because the 
Center lacks the necessary resources and capabilities to manage that process any longer. 
Although the liaison members still play a significant role in bringing employees together for 
knowledge sharing purposes, Unilever increasingly stimulates the operating companies to 
communicate and share directly with their colleagues in other companies. As one manager 
stated: "Historically, headquarters has been like a 'railway junction' with knowledge coming in 
and coming out. Now the center is more a 'signal box' attempting to route the knowledge from 
one place to another without the knowledge necessarily coming through the center." In 
general, however, managers in the Center are still tempted to interfere in and to be copied on 
knowledge transfers between companies. It seems that multi-business firms prefer a middle 
course between full decentralization and full centralization of the responsibility to initiate and 
effectuate the knowledge sharing process. In reality, however, corporate management has often 
problems in handing over this responsibility to managers lower down the organizational 
hierarchy on the basis of managerial or personal (e.g., information is seen as one of the most 
important "power" bases) concerns. 
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A second conclusion which can be deducted from the confrontation between the theoretical 
and empirical findings is that the knowledge environment of several firms active in the 
European context is changing. All three case companies were confronted with transitions in 
their knowledge environment and, related to this development, with a growing need to achieve 
a cross-fertilization between the firm's market knowledge and the firm's product and process 
expertise. Competitive forces or pro-active competitive moves by the firm itself enforce many 
managers to acknowledge simultaneously the importance of market information for 
customization, differentiation, and uncertainty reduction purposes and the importance of 
expertise for efficient and effective manufacturing practices and continuous product and 
process innovation. The assumed trend to decentralized business operations to ensure the 
appropriation of the necessary market information and to be able to achieve the necessary 
integration between expertise and market knowledge could not be verified by the empirical 
findings. However, the need was felt by all three case companies to evolve to a kind of 
decentralized network organization comparable with the transnational organization model as 
introduced by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1987), the heterarchy as described by Hedlund (1986), and 
the multi-center firm as studied by Forsgren (1990). 
Regarding the firm's corporate strategy, the empirical findings indicate that intracorporate 
knowledge sharing, as one of the value-added strategies, is definitely winning in importance in 
justifying the corporate whole. All three case study companies were already discussing the 
particulars of this management issue and were trying to improve their ability to manage this 
process. In search for parenting advantages, Unilever, Canon and ITT World Directories 
identified the sharing of best practices and market information as an important way to reduce 
(development) costs, enable pro-active marketing strategies, and boost the innovative power of 
their business-units. Moreover, the case companies were eager to roll out innovations rapidly 
over the international network of operating companies to circumvent that competitors would 
be able to imitate them and steal their gain. So, our theoretical conclusion that the required 
level of intracorporate knowledge sharing is determined by the firm's corporate strategy 
comprising the value-added strategy and its scope and scale seems appropriate although some 
doubt exists regarding the relationship between the required level of intracorporate knowledge 
sharing and the firm's scope1. 
Regarding the firm's administrative heritage, the empirical findings have verified the 
expected strong influence of this factor on the issues and barriers surrounding intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. Unilever, Canon, and ITT World Directories all have a history of unit 
It is possible that the partially overlapping but broad product lines which multi-divisional types of 
organization posses, can provide them with an important strategic opportunity. If they manage intracorporate 
knowledge sharing among the less related parts of the corporation, they have the chance to capitalize on the 
increasingly complex nature of their markets in a way that a competitor with a more narrow range of 
capabilities will have a hard time to match. In this conception. Canon found it more important to manage 
intracorporate knowledge sharing on a cross-divisional than an one-divisional basis. 
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independence in Europe obstructing the integration and coordination of operations in this 
region. The high degree of operational leeway has created strong institutionalized differences 
in the definition of the business, organizational processes, and company "language." Moreover, 
the lack of integration in the past has made most companies emphasize and focus on 
differences instead of the communality between operations and marketplaces. Building on this 
diversity, firms active in Europe are forced, as argued before, to establish a more united and 
integrated European network of operating companies. Synergy should be exploited and 
knowledge items should be shared from the point where consumer needs are the same. The 
coherence at the foundation provides enough opportunities to share knowledge items without 
harming the requirements for local adaptation. In this respect, firms should both cherish and 
adapt their administrative heritage and start to build unity on diversity as a business response 
to the changing European context. 
In managing the leverage of their knowledge reservoir, all three case companies lacked an 
overall perspective on this particular management issue and have not yet proved to be able to 
systematically attack all the issues involved in managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. 
Managerial responses, as indicated in Exhibit 10.1, are fragmented and are loosely integrated. 
Although the empirical research did not enable us to come up with some well founded 
conclusions regarding suitable combinations of management tools and preferable ways of 
implementation, some general conclusions can be drawn with respect to these management 
tools. First, one of the key findings of the empirical investigation is that many firms start their 
attempt to stimulate and facilitate intracorporate knowledge sharing with establishing state-of-
the-art electronic linkages. Many enterprises that have acknowledged the importance of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing are frittering away their investments in technology. 
Intracorporate knowledge sharing problems are addressed by applying the new and more 
advanced communication technologies in an attempt to implement "electronic information 
spiderwebs" between the firm's subsidiaries. All the case descriptions have shown, however, 
that the act of intracorporate knowledge sharing is a highly complex managerial activity which 
requires a whole lot more than just the institutionalization of highly advanced communication 
tools like intranets, videoconferencing, and desk-top computing. Although these information 
technology tools arc definitely helpful in managing intracorporate knowledge sharing, top 
management should acknowledge the fact that the transfer of knowledge remains a highly 
sensitive political process which is hindered by various knowledge-related complexities and 
deserves more creative and behavioral management responses than simply establishing an 
"electronic super highway" between the firm's subsidiaries. 
Second, a rather new and popular phenomenon in many firms is the attempt to improve 
knowledge management abilities by institutionalizing what arc called Centers of Competence, 
Centers of Excellence, or Innovation Centers. These development centers are established to 
concentrate development resources, reduce duplication in development work, and enable the 
firm to develop and launch a limited number of strong international brands. Moreover, by 
distributing the development responsibilities over the firm's affiliates, interdependencies are 
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Theoretical Propositions 
PI: Knowledge Sharing Awareness System 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing project is more likely to occur when there 
is a management system which makes employees 
aware of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
prospects 
Related Management Tools: 
Knowledge Codification, Registering, and Storage 
Networking 
Assigning Knowledge Exploration Responsibilities 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Sharing Intermediaries 
Implementing Internal Benchmarking Procedures 
P2: Knowledge Sharing Persuasion System 
The initiation of an intracorporate knowledge 
sharing project is more likelv to occur when there is 
a management system encouraging employees' 
interest to participate in the exploitation of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing prospects 
Related Management Tools: 
Financial Measures and Reward 
Commitment and Formal Statements Top Management 
Organizing for Knowledge Interdependencies 
Institutionalizing Knowledge Champions 
Corporate Culture Activating a Social Pressure 
P3: KS Complexity Reduction System 
The successful effectuation of an intracorporate 
knowledge transfer effort is more likely when there 
is a management system reducing the complexity of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing 
Related Management Tools: 
Knowledge Abstraction & Codification; Increasing User 
Involvement & Triability; Establishing a 
Corporate-Wide Language; Arranging Regular 
Management Meetings; Dominant Corporate Culture; 
Financial Measures and Rewards, Commitment and 
Formal Statements Top Management, Organizing for 
Knowledge Interdependencies, Institutionalizing 
Knowledge Champions; Corporate Culture Activating a 
Social Pressure to Share. 
P4: Knowledge Sharing Media System 
The successful effectuation of an intracorporate 
knowledge transfer effort is more likely to occur 
when there is a management system extending the 
possibtlities to tune the richness of the transfer 
medium to the complexity of the intracorporate 
knowledge sharing situation. 
Related Management Tools: 
Knowledge Transfer Skill Development 
Advanced Communication Technologies 
Expatriation Strategy 
Exhibit 10.1: Confrontation between 
UNILEVER 
Unilever's Management Tools: 
A strong informal network; Liaison members (e.g., 
category members, process leaders, information 
managers); Information Centers; Lotus Notes 
conferences; Workshops/Seminars/Task Forces; 
Registering of Best Practice (e.g., brand manuals, 
benchmark studies). 
General Comment: 
Although KS awareness system is quite advanced and 
well developed, a major part of the organization is not 
appropriately "connected". Moreover, those connected 
are threatened by an information overload. 
Unilever's Management Tools: 
Management of Dispersed Innovation Projects (e.g. 
Innovation Funnel); Concentration of Development 
Resources (e.g.. Innovation Centers, Centers of 
Excellence); Powerful Coordinations; Statements of Top 
Managers; Threat to become socially excluded; Issue in 
individual performance appraisals. 
General Comment: 
Although explicit rewards are lacking and a larger 
incentive exist to explore than exploit, Unilever's KS 
Persuasion System is quite strong and could be 
strengthened if Unilever succeeds in making the locus of 
decision power more clear. 
Unilever's Management Tools: 
Standardization of "language"; Harmonization of 
systems; Knowledge abstraction (e.g..technical manuals, 
category business models); Personnel policy ("creating 
the international manager"); Corporate management 
courses, regular international management meetings; 
Corporate Culture creates corporate identity. 
General Comment: 
Although much diversity between the companies still 
exists due to the unit independence in the past, some 
deliberate actions have significantly reduced the 
complexity of KS efforts on average. Moreover, the 
level of trust between Unilever managers is quite 
distinctive and could be the basis on which valuable 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts can be built. 
Unilever's Management Tools: 
New communication channels (e.g.. E-mail, Lotus 
Notes, Videoconferencing, Desk-Top Computing), 
deliberate strategy to develop intercultural skills; 
Expatriation (although Unilever wants to reduce the 
number of expatriates). 
General Comment: 
Although major investments are done in the 
implementation of new communication channels, a 
electronic sharing community does not exist yet and 
could not be typified as a substitute for the strong 
informal information relationships. 
and Empirical Research. 
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Canon Europe N.V. 
Canon Europe's Management Tools: 
Liaison Members; Dedicated Taskforces; Regular 
Management Meetings with an emphasis on 
exchanging knowledge; Workshops & Seminars; 
Various Newsletters. 
General Comment: 
Although some tools exist for front-line managers to 
identify where interesting knowledge items reside in the 
European organization, the view of Canon's top 
management is that all knowledge sharing initiatives 
should be coordinated by the European headquarters. 
Canon Europe's Management Tools: 
Some knowledge exploration tasks are assigned to 
taskforces; Obligation to report on market 
developments; Coordinators detect and inform about 
opportunities to share particular knowledge items. 
General Comment: 
Independent history of the companies has resulted in a 
resistance to corporate interference and headquarters is not 
willing and does not really perceive the need to persuade 
their companies to share. No monetary rewards exist or are 
intended to be implemented. 
Canon Europe's Management Tools: 
Product-embodied exportation of Canon's knowledge; 
Corporate Management Courses, Seminars, and 
Workshops; Japanese occupy key nodes in European 
information network; Regular Management Meetings. 
General Comment: 
Companies strongly differ in terms of their 
conception of the business, definition of their 
processes, and internal "language". Knowledge is not 
codified and no strong corporate identity exists yet. 
The Japanese are a separate cadre of managers in the 
European organization between whom a high level of 
trust exist. 
Canon Europe's Management Tools: 
Expatriation of Japanese; E-mail and Videoconferencing 
application for the communication with Canon Inc.; 
IntercultLiral skills are gradually developed during 
international management meetings. 
General Comment; 
Resources and skills are available to facilitate a limited 
number of communication lines which are perceived as 
important by Canon's top management (e.g., Canon Inc. -
Canon Europe N.V.). Latent communication lines which 
reside unstructured lower down the hierarchy, however, 
lack these resources and need to exploit conventional 
communication tools (e.g. fax, telephone, visits). 
ITT World Directories Inc. 
ITT WD's Management Tools: 
Liaison Members; General Management 
Meetings; IT Competence Centre (e.g., Publitec). 
General Comment; 
Only a very limited number of management tools 
regarding a KS Awareness System could be detected. 
As a consequence, many awareness barriers are still 
significantly obstructing the detection of 
intracorporate knowledge sharing initiatives within 
ITT WD. 
ITT WD's Management Tools: 
None 
General Comment: 
Operating units are totally self-sufficient with respect to 
their knowledge needs. Advancing "internal competitors" 
could weaken your own position in relation the corporate 
headquarters. The Not-Invented-Here syndrome is more 
than prevalent. In corporate management's attempt to tear 
companies apart to be able to weed out low-profit 
activities and "squeez" the most out of the highly 
profitable ones, cooperative relationships were 
demotivated. 
ITT WD's Management Tools: 
None 
General Comment; 
An intracorporate knowledge sharing intitiative is rarely 
undertaken. Once initiated, however, numerous deterrents 
complicate the successful effectuation. Knowledge items 
are developed and adapted without any concern for its 
transferability. The environments within which the 
particular knowledge items are developed differ strongly 
in terms of the process definition, data-structures, and 
applied support systems. Moreover, a strong feeling of 
distrust resides deeply in the organization. 
1IT WD's Management Tools: 
A selected, but very small group of expatriates. 
General Comment; 
No investments are done by ITT WD in the development 
of an advanced communication system linking 
employees throughout the organization and enabling 
the smooth and flexible exchange of information. 
Moreover, transfer skills are limited due to the lack of 
experience with international cooperative projects and 
the lack of management development efforts. 
Employees are in general not expatriated in the aim to 
leverage their particular skills. 
Exhibit 10.1: Confrontation between Theoretical and Empirical Research (Continued). 
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created to stimulate and facilitate cooperative efforts. Regarding this organizational trend, 
however, the findings within Unilever and ITT World Directories are ambiguous. Although 
highly successful in particular situations, the empirical research indicates that these "service 
centers" should be implemented selectively based on the prevailing demands for integration 
and local adaptation. In situations where demands for local adaptation are too strong or much 
stronger than the demands for integration, differentiation arguments for local development 
work should conquer because market knowledge is experimental of nature, the product of the 
confrontation with all kinds of market signals, and hence difficult to codify and communicate. 
Moreover, the development centers should be equipped with a significant degree of decision 
power and must be able to rely on the operating companies for input and feedback. If the 
demands for local adaptation are too strong in a particular area or if the "adopters" are 
unwilling to contribute to, cooperate in sake of, or accept the provided solutions, firms must 
find other ways to manage the intracorporate knowledge sharing process. 
Finally, one of the most important empirical findings of the research project is that 
intracorporate knowledge sharing and conversation management go hand in hand. As Von 
Krogh and Roos (1996: 218) state: "Every company has its own unique set of concepts and 
phrases and usage of concepts and phrases, as well as potential for creating new concepts and 
phrases and new usage of them." Unilever, Canon Europe NV, and ITT World Directories, Inc. 
were all confronted with major difficulties to share knowledge due to the prevailing 
differences in mother-tongue, concepts, phrases, process definitions, and data structures. 
Employees constantly create new language and new meaning ensuing that concepts and 
phrases from one company are, in principle, not translatable into the culture of another 
organization (Von Krogh and Roos, 1996). If not managed carefully, each and every 
subsidiary within a corporation develops and institutionalizes its own "language" obstructing 
and complicating conversations on a cross-subsidiary basis. The more time and resources spent 
by corporate management on developing and giving meaning to concepts and phrases, the 
"richer" the corporate context will be for stimulating and facilitating intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. On the one hand, a thorough dialogue can turn awareness barriers down and stimulate 
the initiation of intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts. On the other hand, a well-managed 
corporate language could smooth the effectuation of knowledge transfer efforts by taking away 
very important and hindering complexity barriers. Without careful attention regarding the 
prevailing definitions and concepts, front-line managers will have major difficulties to onset 
intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts and hence exploit the firm's valuable but scattered 
knowledge resources. 
10.3 SOME CRITICAL NOTES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis will be completed with an elaboration on some critical notes regarding the research 
project "Managing Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing" and an enumeration of some 
suggestions for further research. While being convinced of the relevance for both practising 
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managers and scientists, a few critical notes should put this thesis in its proper context. One of 
these general points of commentary, for example, is the lack of focus in this "all-embracing" 
account on managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. Instead of elaborating on one 
particular barrier or management system, a general account was written on managing 
intracorporate knowledge sharing from the viewpoint of a firm's top management. Although 
agreeing on this drawback, the author deliberately accepted the weaknesses of such an 
approach, namely the inability to come up with "hard proof" to validate or falsify some 
theoretically deduced statements, in advance of an "helicopter view" over the managerial 
issues surrounding intracorporate knowledge sharing. In the attempt to contribute to this 
almost uncharted territory in the management literature and accomplish some progress, this 
study captured as much of the complexity involved in actual managing intracorporate 
knowledge sharing by encompassing many of the relevant variables and integrate them in a 
generic framework. 
Another reasonable comment on the underlying thesis is that it is an institutional account 
which stresses the importance of a planned, structured, controlled, and measured approach to 
intracorporate knowledge sharing comparable with the techno-analytic learning style of 
DiBella, Nevis, and Gould (1996). Knowledge processes and knowledge management are 
often conceptualized as creative, unstructured, and self-organizing activities in an organization. 
The self-organizing paradigm, as introduced by Nonaka (1988), is viewed as a process of self-
organization through chaos or fluctuation and is characterized by instability, creativity, 
spontaneity, and unstructured information creation. Moreover, the individual has a great deal 
of freedom and is allowed to "stand on its own two feet." Notwithstanding the importance of 
creative and spontaneous knowledge exploration activities for the well-being of a firm's 
innovative capacity, we wanted to emphasize in this study the need to complement this "laissez 
faire" style of knowledge management with a disciplined approach to exploit and transform 
good ideas in a productive way . The challenge is, as Graham and Pizzo (1996: 338) argue, "to 
balance organizational creativity and flexibility with the disciplines that turn creative pursuits 
into tangible business advantage." This thesis contributes to the latter task and should be 
complemented in an organizational setting by less bureaucracy and more informal 
communication promoting the spontaneity, experimentation, and freedom of expression that 
are the lifcblood of innovation. 
Related to the previous comment, we could question the claim that a firm's top management 
should strive for the total elimination of the prevailing barriers to intracorporate knowledge 
sharing. As one Unilever manager stated: "Although we aim at reducing the redundancy in 
knowledge activities, duplication can be of value in certain cases. By allowing multiple 
projects to proceed with the investigation of the same problem or issue, one can select the best 
solution at the end and the pooling together of different sources of know-how and experience 
brings in diversity in our knowledge base." Duplication in development activities enables firms 
to take the best of all available solutions and cross-fertilize the existing know-how on shared 
issues. By taking away all the deterrents obstructing and hindering the initiation and 
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effectuation of intracorporate knowledge sharing efforts, this kind of redundancy is strongly 
reduced (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). A firm should try to detect the appropriate "height" of 
the awareness, interest, complexity, and media barriers to be able to exploit the organization's 
scattered knowledge resources while not harming its creativity and innovative power. This 
thesis does not point out the most suitable level for the prevailing barriers in an organization. 
Instead, it aims at clarifying the strategic context of managing intracorporate knowledge 
sharing, the possible deterrents regarding this organizational process, and possible ways of 
reducing them. 
A fourth comment on this research project could be that it overemphasizes the need and 
possibilities of integration in an organization compared to differentiation. Although we tend to 
present the forces of differentiation and integration as complementary towards each other (e.g., 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1987; Handy, 1992), there is a tendency for integration, especially in 
combination with the word "global," to be understood as a more progressive device than 
differentiation (Forsgren, 1992). There is an apparent risk that this tendency will lead to a 
neglect of the costs of and forces against integration. As March and Simon (1958) argue, the 
division of labor and hence the differentiation of subgoals is reinforced by various cognitive 
mechanisms, such as individuals' tendency to selective perception, group pressure toward 
conformity in judgement, and selective exposure to information about the environment of 
those belonging to different parts of the organization. These differences in orientation are 
inherent to large corporations (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) and need to be acknowledged. 
Consequently, we have to be careful not to overestimate headquarters' task to design structure 
and systems in such a way that a beneficial integration is created. At the same time, we have to 
be careful not to underestimate the costs related to integration. 
Finally, the Canon case shows that not all enterprises can be typified yet as decentralized 
network structures within which the only exploitation challenge is the leverage of scattered 
knowledge resources. The Canon case reveals that other knowledge leverage variants than the 
"globally-leveraged-local-innovations" still exist. Companies need to recognize, as Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1990) argue, that other ways exist to develop and leverage innovative products and 
processes (e.g., Center-for-Global innovations, Local-for-Local innovations. Locally-leveraged 
innovations, Globally-linked innovations). The challenge is not promoting one of these 
leveraging processes, but to find a balance between the management systems which guarantee 
effectiveness of central innovations and the efficiency of local innovations. This study 
contributes particularly to the latter task by emphasizing and analyzing the "stimulators" and 
"facilitators" regarding the transfer and exchange of knowledge resources between the 
internationally dispersed companies of a multinational enterprise. 
Concluding, we want to stress that this general account on managing intracorporate 
knowledge sharing needs to be complemented with more focused research projects. Besides 
acknowledging the need for future study on issues as the particular characteristics of 
knowledge, the role of knowledge in the value-creating process of a firm, and the contribution 
of the knowledge concept to the development of a new theory of the firm, we have formulated 
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some suggestions for future research regarding the barriers to share knowledge and the 
possible ways to manage this process. With respect to the barriers to intracorporate knowledge 
sharing, the following questions could be interesting to investigate in future research projects: 
(1) How to rank the barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing in their obstructing 
and hindering influence? Is there an optimal level for the barriers to intracorporate 
knowledge sharing and what is the relationship between different groups of 
barriers? Is it necessary to fully remove the barriers or is it more preferable to keep 
them at a certain height? Is there a particular and preferred order in which barriers 
to intracorporate knowledge sharing should be reduced or eliminated? 
(2) What kind of contingencies exist regarding the obstructing and hindering influence 
of particular barriers to intracorporate knowledge sharing? What kind of barriers 
could be expected in particular organizational settings, industries, or geographic 
regions? 
(3) How to understand the barriers if we conceptualize intracorporate knowledge 
sharing as a continuous process? What is the influence of past successes and 
failures on the initiation and effectuation of intracorporate knowledge sharing 
efforts? 
Management systems could be operationalized by implementing one or more of its 
management tools. Regarding these management tools, we formulated the following research 
questions to indicate some suggestions for future research: 
(1) How to inform employees throughout the firm on prevailing knowledge items 
without creating an "information overload"? How to customize the demand for 
information to the particular needs of the front-line manager? 
(2) How to manage Strategic Centers of Excellence, Competence Centers, and 
Innovation Centers in the multinational enterprises and what kind of organizational 
context is needed to let them succeed? 
(3) What is the added value of the advanced information and communication tools for 
managing intracorporate knowledge sharing and how should they be combined 
with other management tools? 
(£) What kind of incentive and performance measurement systems, both objective and 
subjective, can be created to increase the motivation and hence the appropriate 
"emotional context" to share internally available knowledge items? 
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Although this list of possible research questions is certainly not all inclusive, it definitely 
indicates that still a lot has to be investigated in this area before we are able to fully understand 
and control the complexities involved in managing intracorporate knowledge sharing. In this 
thesis, however, an attempt was made to increase the general understanding regarding 
intracorporate knowledge sharing and to provide both scientists and practitioners with an 
instrument to structure their research, discussions, and action plans regarding the leverage of a 
firm's knowledge reservoir. 
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Samenvatting 
In toenemende mate staat kennis als een waardevolle produktiefaktor in de beiangstelling van 
zowel academici als managers. Kennis over hulpmiddelen, bedrijfsprocessen en 
marktomstandigheden kan, zo veronderstelt men, een onderneming doen onderscheiden van 
haar concurrenten en in dit opzicht de basis vormen voor het verwerven van een 
concurrentievoordeel. In het verlengde van deze toenemende waardering voor kennis ligt het 
groeiende belang dat wordt toegeschreven aan de opsporing, absorptie, ontwikkeling en 
uitbuiting van kennis als een dynamische bron van concurrentievermogen. De "lerende 
organisatie" wordt positief gewaardeerd en sommigc auteurs stcllen dat het vermogen van een 
onderneming om op een effectieve en efficiente manier te leren in wezen het bestaansrecht van 
een onderneming vcrtegenwoordigt. In een tijd waarin een "voorsprong" snel en effectief kan 
worden gei'miteerd, 1 ijlet een onderscheidende vaardigheid in het verwerven, accumuleren, 
combineren en benutten van kennis het enige voordeel dat kan worden bestendigd op lange 
tcrmijn. 
Veel wetenschappelijk onderzoek zal nog vereist zijn voordat we de proccssen in een 
"lerende organisatie" op een redelijke wijze kunnen doorgronden, verklarcn en aansturen. Met 
name theoretische en praktische managementvraagstukken betreffende de exploitatie van 
informatie, ervaring en know-how worden nog te vaak over het hoofd gezien en verdienen 
daarom meer wetenschappelijkc aandacht. Een belangrijk ondernemingsproces dat zich richt 
op het benutten en te gelde maken van kennis binnen de organisatie is de kennisuitwisseling 
die plaatsvindt tussen verschillendc bedrijfsonderdelen. Besparingen op 
kennisontwikkelingskosten en een hogere effectiviteit van de kennisontwikJcelingsaktivitciten 
worden haalbaar indien een onderneming in staat is haar aanwezige kennis begrijpelijk en 
overdraagbaar te maken. De voordelen die verbonden zijn aan deze intra-organisationelc 
kennisuitwisseling kunnen de bijdrage van het concern aan de rentabiliteit van de business 
units significant vergroten, de samenstelling van de portfolio tegenover de aandeelhouders 
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doen verklaren en tevens de concurrentie-strategieen van de afzonderlijke concernonderdelen 
versterken. 
In de studie "Managing Intracorporate Knowledge Sharing" wordt het proces van intra-
organisationele kennisuitwisseling bestudeerd met als doel een integratief raamwerk te 
ontwikkelen waarin het managen van het onderhavige proces binnen de context van een 
multinationale onderneming centraal staat. Dit raamwerk omvat een viertal proposities 
betreffende de managementsystemen die het proces van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisseling binnen een concernverband kunnen stimuleren en faciliteren. Een 
belangrijke aanname hierbij is dat de omvang en complexiteit van veel internationaal 
opererende ondernemingen een directe betrokkenheid van het topmanagement in de weg staan. 
Concernonderdelen opereren in een onderling afhankelijk netwerk waarin het onvoorspelbaar 
is welke kennisuitwisselingsrelaties tussen twee of meerdere concernonderdelen op welke 
momenten van belang zullen worden. Het topmanagement kan zich daarom beter beperken tot 
het scheppen van de juiste voorwaarden en de uitvoerende verantwoordelijkheid delegeren 
naar die lagen in de organisationele hierarchie waar vraag en aanbod van kennis tot elkaar 
dienen te komen. 
In de uitvoering van haar stimulerende en faciliterende taak dient het topmanagement een 
organisationele context te creeren die vorm kan geven aan het denken en doen van managers 
op lagere niveaus in de multinationale organisatie. Het topmanagement heeft voor de 
uitvoering van deze verantwoordelijkheid in potentie een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid aan 
managementinstrumenten tot haar beschikking. De uitwerking van deze 
managementinstrumenten op het proces van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling staat 
centraal in de onderhavige studie. De centrale vraagstelling "Hoe moet het proces van intra-
organisationele kennisuitwisseling worden gemanaged tussen de internationaal verspreide 
business-units van een multinationale onderneming?" was hierbij het uitgangspunt en vormde 
de basis van een onderzoek waarin een balans werd gezocht tussen theoretischc en empirische 
elementen. 
NAAR EEN THEORETISCH AFGELEID INTEGRATIEF RAAMWERK 
Intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling wordt gedefinieerd als een proces waarin kcnnis wordt 
overgedragen van een kennisbezitter naar een kennisvrager die beiden vanuit juridisch oogpunt 
behoren tot hetzelfde concern. Kennis ontpopt haar toegevoegdc waarde pas na toepassing in 
een praktijksituatie en kan zowel vakgcricht als marktgericht zijn. Vakkennis vcrwijst naar de 
bekwaamheid ten aanzien van ingaande, doorgaande en uitgaande processen in een organisatie. 
Vakkennis uit zich in de vaardigheid op basis waarvan een onderneming huidige en 
toekomstige produkten kan vervaardigen en distribueren en mogelijke produkt- en 
procesinnovaties kan verwezenlijken. Marktkennis daarentegen omvat het aanwczige inzicht in 
land en regio-specifieke karakteristieken, omstandigheden en ontwikkelingen. Marktkennis is 
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gebaseerd op marktinfoimatie aangevuld met een zeker marktgevoel en stelt een onderneming 
in staat haar produkten en diensten af te stemmen op de behoeften van de consument. 
Marktkennis bepaalt in hoeverrre het noodzakelijk is de bedrijfsvoering aan te passen aan 
lokale omstandigheden en in dit opzicht stuurt zij de aanpassing van vakkennis met als 
uiteindelijk doel de waardering van lokale klanten, intermediairs en andere belanghebbenden 
te verkrijgen. 
Hoofdstuk 2 benadrukt dat de uitdaging van het managen van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisseling niet is gelegen in de onbeperkte bevordering van dit proces. Het 
topmanagement zal moeten onderkennen dat ondernemingen zich onderscheiden door 
verschillen in de eisen die worden gesteld aan dat proces. Gebaseerd op bestaand onderzoek 
wordt verondersteld dat het vereiste niveau van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling voor 
het overgrote deel wordt bepaald door twee determinanten: (1) de kennisomgeving en (2) de 
concernstrategie. De kennisomgeving van een onderneming is afhankelijk van het belang van 
respectievelijk vak- en marktkennis in het streven naar concurrentievoordelen in de 
verschillende produktmarkten waarin de onderneming aktief is. De waarde van intra-
organisationele kennisuitwisseling neemt toe met een groeiend belang van een van beide 
kennisvormen en stijgt zelfs disproportioneel indien een onderneming besluit tot de 
verwezenlijking van een effectieve kruisbestuiving tussen beide kennisvormen. De 
concernstrategie heeft haar invloed op het vereiste niveau van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisseling via het nagestreefde concernvoordeel, de kwalitaticve samenstelling van 
het concern en de kwantitatieve omvang van de onderneming. De eisen die worden gesteld aan 
intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling nemen evenredig toe met de nadruk die door het 
topmanagement wordt gelegd op het belang van kennisuitwisseling, de gerelateerdheid van de 
concernonderdelen en de omvang van het concernverband. 
Het topmanagement van een onderneming zal vanuit het oogpunt van haar strategische 
doelstellingen het werkelijke en het vereiste niveau van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisseling met elkaar in overeenstemming moeten brcngen. Het werkelijke niveau van 
intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling is afhankelijk van het aantal geinitieerde en 
uitgevoerde kennisoverdrachtprojekten. Vanuit topmanagementperspecticf is dat niveau te 
siurcn middels dc creatic van een organisationcle context die vorm geeft aan het gewenste 
gedrag op lagcre nivcaus binncn de organisationcle hierarchic De uitwerking van de 
organisationcle context op het proces van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling wordt, zoals 
gesteld in hoofdstuk 2, bepaald door twee determinanten: (1) de bestuurlijke erfenis en (2) de 
gei'mplementccrde managementinstrumenten. De bestuurlijke erfenis is de resultante van dc 
manier waarop de onderneming in het verledcn is vormgegeven. Icdere onderneming 
ontwikkelt over de jarcn een karakteristiekc manier waarop organisationcle processen worden 
aangestuurd en uitgevoerd en het is deze bestuurlijke erfenis die vaak zeer moeilijk te 
verandercn is door haar verwevenhcid met de gehelc organisatie. Managementinstrumenten 
worden gehanteerd door een onderneming om richting en inhoud te geven aan 
veranderingsprocessen of bestaandc processen te ondersteunen. 
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De onderhavige studie heeft zich, zonder de andere determinanten van het vereiste en 
werkelijke niveau van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling uit het oog te verliezen, met 
name gericht op de managementinstrumenten waarmee het topmanagement van een 
multinationale onderneming de uitwisseling van de aanwezige informatie, ervaring en know-
how tussen de geografisch verspreide concernonderdelen kan stimuleren en faciliteren. Bij het 
zoeken naar de meest relevante managementinstrumenten is in de bestaande literatuur een 
diversiteit aan blokkerende en complicerende faktoren teruggevonden. Deze barrieres zijn 
voornamelijk bestudeerd door wetenschappers in de hoek van technologieoverdracht en 
innovatiediffusie en hun bevindingen vormen een rijke voedingsbodem waarop het 
ontwikkelde raamwerk de benodigde managementsystemen voor het succesvol managen van 
intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling integreert. 
Een omvangrijke hoeveelheid aan barrieres is bestudeerd en op basis van een 
procesbeschrijving geclassificeerd. De uitdaging lag daarbij niet in het presenteren en 
onderzoeken van nieuwe belemmerende faktoren, maar in het toegankelijk en toepasbaar 
maken van de bestaande en wetenschappelijk onderbouwde inzichten vanuit het perspectief 
van het topmanagement van een multinationale onderneming. Dit managementperspectief 
heeft een sterke sturing gegeven aan de clustering van de barrieres door binnen de 
procesanalyse een onderscheid te maken tussen een beslissings- en een uitvoeringsfase (zie 
hoofdstuk 3). Elke uitvoerende managementaktie wordt voorafgegaan door een beslissing en 
het effectief managen van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling vergt daarom aandacht voor 
zowel de barrieres die vooraf gaan aan het beslissingsproces als de belemmeringen die de 
uitvoering van de kennisoverdracht bemoeilijken. 
De beslissingsfase bepaalt, als beschreven in hoofdstuk 4, het aantal in werking gestelde 
kennisuitwisselingsprojekten. Het initiatief om een kennisuitwisselingsmogelijkheid uit te 
voeren moet worden gesteund en opgepakt door zowel de kennisdrager als de kennisvrager 
voordat men tot de feitelijke uitvoering van de kennisoverdracht kan overgaan. Twee clusters 
van barrieres kunnen echter de initiatie van een dergelijke inspanning in de weg staan: (1) 
bewustzijnsbarrieres en (2) belangstellingsbarrieres. De bewustzijnsbarrieres leiden tot een 
passieve afwijzing van de initiatie van een kennisuitwisselingsinspanning door onwetendheid 
van de betrokken partijen met betrekking tot de mogelijkhcden van uitwisseling. Deze 
onwetendheid kan bijvoorbeeld het gevolg zijn van de onarticuleerbare aard van kcnnis, de 
afwezigheid van informatie met betrekking tot de positie van kcnnis, het bewust achterhouden 
van kennis door de kennisdrager en de cogniticve beperktheid van personen om 
toepassingsmogelijkheden te onderscheiden van kennis die te ver af staat van zijn of haar 
huidige kennis. De belangstellingsbarrieres kunnen liggen in de perceptie dat de baten van de 
kennisoverdacht in eerste instantie niet lijken op te wegen tegen de kosten of in persoonlijke 
bezwaren bij de betrokken partijen die de belangstelling om samen te werken doen afnemen. 
Persoonlijke bezwaren kunnen bijvoorbeeld gelegen zijn in het ontbreken van een beloning 
voor de kennisdrager, een aanzienlijke mate van interne concurrentie voor 
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kennisontwikkelingsbudgetten, de angst om een kennisvoordeel en daarmee organisationele 
invloed te verliezen en een behoefte om alles bij het oude te laten. 
Onoverbrugbaarheid van de bewustzijns- en belangstellingsbarrieres leidt tot een aktieve of 
passieve afwijzing van een kennisuitwisselingsinitiatief. Er komt geen kennisoverdrachtsrelatie 
tot stand tussen de betrokken concernonderdelen indien deze barrieres niet te beslechten zijn 
door een van de betrokken partijen (of beiden). De stimulerende verantwoordelijkheid van het 
topmanagement ligt daarom in het opheffen van de blokkerende werking van deze barrieres of 
deze te reduceren tot een overkoombaar niveau. In Hoofstuk 4 worden in dit opzicht de 
volgende twee proposities geponeerd op basis van de geidentificeerde bewustzijns- en 
belangstellingsbarrieres: 
Propositie 1: De kans op de initiatie van een intra-organisationeel 
kennisuitwisselingsprojekt neemt toe indien er een managementsysteem 
aanwezig is dat werknemers bewust maakt van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisselingsmogelijkheden. 
Propositie 2: De kans op de initiatie van een intra-organisationeel 
kennisuitwisselingsprojekt neemt toe indien er een managementsysteem 
aanwezig is dat de persoonlijke belangstelling van de werknemers laat 
toenemen betreffende betrokkenheid in het benutten van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisselingsmogelijkheden. 
Nadat de beslissingsfase van het kennisuitwisselingsproces succesvol is doorlopen, staat 
men voor de verantwoordelijkheid de kennisoverdracht effectief en efficient ten uitvoer te 
brengen. De uitvoeringsfase moet er op gericht zijn, zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 5, het 
waardepotentieel van een kennisoverdrachtsprojekt ten voile te benutten. De uitvoering van dc 
kennisoverdracht wordt echter gehinderd door twee clusters van barrieres: (1) de 
complexiteitsbarrieres en (2) de mediabarrieres. De complexiteitsbarrieres vergroten de 
complexiteit van de kennisoverdracht van kennisdrager naar kennisvrager. De 
complexiteitsbarrieres zijn sterk situatie-afhankelijk en omvatten faktoren als 
articulcerbaarheid en dubbelzinnigheid van de kennis, de aanwezighcid van een uniform 
begrippenkader, de culturele verschillen tussen kennisgever en kennisncmcr en de aanwezige 
motivatie van de betrokken partijen. De mediabarrieres beperken het vermogen van de 
betrokken partijen een effectieve en efficiente afstemming te bereiken tussen dc complexiteit 
van de kennisuitwisselingssituatie en het benodigde kennisuitwisselingsmedium. De 
mediabarrieres zijn afhankelijk van aanwezige kennisuitwisselingsvaardigheden en 
beschikbare middelen (managementtijd, communicatic-instrumenten). 
Complexiteits- en mediabarrieres kunnen een succesvolle kennisoverdracht in de weg staan 
doordat een slechte afstemming tussen de complexiteit van de kennisuitwisselingssituatie en 
het gehanteerde kennisoverdrachtsmedium af doet aan de effectiviteit of efficientie van de 
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kennisuitwisseling. De faciliterende verantwoordelijkheid van het topmanagement ligt daarom 
in het opheffen van de hinderende werking van deze barrieres of deze te reduceren tot een 
overkoombaar niveau. In hoofdstuk 5 worden in dit opzicht de volgende twee proposities 
geponeerd op basis van de ge'i'dentificeerde complexiteits- en mediabarrieres: 
Propositie 3: De kans op een succesvolle uitvoering van een intra-organisationeel 
kennisuitwisselingsprojekt neeml toe indien er een managementsysteem 
aanwezig is dal een complexiteit reducerende werking heeft op de 
kennisuitwisselingssituatie. 
Propositie 4: De kans op een succesvolle uitvoering van een intra-organisationeel 
kennisuitwisselingsprojekt neemt toe indien er een managementsysteem 
aanwezig is dal de mogelijkheden vergroot om de "rijkheid" van het medium 
aan te passen aan de complexiteit van de intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisselingssituatie. 
In het belang van een succesvolle initiatie en uitvoering van kennisuitwisselingsprojekten, 
pleiten de vier voorgaande proposities voor de vorming van respectievelijk een bewustzijns-, 
belangstellings-, complexiteitsreductie- en mediamanagementsysteem. Deze systemen zijn 
gericht op het verlagen of wegnemen van de blokkerende en hinderende werking van de 
barrieres in het proces van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling om op deze manicr de 
initiatie en uitvoering van kennisuitwisselingsprojekten in alle lagen van de organisationele 
hierarchie te stimuleren en te faciliteren. AIs theoretische concepties zijn deze 
managementsystemen echter niet observeerbaar in praktische situaties. De vier voorgestelde 
managementsystemen zijn daarom uitgewerkt in afzonderlijke en praktisch te hanteren 
managementinstrumenten. De instrumenten worden uitgebrcid beschreven in de betrokken 
hoofdstukken en functioneren als verbinding tussen theorie en praktijk. 
HET EMPIRISCH CASE-STUDIE ONDERZOEK 
Het empirisch onderzoek heeft zich gericht op de verzameling van illustraties met betrekking 
tot het managen van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling binnen een drietal multinationale 
ondernemingen. Er is daarbij gcbruik gemaakt van de case-studic. Case-studies doen recht aan 
de subtiliteit en veelzijdigheid van de empirische werkelijkheid en zijn daarom bijzonder 
geschikt voor onderzoek van een ongestructureerd probleem waarbij de grenzen tussen het 
probleem en haar omgeving nog niet sterk zijn beschreven en waarbij veel aanwezige 
invloedsrelaties nog niet zijn bepaald. In plaats van de blik sterk te reduceren door van een 
sterk afgebakende voorspelling uit te gaan, schept de case-studie met haar voornamelijk 
kwalitatieve onderzoeksresultaten de ruimte voor verdere interpretatie van de relevante 
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variabelen. Een case-studie heeft evenwel als beperking dat de uitkomsten vaak erg algemeen 
van karakter zijn en de populatie vaak te beperkt is om uitspraken te doen over causale 
verbanden. 
Het holistisch karakter van de case-studie dwingt de onderzoeker een degelijke en goed 
uitgewerkte onderzoeksmethodologie te ontwikkelen die sturing geeft aan de uitvoering en 
beschrijving van het onderzoek. Hierbij dient aandacht te worden besteed, zoals uitgewerkt in 
hoofdstuk 6, aan de operationalisatie van de theoretisch afgeleide concepties, de keuze van het 
aantal ondernemingen waar de case-studie zal worden uitgevoerd, de selectie van de 
ondernemingen en de toegepaste dataverzamelingsmethoden. In het onderhavige onderzoek is 
gekozen voor een vergelijkende case-studie waarbij de ondernemingen zijn geselecteerd op 
basis van de onderlinge verschillen betreffende de kennisomgeving, de concernstrategie en de 
bestuurlijke erfenis. De uiteenlopende aard van de betrokken ondernemingen moest leiden tot 
een grote diversiteit in het empirisch materiaal betreffende ondernemingspecifieke 
kennisuitwisselingsbarrieres en managementinstrumenten. De onderzoeksgegevens zijn op een 
systematische manier verzameld met behulp van interviews en documentenanalyse en 
vervolgens gestructureerd aan de hand van de vier determinanten van het vereiste en 
werkelijke niveau van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling. Iedere case-beschrijving sluit 
af met een evaluatie van de vormgeving en effectiviteit van de vier managementsystemen ten 
aanzien van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling. 
CASE-STUDIE #1: UNILEVER 
Unilever (hoofdstuk 7) is een Engels-Nederlands concern dat zich concentreert op 
consumentengoederen zoals voeding, cosmetica en wasmiddelen, bedrijfsaktiviteiten heeft in 
meer dan 80 landen en behoort tot de twintig grootste bedrijven ter wereld. Historisch gezien 
legt Unilever een grote nadruk op het afstemmen van operaties op de lokale 
marktomstandigheden in haar streven naar differentiatie en merkloyaliteit. Deze 
concurrentiestratcgie werd vele jaren ondersteund door een sterk gedecentraliseerde 
ondernemingsstructuur die een grote autonomie en beslissingsruimte toekende aan het 
nationale management. Sinds enkclc jaren staat Unilever echter onder tocnemende druk door 
internationalc concurrenticvcrhoudingen om steeds sneller te innoveren terwijl tegelijkertijd 
gestrecfd dient te worden naar een concurrcrcnde kostenstructuur. De deccntraal opcrerende en 
intcrnationaal vcrspreide Unilevcr-bcdrijven worden gedwongen om hun krachten te bundclcn 
en samen te wcrken in het algemeen belang. Het corporate center is zich ervan bewust dat het 
haar bctrokkenheid hierbij dient tc beperken tot een richtinggevendc, stimulerende en 
facilitcrendc verantwoordclijkheid. 
De Unilever-case laat duidelijk zien hoe een organisatie kan worstelen met haar bestuurlijke 
erfenis in het streven kennis toegankelijk en produktief te maken. De grote mate van 
zelfstandigheid die de concernonderdelen jarenlang hebben genoten heeft geresulteerd in de 
institutionalisatie van een aantal moeizaam overbrugbare barrieres zoals niet overeenkomstige 
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produktiesystemen, sterk varierende informatiestructuren en een relatief hoge 
acceptatieweerstand. In de organisatie van Unilever is echter een breed scala van 
managementinstrumenten terug te vinden die het proces van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisseling stimuleren en faciliteren. Vijf van deze managementinstrumenten worden 
beschreven teneinde de lezer een beter inzicht te verschaffen in de voor- en nadelen van een 
bepaalde oplossing en inhoud te geven aan de in het theoretisch deel geformuleerde 
proposities. 
CASE-STUDIE #2: CANON EUROPE NV 
Canon (hoofdstuk 8) is een Japanse onderneming gespecialiseerd in de ontwikkeling en 
produktie van technologisch hoogwaardige produkten zoals kopieermachines, printers en 
fototoestellen. De technologisch hoogwaardige kennis en de vaardigheid om die voortdurend 
te vernieuwen worden vaak aangehaald als de basis van Canon's succes in de afgelopen 
decennia. Kennisuitwisselingsinspanningen worden in toom gehouden doordat de 
hoogwaardige vakkennis wordt ontwikkeld, toegepast en vastgehouden in (of dicht in de buurt 
van) het thuisland Japan en te gelde wordt gemaakt door een intensieve exportstrategie en een 
succesvolle verkoop van patenten. Een grote zorg van Canon is echter dat veel van haar 
produkten zich in de volwassenheidsfase van de produktlevenscyclus bevinden. Een nieuwe 
generatie van produktconcepten dient te worden ontwikkeld voor een consument die regionaal 
gezien steeds sterker gaat verschillen en vraagt om een produkt dat volledig is afgestemd op 
zijn of haar specifieke behoeften. Canon wordt voor het eerst in haar bestaan gedwongen een 
produktieve kruisbestuiving te realiseren tussen de gecentraliseerde technologische vakkennis 
en de decentraal aanwezige marktkennis, een uitdaging van formaat. 
De case-beschrijving van Canon Europe NV illustreert de ervaringen van een organisatie 
die wordt gedwongen om ook buiten de eigen thuismarkt een kruisbestuiving te realiseren 
tussen de aanwezige vak- en marktkennis. Het managen van intra-organisationele 
kennisstromen is daardoor van loenemend belang voor Canon, maar wordt sterk gehinderd en 
gecompliceerd door verschillende barrieres zoals het gebrek aan ervaring met intra-
organisationele samenwerking en de drang naar autonomic bij de concernondcrdclen. De case-
beschrijving presenteert verschillende managementinstrumenten die voornamelijk de 
marktkennis beter tocgankelijk en overdraagbaar moeten maken. 
CASE-STUDIE #3: ITT WORLD DIRECTORIES, INC. 
ITT World Directories, Inc. (hoofdstuk 9) is een Amerikaans concern bestaande uit acht 
geografisch verspreide ondernemingen dat zich concentreert op het uitgeven van gerubriceerde 
bedrijfsinformatie (Gouden Gids produkten). ITT heeft gedurende vele jaren bijzonder hoge 
netto winstmarges behaald met deze bedrijfsaktiviteit op basis van exclusieve en van 
overheidswege beschermde contracten met locale telefoonmaatschappijen. De concernleiding 
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zette de concemonderdelen jaarlijks onder zware druk om de winstmarges verder te vergroten 
en het volledige winstpotentieel uit de individuele eenheden te persen. Echter, in het begin van 
de jaren negentig werden de exclusieve contracten en daarmee de kunstmatig gecreeerde 
monopoliesituaties niet langer rechtsgeldig geacht op grond van Europese regelgeving. De 
Europese Commissie was van mening dat de exclusieve contracten de concurrentie onnodig 
beperkten en daarom dienden deze overeenkomsten op korte termijn te worden beeindigd. ITT 
World Directories werd aldus gedwongen een organisatie neer te zetten die de vaardigheid 
moest bezitten om op een flexibele en effectieve manier te reageren op een markt die werd 
betreden door nieuwe concurrenten. De concemonderdelen werden na jarenlang tegenover 
elkaar te zijn uitgespeeld door het corporate center gedwongen samen te werken en kennis uit 
te wisselen. 
De ITT World Directories, Inc. case preseneert een beschrijving van een 
veranderingsproces gedurende een periode van twee jaar. In tegenstelling tot de twee 
voorgaande case-beschrijvingen, worden in de ITT case de verschillende stappen besproken 
die de concernleiding van deze onderneming heeft gezet in de poging een netwerk van 
onderling afhankelijke bedrijfseenheden te creeren en het proces van intra-organistionele 
kennisuitwisseling te stimuleren en te faciliteren. Sterk geremd door het diepgewortelde 
onderling wantrouwen tussen de concemonderdelen en het hoofdkwartier, investeert ITT 
World Directories, Inc. in de creatie van een meer gei'ntegreerde Europese organisatie die door 
de bundeling van krachten in staat moet zijn de concurrentie met sterke internationale rivalen 
in de toekomst aan te gaan. 
CONCLUSIES 
Het laaste hoofdstuk behandelt de conclusies zoals deze zijn voortgekomen uit de confrontatie 
tussen de theorie en praktische realiteit betreffende het managen van kennisuitwisseling binnen 
een concernverband. Drie van deze conclusies zullcn hieronder kort worden toegelicht. Ten 
eerste onderschrijft het empirisch onderzoek de theoretisch afgcleide veronderstelling dat het 
belang van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling sterk toeneemt indien een onderneming 
besluit (al dan niet gedwongen) tot het verwezenlijken van een effectieve kruisbestuiving 
tussen vak- en marktkennis. Indien deze integratie een kritieke succesfaktor wordt in de 
concurrentiestrategie van de concemonderdelen dan moet een onderneming om redenen van 
effectiviteit en efficientie een van de kennisvormen laten stromen. Ofwel men decentraliseert 
ce onderzoeks-, ontwikkclings- en produktieaktivitciten en stimuleert en faciliteert de inter-
crganisationele uitwisseling van vakkennis (zie Unilever), ofwel men concentreert een groot 
ceel van deze primaire bedrijfsaktiviteiten en stimuleert en faciliteert de overdracht van 
narktkennis (zie Canon Europe NV). 
Ten tweede hebben wij kunnen constateren dat de bestuurlijke erfenis van een onderneming 
neer dan gemiddelde aandacht vraagt in het managen van intra-organisationele 
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kennisuitwisseling. Unilever, Canon Europe NV en ITT World Directories, Inc. hebben alle 
drie traditioneel een grote mate van onafhankelijk gegeven aan hun operationele 
bedrijfseenheden in Europa. Deze vrijheid heeft geleid tot een grote mate van interne 
differentiatie tussen de concernonderdelen in termen van bedrijfsvisies, bedrijfsprocessen en 
bedrijfstaal. Bovendien heeft het ontbreken van een integratiestrategie geleid tot een grote 
nadruk op de regio- of land-specifieke verschillen terwijl de overeenkomsten worden 
genegeerd. Unilever, Canon Europe NV en ITT World Directories, Inc. tonen in dit verband 
grote overeenkomsten. Het kennisuitwisselingsproces in alle drie de case-ondernemingen 
wordt sterk gehinderd door deze barrieres die door haar verwevenheid met de organisatie erg 
moeilijk zijn weg te nemen of te reduceren. 
Tenslotte tonen de cases aan dat het managen van kennisuitwisseling binnen het 
concernverband een onderbelicht vraagstuk is in veel ondernemingen. Het blijkt dat de 
managementbenadering ten aanzien van intra-organisationele kennisuitwisseling vaak wordt 
gedomineerd door een meer dan evenredige aandacht voor de stimulerende en faciliterende 
werking van geavanceerde informatie- en telecommunicatietechnologie terwijl de "zachtere" 
managementinstrumenten slechts incidenteel en tevens vaak toevalligerwijs aandacht krijgen. 
Een belangrijke bevinding in dit verband was dat het managen van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisseling vraagt om het managen van de door de concernonderdelen gehanteerde 
definities en begrippen. Elk concernonderdeel heeft de neiging zijn eigen definities en 
informatiestructuren te ontwikkelen. Zonder overeenstemming op dit gebied binnen het 
concernverband wordt communicatie en daarmee kennisoverdracht onmogelijk. Het 
topmanagement zal daarom zorgvuldig inhoud moeten geven aan de vorming van een door alle 
concernonderdelen geaccepteerde en gehanteerde concerntaal. 
Samenvattend blijkt de belangrijkste bijdrage van dit onderzock te liggen in het strategische 
evenwichtsmodel tussen het vereiste en werkelijke niveau van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisseling, de classificatie vanuit managementperspectief van een grote varieteit aan 
barrieres en het theoretisch afgeleide raamwerk met betrekking tot het managen van het 
onderhavige proces binnen de context van een multinationale ondcrncming. Het raamwerk 
intcgreert een viertal proposities betreffende de managementsystemen die het proces van intra-
organisationele kennisuitwisseling binnen een concernverband kunnen stimuleren en 
faciliteren. Het integratieve raamwerk werd op een succesvollc wijze toegepast voor het 
structureren en bestuderen van de problemen rond het proces van intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisseling in de organisaties van Unilever, Canon Europe NV en ITT World 
Directories, Inc. De illustratieve maar diepgaande casc-beschrijvingcn leveren een 
referentiekader waaraan theorctische conceptics en praktische crvaringen kunnen worden 
gespiegeld. 
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I. 
Voor de toegevoegde waarde van kennisuitwisseling in bedrijven is het irrelevant of 
deze kcnnis in filosofische termen ook als kennis kan worden aangemerkt. 
II. 
In hun rol van initierende uilvoerder dienen de concernonderdelen van een multinationale 
onderneming rekening te houden met vier barrieres die succesvolle intra-organisationele 
kennisuitwisseling in de weg staan. 
III. 
In haar rol van stimulerende facilitator dient het topmanagement van een multinationale 
onderneming een viertal managementsystemen te implementeren die succesvolle intra-
organisalioncle kennisuitwisseling ondersteunen. 
IV. 
De incest waardevolle organisationele kennis wordt in de regel het minst als dusdanig 
ondcrscheiden. 
V. 
"Mensen zijn geneigd constructies steeds ingewikkelder te maken" (dr. ir. Walt de Heer, 
NRC Handelsblad, 31 augustus 1996). De produktiviteit van een probleemgerichte 
onderzoeker is afhankelijk van het verniogen effectief weerstand te bieden tegen deze 
geneigdheid. 
VI. 
Een vergaande mate van specialisatie op onderzoeksterreinen binnen het vakgebied van 
strategisch management is effectief indien de differentiatie in de kerndefinities de vereiste 
integratie niet in de weg staat. 
VII. 
Menig topmanager heeft zijn persoonlijke afkeer van een sterk gereduceerde 
ondernemingsomvang niet laten beinvloeden door de frequente verschuivingen in de 
tlieoretische inzichten aangaande concernstrategie. 
VIII. 
De Europese Unie mist het vermogen om adequaat op Internationale ontwikkelingen te 
reageren, zolang het tempo waarin de "karavaan" zich voortbeweegt wordt bepaald door 
de langzaamste deelnemer. 
IX. 
Het feit dat massale vechtpartijen worden gearrangeerd via nieuwe media, zoals Internet, 
laat zien dat de huidige technologische vooruilgang op comniunicatiegebied niet 
automatisch gepaard gaat met een toename van de welvaart. 
X. 
Het ontbreken van een bednjfskundig "kennisreservaat" maakt het sociale leven van veel 
bedrijfskundige onderzoekers uiterst vermoeiend. 

